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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, welchen potenziellen Beitrag transnationale Unternehmen (TNU) zur 
Verbesserung des Innovationssystems in spät-industrialisierenden Ländern leisten können. Hierzu 
werden TNU-Zweigbetriebe im verarbeitenden Gewerbe in Thailand analysiert und mit einheimischen 
Firmen sowie Unternehmen in Penang (Malaysia) und Singapur verglichen. 
Technologischer Fortschritt in spät-industrialisierenden Ländern bedeutet vielfach, moderne 
Technologien aus Industrieländern zu absorbieren, zu adaptieren und inkrementell zu verbessern. 
Voraussetzung für diesen Prozess ist, dass Unternehmen externes Wissen aufnehmen und sich aneignen 
können (Absorptionsfähigkeit). Hierzu sind zeit- und kostenaufwändigen Lernprozesses notwendig, 
durch die Firmen technologische Fähigkeiten aufbauen. Erst diese Fähigkeiten ermöglichen ihnen 
Innovationen hervorzubringen. Da interaktives Lernen eine wichtige Komponente dieses Lernprozesses 
ist, spielt die Qualität des Innovationssystems eine entscheidende Rolle. Typischerweise sind diese 
Systeme in spät-industrialisierenden Ländern allerdings schwach ausgeprägt und fragmentiert. 
Gleichzeitig beherbergen sie leistungsfähige TNU. Somit stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit TNU zur 
Verbesserung der Innovationssysteme beitragen können.  
Aufbauend auf Merkmalen und Bestimmungsgründen der Internationalisierung von Unternehmen 
betrachtet die Arbeit deswegen die Auswirkungen von TNU auf Gastregionen, insbesondere hinsichtlich 
des Lernpotenzials für einheimische Unternehmen. Hieraus werden anschließend die theoretisch zu 
erwartenden Einflüsse von TNU auf Innovationssysteme in spät-industrialisierenden Ländern und 
Hypothesen für die empirische Untersuchung abgeleitet. 
Die Analyse von Sekundärstatistiken und vorliegenden Studien belegt ein recht schwach ausgeprägtes 
Innovationssystem in Thailand: Vielen Unternehmen mangelt es an Fähigkeiten für 
Produktentwicklung, Forschung- und Entwicklung, Design und Engineering. Forschungseinrichtungen 
verzeichnen im internationalen Vergleich einen geringen wissenschaftlichen Output und ihre Forschung 
ist nicht unternehmensrelevant. Das Ausbildungssystem bringt zu wenige und zu schlecht ausgebildete 
Absolventen hervor, insbesondere im technisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Bereich. Die 
Technologiepolitik ist durch eine Vielfalt an Institutionen und Programmen gekennzeichnet, die einer 
effektiven Förderung im Wege stehen.  
Auf Basis von schriftlichen und mündlichen Unternehmensbefragungen wird anschließend die 
technologische Leistungsfähigkeit von TNU-Tochterunternehmen im Vergleich zu einheimischen 
Betrieben untersucht, um festzustellen, ob diese geeignete Lern- und Kooperationspartner für 
einheimische Unternehmen sind und somit zur Verbesserung des Innovationssystems beitragen können. 
Während dies für die Gesamtgruppe der Unternehmen nur eingeschränkt zutrifft, sind in der Gruppe der 
fortgeschrittenen Unternehmen TNU deutlich überlegen. Insbesondere tragen sie aktiv zum 
internationalen Wissens- und Technologietransfer bei, indem sie externe Technologien in Form von 
Maschinen, Lizenzen und Patenten sowie Ergebnisse von FuE-Aktivitäten nach Thailand transferieren. 
Ferner sind sie stärker als einheimische Unternehmen in internationale und nationale Wissens- und 
Kooperationsnetzwerke eingebunden und können somit als aktive Wissens- und Technologievermittler 
zwischen der internationalen und nationalen Ebene wirken. Dies trifft insbesondere auf TNU zu, die in 
Thailand Produkt- und Prozessinnovationen hervorbringen. Diesbezüglich ist derzeit ein Anstieg von 
Aktivitäten zu beobachten. Die Folge ist eine Intensivierung von Innovationsaktivitäten in ganzen 
Produktionsnetzwerken von der auch einheimische Unternehmen erfasst werden. Allerdings ist die 
Aufnahmefähigkeit für neue Technologien und die Intensivierung von Innovationsaktivitäten für viele 
einheimische Unternehmen beschränkt, weil es an gut ausgebildetem Personal mangelt. Zum einen wird 
dieser Mangel durch TNU verschärft, die hauptsächlich höher qualifizierte Personen beschäftigen, zum 
anderen tragen einige TNU intensiv zur Weiterqualifizierung von ihren Angestellten und zur 
Verbesserung der Ausbildung in Universitäten bei.  
Aus den Ergebnissen werden Handlungsempfehlungen zur stärkeren Verankerung von TNU sowie zur 
Verbesserung des Innovationssystems und lokaler Lernmöglichkeiten abgeleitet. 
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Summary 
 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the potential contribution of transnational corporations 
(TNC) to the upgrading of systems of innovation in late-industrialising countries. This study looks 
specifically at TNC-affiliates in Thailand’s manufacturing sector and compares them with firms in 
Penang (Malaysia) and Singapore. 
Technical change in late-industrialising countries is primarily a process of absorption, adaptation and 
incremental improvement of modern technologies available in advanced economies. This technology 
and knowledge transfer necessarily involves costly and time consuming learning processes that require 
absorptive capacity and a certain level of commitment from the receiving company. For latecomer 
firms, the main objective becomes the development of technological capabilities, which are a pre-
requisite for further innovative capabilities. An important determinant of the opportunities for 
interactive learning and technological capability development is the quality of the respective system of 
innovation. In late-industrialising countries theses systems are typically fragmented and strongly 
influenced by a presence of TNCs. Taking the characteristics and reasons for the internationalisation of 
firms into account, this study examines the expected impacts that TNCs have on host economies, 
emphasising the learning opportunities that may arise for local firms as a result. The theoretical section 
concludes with an assessment of the potential impact of TNC-affiliates on the system of innovation in 
late-industrialising countries and, additionally, deduces hypotheses for the empirical analysis.  
In order to evaluate the present state of Thailand’s system of innovation (SI), secondary data and 
previous studies are reviewed. Ultimately, this review leaves a fairly poor impression of the Thai SI: 
Many companies lack capabilities for product development, research and development, design and 
engineering. In terms of international comparison, research institutes and universities display weak 
scientific output and, moreover, the research does not match the needs of industry. In addition, the 
quantity and quality of graduates, especially in science and technology, coming out of the education 
system is insufficient. Government policies, because they depend on a large assortment of different 
organisations and programmes responsible for S&T development, are regarded as inefficient.  
The thesis examines the technological capabilities of TNC-affiliates vis-à-vis local firms in order to 
assess whether or not TNC-affiliates are suitable learning and cooperation partners for local firms, and 
can, consequently, be considered as capable contributors to the improvement of the system of 
innovation. Based on postal firm surveys and additional personal interviews, the empirical analysis 
comes to the conclusion that, in general, this is only partially the case. However, with the analysis 
shifted to include only advanced firms, TNCs prevail more clearly. Advanced TNCs are especially able 
to foster the development of the national system of innovation by transferring embodied (e.g. 
machinery) and disembodied (e.g. patents) technology as well as research results to Thailand. Moreover, 
they are more frequently embedded in international and domestic knowledge and cooperation networks. 
In consequence, advanced TNC-affiliates can act as gateways for the diffusion of internationally 
available technology and knowledge in Thailand. In particular, foreign firms that perform product and 
process innovations in Thailand are strongly embedded within the SI. Recently, an increase in respective 
activities has lead entire production networks – including local firms – to upgrade. However, the 
absorptive capacity of local firms for the absorption of new technology and the potential for enhanced 
innovation activities is restricted, due to a lack of skilled labour. On the one hand, TNCs absorb much of 
the scarce high-skilled labour by employing, in general, better educated personnel, on the other hand, 
some TNC-affiliates actively try to improve and extend the human skill base by providing further 
training for their workforce and by contributing to university programmes. 
Based on these empirical results, the thesis concludes with policy recommendations, which could act as 
guidelines for the further embedding of TNC-affiliates in the host economy, the strengthening the 
system of innovation, and the fostering technological learning by local firms. 
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1 Introduction 
“Countries can sustain industrial growth today only if the key players – individual 
enterprises – are able to develop competitive capabilities. Building capabilities requires 
conscious technological and other effort. And this effort is not very different whether an 
enterprise is creating new technologies or learning the efficient use of technologies 
brought from other countries. Whether such effort is undertaken, and how well it is 
managed, varies from enterprise to enterprise, according to its management, strategy and 
resources. But it also depends vitally on the economic environment in which the 
enterprise functions”       (UNIDO, 2002: 93). 
 
Regions, nations and people can only prosper if the companies they host are successful. In order to 
be successful companies need to be competitive. In an increasingly globalised world, with very 
strong competitors operating in the domestic as well as the global market, companies must make 
additional efforts to strengthen their competitiveness.  
 
Thailand has been picked as a case study, because it is a good example of an ‘ordinary’ late-
industrialising country. It is not a highly successful ‘tiger economy’ such as Korea or Taiwan, nor is 
it a special case of a city state such as Hong Kong or Singapore – moreover, it currently finds itself 
in a ‘sandwich position’ in respect to its competitive advantage. After having experienced 
remarkable growth in the decades prior to the Asian crises in 1997, Thailand is no longer a true 
low-wage country, but it is not a high-skill, knowledge economy either. The pressure from 
‘beneath’ is strong: new entrants on the global stage such as China offer large domestic markets, 
low wages and a rapidly improving workforce and infrastructure (e.g. Vongpivat, 2002: chapter 2, 
Altenburg et al., 2003: pp. 33). Hence, Thailand needs to upgrade quickly, in order to sustain and 
enhance its competitive position. If it does not manage to improve the human skill base, the 
technological capabilities of local and transnational companies and the supporting infrastructure, the 
‘doomsday scenario’ of massive disinvestment by transnational corporations (TNCs), decreasing 
world market shares and, consequently, a decline in economic growth rates and poverty reduction 
lingers on the horizon. This is a challenge Thailand shares with other late-industrialising countries. 
 
Thai-based firms, like those in most late-industrialising countries, do not drive the technological 
frontier by inventing ‘new to the world’ products and processes. Rather, they try to improve their 
competitive position in order to catch up with leading companies in advanced countries. This 
catching-up process requires rapid learning and technological upgrading on behalf of the latecomers 
(Wong, 1999a). Consequently, latecomer firms need to be very innovative – not by developing truly 
new products, but by acquiring, adapting, using and improving already existing technology from 
advanced countries. While firms all over the world try to stay competitive by upgrading, i.e. by 
making better products, producing more efficiently, or moving into more skilled activities 
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(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002), latecomer firms need to upgrade and learn more quickly than their 
advanced country equivalents in order to close the gap and catch up. 
 
Upgrading is not a simple intra-firm task, but requires interaction with other parties. For example, a 
company must be aware of new developments in process technology, new organisational methods 
or the latest standards of key customers in lead markets. It needs to know about possible 
technology, where to buy and how to use it; it has to find out about consumer preferences and new 
market niches. It is obliged to enhance the knowledge base of its human capital. In order to achieve 
all this, a company has to rely on information and co-operation networks. The quality of these 
networks is determined by the quality and the quantity of nodes (e.g. companies and universities) 
and their interactions. Additionally, the institutional set-up (such as policies, laws, regulations, etc.) 
has a strong impact on firms’ behaviour. The analysis of these environmental conditions: actors, 
interactions and institutions, is at the heart of the ‘systems of innovation’ (SI) concept. However, 
developing countries have been neglected in innovation systems literature (Carlsson, 2004: 14) – 
creating a gap this study strives to narrow.  
 
Since spatial proximity seems to foster certain kinds of knowledge transfer the quality of their 
national or regional system of innovation is essential for firms. This is not, however, a one-way 
benefit, but works mutually: innovative firms participate in a regional/ national network and 
therefore strengthen the quality of the network, while simultaneously benefiting from this network 
through knowledge flows and co-operation opportunities.  
 
Nevertheless, to consider only the national and regional scale would be misleading. Even 
companies within strong systems must have access to interregional and global knowledge. 
Therefore, interfaces or gateways to the international available pool of knowledge and technology 
are important for any region – but they are particularly important in late-industrialising countries, 
which are typically characterised by a fragmented system of innovation (Ernst, 2002).  
Therefore, in the context of late-industrialising countries, affiliates of TNCs play a particular role: 
First, they account for a high share of economic activity in many of these countries. Second, they 
are exposed to breakneck competition on global markets, which forces them to apply the latest 
technology, to develop new products, to improve quality, and to reduce costs permanently. This 
pressure is transferred to domestic rivals and suppliers alike, because TNCs demand high quality, 
low prices and high standards. Therefore, TNCs push local companies to become more competitive. 
But at the same time, they support local firms, either directly by offering assistance or indirectly by 
knowledge spillovers, demonstration effects etc. Consequently, TNCs can act as gateways or 
interfaces between the regional/ national systems of innovation and the globally available pool of 
knowledge and technology.  
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Following this line of argument the objectives of the thesis are  
• to expand upon the contribution made by TNC-affiliates to the SI and the technological 
learning of firms in late-industrialising countries theoretically, 
• to ascertain the current state of the Thai-SI, 
• to assess the technological capabilities and knowledge-network embeddedness of TNC-
affiliates in comparison to local Thai-firms, and firms in Penang and Singapore, in order to 
evaluate their suitability as collaboration partners and technology senders within the Thai-
SI, 
• to investigate the main characteristics of advanced and embedded TNC-affiliates, 
• to elaborate upon the key mechanisms by which TNC-affiliates improve the Thai-SI and 
foster technological learning by domestic firms, 
• to identify weaknesses of the SI as perceived by firms and elaborate policy 
recommendations for strengthening the SI and the impact of TNC-affiliates. 
 
To meet these objectives, the following key questions will be addressed: 
a) Theoretical aspects: 
1) What are the characteristics and challenges of late-industrialising countries and latecomer 
firms?  
2) Why is the development of technological capabilities quintessential for technical change in 
late-industrialising countries? 
3) What is a national, regional and sectoral system of innovation and how does it relate to the 
development of technological capabilities in late-industrialising countries? 
4) How do SIs in late-industrialising countries differ from those in advanced economies? 
5) What are characteristics of TNCs and how can they theoretically influence host regions 
economies and local firm’s technological learning? 
6) Based on the theoretical overview, what are the (potential) impacts of TNCs on SIs in late-
industrialising countries? 
 
b) Literature review and secondary data:  
7) What is the current state of the SI in Thailand? Which strengths and weaknesses can be 
identified? 
8) What level of quality exists among the primary components of the system, namely firms, 
knowledge-related organisations and government? 
 
c) – f) Questions for the empirical quantitative data analysis: 
9) Are TNC-affiliates more capable than local firms in terms of technological and innovation 
capabilities as well as absorptive capacity? In which respect can differences be identified? 
10) Are these differences between local and foreign firms smaller for more technologically 
advanced firms? 
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11) How strong is the embeddedness of technological advanced firms in domestic and 
international innovation networks? 
12) How do these findings compare to the results of the benchmarking regions Penang 
(Malaysia) and Singapore?  
13) What are key characteristics of technologically advanced and embedded firms in Thailand? 
14) What are the main bottlenecks for technological upgrading perceived by local and foreign 
firms in Thailand? 
 
c), e), f) Questions for the case studies: 
15) What is the state of technological capabilities in selected firms in the automotive and hard 
disk drive (HDD) industry in Thailand? 
16) How strongly are the firms embedded into the local economy in terms of inputs, outputs and 
external collaborations? 
17) To what extent do these firms carry out process and product innovations in Thailand? How 
is the innovation process organised between TNC-affiliates in Thailand and their 
headquarters abroad?  
18) What is the firm’s perspective on the human capital base and how do they try to improve it? 
 
f) In conclusion: 
19) Based on the answers to these questions: What policy recommendations can be given for 
fostering technological capabilities and embeddedness of TNC-affiliates as well as local 
firms in Thailand? 
 
The thesis is organised into six chapters. First, the theoretical background is provided consisting of 
three blocs: The first bloc sheds light on the particular challenges faced by companies in late-
industrialising countries. The concept of technological capabilities is introduced, which allows the 
measurement of a firm’s technological performance. Furthermore, basic concepts for the 
development of technological capabilities via technological learning are presented, namely 
organisational learning processes, absorptive capacity, technology transfer, and crises construction. 
Finally, the different technology trajectories are presented, which companies in South-East and East 
Asian countries utilise for catching-up. 
In the second bloc the concepts of systems of innovation are considered. Spatial (national and 
regional) as well as non-spatial (sectoral and technological) SIs are defined. Moreover, their 
applicability to late-industrialising countries in South East Asia is reflected upon. 
In the third bloc characteristics of transnational corporations and global production networks 
are examined. Motives, types and strategies for the internalisation of production and R&D are 
analysed. This section also explores the notion of embeddedness and possible impacts of TNC-
affiliates on the host economy.  
The final bloc of the theoretical section tries to bring the three lines of theoretical arguments 
together, by providing a condensed picture of the possible contribution by TNCs to the SI in late-
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industrialising countries and, therefore, to the technological learning efforts of domestic firms. 
Based on these theoretical arguments, hypotheses for the empirical investigation are deduced.  
 
Second, the data and methodology are presented. Basically, this thesis utilises two sources of 
information: first, unique survey data from the Thailand R&D and Innovation Survey 2000 and 
2002, which encompasses about 1,200 and 1,400 manufacturing companies and secondly, data from 
qualitative in-depth interviews with ten firms in the automotive and eleven firms in the HDD-
industry. 
 
Third, an overview is given of Thailand’s economic development in the last thirty years and the 
current status of the national system of innovation is analysed based on secondary data and a 
literature review. 
 
Fourth, the deducted hypotheses are tested with the available quantitative data. For this, first local 
and foreign firms are compared in respect to technological capabilities and absorptive capacity. 
Subsequently, only technologically advanced firms are considered. Moreover, the embeddedness of 
these firms is analysed. Explorative statistics enquire into key characteristics of the technologically 
advanced and embedded firms. Furthermore, weaknesses of the Thai-SI are determined as perceived 
by the surveyed firms. 
 
Fifth, using the qualitative data from the interviews a number of in-depth insights from the 
automotive and HDD-industry are used to illustrate and further analyse these findings.  
 
Finally, several conclusions are drawn from the presented analyses and further policy 
recommendations are given on how to strengthen the Thai system of innovation, to better embed 
TNC-affiliates into the Thai systems of innovation, to enhance innovation activities by TNCs in 
Thailand as well as how to reduce bottlenecks for the interaction between TNCs and local 
companies. 
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2 Transnational corporations in the system of innovation of 
late-industrialising countries: theoretical aspects  
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the subsequent data analysis. It draws on three 
main blocs: First, it reviews literature on the specific characteristics, challenges and opportunities of 
late-industrialising countries and latecomer firms, thereby introducing the concept of technological 
capabilities and technological learning. Secondly, it introduces the notion of systems of innovation 
(SIs), which are the primate settings in which these learning and upgrading processes take place and 
which influence these developments. Thirdly, transnational corporations (TNCs) and their global 
activities are scrutinised, because these are essential actors within the world economy, have a 
particular importance in late-industrialising countries and can have a major impact on the SIs as 
well as on technological learning and upgrading. The final chapter of this section weaves these three 
lines of reasoning together in order to provide a theoretical perspective on the role played by TNC-
affiliates in the system of innovation of late-industrialising countries. 
2.1 The challenge for late-industrialising countries: catching up 
2.1.1 Late-industrialising countries and latecomer firms 
It is necessary to set the term ‘late-industrialising’ into a time-context. For example Germany was 
a late-industrialising country in comparison to Britain in the 19th century and managed to catch-up 
successfully (Gerschenkron, 1962; Mathews, 2002). Nowadays, countries that started their 
transformation from an agrarian to industrial economy in the mid 20th century like Thailand, 
Malaysia and Singapore are considered late-industrialising. Ernst and O’Connor (1989: 10 and pp. 
54) identify specific features of today’s late-industrialising countries: They have a short history of 
industrial development, their capital goods industries, parts and components suppliers and related 
support services display a low competitiveness, they are dependent on generic technologies and 
product standards developed in OECD countries, and finally they have a relatively weak human 
resource base (similar Hobday, 1995a: pp. 33).  
In Amsden’s (1991: 285) view, today’s industrialising countries face different conditions: “whereas 
industrialisation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was propelled by new products and 
processes, late industrialisation is being driven by borrowing technology or ‘learning’”.  
Late-industrialising countries have different choices on how to industrialise: Three types of 
industrialisation strategies can be distinguished: the export of indigenous commodities, the import 
substituting industrialisation and the export-oriented industrialisation (Dicken, 2003a: pp. 175). 
Import substitution is a process in which a country starts manufacturing products which it imports, 
in order to substitute for these imports. It has predominantly been the initial stage of the 
industrialising process in late-industrialising countries. Nevertheless, the export-oriented 
industrialisation soon became fashionable and the “conventional wisdom among such international 
agencies as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank” (ibid.: 177). It can be seen as “an 
essential ingredient of latecomers’ growth” (Radoésevic, 1999a: 3), because import substitution by 
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its own did not manage to achieve the desired level of industrialisation. Due to liberalization, 
shrinking transport costs and parallel growth of world trade (globalisation), the export-oriented 
strategy became feasible for most emerging economies in South East Asia.  
In order to export products, companies in late-industrialising countries need to be competitive in the 
world market. While from a traditional macroeconomic point of view competitiveness was only 
caused by prices, costs and exchange rates, research by Fagerberg (1988) gives evidence that 
international competitiveness is based on technological competitiveness and the ability to compete 
in delivery, while the influence of cost competitiveness is less important. Therefore, 
“competitiveness can be seen as the outcome of a continuous process of innovation that enables 
firms to catch up and keep up as technology and the mode of competition change” (Mytelka, 1999: 
17). Consequently, innovation is at the core of technological competitiveness and of economic 
growth1.  
 
Not only countries can be late entrants into the industrialisation process and the world market, but 
also firms within these countries. Latecomer firms may be defined by the following distinctive 
conditions: Due to historical reasons the latecomer firm is a late entrant, which is initially resource-
poor, for example lacking access to technology and markets. Its strategic intention is to catch-up, 
for which it has some initial competitive advantages, such as low costs, which it can utilise to 
leverage a position within the chosen industry (Mathews, 2002: 472). 
For this, latecomers have certain disadvantages as well as advantages compared to earlier entrants. 
The advantages of first movers like early capture of consumers, pre-emption (e.g. key resources), 
and learning curve effects, pose disadvantages for latecomers. Additionally, their rapid learning 
efforts are hindered by their distance from lead-user markets and from leading sources of 
technology, both of which are primarily located in advanced countries. Moreover, they suffer from 
“relative shortage of specialized input resources and inadequate public infrastructures” (Wong, 
1999a: 5). While the first set of disadvantages is experienced by all new entrants, the later ones are 
unique to companies in late-industrialising and developing countries.  
                                                 
1 Economic growth has been defined as “a long-term rise in capacity to supply increasingly diverse economic goods to 
its population, this growing capacity based on advancing technology and the institutional and ideological adjustments 
that it demands” (Kuznets, 1973; cited in Todaro & Smith, 2003: 85). Despite the importance of technological change 
for economic growth, neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956) treated the rate of technological progress as an 
exogenous factor for many years. The growth function only included the stock of capital and labour: Y = F(K,L) 
(Solow, 1956). Due to the diminishing returns on capital and labour the model approaches long-run equilibrium and 
results into convergence to zero growth in all countries (Todaro & Smith, 2003: pp. 130). It was not until the late 1980s 
that Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) internalised technological change into the growth function. The 
new growth model sees technological change as the driving force of economic growth. Key determinants of 
technological change are human capital and knowledge. While human capital encompasses all the knowledge and skills 
that are bound to a person, the term knowledge describes information in the form of publications or blueprints. Thus, 
neoclassical theory was now able to model non-converging development paths (due to persistent growth) and stressed 
the importance of technical change for economic growth as well as for comparative advantages (for the latter see 
Grossman & Helpman, 1990) (for more on new growth theory see e.g. Koschatzky, 2001: chapter 3 and Maier & 
Tödtling, 2002, chapter 6). Additionally, it included more realistic assumptions, such as increasing marginal returns to 
capital investment, economies of scale and imperfect competition (Todaro & Smith, 2003: 147, Schätzl, 2001: pp.202). 
Hence, growth in and competitiveness of a region/country is influenced by the stock of human capital and the 
knowledge that was transferred from other regions/countries; moreover, convergence as well as divergence between 
countries/ regions could be explained (Koschatzky, 2001:81).  
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On the other hand, latecomers also enjoy certain advantages, such as low switching cost, if there is 
a significant change in consumer taste, technology or organisational characteristics, which are 
difficult for established companies to adapt to. Furthermore, late-movers benefit from information 
externalities spawned by technology pioneers and by information asymmetries, because they can 
observe the experiences made by the pioneers. Moreover, late-movers from late-industrialising 
countries possess the advantage of (at least) initially lower factor costs and of (often) sheltered 
markets. Additionally, information on competitors in the advanced countries are easily available, 
whereas information on the newcomers from late-industrialising countries is more difficult to gather 
(Wong, 1999a, Hobday, 2000).  
“Latecomer firms, like latecomer nations, are able to exploit their late arrival to tap into 
advanced technologies, rather than having to replicate the entire previous technological 
trajectory. They can accelerate their uptake and learning efforts utilizing various forms of 
collaborative processes and state agencies to assist with the process, bypassing some of 
the organizational inertia that holds back their more established competitors” (Mathews, 
2002: 470).  
 
In essence, when latecomer firms begin operating, they must import technology from abroad and 
build up technological capabilities (see 2.2) in order to use, adapt and improve these technologies. 
To foster this technological learning (see 2.3), firms have to work on linking, leveraging and 
learning: 
• Linking: connecting with outsiders to acquire needed technologies and skills. Since 
resources are frequently gained through firm-to-firm contractual connections and not from 
open market transactions (Mathews, 2002: 476), it is important for latecomers to access 
production networks (see chapter 2.3.3) and to utilise linkage opportunities through 
outsourcing, OEM-contracting, local sourcing, second sourcing and technology licensing 
(ibid.). 
• Leveraging: “going beyond arms-length transactions to squeeze as much as possible from 
new relationships with outsiders” (UNIDO, 2002: 95). The concept of resource leverage was 
introduced by Prahalad and Hamel (1990, also Hamel & Prahalad, 2000) to depict the 
capacity of firms to tap into financial, technological and other resources for accelerating 
their entry into new product markets or for enhancing process technology upgrading.  
• Learning: to make the links and the resource leverage work, companies need to make an 
effort, i.e. to learn. Learning is necessary in order to master acquired process and product 
technologies. But learning is also essential for building up absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990, see chapter 2.1.3.2), so that firms can combine new and existing knowledge 
for the adaptation, improvement and recombination of technology. Hence, the ability to 
learn rapidly is a necessary pre-requisite for the latecomer’s catch-up process (UNIDO, 
2002, Mathews, 2002). 
 
 9
The basic idea of the catching-up hypothesis is that followers use capital stock that is based on 
older technology than that of leaders. Therefore, the follower will experience a larger leap in 
productivity gains when acquiring new capital goods than the leader and will eventually close the 
gap between it and the leader. However, the potential for growth decreases as the follower 
approaches the leader’s productivity level (Abramovitz, 1986). Freeman (1999) shows for East 
Asian countries that technical change plays a decisive role in the catching-up process. Catching-up 
is often linked to imitation and following the same path of development, but “technological 
imitation serves a more complex function than simply pursuing the same path of development as 
that of more industrialised countries. It involves a critical stage in the process of learning to 
industrialise…” (Juma & Clark, 2002: 4). 
Tab. 2.1: Innovation strategies and their characteristics 
Innovation 
Strategy 
Catch- up Strategies 
(latecomers) 
Keep-up Strategies 
(quick followers) 
Get-Ahead Strategies 
(front runner) 
Capabilities 1 problem solving innovation 
- attention to “know-why” 
- learning to learn 
2 improvements in productivity 
and machinery maintenance 
3 imitation 
4 adaptation 
1 introduction of variety 
2 improvement in quality 
3 reduction in costs 
4 incremental change 
1 new combinations of 
generic technologies 
2 pushing back the frontiers 
of knowledge 
Critical 
Knowledge 
Inputs 
Engineering and management 
capabilities: feedback from 
production process, product 
scanning and adaptation 
capabilities 
Engineering, testing, 
design and marketing: 
linking design and 
production within firm 
Scientific research and 
scaling up of laboratory 
models. Linking of R&D and 
marketing within the firm 
Policy 
Objectives 
Technology transfer, diffusion, 
demonstrating, training 
Technology development, 
R&D networking 
In-house research, 
technology development; 
R&D networking 
Useful 
Partnership 
Linkages 
To apprenticeship programs, 
productivity centres, clients, 
equipment suppliers and 
intermediaries 
To university engineering 
faculties, consultancy 
firms, design centres, 
technology institutes, 
users 
Windowing through a broad 
array of long-term R&D 
collaborative projects with 
research institutions, user & 
material suppliers 
Source: Mytelka, 1999: 20 
Despite the recognition of the importance of path dependency, catching-up is not a linear and 
unidirectional process: “As long as technology is understood as a cumulative unidirectional process, 
development will be seen as a race along a fixed track, where catching up will be merely a question 
of relative speed. Speed is no doubt a relevant aspect, but history is full of examples of how 
successful overtaking has been primarily based on running in a new direction” (Perez & Soete, 
1988: 460). Therefore, the leapfrogging hypothesis claims that latecomers do not have to follow 
all technological stages, but can leap frog certain stages while catching-up. Technological paradigm 
shifts, especially, offer windows of opportunity, i.e. major shifts in technology which result into 
everybody being a newcomer (e.g. Perez & Soete, 1988, Soete, 1985).  
Latecomers and their strategies for catching-up are obviously different from technology leaders, 
that generate new products and processes, or technology followers, that managed to catch-up but 
still operate behind the technological frontier (Hobday, 1995b, Mytelka, 1999; see Tab. 2.1). Once a 
company has caught up with state-of-the-art companies, it needs to switch to a keep-up strategy, 
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and might want to aim for a get-ahead strategy, by working at the edge of the technology frontier 
(see also Ernst et al., 1998a, Hobday, 1995b, a).  
Only few companies from late-industrialising countries such as Korea have so far achieved this 
level. Since the creation of technological capabilities can be seen as a key factor for successful 
catch-up, the next section introduces the notion of technological capabilities and different 
frameworks that facilitate the evaluation of companies and their development over time. 
2.1.2 Technological capabilities  
If latecomer firms in late-industrialising countries decide to follow the export oriented strategy (see 
1.1.1), they need to compete in a global market. Typically, a domestic capital goods industry cannot 
be relied upon to provide them with state-of-the-art machinery; rather they have to import 
technology from advanced countries. To produce on a competitive basis, they are faced with at least 
two challenges: first, they need to acquire the right technology and use it efficiently; second, in 
order to stay competitive they need to improve their production process/ technology constantly. 
Neither task is trivial. Beginning with a static view, it is not sufficient for latecomer firms to simply 
acquire technology and start operating. “If technology were simply a matter of information, 
competitiveness would be relatively easy to achieve and sustain, and catching up economically 
would be much less difficult than it has been. But in fact technology consists of complex ‘bundles’ 
of information – both codified and tacit2 – as well as physical capital” (Bell & Pavitt, 1995: 74). 
Since the tacit components are not transferred easily, it is necessary for latecomer firms to build up 
production capabilities: firms have to accumulate experiences by trial and error, by experimenting 
and understanding the technology. Because of this, every technology has to be combined with a 
local effort of adaptation and learning in order to be run efficiently: “Technology has many tacit 
elements that require a new user to build skills, knowledge and institutional routines (capabilities)” 
(UNIDO, 2002: 94). A more dynamic analysis, suggests that it is not enough to reach a competitive 
production capability. Rather, in order to stay competitive in an ever changing environment, it is 
necessary to improve constantly. Therefore, latecomer firms need to develop technological 
capabilities to generate and manage technical change (Bell & Pavitt, 1995: 78).  
“Once firm-level technological change is understood as a continuous process to absorb or 
create technical knowledge, determined partly by external inputs and partly by past 
accumulation of skills and knowledge, it is evident that ‘innovation’3 can be defined 
much more broadly to cover all types of search and improvement effort. From a firm’s 
point of view, there is little difference in essence between efforts to improve 
technological mastery, to adapt technology to new conditions, to improve it slightly or to 
improve it very significantly – though in terms of detailed strategies, degree of risk and 
potential rewards these efforts will certainly be different”  
(Lall, 1992: 166; also UNIDO, 2002). 
                                                 
 2 Codified knowledge is written down in manuals or embedded in technology and tacit knowledge is bound to 
specific persons or organisations. Refer to chapter 2.1.3.1 for more information on codified and tacit knowledge. 
 3 For a discussion/ definition of the term innovation see 2.1.3.1. 
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Consequently, the main processes of technological change in late-industrialising countries are 
acquiring and improving on technological capabilities, not innovating at frontiers of knowledge. 
Hence, technical change essentially consists of learning to use and improve technologies that 
already exist in advanced economies (Lall, 2000: 13).  
Technological capabilities have been conceptualised since the early 1980s. This concept 
encompasses the stock of technological knowledge and the use of that knowledge. It is connected to 
the notion that latecomer firms develop technological capabilities over time and become eventually 
‘technologically mature’ firms (Dutrénit, 2000: 10). 
There are various ways to categorise firm-level TCs (see Bell & Pavitt, 1995, Lall, 1992, Marcelle, 
2002, Wong, 1999b, Ernst et al., 1998a, UNIDO, 2002). One of the first illustrative concepts was 
presented by Lall (1992; Appendix A1) and is based on previous work by Lall (1987), Katz (1984, 
1987) and Dahlman et al. (1987). It distinguishes two functional categories: investment and 
production, which are each subdivided into more specific functions. Further elaborating on this 
concept, Bell and Pavitt (1995) identified additional supporting activities and the distinction 
between production and technological capabilities (see above) to emphasize the dynamic aspect of 
technical change (Tab. 2.2). For one of the latest versions of the technological capabilities 
frameworks please refer to UNIDO (2002) (Appendix A2). 
Despite the variety of frameworks all concepts agree with Kim (1999) that technological capability 
has (at least) three elements: production, investment and innovation. This limits the frameworks to 
purely technological categories, despite the recognition that these have to be accompanied by 
organisational/ institutional capabilities. As a result, some of the later frameworks include 
marketing capabilities, because of their particular importance for the development of technical 
capabilities (Wong, 1999b, Ernst et al., 1998a, UNIDO, 2002). While almost all concepts display 
the TCs on a matrix, indicating different ‘depths’ of sophistication, such as basic, intermediate and 
advanced, there is some disagreement on how to include innovation: Some frameworks consider 
innovation as a separate category (e.g. Ernst et al., 1998a, Kim, 1999) while others – in accordance 
with the above presented understanding of technical change – see innovation rather as an integrated 
part of each TC-category, indicating different levels of sophistication (e.g. Bell & Pavitt, 1995, 
UNIDO, 2002).  
For a brief review of empirical studies using different types of TC-frameworks refer to Dutrénit 
(2000 pp. 13-17). The main criticism of the concept is that it is a relatively descriptive framework 
which suggests a sequential order. This, however, is not necessarily the way firms evolve. 
Furthermore, it is restricted to technological aspects and its categories are fairly broad, allowing 
companies with different levels of sophistication to fall into the same box as a consequence (ibid.).  
The interviews conducted by the author (see chapter 6) additionally show that some companies 
found it difficult to indicate just ‘one box’, but rather claimed to possess a few intermediate as well 
as advanced TCs. Moreover, the presented frameworks are meant to be universally applicable for 
different industries (the same approach has been followed by the author in his research), which 
allows cross-industry comparison, but neglects industry-specific technologies or ‘state-of-the-art’. 
For example, a particular technology might be basic and common in one industry and rather 
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advanced in another industry. Therefore, it seems worthwhile for industry-specific research to build 
upon the presented frameworks in order to apply a more detailed and narrow framework (e.g. 
Ariffin & Figueiredo, 2002, Ariffin & Figueiredo, 2004).  
Nevertheless, the merits of this type of framework are that it offers a convenient yardstick for 
evaluating a firm’s stage of technological learning, because it structures some of the key functions 
performed by companies. Consequently, the the empirical case studies (chapter 6) will use a Bell 
and Pavitt (1995: 84)-type TC-framework (see Tab 2.2), which distinguishes basic production from 
technology capabilities in investment, production and supporting activities. The framework 
elucidates what activities are to be expected at the basic, intermediate and advanced stages of the 
different technological aspects. It is therefore a convenient empirical tool to ascertain the current 
stage of companies in late-industrialising countries on their way to ‘technological maturity’. For the 
application in the automotive and hard disk drive industry, the general framework has been subject 
to some specification and modification by Afzulpurkar in order to adapt it to industry ‘keywords’ 
(see 3.2.2, Tab. 3.9). 
2.1.3 Building technological capabilities: technological learning  
Technological capabilities are the result of technological learning. In this process a company 
acquires codified knowledge, combines it with existing tacit knowledge and builds up a stock of 
firm specific tacit knowledge. This is a conscious and purposive as well as a costly and time-
consuming process, which is non-linear but path-dependent and cumulative. Because of its 
interactive and technology-specific nature, there is no single trajectory but a range of possible 
development paths (Lall, 2000: pp. 16, Ernst et al., 1998b: 333). Chapter 2.1.3 deals with the 
different aspects of knowledge and learning in detail.  
Whether companies develop technological capabilities and how they do it is at least partly 
influenced by the structure and the efficiency of the business environment in general and the 
regional and national system of innovation more specifically: „successful technological learning ... 
requires an effective national innovation system“ (Kim, 1997: 219; cf. also Wong, 1999a, Fischer et 
al., 2001). Consequently, chapter 2.2 presents the concepts of systems of innovation in more detail. 
2.1.3.1 Learning, knowledge and innovation 
“It is assumed that the most fundamental resource in the modern economy is knowledge and, 
accordingly, that the most important process is learning” (Lundvall, 1992c:1). This is as true for 
late-industrialising as it is for industrialised countries.  
Basically, learning is a process whereby an individual or a firm “acquires, creates and disseminates 
new knowledge” (Kim, 1999: 119) by combining and recombining different pieces of knowledge 
into something new (Gregersen & Johnson, 1997: 480). Strictly speaking, only individuals can 
learn, organisations – made up of individuals – can foster this individual learning and try to 
integrate it into their routines, organisational processes and finally products.  
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Tab. 2.2: Industrial technological capabilities: an illustrative framework 
PRIMARY ACTIVITIES 
INVESTMENT  PRODUCTION  
SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES  
Facility User’s  
Decision-making  
and Control 
Project Preparation 
and Implementation 
 
Process and 
Production 
Organisation 
 
Product-centred  
Developing 
Linkages 
Capital Good 
Supply 
Basic Production 
Capabilities 
(capacities to use 
existing production 
techniques) 
Engaging prime 
contractor.  Securing 
and disbursing 
finance. Officiating 
at opening 
ceremony. 
Preparation of initial 
project outline. 
Construction of basic 
civil works. Simple plant 
erection. 
Routine operation and 
basic maintenance of 
given facilities. 
Efficiency 
improvement from 
experience in existing 
tasks. 
Replicating of fixed 
specification and 
design. Routine QC 
to maintain existing 
standards and 
specifications. 
Procurement of 
available inputs 
from existing 
suppliers. Sale of 
‘given’ products to 
existing and new 
customers. 
Replication of 
unchanging items of 
plants and machinery. 
TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITIES (CAPABILITIES TO GENERATE AND MANAGE TECHNICAL CHANGE)  
BASIC 
 
Active monitoring 
and control of 
feasibility studies, 
technology choice/ 
sourcing, and project 
scheduling. 
Feasibility studies. 
Outline planning. 
Standard equipment 
procurement. Simple 
ancillaries engineering. 
Commissioning and 
debugging. Improved 
layout, scheduling, 
and maintenance. 
Minor adaptation. 
Minor adaptations to 
market needs, and 
incremental 
improvement in 
product quality and 
mechanical 
properties. 
Searching and 
absorbing new 
information from 
suppliers, 
customers, and 
local institutions. 
Copying new types of 
plants and machinery. 
Simple adaptation of 
existing designs and 
specifications. 
INTERMEDIATE 
 
Search, evaluation, 
and selection of  
technology/ sources. 
Tender/ negotiation. 
Overall project 
management. 
Detailed engineering. 
Plant procurement. 
Environment 
assessment. Project 
scheduling and 
management. 
Commissioning. 
Training/ recruitment. 
Process improvement. 
Licensing new 
technology. 
Introducing 
organisational 
changes. 
Licensing new 
product technology 
and/ or reverse 
engineering. 
Incremental new 
product design. 
Technology 
transfer to suppliers 
and customers to 
raise efficiency, 
quality, and local 
sourcing. 
Incrementally 
innovative reverse 
engineering and 
original design of 
plant and machinery. 
ADVANCED 
 
Developing new 
production systems 
and components. 
 
Basic process design 
and related R&D. 
Process innovation 
and related R&D. 
Radical innovation in 
organisation. 
Product innovation 
and related R&D. 
Collaboration in 
technology 
development. 
R&D for 
specifications and 
designs of new plant 
and machinery 
Source: Bell & Pavitt, 1995: 84 
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However, this kind of organisational learning is more than the sum of the individual learning efforts 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, Kim, 1999). Knowledge can be implicit/ tacit or explicit/ codified. 
While codified knowledge is written down in articles and manuals or is embedded in technology, 
tacit knowledge is bound to specific persons or organisations. It reflects a person’s skills or a firm’s 
routines and is context-specific. Since tacit knowledge is difficult to articulate, its transfer is 
restricted to social interaction such as observation, imitation and practice. Because of this, the 
transfer requires face-to-face contacts (Polanyi, 1966, Kim, 1999) and as a result tacit knowledge 
has been termed “sticky information” (e.g. Hippel, 1994). In contrast, codified knowledge is 
globally available by means of modern communication technologies or trade. However, rather than 
conflicting, these knowledge categories are complementary: “Human knowledge is created and 
expanded through social interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995: 61) – a process referred to as knowledge conversation (Tab. 2.3).  
Tab. 2.3: Modes of knowledge conversion 
  To 
 Tacit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
Tacit knowledge Socialisation Externalization 
 
 
From 
Explicit knowledge Internalization Combination 
Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 62 
This conversation consists of four modes: 
• Socialisation: Transforming tacit knowledge into tacit knowledge by sharing experiences, 
hereby creating shared mental models, technical skills etc. 
• Externalisation: Articulating tacit knowledge into explicit concepts. This is seen as a 
quintessential knowledge-creating process “in that tacit knowledge becomes explicit, taking 
shapes of metaphors, analogies, concepts, hypotheses, or models” (ibid.: 64). 
• Combination: Merging pieces of explicit knowledge. Through reconfiguration of existing 
information new knowledge is created, e.g. via formal education in schools. 
• Internalization: Explicit knowledge is internalized into an individual’s tacit knowledge base, 
a process that is closely related to ‘learning by doing’ (ibid.: 62). 
Figure 2.1 depicts the notion of the knowledge spiral, which describes the interplay between 
explicit and tacit knowledge via the four modes of conversation and results in an extension from the 
individual basis to the organisational or even inter-organisational basis, thereby extending the 
knowledge base of the ‘learning organisation’ (e.g. Cohen & Sproull, 1997, Nooteboom, 2002). 
Due to inter-organisational learning among spatial clustered firms ‘collective learning’ can occur 
(see e.g. Camagni, 1991, Keeble, 1999, Lawson & Lorenz, 1999, Capello, 1999). 
In order to learn from others, it is necessary to share tacit knowledge by socialisation. Alternatively, 
it can be externalised first by the ‘sender’, transferred, and subsequently internalised by the 
‘receiver’ into the new context. Consequently, new knowledge can only be utilised if its adapted to 
the new context in which it should be utilised (Brödner et al., 1999). In general four main modes of 
learning can be differentiated (e.g. Bathelt & Glückler, 2002: pp. 244):  
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1. Learning by searching: Companies learn while conducting R&D-activities in order to explore 
new knowledge and technology. 
2. Learning by doing/ using: Companies learn while producing goods (learning by doing; Arrow, 
1962) as well as by using products, e.g. capital goods (learning by using; Rosenberg, 1976). 
3. Learning by training/ hiring: Companies learn by acquiring human capital, either through 
personnel-training (learning by training) or through recruitment of professionals (learning by 
hiring).4 
4. Learning by interacting: Companies learn while interacting with other companies, especially 
customers and suppliers (Lundvall, 1988). Due to its interactive and therefore social character, 
learning by interacting is strongly influenced by institutional and organisational frameworks. While 
learning by interacting seems possible between remote partners under the condition of stable and 
standardised technology (and hence encompassing many already codified components) (Lundvall, 
1988: 355), it is fostered by spatial and cultural proximity in an uncertain business environment 
with complex technologies and rapid technological change (which is characterised by more tacit 
forms of knowledge).  
Figure 2.1: Knowledge spiral 
Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 73 
In summary, learning is mainly a cumulative and interactive process that is strongly influenced by 
the institutional and structural set- up of an economy (Gregersen & Johnson, 1997, Johnson, 1992). 
A prerequisite for organisational learning is individual learning of the workforce. This implies that 
                                                 
 4 The number of “learning by…” routes has multiplied in recent years, for an overview see Malecki, 1997:59. 
Individual Group Organization Inter- organization
Knowledge level
Explicit
knowledge
Tacit
knowledge
Combination
Socialization
Externalization
Internalization
Epistemological
dimension
Ontological
dimension
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individual learning capabilities are essential for the development of TCs in companies in late-
industrialising countries. Therefore, formal learning (e.g. learning by training in university), non-
formal learning (e.g. training on the job) and informal training, “which is defined as a lifelong 
process by which persons who work in foreign affiliates or in domestic companies which closely 
interact with foreign TNCs [Transnational Corporations] may acquire values, attitudes and beliefs 
embedded in the organizational culture of TNCs through daily experience, observation and 
exposure to indoctrination” (Ernst et al., 1998a: 16), have to be taken into account. 
 
Put simply, innovation can be regarded as a ‘learning result’ (Gregersen & Johnson, 1997: 481). 
According to Joseph Schumpeter, technological change can be divided into three steps: a) 
invention, i.e. the discovery of new problem solutions; b) innovation, which describes the very first 
(economic) implementation of the invention and c) diffusion, in which the innovation is spread 
across the economy by imitation and adaptation (Schätzl, 2001: pp. 155). For the “impact on the 
economy, it is not the basic innovation but its diffusion across industry or the economy, and the 
speed of this diffusion, that matters” (Malecki, 1997: 75). 
Most definitions of the term innovation, which are applied for empirical studies, do not require an 
innovation to be ‘new to the world’ but only to be ‘new to the firm’ (e.g. Ernst et al., 1998c, OECD, 
1997a). Thereby, innovations are either technologically new or significantly improved products, 
including goods and services (product innovation), or new or significantly improved production 
methods, including organisational changes (process innovation). Since firms in late-industrialising 
countries rarely work at the technological frontier, but are rather concerned about the diffusion and 
adaptation of existing technologies from advanced countries (see 2.1.2), this thesis applies the 
OECD concept of ‘firm-only’ innovations (new to the firm). However, this definition blurs the 
distinction between the innovation of technology and its diffusion. Nevertheless, due to the 
assumption that companies in late-industrialising countries first have to adapt, use and improve 
existing technologies, the application of this definition seems justified.  
 
A further distinction can be made between radical and incremental innovations. Incremental 
innovations happen more or less continuously due to ‘learning by doing’, i.e. in the production 
process, or to ‘learning by using’, i.e. improvements proposed by users. They are minor 
improvements to existing products or processes, which – in the sum – are very important for the 
growth of productivity. Radical innovations are discontinuous events, mainly produced by R&D, 
which bring about new products, processes or organisations (or a combination of these) and which 
might lead to severe structural change. However, their overall economic impact tends to be 
relatively small and localised (Freeman & Perez, 1988: pp. 45). 
The understanding of the innovation process has changed fundamentally in the last decades. The 
notion of innovation as a linear process, starting with basic and applied research, feeding into 
product and process development, which is then realised in production and finally marketed and 
diffused is now obsolete. Rather, innovation is seen as a chain-linked process (see Figure 2.2), 
which encompasses a variety of feed-back-loops and interactions between ‘firm units’, where new 
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Produce
Analytic Design
Detailed
Design and 
Test
Redesign and 
Produce
Distribute and 
Market
Potential 
Market
General Knowledge
Firm-specific Knowledge and Technology Platforms
Research
ideas from production or marketing feed-back into basic research etc., and between firms and their 
environment (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986, Malecki, 1997: pp. 52).  
Figure 2.2: Chain-linked model of innovation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Malecki, 1997: 53 
In general, innovation processes are characterised by five distinctive criteria:  
• The result of innovative activities is highly uncertain, in technological as well as economic 
terms;  
• many opportunities for innovations rely on advances in scientific research, therefore 
innovations are highly dependent on and bound to scientific progress;  
• search and innovation processes are increasingly complex (see Figure 2.2) and need to be 
formally organised (e.g. R&D-laboratories);  
• and – at the same time – learning by doing and by using poses an important impetus for 
innovation activities, innovation therefore is closely connected to the production and 
marketing of products;  
• innovations rely on previously accumulated knowledge and technology and at the same 
time are determined by these, therefore technical change takes place in an cumulative and 
path-dependent manner (Dosi, 1988: 222-223, Koschatzky, 2001: pp. 38). 
 
Due to these characteristics, especially complexity, high costs, uncertainty and fragmented 
specialised knowledge, “firms almost never innovate in isolation … they interact with other 
organizations to gain, develop, and exchange various kinds of knowledge, information, and other 
resources. These organizations might be other firms (suppliers, customers, competitors) but also 
universities, research institutes, investment banks, schools, government ministries, etc.” (Edquist, 
1997: pp.1; for more see systems of innovation in chapter 2.2).  
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Because knowledge and technology are at least partly public goods, not all of the costly created new 
knowledge can be retained by a company. Knowledge diffuses easily to other actors, which do not 
or only partly compensate for the benefit. These externalities have been termed knowledge or 
technology spillovers. According to Griliches (1992): “knowledge spillover means working on 
similar things and hence benefiting much from each others’ research” (cited in Feldman, 2000: 377, 
see also Maier & Tödtling, 2002: 132, Koschatzky, 2001: pp. 106). In general, positive spillovers or 
externalities are “benefits generated by an economic activity that are greater than those captured 
within the activity itself and greater than those captured by users of the activity’s output” (Moran, 
2001: 24). For economic development and technical change these spillovers are very important. 
From the perspective of a firm, on the other hand, it is necessary to limit such spillovers as much as 
possible. Consequently, collaborations on innovation and knowledge generation have to rely on 
social attributes such as trust. 
The next sections will deal with some key ‘ingredients’ for technological learning in late-
industrialising countries, namely absorptive capacity and technology transfer. Finally a model by 
Kim (1999) will be presented that tries to integrate these different aspects. 
2.1.3.2 Absorptive capacity  
The term ‘absorptive capacity’ (henceforth ACAP) was coined by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 
1990). It builds upon studies in the field of cognitive and behavioural science at the individual level, 
which state that “accumulated prior knowledge increases both the ability to put new knowledge into 
memory, what we would refer to as the acquisition of knowledge, and the ability to recall and use 
it” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 129), Accordingly, ACAP is seen as a necessary pre-requisite for 
effective technological learning (e.g. Kim, 1999).  
ACAP describes a firm’s ability to “recognize the value of new, external knowledge5, assimilate it 
and apply it to commercial ends” (van den Bosch et al., 2003: 5). It therefore consists of three 
components or dimensions: a) recognizing the value b) assimilating and c) applying new external 
knowledge to commercial ends (ibid). Besides this most widely cited definition, two other slightly 
different constructions are used in empirical research (see Tab. 2.4, Zahra & George, 2002). 
Re-conceptualising ACAP based on these three approaches, Zahra and George (2002) view ACAP 
“as a set of organizational routines and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform and 
exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability” (ibid.: 186). Thereby, they add 
three new perspectives to the theoretical discussion: First, ACAP is a dynamic capability. It does 
not contribute to a firm’s output like other capabilities. Rather it is a meta-capability that helps a 
company to cope with efficient organizational change. Because it “influences the firm’s ability to 
create and deploy the knowledge necessary to build other organizational capabilities (e.g. 
marketing, distribution and production)” (ibid.: 188). Consequently, companies with a significant 
amount of ACAP are able to adapt easier to a changing environment, as they can anticipate 
developments with their advanced information processing capabilities (van den Bosch et al., 1999). 
                                                 
 5 In their original definition, Cohen and Levinthal used the word ‘information’ (1990: 128). As van den Bosch et al. 
(2003: 5) show, the term ‘knowledge’ is more appropriate, reflecting Cohen and Levinthal’s true intention. 
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Second, ACAP is made up of four capabilities (acquisition, assimilation, transformation and 
exploitation) that are combinative and build upon each other. Third, potential and realized ACAP 
can be distinguished. While potential ACAP encompasses the ability to value and acquire external 
knowledge, realized ACAP is determined by the transformation and exploitation aspect of 
absorptive capacity. The first describes how well a firm is organised to know about, assimilate and 
acquire external knowledge, the latter shows how well a company can use this knowledge to 
commercialize on it. The ratio between these two is termed the efficiency factor by Zahra and 
George (2002).  
Tab. 2.4: Conceptualization of ACAP 
Definition Dimension 
a)   The ability to value, assimilate, and apply    
new knowledge  
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990)
Ability to value knowledge through past 
experience and investment 
Ability to assimilate 
   - based on knowledge characteristics 
   - based on organizational or alliance dyad  
characteristics 
Ability to apply 
   - based on technological opportunity (amount of 
external relevant knowledge) 
   - based on appropriability (ability to protect 
innovation) 
b)   A broad array of skills, reflecting the need 
to deal with the tacit components of 
transferred technology, as well as the 
frequent need to modify a foreign-sourced 
technology for domestic application 
(Mowery & Oxley, 1995)
Human capital: 
   - skill level of personnel 
   - trained R&D-personnel as % of population 
   - trained engineering graduates 
   - R&D-spending 
c)   ACAP requires learning capability and 
develops problem-solving skills; learning 
capability is the capacity to assimilate 
knowledge – for imitation- and problem 
solving skills to create new knowledge for 
innovation                                  (Kim, 1998)
 
 
Prior knowledge base; intensity of effort 
Source: Zahra & George, 2002: 168 
As can be seen by the different forms of dimensions (Tab. 2.4), research on absorptive capacity has 
been conducted at different levels: Ranging from the sub-firm level, i.e. department- or unit-level 
(e.g. Tsai, 2001, Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), to the firm level (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, 
van den Bosch et al., 1999, Zahra & George, 2002) and the inter-firm level (e.g. Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998). Even countries have been  objects of ACAP investigations, either in the context of 
technology transfer (e.g. Mowery & Oxley, 1995) or of systems of innovation (Carlsson & 
Jacobsson, 1994, Wegloop, 1995). 
 
In combining these concepts it can be concluded that the development of ACAP is determined by 
the following factors: 
a)  The level of prior related knowledge: Learning is a cumulative process, and becomes easier 
with an existing stock of related knowledge, such as basic skills, shared language and 
knowledge of recent scientific or technological developments. Additionally ‘meta-knowledge’ 
like knowledge of problem solving methods, as well as prior learning experiences and learning 
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skills foster the absorptive capacity. The stock of prior related knowledge does not only refer to 
specialised knowledge but also to the diversity or breadth of the knowledge base, since 
“knowledge diversity also facilitates the innovative process by enabling the individual to make 
novel associations and linkages” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990: 131). 
b)  Organizational factors: As van den Bosch et al. (1999) point out, the organisational form 
(how a company is structured, e.g. divisional form vs. functional form) as well as its 
combinative capabilities (formal or informal mechanisms/ procedures by which a company 
combines or integrates different pieces of external information) are important determinants of 
the knowledge absorption and therefore of ACAP. Also, organisational arrangements such as 
the structure of communication or the distribution of knowledge within the firm are essential 
pre-requisites for knowledge assimilation and utilization (van den Bosch et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, the managerial influence, especially human resource management practices, on 
ACAP has to be taken into account (Minbaeva et al., 2003). 
c)  Intensity of effort or commitment: refers to “the amount of energy relinquished by 
organizational members to solve problems” (Kim, 1999: 115). Internalising external knowledge 
requires time and effort. This can be expressed in resource allocation to the development of 
absorptive capacity. 
d)  Human capital: Employees are essential for the absorption of new information or knowledge. 
Even though the ACAP of a firm is more than the sum of its members (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990), the qualification of the human capital is an important proxy for its ACAP (Mowery & 
Oxley, 1995). Thereby, employees’ ability and motivation can be distinguished as key aspects 
(Minbaeva et al., 2003: 589). 
 
According to Cohen and Levingthal (1990) ACAP at the intra-firm or firm level is by and large 
generated by a) own R&D, which not only fosters the development of new knowledge but also 
helps in using external knowledge; b) as a by-product of manufacturing operations and finally c) by 
internal or external personnel training.  
Looking at the inter-firm level, Lane and Lubatkin (1998) suggest the concept of relative 
absorptive capacity, which considers the ability of a student firm to learn from a teacher firm. Key 
determinants for developing ACAP in this context are the similarities of both firms’ knowledge 
bases, organizational structures, compensation policies and dominant logics (ibid.). To recognize 
and value external knowledge, student and teacher must have a common basic knowledge base. 
Moreover, specialised but complementary knowledge is necessary both as an incentive for co-
operation and in order to learn from each other efficiently. Thereby, external knowledge from the 
teacher firm is more easily assimilated by the student firm when the ‘knowledge-processing system’ 
is similar. Since this is unobservable, Lane et al. (2002) use the compensation practice and 
organizational structure as proxies. The dominant logic of a firm reflects its preference for new 
projects, products and ‘way of doing things’, which in turn determines its degree of 
commercialization. 
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Operationalisation of ACAP 
Despite being very popular, the concept of ACAP suffers from a lack of indicators by which it can 
be measured in empirical studies. Traditionally, research on ACAP uses R&D-expenditure per sales 
as an indicator (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, Tsai, 2001, Stock et al., 2001). The fact that only 
“few attempts have been made to measure it [ACAP] outside of the R&D context” (Lane et al., 
2002: M4) is one of the main shortcomings of the concept. An overview of other indicators that 
have been either used or suggested for empirical research is given in Tab. 2.5. 
Tab. 2.5: Measuring ACAP 
ACAP determinant  Indicator 
a) Knowledge acquisition/ Knowledge base  Years of experience of the R&D-department 
 Amount of R&D-investment 
 Bibliometrics (number of publications) 
 Co-citations 
 Share of R&D-personnel 
 Share of employees in training 
 Share of academics 
b) Assimilation  Number of cross-firm patent citations 
 Number of citations made in a firm’s publications 
to research developed in other firms 
 Number of strategic alliances/ collaborations 
engaged in earlier 
c) Transformation  Number of new product ideas 
 Number of new research projects initiated 
d) Exploitation  Number of patents 
 Number of new product announcements 
 Length of product development cycle  
Own compilation based on Knudsen (2001), Lane (1998) and Zahra  and George (2002). 
Zahra and George (2002) criticise these measures, because they are “rudimentary and do not fully 
reflect the richness of the concept” (ibid.: 191). To meet this critique some recent work tries to 
evaluate ACAP by measuring more encompassing factors such as employees’ motivation and 
managerial influence (Minbaeva et al., 2003), systems-, coordination- and socialisation- capabilities 
(van den Bosch et al., 1999) or knowledge and knowledge-processing similarities (for relative 
ACAP) (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  
This thesis recognises that research of ACAP has in the past focused too much on R&D, which 
ignores the fact that firms in late-industrialising countries often improve without having designated 
R&D-departments (e.g. see Arocena & Sutz, 1999, 2002). However, it cannot allow for increased 
focus on managerial and organisational oriented factors, since their measurement is restricted to 
detailed case studies. Rather, chapter 5 will measure – potential – ACAP with a fairly 
comprehensive set of indicators, using qualification structure of the workforce, R&D and training 
expenditure. 
It has been stated that ACAP is important for the acquisition and assimilation of knowledge. This is 
essentially a process of technology transfer and is considered in the next section. 
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2.1.3.3 Technology transfer  
“The generation of new knowledge embodied in new products and processes and its 
diffusion throughout the economy is the main source of economic growth. This 
knowledge is only partly the result of endogenous technological effort. The more a 
country is lagging behind the technological frontier the more it has to rely on foreign 
knowledge and the import of technology through equipment, machinery, licenses or 
through copying (‘reverse engineering’)”      (Radoésevic, 1999a: 2). 
Despite being widely used in academia the term ‘technology transfer’ is difficult to define, due to 
the complex and multidimensional concepts of ‘technology’ and ‘transfer’ (Cohen, 2004: 103). The 
main problems arise by first, trying to put a boundary on the term ‘technology’, second, trying to 
outline the technology transfer (henceforth TT) process which  contains numerous concurrent 
processes, and third, trying to measure the impacts of the transferred technology (Bozeman, 2000: 
627).  
Technology has been defined as “the theoretical and practical knowledge, skills, and artefacts that 
can be used to develop products and services as well as their production and delivery systems” 
(Burgelman et al., 1996 cited in Lin, 2003: 328). Consequently, ‘real’ technology transfer is 
considered to be more than just technology trade (Cohen, 2004: 103), since it does not only involve 
the product that is transferred but also know-how of its use and application (Bozeman, 2000: 629). 
Actually, the physical machinery is only a small part of the TT process (Cohen, 2004: 103), if that – 
using Burgelman et al.’s definition even pure knowledge transfer can be seen as TT. Therefore, 
technology and knowledge transfer are inseparable (ibid., Schmoch et al., 2000). Thus, TT can be 
defined as “the movement of know-how, technical knowledge, or technology from one 
organizational setting to another” (Roessner, 2000 cited in Bozeman, 2000: 629).  
 
Because every technology is rooted or embedded in firm-specific arrangements it includes shares of 
tacit and codified knowledge that can not easily be reproduced by others: “No technique is the 
simple summation of its reproducible elements […] Putting these elements into practice always 
involves a certain degree of tacit knowledge which is not machine embodied nor codifiable and 
easily transferable” (Radoésevic, 1999a: 15). The tacit component of technology is for example 
inherent in operations, fault findings, process control inspections, machine settings, equipment 
design, problem-solving and test equipment etc. (Radoésevic, 1999a: 17). Hence, TT requires costly 
and time consuming learning efforts by the recipient of the technology, i.e. investment and 
commitment (e.g. Enos et al., 1997). It is the task of receiving companies is to assimilate and 
internalise the technology and – essentially – to turn the external technology into an integral part of 
their competitive advantage (Lin, 2003: 329). Besides internal learning this often requires training 
by the transferee which consequently is considered a key component of TT (Enos et al., 1997: 62).  
Bozeman (2000) sees TT as a two-way process requiring a sender and receiver, who transfer a 
specific content (object) via a particular medium (mechanism that is used to transfer the content). 
Sometimes the process is mediated by an intermediary (Cohen, 2004: 105). Furthermore, it is not 
always a two-way process, since the sender can also be passive, as in reverse engineering. Sender 
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and receiver could be firms, research institutes/ universities or parts there of (e.g. TNC affiliates), in 
the same or different countries. 
 
Basically, TT takes place in one of four broad contexts (Tab. 2.6): In the organisational dimension it 
can be either internal (within an organization) or external (between organizations). In the 
technology dimension it can be concerned with either the innovation or the diffusion process 
(Amesse & Cohendet, 2001: 1460). For late-industrialising countries the level of ‘reproducing and 
diffusing technology’ is essential. Because firms in these countries might exhibit difficulty in 
organising TT with other external organisations, the transfer within organisations, namely 
transnational corporations is of great relevance for accessing technology from advanced economies.  
 
Tab. 2.6: Four types of technology transfer contexts 
 Within organization Between organizations 
Creating technology managing innovation contracting out R&D and outsourcing 
Reproducing and diffusing 
technology 
transferring to divisions or 
subsidiaries 
buying or selling proven 
technologies  
(licensing, turnkey etc.) 
Source Amesse & Cohendet, 2001: 1460 
According to Lall (1993) the choice for internal TT by TNCs depends on: 
• The nature of the technology: the higher the degree of complexity, the faster the speed of 
technical change, the newer and more valuable the technology and the more centralised the 
R&D on which it is based the more likely will internalised TT occur. 
• The seller’s strategy: which is determined e.g. by the firm size (larger firms use 
predominantly internalised TT), its product diversification (non-core technologies are more 
likely to be externalised), dependence on brand names, and the firm’s experience with 
different modes of TT. 
• The buyers’ capabilities: More capable buyers/ receivers mean less effort and costs for the 
seller. However, a highly capable buyer could become a (future) competitor and this may 
encourage internalisation. 
• Government policies: Many governments try to increase externalised TT in order to 
improve the capabilities of local companies. On the other hand certain governments attempt 
to attract FDI without taking into account possible TT to local firms. 
 
For technology transfer different transfer-media or mechanisms can be utilised. For international TT 
the eight channels depicted in Tab. 2.7 are seen as the most important ones (based on Radoésevic, 
1999a: pp.19, Mowery & Oxley, 1995: pp. 70, Enos et al., 1997). Each of these mechanisms has a 
specific character in terms of the embodiment of the technology (e.g. in capital goods), the mode of 
transfer (e.g. market mediated) and the role of the seller/partner in terms of involvement. Thereby, 
the different modes of technology transfer also place different demands on the absorptive capacity 
of the recipient firm (Mowery & Oxley, 1995: 70), e.g. reverse engineering of imported capital 
requires different capabilities than operating as a subcontractor for a TNC. 
 24
Tab. 2.7: Types and dimensions of technology transfer 
 Type of embodiment Mode of transfer Role of seller/ partner 
Transfer 
mechanism 
capital 
emb. 
emb. disemb. market
(explicit) 
network 
(intermed) 
hierarchies 
(implicit) 
active enabling passive 
FDI/ JV          
Licensing/ 
Blueprints 
         
Import of (capital) 
goods 
         
Co-operative 
alliances 
         
Subcontracting          
Export          
Transfer by people          
Development 
assistance 
         
Source: based on Radoésevic, 1999a: 21; minor changes 
In general, FDI by TNCs are seen as the most important and cheapest channel of direct technology 
transfer to late-industrialising countries (Enos et al., 1997, Lall, 1993, Damijan et al., 2003). Host 
countries can reap benefits from this kind of inward technology transfer directly, for example 
through higher productivity. More importantly, new technologies may also benefit domestic firms 
indirectly, by diffusing in the host country via spillovers. Important sources of spillovers are reverse 
engineering and skill acquisition through ‘learning by using’. The extent of or opportunity for 
spillovers is determined by the age of the transferred technology, the channel of transfer and the 
level of indigenous technical capabilities (Mowery & Oxley, 1995: pp. 78). For example TNCs 
might use ‘inappropriate’ technology, which is “too modern for the needs of these countries and too 
capital intensive given the resource endowments” (Enos et al., 1997: 56). Moreover, the import of 
technology may hinder indigenous technological efforts and can prevent the development of core 
technologies in host countries, because TNCs perform R&D in their (advanced) home countries 
(Enos et al., 1997, for further impacts of TNCs on the host regions see chapter 2.3.4.). 
2.1.3.4 An integrative model of technological learning 
Figure 2.3 shows an integrative model for technological capability building in firms located in late-
industrialising countries developed by Kim (1999: 121). As shown in the previous chapters, firm-
level learning constitutes the interplay between explicit and tacit knowledge, which is transferred in 
the form of the knowledge spiral from the individual to the organisational level. This learning 
process results in different levels of capabilities in several TC-groups (see chapter 2.1.2). Important 
determinants of the learning process are first the learning orientation and strategy of the firm, which 
relates to its present capabilities (see also chapter 2.1.4), and secondly the absorptive capacity 
within the firm, which is made up of the prior knowledge base and the intensity of effort by the firm 
itself and its members (see 2.1.3.2). This intensity of effort is influenced by a firm’s perception of 
its market position. If a firm feels that its competitive position is challenged, either by new entrants/ 
competitors, by new government policies or by the emergence of new technologies, it is urged to 
amplify its efforts. This kind of external crisis can also be constructed, for example, when TNCs 
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force their suppliers to decrease prices and increase quality. If companies manage to cope with this 
situation the crisis can be creative in the sense that it helps the company to increase its 
competitiveness. If the firm fails to meet the new demands the crisis can also be destructive (Kim, 
1999). The management of a company might also construct a crisis-situation intentionally, feeling 
the need for intensified learning efforts from the members of the organisation.  
 
An important factor in technological learning within the firm is the technology/ knowledge that is 
received from the outside via technology transfer (see chapter 2.1.3.3). This learning is a circular 
process: It builds up absorptive capacity and is eased by the stock of existing absorptive capacity. In 
this TNCs may also play a decisive role for firms in late-industrialising countries, because they can 
provide globally-available state-of-the-art knowledge and technology. Furthermore, since “firm-
level learning tends to become faster and larger in scale as more actors in and around the firm with 
adequate existing knowledge intensify their efforts to convert knowledge within and between 
themselves” (Kim, 1999: 121), it is conducive to a firm’s learning efforts to have a sufficient and 
sophisticated knowledge base within reach (spatially as well as organisationally). Because spatial 
proximity can foster the exchange of (especially tacit) knowledge, the endowment of the firm’s 
environment with different actors can greatly influence its learning performance. Therefore, chapter 
2.2 will focus upon the importance of innovations/ learning systems for technological learning and 
the role of proximity in collective learning and knowledge sharing. 
 
Figure 2.3: An integrative framework of technological learning  
Source: Kim (1999: 121) 
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2.1.4 Technological trajectories 
The empirical observation of different learning and development trajectories has led to the 
formulation of several trajectory frameworks. The first framework builds upon work by Utterback 
and Abernathy (1975) about the technology trajectory in advanced countries. It starts with a fluid 
stage, caused by a high rate of (radical) product innovation, frequent market and product changes, 
goes over into a transition stage, characterized by a change towards a dominant product design, 
mass production methods and price and quality competition. Finally, in a specific stage the market 
and product becomes more mature, price competition forces companies to enhance the efficiency of 
the production process, leading to automatisation and (incremental) process improvements. This 
stage is typically characterised by relocation of production facilities into low-cost developing 
countries. This idea of technology trajectory has many parallels in the notion of the product-life-
cycle (for an overview see Schätzl, 2001, Dicken, 2003a: 104), which distinguishes an initial 
development, growth, maturity, decline and obsolescence phase. Every phase depicts particular 
demand conditions, technology requirements and industry structure. Vernon (1966) extends the 
model by including spatial aspects. In his model, the manufacturing of products in the mature and 
declining phase is characterised by decreasing profits and strong price competition. In order to 
reduce costs, the production is relocated at first from its initial location in agglomerations of 
advanced countries to the respective hinterlands and subsequently to the periphery, i.e. developing 
countries.  
 
The critique of the spatial extension of the product-life-cycle applies to the Utterback and 
Abernathy (1975) model as well. The relocation of production into the periphery is certainly not an 
automatic process and not all types of products can be moved on account of their resource, market 
or human capital orientations (Tichy, 1991). Despite its restrictions the model is seen as “still useful 
in analysing the process of building technological capability in developing countries” (Kim, 1999: 
113). Kim (1980) extends the model by elaborating three additional phases that show the 
technology trajectory of industrialising countries: At an early stage these countries acquire mature 
‘package foreign technologies’ (i.e. including assembly processes, product specifications, 
production know-how, technical personnel, and components and parts) and learn how to produce 
standardised, mature and undifferentiated goods. In a second phase, companies assimilate foreign 
technologies to manufacture differentiated products. Finally, enhanced capabilities and the need to 
compete in export markets lead to a process of gradual improvement of these mature technologies. 
By repeating this process of acquisition, assimilation and improvement, companies in late-
industrialising countries develop technological capabilities and work their way towards 
technological stages closer to the emergence stage (Figure 2.4).  
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Figure 2.4: Technological trajectories 
Source: Kim, 1999: 114 
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marketing and distribution. It can concentrate on the development of production capabilities and the 
mastery of process technology. Additionally, the TNC frequently supports the OEM-firm by 
assisting in the selection of appropriate capital equipment, training managers, engineers and 
technicians and giving advice on production, financing and management (Hobday, 1995b). Since 
the TNC buyer relies on the quality, delivery and the price of the components, OEM-agreements 
can become long-term commitments. The disadvantage for the OEM-supplier is that it is highly 
dependent on and subordinated to the TNC as (frequently) its only customer. Often the OEM-firm 
is prohibited from developing its own market access (ibid.). Furthermore, the value-adding involved 
can be very limited, since the buyer provides or recommends specific supplies, sometimes resulting 
in the OEM-firm as merely an ‘extended workbench’ that is solely responsible for the assembly. 
Tab. 2.8: Transition of latecomer firms: OEM - ODM - OBM 
 Technological transition Market transition 
OEM Learns assembly process for standard, simple goods 
Foreign TNC/ buyer designs, brands, and 
distributes 
ODM 
Local firm designs (or contributes to the 
design, alone or in partnership with the 
foreign company) and learns product 
innovation 
TNC buys, brands, and distributes 
TNC gains post production value-added 
(PPVA) 
OBM Local firm designs and conducts R&D for new products 
Local firm organizes distribution, uses own 
brand name, and captures PPVA 
Source: Hobday, 2000:135; adapted 
Under an ODM agreement a firm conducts some or all of the product-design and processes needed 
to manufacture a product according to the general design-layout provided by the buyer (Hobday, 
1995b: 1178). Consequently, it requires more component- or product-design skills by the latecomer 
firm and frequently complex production technologies. The advantage is that the ODM-firm acquires 
a larger share of value-added activity, while avoiding the costs and risks connected to developing its 
own brand and distribution activities. “Although ODM indicates some advance in technological 
competence, it applies mainly to incremental or follower design, rather than leadership product 
innovations based on R&D” (Hobday, 2000: 134).  
Finally, OBM stands for companies that develop their own products, which are marketed and 
distributed under their own brand. To become an OBM-firm a company needs at least basic 
capabilities in the fields of marketing, product development and R&D. 
As Hobday (2000) points out, a shift from an OEM to an OBM system enables firms to reach into 
international markets, export large volumes of goods, realise economies of scale and invest in 
automation. Furthermore, by supplying demanding customers in the leading markets latecomer 
firms learn by doing, using and interacting (with the foreign partner), and become acquainted with 
product and process technology as well as end-user market requirements (Wong, 1999a). Therefore, 
the OEM-OBM system can be seen “as a training school for technological learning” (Hobday, 
2000: 134). 
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Figure 2.5: Latecomer firms - export - led learning from behind the technology frontier 
Source: Hobday, 1995b: 1184 
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has the choice to invest in either of these: product or process technological capabilities. The 
different generic routes are (Figure 2.6): 
• The ‘Reverse Value-Chain’ Strategy: Basically Hobday’s OEM-ODM-OBM migration 
strategy: Companies start developing process capabilities and later build up product design 
and product creation/ brand competence. “This is a reversal of the normal sequence of 
value-chain activities pursued by large established high-tech firms in advanced countries” 
(Wong, 1999a: 8). By supplying sophisticated customers, the latecomer firm is learning 
about product technology and end-user market requirements at the same time. 
• The ‘Reverse Product-Life-Cycle’ Innovation Strategy (late-follower to fast-follower): 
The latecomer-firm starts producing mature products either by licensing technology from 
advanced companies or by imitative learning, e.g. through consultants. These products tend 
to be targeted at the low-price market segment and, therefore, are several generations away 
from the state-of-the-art; a strategy that becomes possible due to (labour) cost advantages. 
Over time, the firm moves up the technological ladder or approaches the beginning of the 
product-life-cycle by using more sophisticated, up-to-date technologies for its products and 
its production technology until it closes the gap to the technological leaders. This strategy is 
only feasible if the firm is (capable of) pursuing product and process technological learning 
at the same time and if it is able to compete with established companies directly. In order to 
close the gap to the technological leaders it is necessary for a firm to set up its own R&D-
facilities. 
• The ‘Process Capability Specialist’ Strategy: Instead of migrating from OEM to ODM 
firms may also choose to strengthen their OEM capabilities by focusing all their resources 
and effort on the improvement of their production technology. The firm can become a 
‘turnkey contract assembler’ or a specialised niche component or process-steps supplier. It 
constantly invests in the purchasing of the latest process technology or in in-house process 
R&D. This strategy makes very close interactions with the customers inevitable, because it 
is essential to anticipate future process requirements. 
• The ‘Product Technology Pioneering’ Strategy: Concentrating on product technology 
development, these latecomer firms seek to become true (radical) innovators, supplying 
global markets with new products. Common among leading firms from advanced countries, 
this is a very difficult strategy for latecomer firms from late-industrialising countries due to 
the distance from lead-user markets and sources of advanced S&T-knowledge (see 2.1.1). 
Wong has identified four approaches to overcome these disadvantages: First, establishment 
of a strong presence in the lead-user market; secondly, investment in or acquisition of high-
tech start-ups in advanced countries; thirdly, recruitment of highly qualified personnel from 
lead-user markets and centres of advanced S&T-knowledge and finally large investment in 
R&D, either in-house, in collaboration with local S&T-institutes or in countries with 
abundant and cheap R&D-manpower (e.g. China, India, Russia). Notwithstanding, 
companies following this strategy still face the problem of market entry. 
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• ‘Applications Pioneering’ Strategy: Instead of developing new products, the latecomer 
firm applies existing technologies in new innovative ways. This seems only possible in areas 
where the company possesses complementary skills and possesses good insight into the 
business sector and existing technology.  
Figure 2.6: Generic technological capability development strategies of latecomer firms from late-industrialising 
economies 
Source: Wong, 1999a 
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the generation, use and diffusion of new – and economically useful – knowledge” (Fischer & 
Fröhlich, 2001: 1). More generally, systems are made up of components, relationships, and 
attributes (Carlsson et al., 2002a: 234). Components are the operating parts of the system such as 
individuals, firms or universities. Relationships are the links between the components. Attributes 
are the properties of components and relationships (ibid.). 
Since systems of innovations can be differentiated into sectoral or technological and localised 
systems (Fischer & Fröhlich, 2001, Carlsson et al., 2002a), the following sections will first reflect 
on national and regional systems of innovation as examples of localised SI and afterwards on 
sectoral SI and technological systems. 
2.2.1 National systems of innovation 
2.2.1.1 Basic concept 
The founding fathers of the concept of systems of innovation are Chris Freeman (1987, 1988), 
Richard Nelson (1993) and Bengt-Ake Lundvall (1988, 1992b). While Nelson’s approach is more 
descriptive, comparing empirical analyses in fifteen countries, Lundvall is oriented more towards 
building a theoretical basis for the concept (Edquist, 1997). However, theoretical foundations such 
as interactive learning theories (see e.g. Lundvall, 1985), organisation theory (e.g. Penrose, 1959, 
Chandler, 1962, Chandler et al., 1998), institutional (e.g. Coase, 1937, Hodgson, 1988, 1999) and 
evolutionary economics (see e.g. Dosi et al., 1990, Nelson, 1995, Nelson & Winter, 1982) serve as 
common ground.  
Furthermore, the NSI-concept synthesises the notion of a national system of production (based on 
List & Lloyd, 1909), which emphasises the production structure within a country, and the concept 
of national business systems (e.g. Whitley, 1994b, a), which accentuates the institutional set-up. 
Both are subject to national differentiation (Lundvall & Maskell, 2000: 362). Consequently, the 
NSI-approach takes the co-evolution of structural and institutional characteristics into account 
(Lundvall & Maskell, 2000: 359).  
 
A first definition was proposed by Freeman (1987: 1), who defined a NSI as “the network of 
institutions in the public and private sector whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify 
and diffuse technology”. Whereas Lundvall (1992b: 12, 2002: pp. 216) distinguishes a narrow – 
also termed US-approach (e.g. Mowery & Oxley, 1995) – and a broad – coined Aalborg-version – 
definition. While the first includes “organisations and institutions involved in searching and 
exploring – such as R&D-departments, technological institutes and universities” (ibid.: 12), the 
latter consists of “all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-up 
affecting learning as well as searching and exploring – the production system, the marketing system 
and the system of finance” (ibid.: 12).  
According to Lundvall and Maskell (2000: 360) the NSI-approach is based on three insights: First, 
the awareness that successful innovation is related to close interaction and long-term relationships 
(see e.g. chain linked model chapter 2.1.3.1). Second, the relationship and interaction between 
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agents is connected to non-market relationships, called ‘organized markets’, which involve aspects 
such as power, trust and loyalty. Finally, different country specific conditions (in respect to 
structure and institutions) exert a strong influence on how these organized markets develop 
(Lundvall & Maskell, 2000: 360). The fundamental assumption of the NSI-approach is that 
interactive learning is rooted in routine activities. “If institutions define how things are done and 
how learning takes place, it is the economic structure that affects what is done and therefore what is 
learnt” (Lundvall & Maskell, 2000: 362). The degree of matching between structures and 
institutions cause variation between countries (ibid.: 363). 
In summary,  
“The NSI concept emphasizes that firms cannot be viewed in isolation but must be 
viewed as part of a network of public and private sector institutions whose activities 
and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies. Second, it 
emphasizes the linkages (both formal and informal) between institutions. Third, it 
emphasizes the flows of intellectual resources that exist between institutions. Fourth, it 
emphasizes learning as a key economic resource. And fifth […] it asserts that 
geography and location still matter”6            (DeLaMothe & Paquet, 2000:29). 
 
Consequently, in what follows the main components of a NSI: organisations, institutions and the 
relations/ interactions among them, are briefly described and defined.  
Organisations are defined as formal structures with an explicit purpose, which are consciously 
created (Edquist & Johnson, 1997). Important organisations are: 
• manufacturing companies, 
• business services, especially knowledge intensive ones that support manufacturing firms in 
knowledge and technology creation/ diffusion and financial services,  
• public or private knowledge-producing and -diffusing organisations like R&D-institutes or 
universities,  
• government/ governance organisations that set policy, regulatory, or social setting for 
innovations such as parliaments, ministries, trade unions etc., 
• public and private institutions, providing general education and vocational training, 
• and bridging organisations, that facilitate technology transfer between science and business 
(Edquist & Johnson, 1997: 47, Fischer et al., 2001, Patel & Pavitt, 1994: pp. 84).  
 
Of course, not only the existence of these actors is important but their performance and hence 
internal aspects such as organisation, R&D-intensity etc. are also core elements of the NSI-
approach (Lundvall, 1992a: 13).  
                                                 
 6 While providing a neat description of the NSI idea, DeLaMothe’s citation already hints towards a certain confusion 
in the literature between the terms ‘institution’ and ‘organisation’ (for a general critique of some fuzzy terms in the 
SI approach see e.g. Edquist, 1997). 
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Institutions are “sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate 
the relations and interactions between individuals, groups and organisations” (Edquist & Johnson, 
1997: 46). They can be either formal (laws) or informal (traditional way of doing business). While 
organisations are regarded as players of the game, institutions are seen as the rules of the game 
(North, 1990). Lundvall et al. (2002: 220, Lundvall & Maskell, 2000: pp. 360) view the following 
institutional dimensions as having a major impact on learning and innovation behaviour: First, the 
time horizon of the agents (short-term in Anglo-Saxon countries vs. long-term in Japan), second, 
trust between agents; third, the pre-dominating rationality (communicative rationality rather than 
instrumental rationality seems to support innovative behaviour) and fourth, the authority 
characteristic of master-apprenticeship learning. Together these institutions constitute part of the 
term ‘social capital’ (see Putnam, 1993). 
 
Interaction between organisations can take place in either market or non-market relationships. The 
latter, especially, is said to be highly relevant for learning (Lundvall & Maskell, 2000, Edquist, 
2001). Interactions can take not only the form of flows of knowledge and information (including 
human flows) as well as flows of investment and funding, but also informal arrangements like 
networks (Cooke et al., 1997: 478, Niosi, 2002: 292). A recent OECD report (Remoe, 2002: 15) 
defines three categories of interactions that are important within a NSI: Competition forces 
companies to innovate, transaction in which goods and services (including tacit knowledge and 
embodied technology) are traded between organisations and networking by which knowledge is 
transferred through collaboration, co-operation and long term relationships.  
According to Carlsson et al. (2002a) the core activities in a SI are those interactions that involve 
technology transfer, either intentionally or unintentionally (technological spillovers; see 2.1.3.1). 
These knowledge flows basically include interactions among firms, universities and public research 
laboratories, the diffusion of knowledge and technology to firms and the movement of personnel 
(OECD, 1997b: 12). Cooke et al. (1997: 478) assert that these links are of a different nature: They 
can be strong or weak, regular or irregular, intense or relaxed etc.  
 
Additionally, these elements of the system are complemented by further crucial – mostly nationally 
determined – factors, such as the overall economic structure (firm sizes, industry, competition), the 
education and training system, the S&T specialisation of the research institutes and firms, 
government policies and regulations as well as the resulting incentive system, the financial system 
and the availability of (venture) capital, governance structures in a general sense and prevailing 
management practices, degree of labour mobility, cultural and behavioural particularities, the 
historical development of all these aspects over time etc. (see Archibugi & Michie, 1997, 
Koschatzky, 2001, Nelson, 2000, Ernst et al., 1998a, OECD, 1999). 
Figure 2.7 shows a simplified model of a system of innovation with some of the main impact 
factors. It already depicts the essential interplay of different types of spatial systems of innovation, 
namely global, national and regional (see also 2.2.4). 
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Niosi (2002) argues that NSI can be x-efficient as well as x-effective. The first is defined as the 
“gap between observed performance and existing best performance”, while the latter is “the degree 
at which institutions attain their organizational missions” (ibid.: 293). Reasons for inefficiencies 
and ineffectiveness are grounded in path-dependence and lock-in situations. Main factors for system 
inefficiencies include inadequate system rules such as intellectual property legislations or 
restrictions on technology transfer, lack or limited number of key institutions, weak coordination 
among actors and a lack of information flows (Niosi, 2002: 296). The evaluation of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of NSI has to be based on benchmarking exercises between NSI, which hints 
towards the normative weight of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practice that is inherent in the concept (Arocena 
& Sutz, 1999: pp. 5).  
 
This kind of benchmarking is difficult given the country-specific and path dependent nature of each 
NSI (e.g. Gu, 1999) An aspect which poses a bottleneck in one country might not be relevant for the 
NSI improvement in another country. Therefore, policy recommendations that use the NSI concept 
need to avoid easy ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions (Arocena & Sutz, 1999: 6). 
 
Figure 2.7: Actors and linkages in the system of innovation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD, 1999: 23 
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Currently, the scientific debate on NSI is characterised by three trends. First, there is an increase in 
policy-related studies. These reflect the growing interest of policy makers in ‘best or good practice’. 
Second, there are attempts to develop more formalized models for comparative studies of NSIs. 
And third, a stronger focus is laid on ‘low and medium-income countries’ (Balzat & Hanusch, 
2004). For this thesis, the latter part is of particular interest.  
At this point the main controversy is over the terms innovation and system. Does every country 
have a NSI or is this distinction dependant on some minimum requirements? While some authors 
like Radosevic (1999) claim that while the  “catching up and growth of CEECs [Central and Eastern 
European Countries] is closely related to the emergence of systems of innovation”, it is “not yet 
possible to talk about national or regional systems of innovation in CEECs” (Radoésevic, 1999b: 
313). Others, like Arocena and Sutz (1999, 2002), detect NSI in developing countries as well.  
The second debate is concerned with the term innovation. Authors like Viotti (2002) and Mathews 
(2001) prefer the term ‘national learning system’, which in their view is more appropriate to the 
situation in late-industrialising countries. This distinction, however, may be too harsh, considering 
the strong correlation between innovation and learning in advanced and late-industrialising 
countries. At least the Aalborg version of the NSI-concept takes learning explicitly into account. 
Nevertheless, even proponents of this research line acknowledge and demand a stronger inclusion 
of learning (Lundvall et al., 2002).  
In the remainder of this chapter the topic of transferability of the NSI-concept to late-industrialising 
countries will be further elaborated upon. 
2.2.1.2 Extending the concept to South East Asia 
The NSI-concept is based on empirical work in developed countries. A simple transfer and 
implementation of the very same concept in developing countries, therefore, may not be 
appropriate. With this in mind, an analysis of the NSI in South-East Asian late-industrialising 
countries must take the following eight particularities into account: 
Foremost, the modernisation and development of the economy in South-East Asian countries is 
driven to a stronger degree by transnational companies than in industrialised countries, because 
TNCs have the resources, technology and market access that local companies lack (Fromhold-
Eisebith, 2001: pp. 48). Hence, TNC-affiliates are important actors within the NSI. However, these 
are – at least partly – externally steered, important decision-makers reside abroad, making them 
possibly less receptive to domestic policies. 
Moreover, late-industrialising countries are subject to the ‘new division of labour’ (Fröbel et al., 
1980, Ernst, 1980), which resulted into a split up of single production processes in the value-chain 
within global production networks. Since many late-industrialising countries offer low labour costs 
and an abundant labour force, they were mainly assigned to labour-intensive, low-skill production, 
often in the form of pure assembly sites. Especially in export processing zones, these kinds of 
‘extended workbenches’ can be found, importing most of the components and exporting the 
assembled final or intermediate product. Even though the dichotomy between low skill, labour 
intensive production in developing, late-industrialising countries, and knowledge intensive, high 
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skill production in advanced countries is too simplistic, it is in essence correct and an essential 
aspect of the configuration of the developing NSI (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2001: pp. 48). 
Secondly, companies in late-industrialising countries rarely work at the technological frontier. 
Rather, it is crucial for these companies to acquire, utilise, adopt and improve technologies that are 
already established in advanced countries (Wong, 1995, Lall, 2000). Hence, the focus should be laid 
on the distributive performance of the system, i.e. in which way it supports the diffusion of 
technologies. Furthermore, industrial innovation is for the most part conducted in-house and in an 
informal manner, where “R&D-activities are not clearly and formally articulated with the enterprise 
strategy” (Arocena & Sutz, 1999: 13).  
 
Thirdly, human resource development is of major importance to the development of absorptive, 
learning and technological capabilities – especially in late-industrialising countries, which often 
lack a suitable human capital base for innovation. Nevertheless, human resources have so far been 
largely neglected in most NSI-research (Lundvall et al., 2002, Lundvall & Maskell, 2000, Wong, 
2001).  
 
Fourthly, although international links offer important learning opportunities for late-industrialising 
countries, they are not well accounted for in the NSI-concept. Due to a dualistic and 
inhomogeneous economic structure and a weak domestic knowledge base, interactions between 
national agents are seen as less important in emerging than in advanced countries (Wong, 2001, 
Ernst, 2002). Since the NSI in these countries is hardly developed, “international linkages need to 
prepare the way for the development of national innovation systems” (Ernst, 2002: 500). Hence 
most late-industrialising countries rely or even depend on international technology and knowledge 
transfer (see chapter 1.1.3.2). Linkages to foreign sources of innovation therefore predominate over 
domestic links (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2001: pp.48).  
 
Fifth, for advanced countries the NSI-approach is an ex-post concept, which is based on empirical 
observations. It was utilised to describe, analyse and compare well-developed NSI with a strong 
institutional base and advanced infrastructure. For late-industrialising countries that have a fairly 
short history of industrial development, it is an ex-ante concept: Their NSI is less developed by 
order, in respect to the institutional set-up, the quality of S&T activities, and linkages between 
organizations, because the “technological and institutional attributes required for modern growth 
were not developed within their system” (Gu, 1999: 43). Gu argues that the NSI is development-
level specific, which is linked to the structural and institutional development level (ibid.). Similar to 
the situation of latecomer firms (chapter 1.1), this implies several disadvantages, but might also 
hold some opportunities (see Fromhold-Eisebith, 2001: pp. 48): Since existing structures and path 
dependency can pose an obstacle to the development of new and efficient structures (e.g. lock-in 
symptom of old industrial regions; e.g. Grabher, 1993b), new industries might find favourable 
conditions in some late-industrialising countries for creating and manipulating the developing NSI 
in the sense of a ‘window of opportunity’ (cf. Storper & Walker, 1989: pp. 70). In conclusion, the 
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NSI in late-industrialising countries has to be built up alongside economic development. It is not a 
given asset but rather a political and economical objective (Arocena & Sutz, 1999, 2002). For this 
reason the focus of analysis in developing countries should be on ‘system construction’ and ‘system 
promotion’ (Lundvall et al., 2002: 226).  
 
Sixth, as Gu (1999: pp. 43) argues, special attention should be paid to the role of the market in 
promoting learning and generating change in late-industrialising countries, because “market 
mechanisms are still under-developed” (ibid.). Moreover, learning to innovate is often associated 
with capital investment. Hence, while knowledge and learning is a prime source for growth in 
advanced countries, in developing countries capital investment is regarded as more important 
(ibid.).  
 
Seventh, many Asian states differ strongly from advanced economies in terms of policy (Fromhold-
Eisebith, 2001: pp.48). Several could be considered ‘development states’, having a high degree of 
centralised political power, which intervenes in many spheres. Others, such as Thailand, are run by 
strong, ‘CEO-style’ politicians (The Economist, 2004b). Policies in these countries are often 
implemented in a sense of purposeful strategic management for catching up, fostering enhanced 
learning (Gu, 1999: pp. 43). Additional particularities of some late-industrialising Asian countries 
include inefficient or even corrupt bureaucracy, the prevailing strategy for economic development 
(esp. import substitution vs. market integration), the policies regarding education and S&T, the 
special role of state-owned companies and the institutional framework for regional policy 
(Fromhold-Eisebith, 2001: pp.48). 
Finally, cultural aspects such as religion, social behaviour and ‘way of doing things’ result into 
differentiations between NSI. Even without over-generalising Asian cultures, there might be certain 
common characteristics which have a profound influence, for example on the type of interactions 
between different actors in the NSI (Fromhold-Eisebith, 2001: pp. 81).  
 
Arguing from the point of transitional countries such as China, Liu and White (2001) criticise the 
NSI approach for merely describing the role and performance of particular actors, institutions and 
policies while neglecting system-level characteristics, such as “the distribution of these 
[fundamental innovation] activities, the organizational boundaries around them, coordination 
mechanisms, evolutionary processes, and the effectiveness of the system in introducing, diffusing 
and exploiting technological innovations” (ibid.: 1091). In their view, the focus on specific actors 
and institutions hinders comparisons with alternative systems. Hence, they concentrate on five 
fundamental activities: education, R&D, implementation (manufacturing), end-use (customer of 
products and processes) and linkage, i.e. combining complimentary knowledge. Furthermore, rather 
than using specific actor-categories (e.g. universities), they distinguish more generally between 
primary actors, performing one of the five fundamental activities, secondary actors, affecting the 
behaviour of or interplay between primary actors, and institutions. Consequently, instead of asking 
actor-centric questions like “what is the role of private firms in country X’s innovation system?” 
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(ibid.: 1095), they scrutinize the system with general questions concerning structure, dynamics and 
performance of the system. 
Figure 2.8: NSI for small, late-industrialising countries 
Source: Wong (2001): 544 
Regarding some of these criticism, Wong (2001) has elaborated a modified NSI-concept especially 
for Asian newly-industrialised countries (see Figure 2.8). The main organisations in his NSI are 
companies, public R&D and Science and Technology (S&T) support institutions and manpower 
development institutions. By contemplating science and education separately, Wong brings human 
resource development to the forefront of his research. The key objectives of his NSI model are “to 
build up the stock of scientific and technological resources and to allocate and deploy these 
resources to the respective innovation actors” (Wong, 2001: 544). Hereby, he takes into account the 
diffusion of technology, which is crucial for developing countries. Moreover, he includes 
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a result of these changes and the widening of the concept, it is necessary to consider all direct and 
indirect policies affecting either the agents of the system or their interactions.  
Several of the above cited particularities of NSI in late-industrialising Asian countries entwine 
themselves around the presence and influence of TNCs (see also Chenais, 1992). Consequently, 
these are the focused actors of this thesis. Even though this reflects an actor-centric investigation 
criticised by Liu and White (2001), it is justified because the regarded countries are not transitional 
states in terms of their policy systems. Consequently, chapter 2.3 deals with the characteristics of 
TNCs and their potential impact on host economies in late-industrialising countries in general and 
on their NSI in particular. 
2.2.2 Regional systems of innovation and learning 
In the course of the debate about globalisation, the end of nation states and the rise of regions as 
“natural economic zones” was proclaimed (Ohmae, 1993: 78). In innovation research this notion 
was mirrored by the concept of regional systems of innovation (RSI) (Braczyk et al., 1998, Cooke 
et al., 1997, DeLaMothe & Paquet, 1998). Taking on the basic ideas of the NSI-concept, the key 
notion of the RSI is that regions offer particular environmental conditions and opportunities for 
interactions that can either foster or hinder the co-operation between innovative actors in a region. 
Additionally, the amount and quality of regional actors influences the opportunities for learning by 
interacting (Cooke & Morgan, 1998). 
Regions are viewed as “territories smaller than their state possessing significant supra-local 
governance capacity and cohesiveness differentiating them from their state and other regions” 
(Cooke et al., 1997: 480). Cooke et al. (1997: 479) distinguish between cultural and administrative 
regions, depending on the prevailing force of regional identity. Additionally, a region requires an 
identifiable homogeneity “in terms of criteria such as geography, political allegiance and cultural or 
industrial mix” (Cooke, 1998: 15).  
The argument for setting the focus upon regions is twofold. Firstly, nations are not economically 
homogeneous but more often than not consist of different, to a certain degree specialised regions, 
offering particular organisational settings (e.g. highly specialised R&D-institutions, technical or 
financial services) and, therefore, show differences in institutional aspects such as routines, 
traditional behaviour, etc. (Howells, 1999: 74). Secondly, regions represent the spatial level at 
which (localised) interactive learning and tacit knowledge sharing is taking place (Howells, 1999, 
DeLaMothe & Paquet, 2000).  
The main reason why the region is the locus of localised learning is  
• the fact that “tacit knowledge is collective in nature and, because it is wedded to its human 
and social context, it is […] territorially-specific” (Morgan, 1997: 495), 
• that a distance decay function in communication can be observed (Howells, 1999), 
• that a region offers specific untraded interdependencies (Storper, 1997, Storper & Scott, 
1995), “which take the form of conventions, informal rules, and habits that coordinate 
economic actors under conditions of uncertainty” (Storper, 1997: 5), 
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• which together with other regional characteristics such as shared language, common cultural 
background, opportunities for face-to-face interaction and trust caused by long term social 
bonds enhance mutual understanding and collective learning (Lawson, 1999, Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999, Keeble, 1999, Lawson & Lorenz, 1999, Capello, 1999). 
Hence, geographical and socio-cultural proximity fosters collective information gathering and 
screening on markets and technologies. It supports collective learning through skilled labour 
mobility, customer-supplier linkages, exhibition of ‘good practice’, informal information exchange 
etc. Moreover, it facilitates collectively defined managerial practices, decision routines, and 
decision coordination (Camagni, 1991: 130; see also Ratti et al., 1997, Fromhold-Eisebith, 1999, 
2000). 
Breschi and Lissoni (2001), however, have questioned some of the underlying assumptions made in 
concepts of spatially bound knowledge flows and learning. They doubt that the tacitness of 
knowledge (for the scientific and technical, not for the craftsman-type) will necessarily result in 
regional ‘stickiness’ (Hippel, 1994). In their view, communication about specialised knowledge and 
technology requires specific technical language, which is rather bound to particular epistemic 
communities than to a locality. Furthermore, these communities have common ‘codebooks’ (i.e. 
language) which ”may act as a powerful exclusionary device, even for local actors who live and 
work side by side with the community members, but cannot understand the messages (openly) 
exchanged by the latter” (Breschi & Lissoni, 2001: 989). At the same time communication of tacit 
knowledge within these communities seems possible even over long distances.  
Nevertheless, “we recognize that there is hardly any doubt that innovation networks are often 
localized. However, the rationale for co-localization may have less to do with knowledge spillovers 
mediated by physical proximity, than with the need to access a pool of skilled workers and to 
establish transaction-intensive relationships with suppliers and customers” (Breschi & Lissoni, 
2001: 998). A similar point is made by Amin (2000), who states that relational or organisational 
proximity (e.g. by epistemic communities or what he calls communities of practice) might be more 
important than geographical proximity. However, based on research exploring the impact of 
institutional and regulatory conditions on best-practice-learning, Gertler (1995, 2001) concludes: 
“The idea that organizational or relational proximity is sufficient to transcend the effects of distance 
(even when assisted by telecommunications and frequent travel) seems improbable” (ibid.: 19). 
A necessary condition for an RSI is a region’s governance power, including “capacities to develop 
innovative support policies and organisations” (Cooke et al., 1997). This governance power requires 
a regional administration that has the legal and financial means to set up infrastructure and 
intermediary organisations, to pass laws, to create tax incentives and change regulations concerning 
the educational training system, etc. (Cooke, 1998, Cooke et al., 1997, Howells, 1999).  
Similar to the NSI, a RSI consists of the number and properties of actors and their inter- and intra-
regional linkages (Fritsch et al., 1998: 245, Fischer, 2002). Especially the importance of the 
knowledge infrastructure, universities and R&D-institutes, and training systems has been stressed 
(e.g. Asheim & Cooke, 1999), even though empirical results do not fully support these claims (e.g. 
Revilla Diez, 2000, Fritsch & Schwirten, 1998). 
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Hence, RSI could be seen as a smaller variant of the NSI consisting of mainly the same sort of 
organisations, institutions and linkages. Although, as was suggested, it is still subject to debate if an 
RSI is a subsystem or a reduced version of the NSI (Moulaert & Sekia, 2003: 293).  
As for national systems, the question remains unresolved if every region constitutes an RSI or if it 
must fulfil a set of minimal standards (Thomi & Werner, 2001). Cooke (2001: 958) states that there 
are “few fully functioning RSIs”. In his view, a RSI is more than a ‘regional learning system’ 
(Cooke et al., 1997: 484). “A regional innovation system will thus have moved from a learning 
disposition of rapidly understanding and developing the competence to implement, apply and adapt 
innovations originating elsewhere to a ‘tutoring’ disposition where it displays the capability to 
innovate de novo” (Cooke et al., 1997: 484). Consequently, in his recent work Cooke (2003) tries to 
develop a regional innovation and learning system which contemplates the interaction between 
global value-chains and regional clusters for industrial upgrading in less favoured regions. 
In order to provide a framework for empirical studies, certain attempts for the classification of RSI 
have been made (see e.g. Asheim and Isaksen 2000: pp. 179, Cooke, 1998). One example, which 
also includes less successful regions, was elaborated upon by Oinas and Malecki (2002) and is 
presented in Tab. 2.9. They distinguish RSI according to the degree of technological specialisation 
and advancement. Genuine innovator RSI are locations in which ‘new to the world’ innovations are 
developed and best practises emerge. Adapter RSI provide an environment for adopting new 
innovations from external sources quickly and improve them by incremental innovations, while 
adopter RSI are those into which innovations diffuse slowly and which rely on ‘imitator systems’. 
Tab. 2.9: A typology of regional systems of innovation 
Characterization of Region Sectoral Diversity Sectoral Specialisation 
Genuine innovators  
(best practice places) 
Stars  
(e.g. Silicon Valley) 
Shooting stars  
(e.g. Detroit, US) 
Adapters (relatively high levels of 
diverse competences) 
Living room lamps  
(e.g. Hsinchu, Taiwan) 
“Spotlights”  
(e.g. Bangalore, India) 
Adopters 
(production oriented competences) 
Chandeliers” 
(e.g. Bangkok, Thailand) 
“Candles”  
(e.g. Dongguan, China) 
Source: Oinas & Malecki, 2002: 116, adapted 
In conclusion, the endowment of a region with innovative actors and environmental conditions that 
favour co-operation and innovation activities constitute the extent and utilisation of the regional 
innovation potential. Bearing the positive effects of spatial proximity for innovation-related social 
capital building (trust) and knowledge spillover in mind, the regional scale provides an important 
research level. Figure 2.9 sketches the interactive model of an RSI. 
Special cases in point are major metropolitan areas and their hinterland. Since these regions often 
encompass the major ‘growth engines’ of the national or global economy and offer a particular 
endowment of innovative actors and specific, favourable environmental conditions, they can be 
considered metropolitan innovation systems (Fischer et al., 2001, Revilla Diez, 2002b). 
Despite the wide recognition of the RSI concept, some scholars like Bathelt and Depner (2003) and 
Bathelt (2003) question the existence of RSI. They argue that regions lack the necessary autonomy 
to develop independent accumulation- and regulation systems and are rather highly dependent on 
national institutions and external influences. 
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Figure 2.9: Regional system of innovation as an interactive model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Revilla Diez, 2002a: 27 
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111). A TS is, then, defined in terms of flows of knowledge and competence rather than flows of 
goods and services. It constitutes three dimensions (Carlsson et al., 2002b: pp. 10, Carlsson et al., 
2002b: 13): 
a) The cognitive dimension reflects upon the ‘design space’ (used as a synonym for technology), 
which is formed by complementary technical capabilities and evolves constantly.  
b) The organizational and institutional dimension: Actors in the network are all individuals 
(researchers, managers, and critics), who participate in the growth and structuring of the design 
space. They are also referred to as technological communities. These actors are embedded in 
different organisations (e.g. companies, industry organisations, universities) and linked via 
professional or personal relationships. Like the design space, actor networks are subject to change 
over time. 
c) The economic dimension, which includes the economic organisations that convert technological 
possibilities into business opportunities. These organisations influence the TS by shaping actors’ 
relationships through incentives and disincentives, by controlling the allocation of resources for 
knowledge creation and by determining the degrees to which business opportunities are exploited. 
Consequently, a TS consists of knowledge and competence networks, which can become 
development blocs (“synergetic clusters of firms and technologies within an industry or a group of 
industries”; Carlsson et al., 2002a: 10) and competence blocs, responsible for the successful 
exploitation of the business opportunities. Interactions within a TS involve market as well as non-
market transactions within buyer/supplier, problem-solving and informal networks (Carlsson, 1997: 
5). 
Carlsson (1997: 4) points out that the TS-approach is dynamic since it takes into account that 
systems evolve and vary over time. Moreover, the system as such is the unit of analysis, not its 
components. While the concept acknowledges the importance of the geographic location of the 
actors to the strength and density of the networks (Carlsson et al., 2002a: 14), it is not an explicitly 
spatial concept. TS “may be local, regional, or multinational, depending on the nature and extent of 
the networks involved” (Oinas & Malecki, 2002: 106).  
 
Along a similar line of reasoning, a sectoral system of innovation (SSI) is defined as “a set of new 
and established products for specific uses and the set of agents carrying out market and non-market 
interactions for the creation, production and sale of those products. A sectoral system has a 
knowledge base, technologies, inputs and an existing, emergent and potential demand” (Malerba, 
2002: 250). Like other systems of innovation a SSI consists of actors, interactions and institutions. 
Actors are either individuals like consumers, entrepreneurs and scientists or organisations such as 
firms, non-firm organisations (e.g. universities), sub-units of organisations (particularly R&D-
departments) and groups of organisations (e.g. industry associations). Interactions include market as 
well as non-market relationships. Furthermore, these interactions are subject to institutions such as 
standards, regulations, labour markets, etc. (ibid.).  
The forces that shape the dynamics of a SSI and its spatial boundaries have been compacted by 
Breschi and Malerba (1997: 132) into the term, technological regime. It is defined by the 
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opportunity conditions (likelihood for innovations), the appropriability conditions (possibilities of 
protecting innovations), the cumulativeness of technological knowledge (“degree of serial 
correlation among innovations and […] innovation activities”, ibid.: 135) and the relevant 
knowledge base. The latter encompasses the nature of the knowledge base (specificity, tacitness, 
complexity, independence) as well as the means of knowledge transmission and communication. 
Each sector operates under a different regime. 
In respect to spatial aspects they emphasise the geographical concentration of innovators and their 
‘knowledge spatial boundaries’, the search space for relevant knowledge that firms require for their 
innovation process (ibid.).  
Carlsson et al. (2002a :12) see two major shortcomings in the SSI approach: First, it treats the 
concept of technological regime as largely static and unexplained. Second, it focuses on well-
defined industries or branches, which is difficult since new technologies might form new systems of 
innovations across sectors.  
From the point of view of an SSI-advocate, the differences between the TS- and SSI-approach are: 
First, the latter focuses strongly on private firms as central actors. Second, the SSI looks at 
competitive relationships among firms of the same branch whereas the TS concept considers 
networks of vertically and horizontally connected organisations that contribute to the development 
of specific technologies. Third, the SSI-concept takes the geographical boundaries of innovative 
activities into account, by considering the meaning of different spatial levels for particular sectors. 
And fourth, the SSI-approach uses some taxonomies and categories of the technical change 
literature (Breschi & Malerba, 1997: 131). 
2.2.4 Common characteristics and problems: towards a multi-scale 
approach? 
According to Edquist (1997) all different types of systems of innovation have a set of common 
characteristics, which are: 
1. All of them place innovation and learning at their centre. 
2. They try to include all determinants of innovations, considering political, economic, and historic 
as well as sociological and cultural aspects. 
3. They are based in evolutionary economics and therefore share a historical perspective, which 
includes path dependencies and sequential transformations. 
4. They are of a rather comparative nature, whereby they do not postulate an optimal system. 
However, they focus on evaluating different systems by comparison and learning from ‘good 
practice’. 
5. The interdependence and interaction between the elements of the system is the most important 
characteristic in all approaches. Furthermore, these relations are “extremely complex and often 
characterised by reciprocity, interactivity, and feedback mechanisms in several loops” (Edquist, 
1997: 21).  
6. All types of innovations (product, process and organizational) are taken into account.  
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7. They emphasise the importance of institutions, despite no common understanding of the term 
‘institutions’. 
8. There are still ambiguities in all concepts: Some key elements are not commonly defined; the 
borders of the systems and the exact elements to be included are still fuzzy. 
9. Finally, all these notions are sooner conceptual frameworks than formal theories. 
Besides the merit of helping to improve understanding of the role that innovation plays in economic 
growth and towards setting technology policy in a broader framework, empirical SI-studies are 
faced with several shortcomings and methodological problems: the prevalence of snapshot studies 
and a lack of dynamic (longitudinal) studies, the concentration on invention and neglect of the 
innovation (economical exploitation) stage, the disregard of the role of financial institutions, the 
missing assessment of the performance of SI, a lack of formal modelling, difficulty in setting 
system boundaries and exact levels of analysis and finally, a bias towards industrialised countries 
(Carlsson, 2004, Carlsson et al., 2002a).  
Although each SI-concept has a different focus, the “various system approaches are complements, 
not substitutes, each focusing on a particular domain with its own issues, problems and 
opportunities” (Carlsson, 2004: 16), since territorial and sectoral innovation systems overlap at a 
particular location. Therefore, it seems necessary to integrate the different approaches or at least try 
to clarify the interdependence among SI (Chang & Chen, 2004, see Tab.2.10). 
Tab. 2.10: Comparing the NSI, TS/SSI and RSI approach 
Approach Major knowledge 
links 
Knowledge transfer facilitating 
factors 
Systemic boundaries 
NSI Triple-helix
7 
interactions 
Common language, social, 
cultural codes of communication Nation-bound 
TS/SSI Inter-technological links 
Technological complementaries 
and synergies; science and 
technology relation 
Sector- or technology-
bounded,  
not necessarily nation-
bound 
RSI 
Tacit knowledge 
sharing; social 
networks 
Geographical proximity, co-
location learning; tacit knowledge 
spillover 
Region-bounds 
Source: Chang & Chen, 2004: 28 
Contemplating empirical work at the global, national and sub-national scale, Bunnell and Coe 
(2001) make a case for a stronger focus on linkages and interrelationships between and across the 
different spatial levels. They assert that extra-local networks are critical but have received too little 
attention (for empirical evidence for the importance of intra- as well as interregional links for 
innovation see e.g. Sternberg, 2000). They demand a shift away from territorially restricted research 
towards a more network and key-actors oriented research8.  
                                                 
 7 Triple helix is a synonym for the three main actors in the system: firms, universities and government (Chang & 
Chen, 2004: 27) 
 8 A line of reasoning that has found profound repercussion in the relatively new theoretical perspective of relational 
economic geography (e.g. Boggs & Rantisi, 2003, Bathelt & Glückler, 2002, 2003). 
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Taking on these criticisms, Oinas and Malecki (1999, 2002) have suggested a spatial innovation 
system (SIS), which “consists of overlapping and interlinked national, regional and sectoral systems 
of innovation” (Oinas & Malecki, 1999: 10). The starting point is a new technology that is 
developed within a technological system and creates a dynamic technological trajectory or path. 
The technological systems and its components evolve in space and time. Nevertheless, actors of the 
TS are spatially located within several RSI and RSI-characteristics (such as localised learning and 
creativity) are important for the further development of the TS. Consequently, it is not autonomous 
from the RSI in which its components operate. As a result a distinct spatial division of labour arises, 
with linkages between different RSI (for Oinas and Maleckis RSI classification see Tab. 2.9).  
 
In the words of Oinas and Malecki (2002: 109):  
“Key issues in discussing SIS are (1) the simultaneous and interdependent development 
of components of technological systems possibly in many places, utilizing spatial 
divisions of labour among several RSI specialised in different aspects of technologies, 
possibly in more than one NSI, and (2) the ‘travels’ that technologies make in space and 
over time as knowledge flows take place along the progress made in the frontiers of 
those components”.  
 
Key elements are the technological path itself, RSI, actors (individuals as well as organisations and 
firms), and their proximate or distant networks. Because distant networks cannot make use of 
spatial proximity, they are based rather on organisational, relational, institutional and temporal 
proximity. 
The spatial innovation system approach is a useful attempt to merge the different SI-concepts, but it 
is still at a very early, conceptual stage, and has not resulted in any empirical investigations so far. 
A similar line of reasoning leads to the notion of the “National Supersystem of Innovations” by 
Fromhold-Eisebith (2004), who tries to integrate RSI, NSI and an international system of 
innovation. In her view, each level executes a specific function: the RSI is the location where 
collaborative networking and collective learning takes place. The national level is responsible for 
regulation, setting policies and institutions, while the international innovation system links and 
combines different RSI, and offers a regulative framework for international co-operation. 
Figure 2.10 presents a model of a hypothetical manufacturing company that is integrated into 
several sectoral and territorial systems of innovation at the same time (Kiese, 2004: pp 24). The 
model includes two propositions: first, the likelihood of interaction depends on the spatial and 
technological proximity of possible cooperation partners. Spatial proximity by itself is not 
sufficient; rather complementarities and the compatibility of the involved knowledge are essential. 
Second, territorial and sectoral innovation systems overlap within a region to form a regional 
innovative cluster (Cooke, 1998: 10) or a spatial innovation system (Oinas & Malecki, 1999, Oinas 
& Malecki, 2002, 2002).  
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Figure 2.10: Combining sectoral and territorial systems of innovation 
Source: Kiese, 2004: 25, translated and redrawn 
2.3 Transnational corporations and global production networks 
It has been pointed out in the previous chapters that the economies and systems of innovation in 
late-industrialising countries are more strongly influenced by TNCs than those in advanced 
countries. Moreover, it has been stated that international linkages are needed to overcome 
weaknesses of the SI in these countries. Important actors for international linkages are transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and their foreign direct investments (FDI). FDI are a significant and efficient 
mechanism for international technology transfer (see 2.1.3.3). Consequently, this chapter takes a 
closer look at TNCs and their production networks. The remainder of the chapter gives an overview 
of definitions and characteristics of TNCs and different forms of FDI, before analysing the 
theoretical foundation of cross border investments in production and R&D. Subsequently, concepts 
of production networks are introduced. In the final part of the chapter the impact of TNC-activities 
on the host regions is described. 
2.3.1 Definitions and characteristics 
There is no clear and unified distinction between the term ‘transnational corporation’ (TNC) and 
‘multinational corporation’. Dicken (2003a: 198) defines a TNC as “a firm that has the power to 
coordinate and control operations in more than one country, even if it does not own them”.  
Furthermore, he uses the terms TNC and MNC synonymously, arguing that  
“... the term 'transnational corporation' [is preferable] to the more widely used term 
'multinational corporation', simply because it is a more general, less restrictive term. The 
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term 'multinational corporation' suggests operations in a substantial number of countries 
whereas 'transnational corporation' simply implies operations in at least two countries, 
including the firm's home country. In effect, all multinational corporations are 
transnational corporations but not all transnational corporations are multinational 
corporations” (Dicken, 1992:47).  
 
Additionally, the term multinational enterprise (MNE) is applied, which is defined as “enterprises 
which own or control foreign-owned value-added activities, and which internalize cross-border 
intermediate product markets” (Dunning, 2000a: 30). This term is consequently similar to Dicken’s 
definition of a TNC.  
Tab. 2.11: Some ideal-types of TNC-organisation: basic characteristics 
Characteristics Multinational International Global Integrated network 
Structural 
configuration 
Decentralized 
federation;  
many key assets, 
responsibilities, 
decisions 
decentralized 
Coordinated 
federation;  
many key assets, 
responsibilities, 
resources, 
decisions 
decentralized but 
controlled by HQ 
Centralized hub; 
most strategic 
assets, resources 
responsibilities, 
decisions 
centralized 
Distributed network of 
specialized resources 
and capabilities 
Administrative 
control 
Informal HQ-
subsidiary 
relationship; 
simple financial 
control 
Formal 
management 
planning and 
control systems 
allow tighter HQ-
subsidiary linkage 
Tight central 
control decisions, 
resources and 
information 
Complex process of 
coordination and 
cooperation in an 
environment of shared 
decision-making 
Management 
attitude 
towards 
overseas 
operations 
Overseas 
operation sees as 
portfolio of 
independent 
businesses 
Overseas operation 
sees as 
appendages to a 
central domestic 
corporation 
Overseas 
operation treated 
as ‘delivery 
pipelines’ to a 
unified global 
market 
Overseas operation 
sees as integral part of 
complex network of 
flows of components, 
products, resources, 
people, information 
among interdependent 
units 
Role of 
overseas 
operations 
Sensing and 
exploiting local 
opportunities 
Adapting and 
leveraging parent 
company 
competencies 
Implementing 
parent company 
strategies 
Differentiated 
contributions by 
national units to 
integrated worldwide 
operations 
Development 
and diffusion of 
knowledge 
Knowledge 
developed and 
retained within 
each unit 
Knowledge 
developed at the 
centre and 
transferred to 
overseas units 
Knowledge 
developed and 
retained at the 
centre 
Knowledge developed 
jointly and shared 
worldwide 
Source: Dicken, 2003a: 215 based on Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998 
Some authors argue that there is a qualitative shift from multinational to transnational corporations. 
While MNCs are engaged in multi-country production operations with their headquarter (HQ) and 
R&D-departments in the country of origin, TNCs display a stronger global integration of their 
economic activities, including HQ- and R&D-functions, locating their function in whichever 
location suits them best (Allen, 1995: 61). A similar distinction is made by Bathelt and Glückler 
(2002: pp. 275), who differentiate between international companies, which concentrate all 
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functions in the home market and export their products; multinational corporations, which 
dispose of an international production network, but are still hierarchically governed by the HQ in 
the home country; and transnational corporations which are spatial diversified, having key 
coordination-, control- and R&D-functions positioned in several locations that interact intensely 
and frequently with each other. In contrast, Dicken (2003a) as well as Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) 
see the term TNC as an umbrella term under which different organisation types can be summarised. 
These types include multinational-, international-, global- and integrated-network- firms. Tab. 2.11 
presents some of the key characteristics. 
Similar to Dicken and Dunning, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) commonly defines TNCs as “incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising 
parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates” (UNCTAD, 2001: 275). A parent enterprise is 
described as an “enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than its home 
country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake” (ibid.). A foreign affiliate is an 
incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor who is resident in another economy 
owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise (UNCTAD, 2001: 
275). 
UNCTAD distinguishes three types of foreign affiliates: 
• A subsidiary is an incorporated enterprise in the host country in which the parent enterprise 
owns more than 50% of the shareholder’s voting power and has the right to appoint or 
remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body. 
• An associate is an incorporated enterprise in the host country in which the parent owns 
between 10% and 50% of the shareholders’ voting power. 
• A branch is a wholly or jointly owned unincorporated enterprise in the host country. It can 
be a permanent establishment or office, an partnership or joint venture, land, structures 
and/or immovable or mobile equipment (UNCTAD, 2001: 275)  
 
Consequently, a 10% capital stake is commonly considered as a threshold for the control of assets 
by UNCTAD. However, in some countries an equity stake of more than 10% is still used, e.g. the 
United Kingdom regarded a stake of 20% as a threshold until 1997 (UNCTAD, 2001: 289), China 
considers a 25% share as necessary for foreign control (Huang, 2003: 5) and in the USA the same 
limit of control is applied in the tax context (Kinney & Lawrence, 2000: 11). Similarly, early 
studies in the USA under the direction of Vernon used the 25% boundary (Vaupel & Curhan, 1969), 
which is still employed by Kumar (1990,na), in order to account for a variety of concepts even 
within one country, namely India, where different authorities apply 50%, 40% and 25% limits. 
Other authors, such as Ivarsson (2002b,2002a) analyse only majority-owned foreign affiliates and 
hence use a 50% criteria. In order to assess the influence of TNCs in Thailand, this thesis applies a 
capital stake of 30% as the threshold for external control (see chapter 5.1 for details). 
 
Generally, a TNC can set up a foreign affiliate either by ‘greenfield investment’, by acquisition of 
existing facilities/ companies or by merger with local capital (joint venture) (Dicken, 2003a: 278). 
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The various organisation models of TNCs (see Tab. 2.11) naturally imply different relations 
between the HQ and the affiliate, which in turn exert a strong influence on the impact the affiliate 
has on the host economy and its innovation system. Dicken (2003a: 218) sees three different roles 
for affiliates. They are either local implementers, whose main task it is to adapt TNC-products for 
the local market and hence have limited geographical scope and function; or they are specialized 
contributors, which possess specific expertise and are therefore tightly integrated in the TNC-
network. Moreover, affiliates can have a world mandate. These affiliates have a global or regional 
responsibility for a specific product or type of business (see also chapter 2.3.4). 
In direct relation to the cross-border activities of TNCs stand foreign direct investments (FDI). A 
direct investment is an “investment by one firm in another with the intention of gaining a degree of 
control over that firm’s operation” (Dicken, 2003a: 51). In the case of FDI the ‘other firm’ is simply 
located in another country. FDIs are different from portfolio investments, because the latter are 
driven by pure financial interest (ibid.).  
UNCTAD defines FDI as:  
“an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and 
control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) 
in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI 
enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate). FDI implies that the investor exerts a 
significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other 
economy”                (UNCTAD, 2001: 275). 
These investments encompass initial as well as all subsequent transactions between the two entities 
(e.g. parent and foreign affiliate). They are essentially comprised of three components: equity 
capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company loans (ibid.). 
The remainder of this chapter considers Dicken’s (2003a) definition of TNCs and contemplates 
upon the reasoning and modes of direct involvement via affiliates (2.3.2), as well as their indirect 
activities by exercising control or influence over companies which are involved in Global 
Production Networks or Commodity Chains (2.3.3). Finally, it considers the impact of TNC-
affiliates on the host economy (2.3.4). 
2.3.2 Internationalisation of production and R&D: why cross borders? 
Traditionally, FDI and other forms of cross border investments were not treated separately. In 
neoclassical theory FDI-flows are simply seen as factor movements caused by differences in the 
factor prices (interest rates). These differences are constituted by different factor endowments 
(Mundell, 1957, Richardson, 1969, 1973). Consequently, capital would flow from capital rich 
countries with low interest rates to capital poor countries with higher rates, until factor equalization 
is achieved. Alternatively, international trade leads to factor equalization (see Heckscher & Ohlin, 
1991; for theorising TNC-growth in the factor proportion theory cf. Krugman, 1995, Helpman, 
1985, Helpman & Krugman, 1985).  
This approach takes FDI-flows into account, but not the role of TNCs as the actors responsible for 
FDIs. In the 1960s Vernon (1966) extended the notion of the product-life-cycle to accommodate 
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locational decisions made by companies at different stages in the product-life-cycle. In his model, 
companies would start to develop and produce new products first in their home base and export 
them to foreign markets. After some time firms may see the need to set up production facilities in 
these markets either in order to reduce production or distribution costs or to safeguard market 
shares. In due course, the product and the production technology would become more standardised 
and the need for cost reduction for the mature product would increase, such that the company is 
pressed to relocate production to a low-labour cost country to stay competitive.  
Hence, these traditional approaches explain FDI flows between advanced and developing countries 
on the basis of comparative advantages (cf. Kleinert, 2004: pp.28). While they describe the initial 
FDI by US, European and Japanese companies quite well, they “can no longer explain the majority 
of international investment by TNCs” (Dicken, 2003a: 204).  
In order to overcome these shortcomings Dunning proposed the OLI (ownership – location – 
internalization) or eclectic paradigm. This is rooted in Hymer’s pioneering work (1976), in which 
he argues that foreign companies need to have company-specific advantages over domestic rivals in 
order to conduct cross-border investment. Dunning asserts that TNC-activities are determined by a 
triad of variables: ownership advantage, internalisation advantage and location advantage (see 
Dunning, 1998, 2003). For cross border investment to occur all three have to be taken into account. 
The first variable describes the competitive advantage of a particular company over foreign rivals 
due to “privileged ownership of, or access to, a set of income-generating assets, or from their ability 
to coordinate these assets with other assets across national boundaries” (Dunning, 2003: 28). The 
second depicts the reasons why it is advantageous for the company to exploit these assets itself 
rather than selling them to other (domestic) companies. Finally, the latter is a proxy for the specific 
advantages of particular locations for asset exploitation, e.g. low labour cost, market access, etc. 
(ibid.). 
Alternatively, the transaction cost approach (Coase, 1937, Williamson & Masten, 1995) has been 
used to explain internalisation by the associated costs. Accordingly, TNCs have the choice of 
market and intra-firm transactions for production and will only internalise transactions if this is 
cheaper than (cross-border) market dealings. 
 
The decision about the location for an overseas-investment is influenced by a firm’s motive for this 
investment. These can be either:  
• Resource-seeking: Companies look for location-specific resources, which are either 
tangible (e.g. natural resources or production factors such as labour) or intangible (expertise, 
specialised services etc.).  
• Market-seeking: Firms seek market access by settling close to it, which reduces transaction 
costs and eases the gathering of information on market requirements. 
• Efficiency-seeking: Companies might try to improve their efficiency by making use of 
economies of scale and scope, global sourcing etc. Typically, this motive leads to the 
specialisation of various affiliates in the TNC-network.  
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• Strategic asset-seeking: Firms use FDI to acquire strategic assets (either tangible or 
intangible) that may be critical to their long-term strategy. In contrast to the former motives, 
strategic assets seeking investment does not imply the exploitation of an existing ownership 
advantage of the firm. Instead, FDI may be a vehicle with which the firm can build 
ownership advantages that will support its long-term expansion at home and abroad, e.g. by 
tapping into new knowledge via joint ventures, joint research etc. (Dunning, 1998, 2000b, 
Rugman & Verbeke, 2003, Bathelt & Glückler, 2002). 
 
TNCs pick locations very carefully, choosing not only a specific country but also the appropriate 
region/city for their investment. TNC-affiliates tend to cluster in the most suitable places, mostly 
agglomerations, because these places offer agglomeration benefits, such as urbanisation and 
localisation economies in terms of infrastructure, markets, production factors, specialised skills, 
suppliers and institutions (see e.g. Marshall, 1920, Schätzl, 2001: pp. 34; for empirical evidence see 
UNCTAD, 2001: pp. 59-88, Caves, 1996: 54). In late-industrialising countries with limited 
infrastructure and economic structure, most FDIs will concentrate on the primate city. In general, 
the degree of affiliates’ location in agglomeration depends on the sector, for example high-
technology facilities are more concentrated than the food and beverage industry (UNCTAD, 2001: 
68). The requirements on the location vary according to the motive of the investment (for details see 
Dunning, 1998: 53). These factors have been subject to change within the last three decades. The 
most prominent change relates to the reduction of spatial transactions costs through liberalisation, 
which has not only allowed for a spread of activities but also for bunching of related activities 
(ibid.).  
The locational decision by TNCs is assumed to be less persistent than that of domestic firms. It is 
frequently argued that TNCs are ‘footloose’, in the sense that they can quickly shift production to 
other locations if the environment conditions in the host country deteriorate or other locations 
become significantly more attractive (see e.g. Caves, 1996). However, the notion of place- and 
boundary-less TNCs is rejected as a myth (see e.g. Dicken, 2003b), because on the one hand, TNCs 
bear a pretty strong imprint from their home country, i.e. they bring numerous inherent 
organisational and behavioural attributes with them to the host country (see also Gertler, 
2001¸Gertler, 2003), while on the other hand, they “invariably have to adapt some of their domestic 
practices to local conditions” (Dicken, 2003b: 41). Hence, TNC are neither completely placeless nor 
can they substitute locations without experiencing significant switching or sunken costs. 
From the perspective of the geographical organisation of their production TNCs can basically 
follow four different strategies. They can operate globally concentrated by producing at a single 
location and exporting to world markets. Alternatively, they might follow a host-market 
production strategy, in which each production unit caters for the respective host market, or 
implement a product specialisation strategy, in which each production unit is specialised in one 
product, which is then marketed at a regional or global level. The most sophisticated organisation 
structure is transnational vertical integration, whereby each unit is responsible for either certain 
components or production steps (Dicken, 2003a: 246).  
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A significant change is taking place in the motives for FDI: The last two decades have witnessed a 
“rapid growth of strategic asset-seeking FDI, which is geared less to exploiting an existing owner 
specific advantage of an investing firm, and more to protecting, or augmenting, that advantage by 
acquisition of new assets, or by a partnering arrangement with a foreign firm” (Dunning, 1998: 55). 
Moreover, more traditional forms of FDI have also changed, and foreign subsidiaries are nowadays 
more embedded in their host economy, have deeper value-chains and perform higher order activities 
including R&D (ibid.). 
Both processes resulted in a situation where “an increasing proportion of the total R&D-expenditure 
is accounted for by […] foreign subsidiaries” (Dunning, 2000a: 16; see also Brockhoff, 1998: pp. 
3). Consequently, the internationalisation of production is followed by FDI in R&D-functions 
(Hotz-Hart, 2000:442). However, it remains unclear how much late-industrialising countries like 
Thailand can benefit from this trend. Dunning (2002; cited in Nunnenkamp, 2002: 5) states that FDI 
in developing countries have shifted from market- and resource-seeking to efficiency-seeking 
motives, however, the former still dominate. Strategic-asset-seeking motives, on the other hand, 
play almost no role in FDI in developing countries (see Nunnenkamp, 2002). 
 
Since the coordination of internationally dispersed R&D-facilities is not a simple task (Brockhoff, 
1998: pp. 83), the question must be raised: why do firms internationalise their R&D-functions, 
which traditionally have been conducted at the home base of the TNC?  
The main reasons for R&D-related FDI can be grouped in the following categories:  
• Market-related: TNCs require local R&D units in order to adapt products to local needs, to 
keep track of customer demands and to provide technological back up for important 
production sites. 
• Technology-related: TNCs try to tap into foreign science and technology (S&T) resources. 
• Cost-related: R&D is a human capital intensive endeavour and TNCs may seek locations 
with low labour costs for engineers and scientists. Moreover, in some industries the supply 
of high-class scientists at the home base is simply not sufficient to sustain the TNC’s R&D-
efforts.  
• Related to technology monitoring: TNCs use R&D units to monitor new developments in 
S&T or to analyse competitors.  
• Non-R&D-related: Some national governments require the establishment of R&D-facilities 
(e.g. in pharmaceuticals) before granting market access. Additionally, a TNC may aspire to 
improve its image by showing a level of commitment to the host region, for example, by 
transferring R&D-functions (Reddy, 2000, see also Brockhoff, 1998: pp. 28). 
 
The variety of motives just described for R&D-related FDI is also reflected in the type of R&D-
facility that a TNC might set up abroad.  
Simplified, the R&D-process takes place in three phases: (1.) Applied scientific and marketing 
research that leads to (2.) a product design, which is then developed into a prototype and a product 
suitable for volume production. Before this production can start (3.) some ‘de-bugging’ and 
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adaptation to local conditions has to take place in order to run the new production line efficiently 
(Dicken, 2003a). Each of these phases is related to a certain type of R&D-facility. The most basic 
version is a ‘support laboratory’ to provide (3.) technical back-up for production and facilitate the 
transfer and adaptation of technology from the parent to the affiliate. A more ambitious endeavour 
involves the arrangement of a ‘locally integrated R&D-laboratory’, which engages in product 
design and development for the local market (2.). The highest order activity constitutes an 
‘international interdependent R&D-laboratory’, which is more extensively integrated with other 
globally-based R&D-centres of the TNC than to the firm’s production sites within the host country. 
Its objective is to develop new ideas for the global operations of the TNC (1.) (Dicken, 2003a, a 
complementary taxonomy is offered by Ronstadt (1977) who distinguishes technology transfer, 
indigenous-, global- and corporate-technology units).  
Of course, the choice of a particular type of R&D-facility depends on the company’s particular 
R&D-strategy. Traditionally, TNCs follow a centre-for-global strategy by developing new products 
at home for the global market. But especially in important markets TNC may desire R&D-units that 
develop products independently for the host market (local-for-local strategy) or even the global 
market (local-for-global strategy). Ambitious TNCs try to organise a network of globally dispersed 
R&D-units, which cooperate to develop new products for the global market (global-for-global 
strategy) (Ghoshal & Barlett, 1990). Frequently a TNC utilises different strategies for different 
products in order to reap the greatest benefits. 
Considering the different types and motives attributed to foreign R&D-facilities, Kuemmerle (1999) 
distinguishes between R&D-units that are concerned with the exploitation of the firm’s knowledge 
stock, which he labels ‘home-base-exploiting’ (HBE), and units that aim at augmenting that existing 
knowledge stock of the firm, named ‘home-base-augmenting’ (HBA) FDI. HBE is responsible for 
adapting existing products to local needs and transferring knowledge and prototypes from the firm’s 
home location and therefore follows existing production abroad (see also Hotz-Hart, 2000). There is 
evidence that much of the technology that is developed by TNCs abroad is of the HBE-type, 
because it falls into the core areas of the firms’ competence, “suggesting that adaptation and 
technical support to foreign manufacturing plants continues to be a major explanatory factor” 
(Cantwell & Iammarino, 2003: 4) for the dispersion of multinational R&D-activities. 
In contrast, HBA has the task to extend existing core competencies and to broaden the knowledge 
base of the firm. Its locational requirements are fairly different from those of HBEs. In order to 
participate in innovative networks, to benefit from spillovers and to tap into local knowledge, they 
need to be located in metropolitan areas that host a high density of high-class R&D-facilities (public 
or private), service companies and institutions as well as a large pool of highly educated engineers 
and scientists (e.g. Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2004). Furthermore, different locations offer different 
specialisations, and it is necessary for TNC to ‘be there’ in order to make use of this localized 
knowledge. Reddy (2000: 27) evaluates this access to “a wide range of innovative stimuli and 
sources of scientific creativity” as the key driving force behind the globalization of R&D by TNCs.  
Even though this kind of localized knowledge is increasingly distributed internationally, it is 
predominately sited within the Triad of Europe, Japan, and North America (Hotz-Hart, 2000; 
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Dunning, 2000a). More than 90% of the world’s industrial R&D is still carried out within the 
industrialised world (Reddy, 2000). Nevertheless, the distribution of locations of innovative stimuli, 
key knowledge and sources of creativity is patently uneven within the industrialized world, still 
there is “some suggestion that the major metropolitan areas and their surrounding hinterlands are 
becoming the loci of agglomerative knowledge enhancing activity” (Dunning, 2000a: 125). 
Furthermore, initial empirical results suggest that most of the R&D performed in late-industrialising 
countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore is of the HBE type (Revilla Diez & Berger, 
2005). 
There is almost no internalisation of headquarters (HQ) which are overwhelmingly located in the 
TNC home country (Dicken, 2003a: pp. 238). However, many TNCs pursue a regionalisation 
strategy and have established regional headquarters (RHQ). Their main objective is to safeguard 
the HQ’s influence. They coordinate and control the activities of the affiliates in a region 
(understood as a supranational entity) and mediate between the HQ and the affiliates. Furthermore, 
RHQ are part of the TNC’s ‘intelligence gathering’ system, that perceives and understands changes 
in the host region (ibid., Yeung et al., 2001). RHQ are mainly located in world or global cities 
(Sassen, 1991) that offer agglomeration economies, excellent transport and communication 
infrastructure. In Asia RHQ are mainly situated in Singapore and Hong Kong (Yeung et al., 2001). 
Taken together, these changes have not diminished the explanatory power of the OLI framework, 
since FDI in R&D-facilities are also in line with this framework. Still, the dynamics between the 
three components have changed: Since the traditional hierarchical organisation has given way to 
more flexible integrated network organisation of innovative cross-border activities, the 
internalisation-advantage should be seen in a different light. Additionally, there is a stronger 
interaction between the ownership- and the location-advantage (Cantwell & Iammarino, 2003). It 
can be argued that a present firm’s ownership-advantages are dependant on previous location-
factors, while on the other hand a country’s locational-advantage can benefit from locally based 
companies (local or foreign) with strong ownership-advantages (Narula, 1996).  
2.3.3 TNCs in networks of externalised relationships 
TNCs are not only involved in economic operations where they own stakes of an enterprise within 
the host country, but also influence domestic companies by including them in their production 
network or by forging alliances with them. This section briefly summarises the core 
conceptualisations, namely strategic alliances, production networks, global commodity chains and 
global production networks, because the interviews presented in chapter 6 will take account of these 
types of relationships in Thailand.  
 
Strategic alliances 
“Strategic alliances are formal agreements between firms to pursue a specific strategic objective” 
(Dicken, 2003a: 260). The objectives behind alliances can be related to research (e.g. cooperative 
R&D), technology (e.g. technology sharing or cross licensing) or market activities (e.g. joint 
distribution) (ibid.). The number of strategic alliances has increased rapidly in the last few decades 
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(Linden, 2000, Hagedoorn & Osborn, 2002, Dunning, 1997) and are forged mostly between 
competitors (Dicken, 2003a: 258). The share of international partnerships in newly established 
R&D-alliances is more or less constant at around 60%, with a strong focus on the Triad countries 
(North-America, Europe, Japan) (based on from 1960 to 1998 figures, Hagedoorn & Osborn, 2002, 
Narula, 2003). Consequently, strategic arrangements are not yet of significant importance in late-
industrialising countries such as Thailand. 
 
Production networks 
A large and increasing proportion of inputs in the manufacturing process are purchased externally, 
either ‘off-the-shelf’ from independent suppliers or through long-term relationships with 
independent suppliers. The latter case, called subcontracting, is of increasing importance, and 
reflects a situation in between internalised production and arm’s length market transaction. In 
industrial subcontracting the customer either procures certain components from the subcontractor or 
sources entire parts of the production process out.  
Motivation for subcontracting can be threefold: either the subcontractor possesses sophisticated 
skills and equipment for specialised functions, or is able to produce components of the process at a 
lower price, or the subcontractor offers extra capacity in times of high demand (Dicken, 2003a). 
Frequently, subcontracting is connected with knowledge and technology transfer, because the 
customer does not only provide detailed design or specifications, but also gives assistance in 
choosing and purchasing the right equipment, materials and components. Additionally, the 
customer may offer training, technical advice or even financial assistance (ibid.). Hobday (1995a) 
has shown that for East Asia subcontracting (in the form of OEM, see 2.1.3.4) posed as an 
important means for technological upgrading. 
 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) 
A GCC has been defined as “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986: 159) and consist of “sets of interorganizational 
networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to 
one another within the world economy” (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994: 2). GCC refer to all 
activities involved in design, production and marketing of a product. It can be either producer-
driven, i.e. organised by a large manufacturing TNC, or buyer-driven, when for example a large 
retailer coordinates the network. It includes the input-output and governance structure as well as the 
geographical configuration with its social and institutional context (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994: 
pp. 96). As distinctive characteristics, the GCC framework includes an international dimension, 
regards the power exercised by the organiser of the chain, considers the coordination of the chain 
as a source of competitive advantage and takes into account organisational learning as the main 
mechanism by which firms establish their position within the chain (Gereffi, 1999: 34). The central 
hypothesis of the GCC concept states, “development requires linking-up with the most significant 
‘lead firms’ in an industry” (ibid.).  
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Global Production Networks (GPN) 
The concept behind GPNs is based partly on that of GCCs. It has been simultaneously elaborated by 
Ernst (e.g. Ernst, 2002, Ernst & Kim, 2002) and a group based around Peter Dicken, Henry Yeung 
and Jeffery Henderson (e.g. Henderson et al., 2002). In Ernst’s perspective a GPN is dominated by 
and built around a ‘flagship’, i.e. a large TNC. It includes TNC-affiliates and joint ventures as well 
as its subcontractors, service providers and partners in strategic alliances. The purpose of the GPN 
is to provide the flagship “with quick and low-cost access to resources, capabilities and knowledge 
that are complementary to its core competencies” (Ernst & Kim, 2002: 1420). The flagship is able 
to control the GPN and exercise power and pressure upon its members because it controls resources 
and capabilities for innovation, transactions and knowledge exchange within the GPN (ibid.: 1422).  
The GPN concept elaborated by Henderson et al. (2002) provides a broader analytical framework 
which pays attention to the structure and power relations within networks of firms involved in the 
development, production and marketing of a product. It additionally includes aspects of value 
creation and transfer, of institutions which influence firm strategy and the implications of these for 
technology upgrading, value-adding and capturing (ibid.: 447). Basically, three conceptual 
categories are considered: a) value (creation, enhancement and capture), b) power (corporate, 
collective and institutional) and finally c) embeddedness (either territorial or network) (ibid.: pp. 
448). 
The merits of these approaches are that they try to break up a state-centric view, take international 
connections seriously, and include aspects of power in the analysis. Because empirical observations 
underline the importance of external relationships for technological learning in late-industrialising 
countries (see chapter 2.1.4), this is a central undertaking. Accordingly, aspects of power will be 
taken up to a certain extent in the analysis of the interviews (chapter 6). The analysis in chapter 5, 
however, is limited to TNC-affiliates that are located in Thailand. Consequently, the next section 
considers possible impacts TNC-affiliates may have on the host economy. 
2.3.4 Impact of TNC-affiliates on host regions 
Generally, the establishment of a TNC-affiliate is an investment, whose impact on the host 
economy can – as a first step – be analysed from a post-Keynesian growth-theory perspective. 
Keynes (1936) pointed towards the income-effect caused by the investment, which increases the 
national product. Moreover, extra production capacity is added to the local capital basis (capacity-
effect) (Domar, 1946, Harrod, 1948). Once set up, a TNC-affiliates interacts with the host economy 
through various linkages: It might procure inputs and services from domestic sources (backward 
linkages) and sell to domestic customers for further processing (forward linkages, on both cf. 
Hirschman, 1958). Additionally, TNC-affiliates import and export goods and services contributing 
to a countries trade balance. Furthermore, the presence of a TNC-affiliate creates direct and indirect 
employment opportunities (labour market effects and additional income-effects) and demands in 
domestic capital markets. Moreover, TNC-affiliates may generate profits, which – despite the 
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frequent practice of transfer pricing9 – will raise local tax-revenues. In general, all of these local 
activities have multiplier effect and trigger further rounds of income generation within the local 
economy. Finally, TNC-affiliates can compete with local firms, which can in turn threaten the 
survival of existing firms and spur the formation of new ones (competitive effect) (see Dicken, 
2003a: pp. 278, Blomström & Kokko, 2001, Schätzl, 2000: pp. 97, Schätzl, 2001: pp.143). 
Dicken (2003a: pp. 278) identifies five potential impact areas, displayed in Tab. 2.12: capital, 
technology, linkages, industrial structure and employment (see also UNCTAD, 1999: pp.149), 
while this thesis concentrates primarily on technology and linkages. Given this, the impact of an 
affiliate is determined by its own characteristics: mode of entry, functions, operational attributes, 
and the characteristics of the host economy, for example, the dynamic of the local business 
environment (Holm et al., 2003) and the policies adopted towards the promotion of FDI. 
 
Tab. 2.12: The major dimensions of the potential impact of TNCs on host economies 
Nature of the foreign-controlled 
unit 
Nature of the host economy Major areas of potential TNC impact 
 
Mode of entry 
1. establishment of new unit 
2. acquisition of existing firm 
3. joint venture with local firm 
 
Function 
1. to utilise local resources 
2. to serve host-country markets 
(import substitution) 
3. to serve export markets (export 
platform) 
 
Attributes 
1. industry type 
2. technology 
3. scale of operations 
4. extent of integration within parent 
company 
 
- level of economic development 
- size of the economy 
- resource endowment 
- technological base 
- social, political, cultural 
characteristics, etc. 
 
Capital and finance 
- initial inflow of capital 
- capital raised locally 
- profits retained locally 
- profits remitted to parent company 
- transfer pricing 
- cost to host country of obtaining plant 
 
Technology 
- extent of technology transfer 
- appropriateness of technology 
- cost to host country 
 
Trade and linkages 
- propensity to export 
- propensity to import materials and 
components 
- use of local suppliers (extent of local 
linkages) 
 
Industrial structure and 
entrepreneurship 
- effect on concentration of industry 
- effect on competitive position of 
existing indigenous firms 
- effect on formation of new indigenous 
firms 
 
Employment and labour issues 
- volume of employment 
- type of employment (skills, gender) 
- wage levels and recruitment 
- labour relations 
- stability 
Source: Dicken, 2003a: 280; adapted 
 
                                                 
 9 Many cross-border transactions take place within the corporate network. The TNC is fixing the price for these 
intermediate products, allowing for adjustments in order to minimise taxes payable to national governments (cf. 
Dicken, 2003a: pp.282). 
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Most important for the development of technological capabilities in local firms are productivity 
and technology spillovers which “take place when the entry or presence of TNC-affiliates lead to 
productivity or efficiency benefits for the host country’s local firms, and the TNCs are not able to 
internalize the full value of these benefits” (Blomström & Kokko, 2001: 440). These spillovers are 
basically knowledge externalities (Breschi & Lissoni, 2001: 977, see chapter 2.1.3.1) that are bound 
to linkages between TNC-affiliates and domestic firms (Blomström & Kokko, 2001: 442; for a 
literature review of empirical studies on technological spillover from FDI see Fan, 2002).  
 
In particular backward linkages are seen “as the main vehicle to promote technological spillovers 
from TNCs” (Altenburg, 2000: 9), because they are an efficient means for the exchange of 
information, technology and skills. This is especially true for “transactions that go beyond arm’s 
length, one-off relations (as in buying standardized products off the shelf) and involve longer-term 
relations between firms” (UNCTAD, 2001:127). Because these linkages can promote a domestic 
supplier’s production efficiency, productivity growth, technological and managerial capabilities as 
well as market diversification and export growth (UNCTAD, 2001: 129). However, local suppliers 
must first qualify for supplying TNC-affiliates on a long-term basis. For this, they have to meet a 
TNC’s requirements in respect to quality, price, and delivery. Otherwise, an affiliate may import 
inputs, produce them in-house or procure them from ‘follow-source suppliers’, i.e. firms that 
already supply the TNC at its home base and follow it to production sites worldwide (ibid., Ivarsson 
& Alvstam, 2004). If a locally-owned supplier wins recognition, the TNC-affiliate can also help it 
meet demands by providing assistance. This assistance includes transferring technology, providing 
training, sharing information and offering financial support (UNCTAD, 2001, see Tab. 2.13) Caves 
(1999) points out, that TNC-affiliates have a strong self-interest in improving the performance of 
domestic suppliers. In his view, the degree of assistance offered correlates to the degree at which 
benefits are recaptured from the spillover of the affiliate. 
In terms of forward linkages customers benefit from the market entry of TNC-affiliates, since 
these tend to improve the quality and/or lower the prices for inputs. Additionally, TNCs often 
outsource their distribution activities to domestic service or trade firms (e.g. car dealer). This goes 
hand in hand with comprehensive training and technology transfer (e.g. marketing know-how, 
personnel training, raw material procurement etc.), given that these outlets represent the trademark 
to the customer. The franchise system is a special case in point.  
For industrial buyers, TNC-affiliates often provide assistance during the sale of capital goods, e.g. 
they train the personnel on how to operate and maintain the equipment (often not only including 
know-how, but also a certain extent of know-why knowledge). Frequently, they also offer 
information on international quality standards and market trends (Altenburg, 2000: pp.13). Having 
said that, Blomström and Kokko emphasise, that there is much less evidence of forward than 
backward linkages (2001: 443). 
 
Another frequent and important link exists between TNC-affiliates and public institutions, such 
as universities, public R&D-institutes or training institutions like tertiary education institutions. 
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These include collaboration on research as well as on training. The latter is especially common, 
seeing as “all new technologies need shop-floor, technical and managerial training” (UNCTAD, 
1999: 214). TNCs offer attractive job opportunities, which create an incentive for prospective 
students e.g. to choose engineering or science courses (Blomström & Kokko, 2002: 16). 
Furthermore TNC-affiliates offer scholarships, sponsoring, advice on the curriculum, material, and 
access to relevant new technologies (ibid., UNCTAD, 1999 214 & pp. 273). However, “the 
existence of linkages does not prove that there are spillovers, although the two are probably closely 
related” (Blomström & Kokko, 2001: 442), because even if the TNC charges the domestic company 
for its support services, it is not always able to retrieve all of the value from the resulting 
productivity increase (ibid.). 
Tab. 2.13: Possible assistance by TNC-affiliates to domestic suppliers  
Area Mechanisms 
Transferring technology  
a) Product technology 
 Provision of proprietary product know-how 
 Transfer of product designs and technical specifications 
 Technical consultations with suppliers to help them master new technologies 
 Feedback on product performance to help suppliers improve performance 
 Collaboration in R&D 
b) Process technology 
 Provision of machinery and equipment to suppliers 
 Technical support on production planning, quality management, inspection and 
testing 
 Visits to supplier facilities to advise on layout, operations and quality 
 Formation of “cooperation clubs” for interacting with or among suppliers on 
technical issues 
 Assistance to employees setting up their own firm 
c) Organizational and managerial know-how 
 Assistance with inventory management and the use of just-in-time and other 
systems 
 Assistance in implementing quality assurance systems 
 Introduction to new practices such as network management or financial, purchase 
and marketing techniques 
Providing training 
 Training courses in affiliates for suppliers’ personnel 
 Offering access to internal training programmes in affiliates or abroad 
 Sending teams of experts to suppliers to provide in-plant training 
 Promotion of cooperative learning among suppliers 
Sharing information 
 Informal exchanges of information on business plans and future requirements 
 Provision of annual purchase orders (for precocious planning) 
 Provision of market information (particular on foreign markets) 
 Encouraging suppliers to join business associations 
Providing financial support 
 Providing special or favourable pricing for suppliers’ products 
 Helping suppliers’ cash flow (e.g. through advance purchase and payments etc.) 
 Longer-term assistance through provision of capital, guarantees for bank loans, 
leasing, etc. 
Source: UNCTAD, 2001: pp. 142 
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For the competitive effect on local firms, the impact can be mixed. On the one hand, increased 
competition might lead to enhanced efforts from domestic companies in terms of technological 
upgrading. Subsequently, these companies may even enter highly competitive export markets. On 
the other hand, if the technology gap between TNC-affiliates and domestic companies is too large, 
domestic firms might be driven out of the market (crowding out effect; see e.g. UNCTAD, 1999: 
171). Additionally, TNCs may lead to spin-offs, i.e. when former employees of the TNC-affiliates 
use the acquired knowledge to set up their own enterprise. This enriches the economic structure of 
the host economy and contributes to the diffusion of technology and knowledge (UNCTAD, 2001: 
131). 
Other spillover effects include demonstration effects, i.e. technologies or organisational procedure 
applied by TNC-affiliates can be copied or adapted by local companies observing TNC-affiliates’ 
practices. Moreover, knowledge and skill spillovers take place via personnel mobility: TNC-
affiliates tend to use more advanced technologies and management practices and therefore place 
higher requirements on their personnel, which is as a consequence subject to more training. Due to 
labour mobility, knowledge and skills may spread through the host economy (Altenburg, 2000: pp. 
17). However, the quality of technology and know-how transferred by TNCs to their affiliates in 
late-industrialising countries is not always state-of-the-art. The quality depends on host countries’ 
institutional development, such as the protection of property (intellectual) rights, the rule of law, 
degree of corruption etc. (Nunnenkamp & Spatz, 2003b: 3). 
The intensity of a TNC-affiliate’s integration in a host region’s networks can be termed 
‘embeddedness’. Generally, embeddedness has been described as follows: “The more dependent 
the subsidiary is on its counterparts to pursue its activities and the more adapted it is to its 
counterparts, the more embedded it is” (Andersson & Forsgren, 2002: 346). Since embeddedness 
can relate to the integration in networks inside and outside the TNC, corporate and external 
embeddedness are distinguished from each other (Dicken et al., 1994, Andersson & Forsgren, 
2002). External embeddedness can either be local or non-local. Important general indicators for 
embeddedness are flows of good and services between the counterparts (ibid.: 348). The “most 
important single indicator for local embeddedness relates to supplier relationships” (Dicken et al., 
1994: 38). Local embeddedness therefore reflects the choice and autonomy of the TNC-affiliate and 
the existence of appropriate partners in the host region (ibid.: 39). Hence TNC-affiliates can be 
classified based on the intensity of their corporate and external embeddedness TNC (see Andersson 
& Forsgren, 2002, Kutschker & Schurig, 2002, Andersson et al., 2001, Andersson et al., 1999, 
Holm et al., 2003). 
Moran (2001: 62) asserts that the strength of embeddedness in the TNC-sourcing-network (i.e. the 
corporate embeddedness) strongly influences the affiliates contribution to the host economy (see 
Tab. 2.14). He concludes that the “interaction with the parent […] creates a particular dynamic 
channel for bringing new technology and best business practices into the host economy. The 
benefits extend from the affiliate itself to local suppliers, with a relatively strong likelihood of 
generating spillovers and externalities for the host economy more broadly” (ibid.: pp. 62). 
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Consequently, internal and external forms of embeddedness are important determinants for the 
successful transfer and diffusion of internationally available technology within the host economy.  
Tab. 2.14: Schematic comparison of foreign affiliates closely integrated into the parent’s global sourcing network 
with foreign affiliates that are not 
 Foreign affiliates closely 
integrated into parent’s global 
sourcing network 
Foreign affiliates not closely 
integrated into parent’s global 
sourcing network 
Predominant 
characteristics of 
foreign affiliate 
wholly owned,  
few domestic-content or 
technology-sharing requirements, 
full-scale size,  
largely export-oriented 
subject to joint-venture, domestic-
content, technology-sharing 
requirements, often boutique or 
less than full-scale size, largely 
domestic oriented 
Foreign affiliate’s 
position in relation to 
industry’s competitive 
frontier 
cutting edge of technology, 
business practices, quality control; 
near real-time pace of upgrading 
older technology (3 – 10 years 
older), less advanced business 
practices and quality control;  
lags in pace of upgrading 
Backward linkages highly variable, but often extensive 
with local suppliers enjoying 
economies of scale 
specified by domestic-content and 
joint venture requirements, but 
limited by small scale 
Local suppliers’ 
position in relation to 
industry’s competitive 
frontier 
extensive assistance on the part of 
foreign affiliate in enhancing 
efficiency and quality control of 
local suppliers 
less extensive assistance on the 
part of foreign affiliate in enhancing 
efficiency and quality control of 
local suppliers 
Externalities OEM and REM qualification and 
export coaching for local suppliers, 
movement of skilled workers and 
managers within host economy 
some movement of skilled workers 
and managers within host economy 
OEM = original equipment manufacturer; REM= replacement equipment manufacturer; Source: Moran, 2001: 62 
Additional determinates for local embeddedness include (based on UNCTAD, 2001: pp. 137): 
• Investment motives and strategies: domestic-market oriented affiliates source more 
locally, than export-market oriented. This is due to lower quality and price requirements of 
the domestic market and higher expertise of local suppliers on the demands of the domestic 
market . Moreover, TNC-affiliates try to avoid exchange rate risks. Another factor is the 
structure and embeddedness into (global) production networks; 
• Technology and market position: standardised, mature technology is likely to be procured 
off- the shelf- while specialised, advanced products and technologies are sourced either in-
house or in long-term relationships;  
• Role assigned to affiliates: greater autonomy frequently leads to more local linkages; 
• Age of foreign affiliate: local procurement by affiliates tends to increase over time; 
• Mode of entry: mergers and acquisitions have stronger local linkages than greenfield 
investments, since they acquire existing linkages; 
• Size of affiliate: large affiliates source less locally than small affiliates; 
• Sector: different industries offer different opportunities for local suppliers to engage in 
supply chains of foreign affiliates. 
 
 64
The reduction of the term embeddedness to a simple synonym of external economic linkages is 
strongly criticised by Oinas (1997: 26). Together with Glückler (2001) and Hess (2004) he stresses 
that the original notion of embeddedness as introduced by Polanyi (1944) and Granovetter (1985) 
emphasises the importance of social relations, concrete personal relations as well as the structures 
or networks of these relation, for economic activities. The importance of embeddedness stems from 
its trust generating effect (Granovetter, 1985: 490) which reduces uncertainty and opportunistic 
behaviour in economic transactions. Embeddedness is seen as a four dimensional concept, including 
cognitive, cultural, political and structural embeddedness. The key element is structural 
embeddedness, which describes how an actor is integrated into networks fostering knowledge 
transfer and learning (Taylor & Leonard, 2002: 2, Boschma et al., 2002: 26). It is associated with 
four common features (Grabher, 1993a, Taylor & Leonard, 2002):  
• reciprocity: transactions between firms occur frequently and while not reaching 
equivalence in every transaction do reach an approximate balance over time 
• interdependence: trust and “mutual adaptation and orientation” (Grabher, 1993a: 9) 
in long-term relationships foster knowledge transfer between firms 
• loose couplings: although firms change their cooperation partners frequently in 
order to access various sources of information, they are able to sustain a stable 
framework of interaction (see also Lundvall, 1993)  
• asymmetric power relations: which takes into account that networks do not only 
consist of collaboration and partnership but also dominance and exploitation 
between unequal exchange partners (Hakansson & Johanson, 1993). 
 
From a typical perspective in economic geography, embeddedness refers to the involvement in local 
social relations, even though this has not been stated in the original formulation by Granovetter 
(1985) (Oinas, 1997: 26). In economic geography the concept “has been widely adopted because it 
revives the idea that firms are firmly linked to their local production environment […]” (Boschma 
et al., 2002: 22). Hence it includes popular notions in the subject such as untraded 
interdependencies (Storper & Scott, 1995, Storper, 1997), institutional thickness (Amin & Thrift, 
1994b, a), institutional endowment (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999) or social capital (Putnam, 1993, 
Morgan, 1997, Boschma et al., 2002). All of which take account of the unique socio-cultural 
properties of a specific region, such as formal and informal institutions, that shape firms’ behaviour, 
inter-firm-cooperation and interactive learning (see chapter 2.1.3.1 and 2.2.2). However, the ‘all-
inclusiveness’ reduces the usefulness of the concept, because “it encompasses too many things with 
the result of being ambiguous” (Oinas, 1997: 26). 
 
Despite this criticism, chapter 5 and 6 will use the term embeddedness in order to describe input/ 
output as well as external R&D, innovation and human resource development linkages within the 
host economy. For the objective of this thesis this ‘superficial’ usage of the term is sufficient, 
because it describes the sufficiently the local involvement that can be considered a pre-requisite for 
local learning opportunities.  
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However, concerning the involvement of TNCs in local learning networks Gertler (2003) concludes 
– based on empirical research – that “the tendency for TNCs to embed themselves in local learning 
relationships abroad seems still to be quite limited at best” (ibid.: 112). 
 
In summary, the benefits of TNCs as enumerated above are that “they create an inflow of funds in 
the form of foreign exchange, helping to plug both the savings and the foreign exchange gaps. They 
are expected to create employment, increase exports, bring in new technology, managerial and 
marketing skills, and improve competition in relatively lethargic markets” (Kambhampati, 2004: 
135).  
Conversely, TNCs tend to receive criticism for the very same reasons. TNCs often raise credits 
within the country. Consequently, the capital transfer is not as high as assumed and domestic 
borrowing on tight financial markets can lead to crowding out effects, i.e. local companies might 
not be able to acquire funds. Tax and import duty exemptions as well as transfer pricing can result 
in meagre revenues for the state from the TNC-activity, while at the same time, states often need to 
invest in infrastructure, etc. in order to attract TNCs. When domestic firms are weak, TNCs can 
create monopolistic or oligopolistic market power, driving even fairly competitive local firms out of 
the market. This can result in a net-loss of jobs, since many local companies are more labour-
intensive than modern TNC-affiliates. Above all, if TNCs use ‘inappropriate technology’ (e.g. 
highly automated production technology in countries with abundant unskilled labour) local 
employment effects as well as opportunities for technology spillovers (when the technology is 
simply not adequate for domestic companies) are sharply diminished. Some TNC-affiliates also use 
local employees on the shop floor level only, while all management positions are held by 
expatriates, reducing learning opportunities. Moreover, if the labour market for qualified personnel 
is tight, demand from TNC-affiliates might leave domestic companies without adequate staff. 
Furthermore, economically weak countries can become economically and politically dependent on 
large TNC-affiliates. Finally, TNC have been criticised for re-locating environmental harmful 
production into late-industrialising countries (see Kambhampati, 2004:pp. 135, Hemmer, 2002: pp. 
337, Altenburg, 2001, Schätzl, 2000: pp. 198, Dicken, 2003a: pp. 278, Todaro & Smith, 2003: pp. 
638, Caves, 1996: pp. 224). More generally, for example Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2003a) do not 
find empirical evidence for a significant correlation between FDI and economic growth in 
developing host countries. 
 
National vs. regional impacts 
Only some of these impacts are of truly national nature, such as tax revenues or competition effects. 
Most impacts are instead limited to a regional level. As has been stated in chapter 2.3.2, TNCs 
concentrate in the most conducive locations in a country, mostly in metropolitan regions that offer 
significant agglomeration benefits. Consequently, many of the impacts from TNC-affiliates are 
restricted to these agglomerations. For example, many TNC-affiliates apply a just-in-time sourcing 
that requires their suppliers to be located within a certain distance. As a result, backward linkages 
will not affect local firms in remote places. Another example is knowledge spillovers that are 
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facilitated by proximity (see 2.1.3.1, 2.2.2), therefore benefiting local firms in the vicinity of the 
spillover source. 
Thus, by being part of an agglomeration TNC-affiliates may increase the agglomeration effects by 
inducing circular-caused cumulative processes (Myrdal, 1957), i.e. the attraction of even more 
production factors, which encourage further concentration of economic activity leading to spatial 
disparities in the host country. However, according to the polarization-reversal-hypothesis 
(Richardson, 1980) these concentration effects tend to decrease over time, as agglomeration costs 
will finally lead to re-location or new industry locations, first in the hinterland and later in sub-
centres within the country, resulting in a more equal distribution of economic activity.  
Nevertheless, the presence of TNC-affiliates in late-industrialising countries initially fosters a 
(simplified) dualistic industrial structure in terms of technological sophistication and market 
orientation (technologically advanced, foreign-owned, export oriented firms vs. technologically 
weaker, locally-owned, domestic oriented firms; e.g. Ernst, 2002: 500) as well as dualistic spatial 
structures (thriving agglomerations vs. backward periphery).  
2.4 The potential contribution of TNCs to host regions’ system of 
innovation – deducing working hypothesis 
The previous sections state that the main challenge faced by (latecomer) firms in late-industrialising 
countries is to catch up with their competitors in industrialised countries. The main objective hereby 
is to develop technological capabilities in order to upgrade technological performance, to develop 
innovation capabilities and to capture a more generous piece of the value-chain. The development 
of technological capabilities requires technological learning, which is a time consuming and costly 
exercise. Important inputs for technological learning are learning opportunities (learning by 
interacting), the development of absorptive capacity (especially via personnel training) and the 
utilisation of advanced technology from abroad via channels of technology transfer.  
These efforts have to be set within the context of the national, regional or sectoral system of 
innovation, which strongly influences firm behaviour and opportunities. The SI-approach describes 
learning and co-operation opportunities by evaluating the stocks of the system, the quantity and 
quality of suitable partners, and assesses the flows within the system by considering the linkages. 
Furthermore, it takes determinants of firm behaviour into account by looking at incentives and 
support for learning and innovation in regard to policies, market conditions, available funds, 
prevailing attitudes and norms, etc.  
Within the innovation systems of late-industrialising countries transnational corporations are 
important actors because they possess several owner specific-advantages vis-à-vis domestic firms, 
such as sophisticated, modern technologies, advanced organisational and technological capabilities, 
market access, etc. Moreover, they are embedded in transnational corporate networks that can 
provide easier access to internationally available technology and knowledge. Hence, TNC-affiliates 
can have positive effects on the host economy, especially when they are the source of spillovers that 
enhance technological learning by local firms. 
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In the following the possible positive and negative impacts of TNC-affiliates on their host’s 
innovation system are summarised. Since an SI consists of components (actors), their relations 
(links) and attributes (properties of components and links) (chapter 2.2), the impacts are categorised 
respectively. Positive impacts include: 
Components (Actors): 
• TNC-affiliates improve the SI by ‘simply being there’. They are additional actors in the 
system and consequently additional potential network partners for domestic firms.  
• TNC-affiliates tend to bring with them follow-source suppliers, adding new actors to the SI. 
Mostly, these follow source suppliers ‘fill a gap’ in the domestic economy, which improves 
the system. 
• There may be spin-offs from TNC-affiliates adding actors to the SI. 
• TNC-affiliates can participate in the creation of new organisations, such as industry lobby 
groups, specialised training facilities etc., which can in turn enhance linkages and/or quality 
of actors. 
• TNCs may set up own training facilities or might donate or sponsor university chairs. 
Attributes of actors 
• TNCs operate on global markets and must be globally competitive. This requires them to 
apply the latest technology and management practises. TNC-affiliates bring these methods 
and technologies (mostly) with them to late-industrialising countries, offering domestic 
companies access to these technologies via conscious assistance or unintended spillover 
effects. Therefore, TNC-affiliates offer learning opportunities, which can lead to improved 
domestic company performance and, consequently, to improved domestic actors within the 
SI. 
• Most TNC-affiliates source locally to a certain degree. If they do not bring in follow source 
suppliers they rely on locally owned suppliers, which they push and assist to meet their high 
requirements. Again, this increases the quality of actors within the SI.  
• Some TNC-affiliates contribute to the quality of training/ university courses by giving 
advice on curricula, providing equipment and/or offering job opportunities. 
• TNC-affiliates in late-industrialising countries are frequently in a strong political position, 
because these countries are to a certain degree dependent on TNC- investment. Therefore, 
they have influence on national politics and may try to improve the framework conditions 
for learning and innovation.  
• TNC-affiliates employ people, who are subject to training on-the-job with its subtle 
indoctrination of modern organisation and working methods. If these employees move to 
other employers, they can transfer this knowledge to other companies or, in the least, other 
companies might benefit from further educated personnel. 
Relations (Linkages) and their attributes 
• Obviously, most TNC-affiliates have some local linkages, adding to the density of the 
knowledge and collaboration network in the SI. Moreover, they often organise or motivate 
supplier clubs, thus creating new linkages between actors of the SI. 
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• Some TNC-affiliates establish linkages to horizontal partners, esp. to training facilities and 
research institutions/ university. 
• In most late-industrialising countries an SI is still developing rather than already of mature 
nature – TNC-affiliates with their experience of ‘full blown’ SI can contribute to the 
development of the SI, i.e. fostering linkages, if they conceive any benefit from doing so. 
 
However, TNC-affiliates might also be indifferent to or even have negative impacts on the SI. In 
terms of components and relations TNCs may exclude themselves from local cooperation 
networks: With their follow-source suppliers they might simply replicate networks from their home 
base or solely rely on international networks that exclude local actors. Furthermore, they might 
exercise pressure on local suppliers or associated companies not to interact autonomously with third 
parties, but insist on being the interface for every kind of external collaboration, thereby restricting 
opportunities for interactive learning. Generally, local involvement in networks depends on the 
degree “commitment” TNC-affiliates show towards the host country. Some TNC-affiliates feel a 
certain responsibility to interact locally and improve local conditions, while others simply operate 
in isolation. 
When TNCs seize local resources (e.g. human capital) this can have negative impacts on the 
attributes of other actors, as they might limit the development possibilities for local companies due 
to an absolute lack of these resources. Moreover, prominent TNC-affiliates might distract the 
attention and care of local policies/ regulations from the need of local companies, even though the 
latter might be even more important from an endogenous development strategy point of view (e.g. 
Maier & Tödtling, 2002: pp. 192), and for network collaboration as well. Certainly, the degree of 
potential impacts from TNC-affiliates on the host SI depends strongly on the specific characteristics 
of the TNC-affiliates (see 2.3.4).  
The subsequent analysis will be threefold: 
A  Analysis of existing studies and secondary data on the Thai innovation system and its 
components (chapter 4). 
B  Analysis of the quantitative survey data in Thailand, Singapore and Penang. The analysis 
will concentrate on the possible impact of manufacturing TNC-affiliates on the SI by 
questioning their suitability as collaboration partners and technology senders. This is 
achieved by evaluating their technological capabilities, absorptive capacity and 
collaboration activity vis-à-vis local firms. Additionally, advanced firms will be scrutinised 
to see if local firms find sophisticated counterparts in this group. Moreover, the analysis will 
pinpoint key characteristics of advanced and embedded firms and establish major 
bottlenecks in the innovation system (chapter 5). 
C  Analysis of interviews by the author in the hard disk drive and automotive industry, to 
enquire into the state of technological capabilities, the degree of embeddedness, the 
mechanisms of product and process developments as well as the perception of bottlenecks in 
the system (chapter 6). 
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The key questions leading the analysis in part A, as stated in the introduction, are:  
1. What is the current state of the Thai systems of innovation – which strengths and 
weaknesses can be identified? 
2. What level of quality exists among the primary components of the system, namely firms, 
knowledge-related organisations and government? 
In order to answer the questions brought up in the introduction, part B requires further elaboration. 
In the following, three sets of working hypotheses will be deduced and some further questions for 
explorative statistics raised. 
First, TNCs can be assumed to be superior to locally owned firms, because the status of being a 
TNC implies that it possesses some owner specific-advantages, has a good resource base, operates 
successful in the highly competitive world market and has access to knowledge and technology in 
advanced markets due to its global presence. Hence, TNCs are supposed to have higher capabilities 
than domestic firms. Therefore, the first set of hypotheses is: 
H1: TNC-affiliates are actors with higher capabilities than local firms. Consequently, they are 
suitable contributors to the upgrading of the host countries’ SI. 
 H1a: TNC-affiliates possess higher TCs than local firms. 
 H1b: TNC-affiliates have a higher absorptive capacity than local firms. 
 
If these hypotheses find support in the empirical data, it can be stated that TNC-affiliates in 
Thailand, Penang and Singapore exhibit the necessary pre-conditions for being suitable technology 
transfer senders and useful collaboration partners for domestic firms. However, it inquires into 
neither if (or how) TNC-affiliates interact with other actors nor what contents are transferred in 
these interactions.  
 
Second, late-industrialising economies are typically characterised by an inhomogeneous and 
dichotomised economy of advanced and backward firms. The first set of hypotheses looks at all 
firms, hence considers whether TNC-affiliates are generally appropriate learning partners for local 
firms or not. The second set of hypotheses focuses on the group of advanced firms (i.e. firms that 
are either product or process innovators or carry out R&D; for details see chapter 5.3). What is the 
situation like within this group, can advanced local firms also benefit from advanced TNC-
affiliates? Or do the capabilities of advanced local firms’ actually exceed those of the advanced 
TNC-affiliates? It therefore enquires, if TNC-affiliates are sophisticated enough to be suitable 
transfer and collaboration partners for local firms at different stages of the catching-up process. 
Hence, the second set of hypotheses is: 
H2: Even within the group of advanced firms, TNCs have higher capabilities than local firms. 
 H2a: Advanced TNC-affiliates possess higher TCs than advanced local firms. 
 H2b: Advanced TNC-affiliates have a higher absorptive capacity than advanced local firms. 
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Third, chapter 2.3.4 states that TNC-affiliates are embedded in local and international networks to 
different degrees. Thereby, strongly embedded firms can foster a SI by transferring internationally 
available knowledge and technology to the Thai NSI. Again, it is not possible to measure real flows 
in this section, but to gauge the level of opportunity for these flows to take place. Due to the 
available information, this analysis will again change the focus group. After having analysed first 
all and secondly only advanced firms, this hypothesis will take account of R&D-performing and 
potentially innovating (i.e. other innovation activities than R&D conducting; see chapter 5.3) 
firms. Consequently, the third hypothesis is: 
H3: R&D performing and potentially innovating TNC-affiliates are suitable technology transfer 
partners for local firms, since they are strongly embedded in the host economy and have access 
to foreign/ external technology. 
 
Additionally, there are two further explorative questions, which are of great interest in terms of 
scientific insight and policy recommendations in respect to key characteristics of beneficial TNC-
affiliates: 
Q1: What are key characteristics of advanced TNC-affiliates in Thailand? 
Q2: What are main determinants of embedded TNC-affiliates? 
 Q2a: Considering general embeddedness in R&D and innovation networks. 
 Q2b: Considering the embeddedness in the Thai system of innovation. 
 
The final explorative question relates to external factors of the SI that hinder technological learning 
and upgrading in firms. 
Q3: What are major bottlenecks within the Thai innovations system according to the perception of 
local and foreign firms? 
 
Part C takes a more detailed, qualitative look at the case study sectors. Questions are: 
1. What is the state of technological capabilities in the firms? 
2. How strongly are the firms embedded into the local economy in terms of inputs, outputs and 
external collaborations? 
3. To what extent do the firms carry out process and product innovations? And how is the 
innovation process organised between TNC-affiliates in Thailand and their headquarters 
abroad?  
4. What is the firm’s perspective on the human capital base and how are they trying to improve 
it? 
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3 Research design: indicators, data and methodology 
In order to answer the previously raised questions and to test the stated hypotheses, it is first 
necessary to lay the foundation for the analysis of the empirical quantitative and qualitative data. 
First, this chapter gives an overview of available indicators for measuring technological and 
innovation capabilities and activities. Secondly, it introduces the sampling strategy of the 
quantitative survey and presents information on the representativeness of the data. This section also 
contains information on the benchmark studies in Singapore, Penang and Europe. Thirdly, the 
chapter gives insight into the in-depth interview approach including a custom-tailored matrix on 
technological capabilities. 
3.1 Measuring systems of innovation and technical change at the firm 
level 
In order to measure a NSI, Niosi et al. (1993: pp. 222) propose that the units (organisations), flows 
and performance of the system be measured. With regard to the units, they suggest taking the 
number and relative size of firms, universities, government laboratories etc., the ownership and 
control of these units as well as their regional distribution into account. 
In respect to flows, the authors distinguish the following: financial flows can be measured as the 
shares of publicly and privately funded R&D at GDP (termed gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
(GERD) and business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD)). Technology or knowledge flows 
are appraised via scientific quotations in patents, analysis of co-citations, publications and patent 
records, as well as the analysis of input-output statistics (for embodied technology diffusion) (ibid.). 
Moreover, they take account of interactions initiating knowledge flows. These are difficult to 
quantify and can only be investigated in detailed firm surveys that shed light on co-operation or 
strategic alliances behaviour. The same is true for the spread of social innovations like the use of 
certain organizational innovations such as Kanban, JIT or TQM-systems10. Finally, personal flows 
might as well be accounted for in labour market statistics or gathered from firm surveys (see ibid., 
OECD, 1997b: pp. 7 and 45). 
Indicators for the performance of the system could include patents granted per expenditure or per 
researcher (direct) or figures on the international flows of technologically intensive goods, services 
and payments (indirect) (Niosi et al., 1993: 224). However, these performance indicators cater very 
much to a narrow understanding of a NSI. For late-industrialising countries especially, a wider set 
of indicators is appropriate, including, in particular, information on the education system.  
The European Innovation Scoreboard is a good example of a framework that elaborates upon a set 
of indicators, thus offering a means to evaluate NSIs (EU, 2005). It includes indicators related to 
human resources, knowledge creation, transmission and application as well as finance and output 
                                                 
 10 Kanban: tool for a just-in-time system, maintains an orderly and efficient flow of materials throughout the 
manufacturing process; JIT: a material requirement planning system for a manufacturing process in which there is 
little or no manufacturing material inventory; TQM: Total quality management, an management approach to long-
term success through customer satisfaction by constant quality improvement (American Society for Quality, 2005). 
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(see Tab. 3.1, also indicating the data source). Hereby, it draws heavily from firm-level surveys, 
namely the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Even though these indicators focus on high-
performing countries, some are also available for late-industrialising countries, such as Thailand, 
and will be presented in chapter 4. 
Tab. 3.1: NSI indicators and data source used in the European Innovation Scoreboard 2004 
1. Human resources 
 S&E graduates (‰ of 20 – 29 years age class) / EUROSTAT (Education statistics) 
 Population with tertiary education (% of 25 – 64 years age class) / EUROSTAT (LFS) 
 Participation in life-long learning (% of 25 – 64 years age class) / EUROSTAT (LFS) 
 Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce)/ EUROSTAT 
(LFS) 
 Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) / EUROSTAT (LFS) 
 
2. Knowledge creation 
 Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP) / EUROSTAT (R&D statistics); OECD 
 Business expenditures on R&D (% of GDP) / EUROSTAT (R&D statistics); OECD 
o EPO high-tech patent applications (per million population) / EUROSTAT 
o USPTO high-tech patents granted (per million population) / EUROSTAT 
o EPO patent applications (per million population) / EUROSTAT 
o USPTO patents granted (per million population) / EUROSTAT 
 
3. Transmission and application of knowledge 
 SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs) / EUROSTAT (CIS) 
 SMEs involved in innovation co-operation (% of all SMEs) / EUROSTAT (CIS) 
 Innovation expenditures (% of total turnover) / EUROSTAT (CIS) 
 SMEs using non-technological change (% of all SMEs)/ EUROSTAT (CIS) 
 
4. Innovation finance, output and markets 
 Share of high-tech venture capital investment / EVCA 
 Share of early stage venture capital in GDP / EUROSTAT 
o Sales of ‘new to market’ products (% of total turnover) / EUROSTAT (CIS) 
o Sales of ‘new to the firm but not new to the market’ products (% of total turnover) / 
EUROSTAT (CIS) 
 Internet access / EUROSTAT 
 ICT expenditures (% of GDP) / EUROSTAT 
 Share of manufacturing value-added in high-tech sectors / EUROSTAT (SBS) 
S&E: Science and Engineering, EPO: European Patent Office; USPO: U.S: Patent Office, SME: Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises, LFS: Labour Force Survey, CIS: Community Innovation Survey;    Source: EU, 2005 
Moreover, innovation related indicators have been differentiated into input-, throughput- and output 
indicators (Grupp, 1997: pp. 143, OECD, 2002, OECD, 1997a, Revilla Diez, 2002a: pp. 40). These 
indicators can, in principle, be applied at the country, as well as the firm level. In the following, 
indicators pertaining to the firm level are presented.  
Firstly, due to methodological reasons one must make a distinction between the key terms R&D 
and other innovation activities. The leading guide for R&D-surveys, the OECD’s Frascati manual 
(OECD, 2002: 30) defines that “research and experimental development (R&D) comprise creative 
work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including 
knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications”. In this case, the term R&D subsumes basic research, applied research and 
experimental developments (for examples see OECD, 2002: 81). However, it excludes many 
activities related to innovation which are essential for a firm’s innovation performance, such as 
education and training, acquisition of technology (embodied and disembodied), tooling up and 
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industrial engineering, industrial design, production start-up and marketing for new and improved 
products, etc. (ibid.: pp. 30). For surveying these type of innovation-related activities the OECD 
published the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997a), which covers technological product and process 
innovations. These are defined as new or significantly improved products (ibid.: pp. 31; see chapter 
2.1.3.1). Above all, the activities covered by the Oslo Manual are of relevance to firms in late-
industrialising countries, as these rarely perform clearly articulated R&D (see 2.2.1.2). Moreover, 
the covered activities are related closely to the existence of technological capabilities (see 2.1.2). 
 
Input indicators measure the resources devoted to the innovation process. Traditionally, the main 
indicators are the R&D-intensity (R&D-expenditure per sales) and R&D-personnel intensity (R&D-
personnel in % of total workforce). Since R&D is only one source of new knowledge it is 
appropriate to consider license fees and royalties for the acquisition of external technology in 
addition (Grupp, 1997: 153). Hence, an additionally broad definition of innovation expenditure is 
used (OECD, 1997a), even though this is difficult for firms to report, given that firms do not keep 
separate records of this expenditure (Kleinknecht et al., 2002: 114). Moreover, the qualification 
structure of the R&D-personnel or the workforce can be seen more generally as an input indicator 
(OECD, 2002; Revilla Diez, 2002a). Nevertheless, input indicators have a significant weakness, 
because they can be “used more or less efficiently” (Kleinknecht et al., 2002: 110). For this reason 
indicators capable of measuring further steps in the innovation process must complement them. 
 
Throughput indicators are the result of research activities that have not yet been developed into 
marketable products. The most important indicator is the number of patents, either in relation to the 
R&D-personnel or total employees. Nevertheless, this indicator clearly misses a number of 
innovations, as some innovations are simply not patentable or firms are reluctant to patent 
innovations due to costs, the requirement of disclosure, the limited life-time of the product or the 
perceived time-lead over competitors (e.g. Kleinknecht et al., 2002, Giese & Stoutz, 1998). Further 
throughput indicators are e.g. prototypes, pilot lines or the commercialisation of new knowledge via 
licences (Revilla Diez, 2002a: 43). 
The final set of indicators relates to the primary objective of the innovation process, namely the 
development of new, marketable products or processes. Since it is difficult to measure the true 
innovativeness of new products (e.g. Revilla Diez, 2002a: 44), these output indicators are mostly 
related to the number of newly introduced products or processes within a certain period of time 
(Grupp, 1997: pp. 195, OECD, 1997a). A problem with such a tally of innovations lies in the 
complex character of many products, which can consist of several new components that may have 
been developed in collaboration with suppliers (Revilla Diez, 2002a: 44). Moreover, a simple count 
of innovations ignores how substantial each single innovation is. A product undergoing minor 
improvement will be counted at the same intensity as a path-breaking new invention. Hence, the 
contribution of new products/ processes to total turnover/ production is often required to alleviate 
these concerns (Grupp, 1997: pp. 195, OECD, 1997a). Finally, this kind of information is gathered 
in questionnaire-based surveys. Firms have the capacity to give biased answers about their 
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innovativeness. To avoid this bias, it is possible to analyse new product announcements in trade and 
technical journals (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). However, similar concerns exist regarding the validity 
of this indicator (ibid.). 
In chapter 5, a set of input, throughput and output indicators will be analysed. Moreover, some 
indicators of technological capabilities and activities are used, which are either self-explanatory or 
will be defined prior to the analysis. Beforehand, however, the next section will take account of data 
gathering methodology. 
3.2 Data gathering process 
Two different approaches to data gathering were used in this thesis. First, quantitative survey data 
from both the first and second R&D/ Innovation Surveys in Thailand is used. Chapter 3.2.1 gives an 
overview of the methodology and sample in both Thailand and the benchmarking regions. 
Moreover, it provides a brief critique of the methodology. Secondly, qualitative data was collected 
in 20 in-depth firm interviews in the automotive and hard disk drive industry. Background 
information is presented in chapter 3.2.2. 
3.2.1 Quantitative data: questionnaire based survey 
The subsequent sections will provide information on the questionnaire, the sampling procedure, the 
response rates, and the representativeness of the sample in Thailand and the benchmarking regions. 
Moreover, some questions will be contemplated regarding possible problems with the quantitative 
survey methodology. 
3.2.1.1 Thailand R&D and innovation survey 
The presented work is based on two unique and original datasets that were retrieved in the first 
(2000) and second (2002) R&D/ Innovation Surveys. These were commissioned by the Thailand 
National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA), and conducted by the Brooker 
Group plc.  
The first survey concentrated on manufacturing companies, whereas the second survey included 
service companies as well. The questionnaire (see Appendix A3) is based on definitions from 
OECD’s Oslo and Frascati manuals (OECD, 2002, OECD, 1997a), taking into account previous 
innovation surveys, such as the European Regional Innovation Survey (ERIS, see Fritsch et al., 
1998, Sternberg, 2000), the Penang State Innovation Survey (PSIS) (Stracke, 2003) and the 
Singapore National Innovation Survey (SNIS) (Kiese, 2004).The first survey was conducted from 
January to April 2001 (Virasa & Brimble, 2001), the second from October 2002 until February 
2003 (Brimble, 2002).  
Both the 2000 and 2002 questionnaires are comprised of the following parts: 
• Section A: General information on companies including type of products, year of 
establishment, number of employees, etc. 
• Section B: R&D activities including types of activities, expenditure and personnel, etc. 
• Section C: Innovation activities other than R&D 
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• Section D: External collaboration for R&D and innovation 
• Section E: R&D and innovation environment in Thailand 
The 2002 questionnaire was, however, slightly modified with some questions being erased (Brooker 
Group, 2001, Brooker Group, 2003). Both questionnaires were subject to pre-tests with a sub-
sample (ibid.).  
 
Sampling Strategy 
For the 1st RD/ Innovation Survey the ‘Business On-line Database’11 was used, which includes 
comprehensive information on around 35,000 manufacturing establishments registered with the 
Commercial Registration Department at the Ministry of Commerce (Brooker Group, 2001). 
Thereby, the survey concentrated on medium- and large-sized manufacturing firms, with a 
minimum annual revenue of 12 million Bhat in 1999 (Brooker Group, 2001: 2-2)12.  
From a total sampling frame of 13,415 companies, 2,166 firms were selected (16.2%) using a three-
stage sampling procedure consisting of stratified random sampling, probability proportional to size 
(PPS) and systematic random sampling within each industrial sector in each stratum (Brooker 
Group, 2001: 1-2). The three strata were created according to firm size (measured in 1999 
turnover). Then, for each sector (Tab. 3.2), all firms from the first stratum (200 largest companies), 
20% from the second stratum (next 2000 medium to large companies) and 3.3% from the third 
stratum (remaining 11,215 small firms) were selected by applying a systematic random sampling 
technique.  
Tab. 3.2: Manufacturing Sectors by two-digit Thai Standard Industry Classification  
31 Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco 
32 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and leather products 
33 Manufacture of wood and wood products, including furniture 
34 Manufacture of paper and paper products, printing and publishing 
35 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products
36 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
37 Basic metal industries 
38 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 
39 Jewellery, diamond, gem and ornaments 
Source: Brooker Group, 2003: 3; for  TSIC see Department of Labour, 1972) 
Of the 2,166 firms sampled, a total of 1,019 completed questionnaires were received representing a 
response rate of 47%. Unfortunately, the Brooker Group presents no information on the industry-
specific response rate. 
For the 2nd RD/ Innovation Survey the ‘Business On-Line Database’ was once again queried, this 
time containing information from roughly 50,000 establishments (Brooker Group, 2003).  
The sampling methodology used in the first survey was replicated in order to ensure consistency. 
The sampling frame consists of 14,870 manufacturing companies, including the 1,019 
manufacturing firms interviewed during the first survey.  
                                                 
 11 An information service by the Business Online Company Limited, Thailand, under the consent of Department of 
Commercial Registration the Ministry of Commerce. 
 12 The boundary of 12 million Bhat was retrieved from a SME study by the Department of Industrial Promotion, that 
found that small firms had average annual sales of 12 million Bhat in 1999 (Brooker Group, 2001: 2-2). 
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Again, this group was divided into three strata according to revenue (2001), with the first stratum 
including the top 200 firms, the second stratum the following 2,000 firms and the third stratum the 
remaining firms. The same probabilities for selection were also assigned: first stratum 100%, 
second stratum 25% and third stratum 3.3% (Brooker Group, 2003: pp.3).  
From the sample frame, 3,945 firms (26.5%) were selected. Of these, 1,449 firms responded, 
equalling a response rate of 36.7%. Tab. 3.3 presents the industry-specific response rates of the 
second survey (manufacturing only). Even the lowest response rates of wood products (31.1%) are 
satisfying upon comparison to benchmark surveys in Europe, Singapore and Penang (see Tab. 3.7). 
Tab. 3.3: Industry-specific sampling frame and response rate for the 2nd survey (manufacturing) 
Sector Sampling 
Frame 
Approached Received Response 
Rate % 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 1,950 500 176 35.20
32 Textiles, leather, leather products 2,511 676 221 32.69
33 Wood, wood products 926 193 60 31.09
34 Paper, printing, publishing  1,312 212 85 40.09
35 Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber, 
plastic  
2,689 835 317 37.96
36 Non-metallic, glass, ceramic, clay 625 134 46 34.33
37 Basic metal  603 174 67 38.51
38 Fabricated metal products, 
machinery, equipment  
3,882 1,137 446 39.23
39 Other manufacturing  372 84 31 36.90
Total 14,870 3,945 1,449 36.73
Source: Brooker Group, 2003: pp. 4 
It is important to point out that the two surveys do not form a consistent time series, but rather two 
snapshots. The surveys differ in terms of sample size and structure. Despite these limitations, 
chapter 5 will make cautious comparisons between the two surveys, comparing patterns rather than 
absolute figures. 
 
Representativeness 
In order to evaluate the quality of the sample, data on the population is compulsory. The National 
Statistics Office of Thailand conducted its latest industrial census in 1997. More current 
information is available in the manufacturing industry surveys from 2000 and 2001, which are 
based on samples and only include enterprises with ten employees or more (see National Statistical 
Office, 2004). 
For the 1st R&D/ Innovation Survey, Schiller (2003: 47), based on the R&D/innovation survey data 
and the manufacturing survey from 2000, asserts that the sample is a good representation of the 
population. While Schiller based his assertion on Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient, 
an application of the more appropriate Pearson’s Chi-Square test for homogeneity results in the 
rejection of H0 and therefore does not support the finding that both distributions are founded in the 
same population. However, this is also true for the comparison between the 1997 census and the 
2000 manufacturing survey. Furthermore, the comparison between the manufacturing survey 2001 
and the R&D/innovation survey data 2002 rejects the nil hypothesis.  
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Tab. 3.4: Structure of the sample and the population for the 1st R&D/ Innovation Survey13 
Number of establishments Number of employees TSIC-2 
Pop. Sample Sample/ 
Pop. (%) 
Pop. Sample Sample/ 
Pop. (%) 
31 Food, beverages, 
tobacco 3,470 146 4.21 402,760 94,060 23.4
32 Textiles, leather 
products 3,728 140 3.76 489,858 97,789 20.0
33 Wood, wood 
products 865 38 4.39 56,967 13,935 24.5
34 Paper, printing, 
publishing  1,256 55 4.38 84,759 11,753 13.9
35 Chemicals, 
rubber, plastic  2,661 235 8.83 259,202 67,000 25.8
36 Non-metallic, 
glass, clay 1,825 35 1.92 111,350 21,662 19.5
37 Basic metal 
  465 19 4.09 38,758 12,317 31.8
38 Metal products, 
machinery, equip.  4,942 327 6.62 549,847 247,608 45.0
39  Other 
manufacturing  1,639 24 1.46 177,799 5,810 3.3
Source: R&D/ Innovation Survey 2000; National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2000,  
own calculations 
Tab. 3.4 and 3.5 depict the size of the population, the sample and the relation between sample and 
population for the first and second survey. Additionally, the share of employees in the 
R&D/innovation surveys is compared with that in the manufacturing surveys. 
In terms of number of establishments, sectors 31-34 are fairly equally represented in both surveys. 
Sector 35 and 38 are over- whereas sector 36 and 39 are underrepresented. TSIC 37 is 
overrepresented only in 2002. The number of employees represented by the sample is much higher 
than for the number of establishments. The sampling procedure is the primary cause for this, as it 
favours large firms (see below). As with the number of establishments, the sample displays an 
uneven composition. Both surveys include a similar share of employees in sectors 31-33 and 35. 
Sector 34 (2002), 37 and 38 are over-, while sector 34 (2000), 36 (2002) and especially 39 are 
underrepresented.  
The overrepresentation of some sectors is likely a result of the sampling procedure, since turnover 
was a criterion for both the strata and the probability of selection. Sectors 35 and 38 are among 
those with the highest sales per establishment, whereas firms in sectors 36 and 39 show lower sales 
per establishment (based on National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2001; own 
calculations). This assumption is supported by the comparison between the size of the sample frame 
and the population for the second survey (cf. Tab. 3.3 and Tab. 3.5).  
Moreover, the chemicals and machinery/ equipment industries can be considered more innovation-
affined than the primarily raw material-oriented sectors of non-metallic, glass, clay, and others 
                                                 
13 Figures for the population of manufacturing firms were retrieved from the Manufacturing Survey 2000 (National 
Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2000) which uses the 3rd revision of the ISIC-classification (see UN 
Statitics Devision, 2004). Since the R&D/Innovation survey classifies according to the TSIC 1972 (Department of 
Labour, 1972), which is based on the ISIC Revision 2 (see UN Statitics Devision, 2004), the classes can be only 
approximately matched. 
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(including e.g. jewellery, gem etc.). Hence, the response-propensity for an R&D/ innovation survey 
can be supposed to be higher in the first group. 
Tab. 3.5: Structure of the sample and the population for the 2nd R&D/ Innovation Survey14 
Number of establishments Number of employees TSIC-2 
Pop. Sample Sample/ 
Pop. (%) 
Pop. Sample Sample/ 
Pop. (%) 
31 Food, beverages, 
tobacco 3,300 176 5.33 404,247 99,843 24.7
32 Textiles, leather 
products 3,695 221 5.98 485,536 134,258 27.7
33 Wood, wood 
products 797 60 7.53 52,482 17,272 32.9
34 Paper, printing, 
publishing  1,283 85 6.63 44,543 25,473 57.2
35 Chemicals, 
rubber, plastic  2,635 317 12.03 276,239 92,263 33.4
36 Non-metallic, 
glass, clay 1,802 46 2.55 130,524 18,594 14.2
37 Basic metal 
  476 67 14.08 38,591 17,730 45.9
38 Metal products, 
machinery, equip.  4,932 446 9.04 669,718 266,730 39.8
39  Other 
manufacturing  1,687 31 1.84 164,610 14,549 8.8
Source: R&D/ Innovation Survey 2002; National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2001,  
own calculations 
Tab. 3.6: Number of establishments by size: manufacturing 2002 sample and population 
Size  
(employees) 
Population Sample Relation Sample to 
Population (%) 
1-4 33,814 1 0.00
5-9 21,177 7 0.03
10-19 15,209 15 0.10
20-49 12,075 133 1.10
50-99 4,548 180 3.96
100-299 4,397 505 11.49
300-499 1,156 198 17.13
500-999 793 168 21.19
>1,000 494 166 33.60
based on Year Book of Labour Statistics 2000 (Alpha Research, 2003:162) 
In terms of firm size, the distribution of the sample reveals a strong bias towards larger companies 
(see Tab. 3.6 for the 2002 survey). This is the result of a sampling procedure which applies a 
threshold of 12 million Bhat annual revenue and designates a higher probability to larger 
companies, causing the R&D/Innovation Survey to be aimed primarily at medium to large-sized 
companies. 
In conclusion, it is not possible to get a current and comprehensive picture of the population, 
because the latest industrial census is outdated (being conducted in the crisis year of 1997) and the 
current manufacturing survey is based on a restricted sample used for estimations about the 
population. However, comparing the sectoral distribution of ‘firms with foreign investment’ 
                                                 
 14 see 13 
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according to the manufacturing survey 2001 with the distribution in TNCs15 in the Thailand R&D/ 
Innovation Survey 2002 (for more details see 5.1) reveals a suspicious similarity (see table 3.7), 
even though the Chi-Square test of homogeneity rejects H0. Consequently, the sample is not 
weighted, because there is no reliable, current information about the population, and the sectoral 
composition of TNCs seems to be sufficiently similar to the estimated population to conduct a first 
analysis. 
Tab. 3.7: Sectoral Distribution of foreign firms in the manufacturing survey 2001 and the Thailand 
R&D/Innovation Survey 2002 
TSIC-2 Manufacturing Survey 
2001 
R&D/Innovation Survey 
2002 
31 Food, beverages, tobacco 8.3 7.6
32 Textiles, leather products 12.8 10.2
33 Wood, wood products 1.2 1.0
34 Paper, printing, publishing  4.4 3.0
35 Chemicals, rubber, plastic  22.5 22.9
36 Non-metallic, glass, clay 3.6 1.8
37 Basic metal  3.3 5.8
38 Metal products, machinery, equip. 35.3 45.4
39  Other manufacturing  8.6 2.2
Source: R&D/ Innovation Survey 2002; National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2001, own 
calculations 
 
Figure 3.1: Regional distribution of the surveyed companies of the first and second R&D/ Innovation survey 
Source: R&D/ Innovation Survey 2000/2002, own graphic 
                                                 
 15 Please note the different definition, since in this work TNCs are defined as firms with at least 30% foreign 
ownership (see 5.1). 
Number of surveyed firms
2002
2000
932 firms
6 firms
80 firms
extended view 
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Figure 3.1 displays the regional distribution of the firms surveyed in the first and second 
R&D/Innovation survey in Thailand. It exhibits, and quite impressively, a very strong concentration 
in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR consists of the provinces of Bangkok, Samut Prakan, 
Samut Sakhon, Nonthaburi, Phatum Thani and Nakhonpathom), Ayutthaya and the Eastern 
Seaboard Region (ESR encompassing the provinces Rayong, Chonburi and Chachoengsao). In 
total, these core regions account for 91% (2000) and 88% (2002) of the sample. This mirrors the 
strong concentration of Thailand’s economic activity in Bangkok (see chapter 4.1.2). However, 
compared to the population of manufacturing establishments, one can recognise a bias in the sample 
towards this core region. Based on the labour statistics 2000, only 58% (Alpha Research, 2003) of 
all establishments are located in these provinces. According to the manufacturing census 2001 
(National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2001), the BMR accounts for 62% of all 
manufacturing establishments. No separate data for ESR and Ayutthaya are available from this 
source.  
Presumably, this bias is in part due to the sampling procedure’s tendency to favour large 
enterprises. Since this thesis focuses on TNC-affiliates, which are strongly concentrated in the core 
region (see chapter 4.1.3.2), the bias does not need to be corrected for. 
3.2.1.2 Benchmarking surveys 
In order to benchmark the results of the 1st and 2nd Thailand R&D/Innovation Survey the 
subsequent sections will make use of original data from the European Regional Innovation Survey 
(ERIS), the Singapore National Innovation Survey (SNIS) and the Penang State Innovation Survey 
(PSIS). This section will briefly reflect upon methods of data gathering in the benchmarking 
studies. 
 
a) European Regional Innovation Survey (ERIS) 
A research consortia from the University of Hanover, Cologne, Freiberg and from the Fraunhofer 
Institute for Systems and Innovation Research, Karlsruhe conducted the ERIS project in two phases 
from 1995-1997 and 1997-1999, surveying manufacturing and service companies as well as 
research institutes in eleven European regions (Sternberg, 2000). A total of more than 8,600 
questionnaires were gathered, with around 4,200 from manufacturing, 2,500 from service 
companies and 1,900 from research institutions. The selected case study regions range from 
agglomerations such as Barcelona, Vienna and Stockholm to peripheral regions such as South 
Wales and Saxony (ibid.). For more information on the project’s key findings, see special issues of 
Raumforschung und Raumordnung (e.g. Fritsch et al., 1998) and European Planning Studies (e.g. 
Sternberg, 2000) as well as a number of monographs (e.g. Fischer et al., 2001, Revilla Diez, 2002a). 
 
b) Singapore National Innovation Survey (SNIS) 
In cooperation with the Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Centre for Management of 
Innovation and Technopreneurship at the National University of Singapore, the University of 
Hanover conducted the SNIS in 1999/2000. The SNIS concentrated on the four key industries for 
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innovation in Singapore, namely the electronics, chemicals, engineering and life sciences sectors, 
which in 1999 account for 67.8% of all manufacturing companies, 83.2% of all manufacturing 
employees and 93.1% of all manufacturing production (Kiese, 2004). The sample frame contained 
1,869 companies (70.1% of the companies in the named sectors according to the industry census), 
from which 374 utilisable questionnaires were returned, achieving a response rate of 20% (ibid.). 
While the sample displays a bias towards larger companies (measured in number of employees), it  
offers an appropriate representation of the population in terms of the sectoral structure (ibid.). 
 
c) Penang State Innovation Survey (PSIS) 
In 2000 the University of Hanover, in cooperation with the Socio-Economic and Environmental 
Research Institute (SERI) and the State Executive Councillor for Economic Planning, Education, 
and Human Resource Development, carried out the PSIS. On the basis of a non-official database 
provided by the Penang Development Corporation, 921 questionnaires were sent out to 
manufacturing companies, of which 192 usable questionnaires could be reclaimed (equalling a 
response rate of 20.2%) (Stracke, 2003). The sample shows a structural bias towards the chemical, 
electrical engineering and fabricated metal products sectors. Due to insufficient statistics for the 
distribution of establishments in terms of size, no judgement of representativeness could be reached 
(ibid.). 
 
Tab. 3.8 gives an overview of the case study regions, their launch-years, the number of responses as 
well as the response rates (only for manufacturing which is the focus of this thesis), while Tab. 3.9 
displays the sectoral structure of the considered surveys. 
Tab. 3.8: Innovation Surveys in Europe (ERIS) and South East Asia (manufacturing only)
Region Country Year (1) Realised 
Sample 
Response Rate 
Baden Germany 1995 430 15.8% 
Hannover-Brunswick-Göttingen Germany 1995 372 20.6% 
Saxony Germany 1995 1,004 26.7% 
Alsace France 1997 263 15.0% 
Barcelona Spain 1997 395 15.3% 
Gironde France 1997 101 12.7% 
Slovenia Slovenia 1997 416 31.2% 
South Holland Netherlands 1997 261 13.7% 
South Wales UK 1997 280 17.6% 
Stockholm Sweden 1997 451 24.0% 
Vienna Austria 1997 204 19.9% 
Total ERIS  4,177 19.7% 
Singapore Singapore 1999 373 20.0% 
Penang Malaysia 2000 191 20.7% 
Thailand (1) Thailand 2000 1,019 47.0% 
Thailand (2) Thailand 2002 1,449 36.7% 
(1) launch; Source: ERIS database, EDB/NUS-CMIT National Innovation Survey, Penang State Innovation Survey;  
  Thailand R&D/ Innovation Survey 2000/ 2002 
 82
Tab. 3.9: Sectoral Structure (in %) of the comparative surveys (grouped according to TSIC 2-digit classes) 
 TSIC TIS (1) TIS (2) PSIS SNIS ERIS 
31 Food, Beverage, Tobacco 14.3 12.1 9.9 0.0 7.3 
32 Textiles, leather, leather products  13.7 15.3 1.6 0.0 6.0 
33 Wood, wood products  3.7 4.1 1.6 0.0 3.8 
34 Paper, printing, publishing  5.4 5.9 6.3 0.0 9.1 
35 Chemicals, petroleum, coal, rubber, plastic  23.1 21.9 23.4 20.8 11.2 
36 Non-metallic, glass, ceramic, clay  3.4 3.2 0.5 5.9 5.0 
37 Basic metal  1.9 4.6 5.7 1.4 3.4 
38 Fab. metal products, machinery, equipment  32.1 30.8 47.4 71.7 49.0 
39 Other manufacturing  2.4 2.1 3.7 0.3 5.2 
 Total (n) 1,019 1,449 192 371 4,079 
TIS= Thailand Innovation Survey; PSIS= Penang State Innovation Survey; SNIS = Singapore National Innovation 
Survey; ERIS = European Regional Innovation Survey 
NB Sectors of PSIS, SNIS and ERIS had to be aggregated for comparison. Furthermore, ERIS and SNIS data is 
classified according to ISIC Rev. 3, while PSIS and TIS are classified according to ISISC Rev. 2. (UN Statitics 
Devision, 2004). 
3.2.1.3 Critique of the methodology 
Written questionnaires offer the advantage of allowing one to survey large samples. Furthermore, 
they preserve the anonymity of respondents and reduce time pressures for answering the 
questionnaire (see e.g. Wessel, 1996: pp. 104). Nevertheless, they also contain some inherent 
disadvantages. First of all, written standardised questionnaires pose a clear restriction to the amount 
of information gathered. Individual or sectoral particularities cannot be accounted for (ibid.). 
Secondly, there is the question of reliability of the data: written surveys rely on self-assessment 
and, consequently, conscious or unconscious manipulation and mistakes. Even though all surveyed 
firms were assured anonymity, there might be a tendency to present one’s firm in a positive light. 
Moreover, it may lead to strategic behaviour: for example knowledge that the survey is 
commissioned by the national S&T development agency could cause some firms to cast public 
policy towards innovation in a darker light, hoping that a negative assessment would trigger 
increased benefits. In addition, a single person usually answers questionnaires. Depending on his or 
her position within the enterprise, their insight into different functional areas may be limited. 
Additionally, even the most carefully designed and pre-tested questionnaires can often sound ‘too 
scientific’ for business people, leading to misunderstandings.  
Thirdly, many terms are not or cannot be clearly defined within the questionnaire. Some terms 
might be understood differently according to the respondent’s background. For example, the terms 
applied research and experimental development are comprehensively explained in the 
questionnaire. Nevertheless, the head of an R&D-department interpret them differently than the 
General Manager. Other terms are ambivalent: What is the difference between intense and very 
intense cooperation? Again, respondents with different experience, cultural or professional 
backgrounds may possess different ‘mental yardsticks’. Furthermore, some categories are 
formulated in a way that can include many different things, e.g. acquisition of external technology 
might relate to the purchasing of a generator, to custom-tailored production lines, blueprints, 
licenses as well as patents. Such broad categories reveal only limited clues to highly differentiated 
processes and capabilities (cf. ibid.).  
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A second set of problems relates to the transfer of a methodology developed for advanced 
economies, such as OECD’s Frascati and Oslo Manual (OECD, 2002, OECD, 1997a), the European 
Union’s Community Innovation Survey (CIS) or the European Regional Innovation Survey (ERIS), 
to late-industrialising countries.  
Innovation in late-industrialising countries is predominantly taking place incrementally within the 
production process rather than in formally assigned R&D-departments. This informality and 
individuality of the innovation process causes difficulty when applying a set of standardised 
questions to it. Furthermore, these activities are not easy, even for the firm itself, to account for. 
While R&D-expenditure is treated separately, there is most often no clearly expressed ‘innovation-
related activity budget’, hence many firms simply do not know what they spend on innovation 
activities (Kleinknecht et al., 2002:114). This is also true for organisational change, which is 
independent from product and process innovations, but prepares the ground for these innovations 
and should , as a consequence, be considered (see Ellis & Polcuch, 2005). 
Moreover, most questionnaires emphasise the output of the innovation process (e.g. in the Penang 
and Singapore questionnaire, only firms that successfully adopted a new process or introduced a 
new product were asked about their innovation process). However, many firms in late-
industrialising countries carry out innovation activities other than R&D without achieving an output 
(ibid.). Since capability building and technological learning are essential in these countries, surveys 
should take these processes into account despite their outcome. For example, the R&D/Innovation 
Survey in Thailand distinguishes explicitly between the performance of R&D, other innovation 
activities and the output of these activities. Its results reveal a considerable amount of firms 
performing innovation activities without creating an output. Hence, the Thailand questionnaire is a 
first attempt towards allowing for these activities. Unfortunately, the questionnaire has – at least 
from a regional science point of view – the drawback of not including questions regarding the 
locations of collaboration partners. 
All these considerations show the need to supplement written questionnaires with personal 
interviews in order to first, double-check answers and to identify possible inconsistencies and 
second, gain further insights into complex processes. Consequently, the presented research has 
pursued both methodologies (cf. Wessel, 1996. pp. 103, Schätzl, 2000: pp. 40). The subsequent 
section delivers basic information on the qualitative interviews. 
3.2.2 Qualitative data: in-depth interviews 
In addition to the questionnaire based data, the author conducted semi-structured interviews with 
General Managers, R&D and Production Managers of ten automotive and eleven hard disk drive 
(HDD) companies in September and October 2003.  
These sectors were chosen because they account for a significant share of GDP and exports (see 
4.1.2). Moreover, they are among the largest recipients of FDI (see 4.1.4.2) and are dominated by 
TNCs. They are highly competitive on a global scale and are industries targeted by the Thai 
government (Office of the Prime Minister Thailand, 2004). For example Thailand’s government 
promotes the country as the “Detroit of Asia” (e.g. Praiwan, 2004b), because it has the highest 
 84
concentration of vehicle manufacturers in South-East Asia, with ten major car companies operating 
local assembly plants (Brooker Group, 2002b, Bangkok Post, 2003). In the HDD-industry, four out 
of seven global assemblers operate in Thailand, which makes the country the second largest HDD-
producer in the world (Wiriyapong, 2003a, b; for more information on both industries refer to 
chapter 6.1.1 and 6.2.1.). Consequently, both sectors are of particular interest in regards to the 
influence of TNCs on the Thai innovation system. 
Appendix A4 gives an overview of the interviews that were conducted, while appendix A5 and A6 
present the semi-structured interview guides for each industry. The guides include general 
information on the company including the location of suppliers and customers, the self-assessment 
of technological capabilities and external collaborations. The self-assessment of technological 
capabilities was implemented using a modified Bell and Pavitt-type (1995) framework (see 2.1.2), 
which has been designed specifically for the project by Dr. Nitin Afzulpurkar of the Industrial 
Systems Engineering Program at the School of Advanced Technologies at the Asian Institute of 
Technology (see Tab. 3.10). The framework tries to simplify the identification of capabilities for the 
interviewees by using industry-compliant keywords in the fields of investment, manufacturing 
(process, product and industrial engineering), innovation and linkages.  
The interviews in the HDD-industry were conducted together with Dr. Peter Brimble of Asia Policy 
Research and Dr. Nitin Afzulpurkar of the Asian Institute of Technology. This team was 
commissioned by NSTDA to conduct an HDD-cluster survey. As a first step in the research, all key 
actors within the HDD-cluster were identified. Afterwards, most of the known actors were 
approached with support from the Thailand division of the International Disk Drive Equipment and 
Materials Association (IDEMA), an industry interest group, in order to arrange interviews. During 
the interviews additional actors were identified and, subsequently, asked to meet with the research 
team. Finally, eleven companies and several surrounding actors agreed to take part in the survey.  
The interviews in the automotive industry were arranged by the author with support of the Science, 
Technology and Innovation Policy Research Department at NSTDA. Based on information from the 
1st and 2nd Thailand R&D/Innovation Survey, several companies in the automotive industry were 
chosen and then contacted by phone and fax, including a letter of reference from the vice-president 
of NSTDA, Dr. Chatri Sripaipan (see Appendix A7). Ten companies and a few surrounding actors 
agreed to interview appointments. On several occasions Preeda Youngsuksathaporn and Sittirat 
Tapahudee of NSTDA supported the author. 
Additionally, the author took part in a number of interviews with the frozen seafood industry, which 
were conducted by NSTDA staff in order to examine this cluster. The cooperation partners offered 
the author an opportunity to pre-test the semi-structured interview guide during these interviews. 
Accordingly, the findings of these interviews are not part of the presented thesis. 
All interviews took about one hour. The interviewers took notes during the interview, and most 
interviews were followed by a guided tour through the plant, which offered the opportunity to 
enquire further into certain aspects and to enhance the understanding of the particular production 
process.  
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Critique of the methodology 
Similar to the problems encountered in written surveys (see 3.2.1.3) interviews might suffer from a 
lack of reliable data. Interviewees might give consciously or unconsciously ‘wrong’ or biased 
answers. Additionally, interviewees might misunderstand questions, especially since all interviews 
were conducted not in the mother tongue of the interviewees, but in English. On the other hand, one 
benefit of interviewing is precisely this opportunity to repeat and explain questions, or to ask 
additional ones. Still the ad-hoc nature of the answers given might cause the interviewee to forget 
details. However, all interviewees were prepared for the interviews with a letter outlining the key 
aspects of the interview (e.g. see Annex A7).  
Basically, the presented approach treats data from interviews as a resource, i.e. the data is supposed 
to reflect the interviewees’ reality, and not as a topic, i.e. reflecting a reality that is jointly 
constructed by the interviewee and the interviewer (see Rapley, 2004: 16). Consequently, the 
gathered data is treated as fact. This assertion is based on the objective of the interviews, which was 
to retrieve relatively easy to communicate, factual information, such as main customers and 
suppliers and their location, descriptions of collaboration processes etc. Therefore, an individual’s 
emotions, attitudes, behaviour, etc are intended to be of minimal influence on this information. 
However, the behaviour and manner with which an interview is conducted by the interviewer can 
also influence how the interviewee formulates answers. 
It is the strength of this method to have gathered much in-depth information about collaborations, 
which are additionally illuminated with some exemplary cases and anecdotal evidence. 
Consequently, the interplay between quantitative and qualitative information offers the greatest 
balance between information and data reliability. 
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Tab. 3.10: Technological Capabilities – a unified framework for the firm interviews 
Manufacturing  
Investment Process 
Engineering 
Product 
Engineering 
Industrial 
Engineering 
Innovation Linkages 
Basic 
• Feasibility Studies 
• Site selection 
• Project preparation 
• Scheduling 
• Maintenance 
• Quality 
management 
• Understanding 
basic product 
design 
• Adapting minor 
product changes 
• Optimization 
based 
scheduling 
• Basic skill 
upgrading 
programs 
• Process 
improvement 
• Local parts 
development 
• Local supplier base 
development 
• Subcontracting to technological 
service providers 
Inter-
mediate 
• Technology 
selection 
• Contract 
negotiation 
• Technology 
transfer 
agreements 
• Recruitment and 
initial training 
project execution 
• Process 
optimization 
• Process 
adaptation for 
product 
variations 
• Introduction of 
TQM/Kanban 
techniques 
• Technology 
transfer for new 
products 
 
• Productivity 
analysis 
• Benchmarking 
• Advanced 
inventory control 
(JIT etc) 
• Advanced skill 
development 
• Logistics 
management 
• Supply chain 
management 
• Product 
support 
improvement 
(packaging, 
testing) 
• R&D transfer 
• New process 
design 
• Process/product upgrading in 
collaboration with supplies and 
R&D institutes  
• Reverse system engineering in 
collaboration with external 
partners 
• Industry networking and 
collaboration for re-competitive 
development 
Advanced • Organization 
management using 
ISO and BS 
standards 
• Ability to develop 
own turn-key 
projects 
• Export of project 
know-how. 
• Implementation 
of MRP ERP 
systems 
• Process 
standardization 
using ISO and 
BS standards 
• Tracking global 
product changes 
• New product 
design 
• Long term HR 
development 
programs 
• Supply chain 
development 
(cluster based) 
• New product 
innovation 
• Organization 
set up for 
innovation 
• Long term linking with R&D 
institutions and universities 
• Licensing new technology to 
partners and suppliers 
• Strategic alliances with 
academic institutes and R&D 
agencies to open new product 
markets and services 
Source: Elaborated for the HDD- cluster research project by Dr. N. Afzulpurkar, Industrial Systems Engineering Program  
at the School of Advanced Technologies, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand 
ISO International Standard Organisation  MRP Material Requirements Planning 
BS British Standard    ERP Enterprise Resource Planning 
TQM Total Quality Management   JIT Just in time 
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4 Development and the state of the Thai system of innovation 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the Thai NSI. Since the NSI-concept is 
based on evolutionary economics, both path dependency and history matter. Accordingly, it seems 
necessary to provide a brief summary of economic development in Thailand (4.1), with an emphasis 
on exports and FDI. Moreover, sectoral and regional destinations of FDI are considered and a first 
assessment of the impact of FDI – based on a literature review – is made. Additionally, policies 
concerning FDI are taken into account. Chapter 4.2 contemplates briefly the quality of the three 
main components of the Thai NSI, namely firms, knowledge-related organisations and government, 
in order to assess the current state of the NSI. 
4.1 The Thai economy and FDI: development, structure, impacts, and 
policies  
4.1.1 Historic development 
Thailand has been an agricultural society for centuries. It can therefore, be assumed that GDP 
growth was very moderate, almost insignificant, from the mid 19th century to the 1950s. It began to 
accelerate within the period between 1950 and 1960, reaching an annual growth rate of about 4.5%. 
This was caused primarily by an export ‘boom’ of agricultural products during the Korean War and 
an increase in manufacturing (Dixon, 1999: pp. 74). However, the economy remained strongly 
dependent on a fairly narrow range of primary products, mainly agricultural goods such as teak, 
rubber and rice, which accounted for two-third of all exports in 1960 alone. Agricultural products 
made up almost four-fifth of total exports (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: 22). The end of the Korean 
War boom resulted in a slow-down, forcing the government to implement new policies. 
Consequently, the first National Economic Development Plan was introduced in 1960 (Dixon, 
1999: 80). The first phase of industrialisation was dedicated to import substitution (see chapter 
2.1.1) (Poapongsakorn & Tonguthai, 1998: 159). The government introduced high levels of import 
tariffs on consumer goods and low levels for intermediate and capital goods in order to foster the 
establishment of a domestic industry. Furthermore, the Board of Investment (BOI) was established 
in 1959 for the promotion of enterprises (Jomo, 1997: 61). The BOI could make use of several 
instruments, e.g. guarantees that the government would neither nationalise promoted companies nor 
create competition through state enterprises, licenses for hiring foreign staff, ‘tax holidays’ for up to 
eight years and the adoption of protective tariffs reaching up to 50% of the goods’ value (Dixon, 
1999: 87). Despite favourable GDP annual growth rates of about 8% from 1960 to 1969 and 7% 
from 1970 to 1979 the Thai economy remained “remarkably low key” (ibid.: 93), depending 
strongly on the export of primary products and an import-substituting industry. Nevertheless, firms 
soon began to export their products. Generally, the industrial sector was based on “a handful of big 
[Thai owned] conglomerates” (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: pp. 22) and a quantity of foreign 
capital. From a sectoral perspective, the major growth areas were agro-processing, textiles and 
certain assembly activities for the domestic consumer goods market (Dixon, 1999: 102). Due to a 
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worsening balance of payments in 1969-70, Thailand slowly adopted an export oriented 
industrialisation approach by giving greater incentives to export industries from 1972 onwards 
(Poapongsakorn & Tonguthai, 1998: 160). Triggered by a severe economic and political crisis in 
the late 1970s caused by the oil price rise and a fall in the returns on Thailand’s main export 
products, the World Bank entered the stage and was to determine that economic growth was 
hampered by long-term structural problems. As a consequence, the World Bank recommended a 
structural adjustment program, which included a clearer shift from import substitution to export 
oriented industrialisation, which had proved highly successful in the South-East Asian tiger states 
of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (Dixon, 1999: pp. 111). Subsequently, the 
government would promote export industries by offering tax rebates to firms not promoted by the 
BOI, the establishment of bonded warehouses and export processing zones, as well as by 
streamlining customs procedures (Poapongsakorn & Tonguthai, 1998: pp. 160).  
Nonetheless, in the early 1980s the Thai government was still struggling to implement real reforms, 
such as reforming the taxation system, removing export restrictions and export taxes, reducing 
import taxes, privatisation and simplifying investment regulations etc. (Dixon, 1999: pp. 115). 
Suddenly, with only a minimal number of reforms in place, the economy took off. Beginning in 
1987, fuelled by the devaluation of the Thai Bhat in 1984 and 1985 and fostered by a saturation of 
the domestic market and large over-capacities, export of manufactured products increased sharply 
(initially textiles and later electronic products, Figure 4.1) as did GDP growth (Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.1: Exports and manufactured exports in US$ 1970 - 2003 
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Source: Bank of Thailand; 1970-1994: cited in Dixon, 1999: 114; 1995-2003 Bank of Thailand, 2004a 
This growth was driven further by a massive inflow of FDI beginning in 1987 (Figure 4.3): It was 
predominantly Japanese firms that invested in Thailand, after the Japanese central bank was forced 
to revalue the yen in 1985. From 1985 till 1989 the yen rose 89% against the dollar and 
manufacturing firms were literally fleeing Japan. Since the tiger states of Taiwan, South Korea, 
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Singapore and Hong Kong were also facing rising currencies and costs, the bulk of investments 
went to Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: pp.2, see also Kraas, 
1996). Moreover, these NICs acted as additional sources of investment, which flowed into the Thai 
economy. Such a development led to the ‘flying geese’ paradigm, which saw Japan as the leading 
goose initially pulling the first tier NICs and later countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
with it as it relocates labour-intensive production (Akamatsu, 1962; for critical aspects in respect to 
knowledge transfer see Hayter & Edington, 2004). 
Figure 4.2: GDP growth rate in % (annual) in Thailand and other Asian NICs 
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Figure 4.3: Net flows of foreign direct investment to Thailand 1970 – 2003 
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The majority of the money was invested in labour-intensive export-oriented industries, like textiles 
and electronics (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998). Dixon (1999: pp. 124) asserts that four reasons 
spoke in favour of Thailand: a) Price advantage: Thailand had the lowest labour costs in ASEAN 
and the devaluation of the Bhat increased its price competitiveness; b) Political advantage: 
Thailand was considered the only politically stable ASEAN country; c) Strategic advantage: 
production in Thailand allowed Japanese firms to avoid restrictions imposed by the EU and North 
America on Japanese exports and finally d) Local knowledge: due to a comparatively long history 
of investment Japanese firms could make use of existing linkages, contacts and expertise. The 
following years witnessed remarkable economic and export growth. Manufacturing exports grew at 
an annual rate of almost 23% from 1990 to 1995 (Lall, 1998) and the economy grew at an annual 
rate of 8.5% (EIU, 2004: 30). A projection from The Economist predicted that Thailand would 
become the world’s seventh largest economy by 2020 (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: 100). 
However, Thai exports still consist more of ‘simple’ manufacturing, e.g. food processing and 
textiles, than in the tiger economies and Malaysia (Lall, 1998; for more on export see below).  
In 1996 the export growth rate declined sharply from around 21% in 1995 to 8% by the end of 
199616 (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1998: 95). What were the reasons?  
First, new export competitors from ‘even lower cost’ countries like China, Vietnam, Indonesia and 
India entered the market following free market reforms in the late 1980s. This made it more 
difficult for Thai based firms to compete on prices, because real wages were increasing from 1991 
onwards at 8% per year, due to a shortage of labour. In the past, additional labour from the 
countryside could be activated without additional cost, now the labour market had tightened. 
Second, the recession in Japan caused a devaluation of the yen beginning in 1995. Within two years 
the cost of Thai imports increased by 40% for Japanese customers (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: 
pp.96). Since the Bhat was pegged to the strengthening US$, Thai low-cost exports lost their 
competitiveness and the import-dependent high-technology exports could not fill the gap (EIU, 
2004). Third, the Thai economy had invested too little in the upgrading of export industries in order 
to stay competitive. Rather, investment went into more lucrative property businesses or service 
industry (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: pp. 96).  
Moreover, the Thai economy with its remarkable growth had attracted large foreign (portfolio) 
investments. These investments went mostly into the domestic market, i.e. heavy industry, 
infrastructure, services (including real estates), consumer finance and stock speculations 
(Phongpaichit & Baker, 2000: 2). However, the massive inflow “obscured the export slowdown and 
produced a bubble economy of inflated assets, overbuilt property, excess spending, and incautious 
investment” (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998: 126). Overinvestment, in turn, resulted in both over-
capacity and declining returns. First, property firms could not repay their credits. The bubble then 
burst, when finance firms went bankrupt in light of ‘non-performing loans’, which were guaranteed 
with overvalued property or assets. Shocked foreign investors began to sell their holdings in the 
                                                 
 16 NB official statistics exaggerate the decline: export figures were not reflecting real exports, since VAT refund 
fraud was a wide spread problem; see Phongpaichit and Baker, 1998: 95 
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stock market, and international currency brokers speculated against the Bhat, which was finally 
floated on the 2nd of July 1997. As a consequence, foreign funds rushed out of Thailand; Within the 
“next twelve months, the private capital outflows and net of foreign direct investment were 
equivalent to almost a fifth of GDP” (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2000: 3). The financial crises became 
an economic one, as firms with foreign loans lost liquidity, inflated liabilities or went out of 
business, as many did in the end. Demand and consumption declined sharply: more firms went 
bankrupt and many people became unemployed (Phongpaichit & Baker, 1998, 2000; for more see 
also Kraas, 1998, 2000).  
In recent years there are clear signs of recovery (hampered by non favourable condition of the world 
economy), but the Asian crisis still hints towards a need for restructuring, addressing the problems 
detected at the outset of the crises: eroding international competitiveness (e.g. Poapongsakorn & 
Tangkitvanich, 2001). Despite this remarkable growth (and decline), Thailand’s GNP/GNI17 per 
capita is significantly lower than in first tier NICs (Singapore, Korea and Taiwan), but also lower 
than in neighbouring Malaysia (Tab. 4.1). 
Tab. 4.1: Per capita GNP/GNI (US$) for South East Asian countries 1996, 1999, 2002 
Country 1996 1999 2002 
Thailand 2,000 1,980 2,930
Malaysia 3,540 3,370 4,330
Singapore 20,690 22,930 30,590
Korea 9,930 8,530 10,590
Taiwan 12,930 13,110 13,230
Philippines 1,030 1,040 1,160
Source: Asian Development Bank, 2000, 2003, 2004 
4.1.2 Structure of GDP and exports 
Another problem brought to light during the crisis was the limited sectoral change during the period 
of economic growth. The share of GDP achieved by the primary sector declined from about 50% in 
1950 to about 10% in 2003, whereas manufacturing rose from 10% to 35%, and services increased 
from about 35% to 45% in the same period (Dixon, 1999: 10, Office of The National Economic and 
Social Development Board, 2003, Asian Development Bank, 2004: 72). However, these figures 
show that Thailand is, without doubt, still an agricultural country and that the shift towards a 
service economy is less intense than in other countries. In 2003, Korea (agriculture: 3.2%; industry: 
34.6%, service: 62.2%) or Taiwan (1.8%; 30.4%; 67.8%) were oriented towards the tertiary sector 
to a much higher degree, whereas Malaysia shares a similar structure (9.5%; 48.6%; 45.5%) (ibid.).  
Within the manufacturing sector machinery and equipment accounts for the lion’s share of GDP 
(29%), followed by food and beverages (21%), textiles (18%) and chemicals (15%). Within TSIC-
sector 38, manufacturing of motor vehicles (7%), radio and TV (6%), office and computing 
machinery (5%) and machinery and equipment (4%) are the most important industries (National 
Economic and Social Development Board, 2002, Tab. 4.2). 
                                                 
17 Gross National Income (GNI) is the new term for gross national product (GNP). It is GDP plus net receipts of 
primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national 
currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies. Per 
Capita GNI (US$), formerly per capita GNP, is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World 
Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population (Asian Development Bank, 2004: 387). 
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Tab. 4.2: Contribution of sectors to total manufacturing GDP (2002) 
TSIC-2 % TSIC-3 sectors within  
TSIC-2 sector 38 
% 
31 Food, beverages and 
tobacco 20.58  
32 Textiles, leather, leather 
products 18.31  
33 Wood, wood products 0.45 Machinery and Equipment 4.02
34 Paper, printing, publishing  2.96 Office, Accounting and Computing Machinery 5.29
35 Chemicals, petroleum, coal, 
rubber, plastic  14.94 Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 1.55
36 Non-metallic, glass, 
ceramic, clay 4.25
Radio, Television and Communication 
Equipment and Apparatus 5.87
37 Basic metal  1.07 Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments, Watches and Clocks 1.16
38 Fab. metal products, 
machinery, equipment  28.95 Motor Vehicles 7.39
39  Other manufacturing  8.50 Other Transport Equipment 0.89
  100.00  
NB Figures for the GDP share are based on the 3rd revision of the ISIC classification (see UN Statitics Devision, 2004). 
Since the R&D/Innovation survey classifies according to the TSIC 1972 (Department of Labour, 1972), which is based 
on the ISIC Revision 2 (see UN Statitics Devision, 2004), the classes can be only approximately matched.   
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board, 2002 
Sectoral change in terms of employment is even more limited: an over-proportional share of the 
labour force is still employed in the primary sector (about 49% in 2000), with much less in industry 
(17%) and services (34%) (Jomo, 1997: 84, Asian Development Bank, 2004: 64). Once again, this 
contrasts markedly with countries like Korea (ca. 9%, 19%, 72%), Taiwan (ca. 8%, 35%, 57%) and 
also Malaysia (ca. 15%, 36%, 50%), which have shifted decisively towards industry and/ or 
services (ibid.). 
This overview of the economic development in Thailand has emphasised the importance of exports. 
Tab. 4.3 presents Thailand’s top 10 export items (ranked by value) in 2001. These products account 
for more than 40% of all export revenue. Computer related products such as ‘automatic data 
processing machines and parts thereof’ and ‘electronic integrated circuits’ represent about 18% of 
total exports alone. 
According to the Bank of Thailand (2004a), the share of high-tech exports to total manufactured 
exports rose from 53.3% in 1993 to 69.2% in 2003, whereas labour intensive exports (27.8% to 
11.9%) as well as resource based exports (11.4% to 9.6%) declined.  
Tab. 4.3: Thailand’s top ten export items in 2001 
Product Share of total exports in 2001 
Automatic data processing machines and parts thereof 12.2
Electronic integrated circuits 5.4
Garments 4.5
Motor cars, motor vehicles, parts and accessories 4.1
Canned fish 3.1
Precious stones and jewellery 2.8
Radio-broadcast receivers, television receiver and parts thereof 2.6
Polymers of ethylene, propylene, etc. in primary forms 2.5
Rice 2.4
Rubber 2.0
Source: Bureau of Commercial Information Administration; cited in Tambunlertchai, 2002: 51 
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This positive evaluation is challenged by the International Institute for Management Development 
(IMD), which asserts that Thailand’s high-technology exports in 2001 only accounted for 31.4% of 
all manufactured exports (IMD, 2004: 703). In total, the country exported high-tech products worth 
US$ 15,234m in 2001 and earned a rank of 18 in the IMD listing (ibid.). In both terms Thailand 
ranks behind Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Malaysia (ibid.).  
Another ranking sees Thailand ranked 7th in the top 25 developing economy exporters of high-
technology manufactures (by export values 1997) as compiled by UNCTD (1999: 440). Using the 
UN Comtrade Database for a slightly more differentiated analysis, Brimble (2003a: 341) presents 
Tab. 4.4. It shows that Thai exports are still fairly labour-intensive, but that its science-based export 
share is higher than Korea’s and close to Taiwan’s, whereas Singapore is still far more advanced. 
Brimble asserts that the observed increase in science-based exports is more “in the labour-intensive 
end of science-based production” (ibid.: 339).  
Tab. 4.4: Distribution of manufactured exports by technology categories (%)18 
 Korea Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 1980 1990 1999 
Resource-
based 9.0 6.8 11.6 44.4 26.9 13.2 9.8 8.2 9.2 21.7 13.8 10.7
Labour-
intensive 49.2 40.8 23.2 10.6 10.3 7.6 54.3 41.2 31.0 47.0 45.5 35.8
Scale-
intensive 23.6 19.3 21.0 9.9 5.9 5.5 9.1 10.3 10.6 7.8 6.3 7.7
Differentiated 11.3 15.6 18.7 20.5 22.3 21.2 12.4 20.6 20.4 22.2 14.1 19.5
Science-
based 6.9 17.4 25.5 15.1 34.6 52.5 14.5 19.8 28.9 1.2 20.2 26.4
Source: Brimble, 2003a: 341 
Similarly, Lall (2001) cautions against misinterpreting the high figures for high-technology exports, 
which:  
“may conceal large differences in the underlying capabilities of manufacturing industry. 
On the one hand, they can reflect high levels of local physical and technological content 
(as in Korea and Taiwan); on the other, they can reflect low local content and simple 
assembly activity under the aegis of MNCs. Much of ‘technology-intensive’ production 
in Thailand falls in the second category”  
(Lall, 2001: 349).  
This assertion is supported by data from a 1997 study by the Siam Commerical Bank Research 
Institute (cited in Tambunlertchai, 2002: 79), in which the import content of high-technology 
exports, such as computer (64%) or integrated circuit boards (72%) is found to be fairly high. 
Medium- to low-technology products such as vehicles, parts and accessories (53%) or garments 
                                                 
18 N.B. Classification is based on OECD (1987). Resource-based refers to access to natural resources, e.g. for oil 
refining or food processing; labour intensive to un- and semi-skilled labour for e.g. textiles and garments; scale-
intensive to length of production runs, e.g. for steel, auto or paper industry; differentiated means the ability for tailored 
products for varied demands such as advanced machinery and TVs; science based confers to the rapid application of 
science and technology as e.g. in electronics and biotechnology (Lall, 1998). 
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(44%) use a visibly higher share of local content. As can be seen, these indicators cast some early 
doubts regarding the performance of the Thai NSI. Further evidence is presented in chapter 4.2. 
4.1.3 Spatial distribution of economic activities 
Industrialisation in Thailand has always been heavily concentrated in the Bangkok region, with 
approximately 70% to 75% of total production stemming from the Bangkok metropolitan region 
(Kraas, 1996: 247, Poapongsakorn et al., 2000: 116). Despite agglomeration diseconomies such as 
massive traffic congestion, inadequate public infrastructure (e.g. sewers), air and water pollution as 
well as labour shortages (ibid.), Bangkok and its vicinity (provinces of Nakhon Pathom, 
Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan and Samut Sakhon) is still the ‘economic powerhouse’ of 
Thailand. According to the 2001 Manufacturing Industry Survey, Bangkok and its vicinity host 
62% of all manufacturing establishments with more than 10 employees, employs 58% of the 
manufacturing workforce and accounts for 46.9% of gross output and 52.5% of value added 
(National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2001: table 7).  
 
This economic structure also becomes visible when scrutinising gross provincial product (GPP) per 
capita in 2002 in US$. Figure 4.4 shows the disparities in Thailand, clearly displaying the 
dominance of the Eastern Seaboard and the Bangkok metropolitan region. Maximum GPP per 
capita is US$ 12,008 in Rayong (Eastern Seaboard Region); minimum is US$ 419 in Nong Bua 
Lamphu in Northeast Thailand. The classes are built according to the method of standard deviation 
around the mean of US$ 1,990. 
Figure 4.4: Gross provincial product per capita (2002) a) standard deviation classes; b) in US$a) 
a)       b) 
 
NB Figures have been calculated in US$ according to average exchange rate in 2002 of 1 Bhat = 0.02329 US$. 
Data in b) is classified according to natural breaks, in order to present a very differentiated pattern. 
Source: National Economic and Social Development Board, 2004, own graphic 
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4.1.4 FDI inflow, structure, effects, and policies  
Since the focus of this thesis is on TNC-affiliates, the following chapter will scrutinise data about 
inflows and stocks of FDI in Thailand, its sectoral distribution, destinations for FDI, policies 
towards FDI, and the impact in terms of the real economy. 
4.1.4.1 Inflow and stock of FDI 
The previous section provides sufficient evidence to suggest that Thailand’s industrial development 
was closely connected to export and the impact of FDI. The main reasons for which TNCs invested 
in Thailand were cheap labour costs, political stability and favourable exchange rates. Still, a 
sufficient domestic market with high growth potential in the 1980s and 1990s and the perspective of 
the ASEAN free trade area also played an important role. Additionally, the privileges offered by the 
BOI did attract FDI (see Siamwalla et al., 1999, Poapongsakorn & Tangkitvanich, 2001: pp. 110, 
Dixon, 1999: pp. 124). As was shown, the existing infrastructure and supplier base also became 
relevant factors (Brimble, 2005). Consequently, most of the foreign investment in Thailand has 
been of a resource- and market-seeking nature (see 2.3.2).  
Dixon (1999: 2) asserts that economic development in Thailand “has been associated with a much 
greater involvement of foreign investors and transnational corporations than was the case in Taiwan 
and South Korea”. However, in comparison to neighbouring countries such as Malaysia and 
Singapore, Thailand’s share of worldwide FDI is not exceptional. Contrarily, it has received 
considerably fewer investments than the other two countries, even though it has caught up with 
Malaysia since 1996 (Tab 4.5).  
Tab. 4.5: Amount and distribution of global inward FDI flows (annual average)  
Year Worldwide  
(US$m) 
Developing 
countries 
(%) 
South, East, 
and South 
East Asia (%) 
Singapore 
 
(%) 
Malaysia 
 
(%) 
Thailand 
 
(%) 
1980-1985 49,831 25.4 9.3 2.67 2.12 0.53
1986-1990 149,702 17.4 9.1 2.30 0.83 0.78
1991-1995 226,123 33.8 20.4 2.84 2.01 0.79
1996-2000 788,358 24.3 12.6 1.47 0.55 0.57
2001-2003 685,300 26.7 13.9 1.57 0.30 0.33
Source: UNCTAD, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2004; own calculation 
This pattern also holds true for data on FDI inward stock: in 2003 Singapore held about 10.9% of 
South, East and South-East Asia’s FDI stocks, whereas Malaysia hosted 4.4% and Thailand 2.7% 
(UNCTAD, 2004).  
In order to assess the inflow and inward stock in relation to the local economy, Tab. 4.6 shows the 
figures for FDI flows as a % of fixed capital formation and of FDI stocks as a % of GDP. Clearly, 
FDI in Thailand has been increasing since 1995, but the total inflow and stock is far less important 
than in Singapore and Malaysia or in South, East and South East Asia generally. Furthermore, the 
figures for Thailand are either no different or slightly higher than for worldwide FDI. 
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Tab. 4.6: Inward FDI flows and stock in relation to gross fixed capital formation and GDP 
 World South, East 
and South 
East Asia 
Singapore Malaysia Thailand 
Inward FDI flows as % of gross fixed capital formation (annual average) 
1981-1985 17.4 10.8 3.1
1986-1989 NA 35.2 9.6 4.9
1990-1995 4.1 6.7 30.5 19.4 4.4
1996-2000 11.9 11.7 39.9 16.9 15.2
2000-2003 10.0 9.8 43.8 9.3 7.8
Inward FDI stocks as % of GDP 
1980 6.6 27.4 52.9 20.7 3.0
1985 8.3 24.6 73.6 23.3 5.1
1990 9.3 20.8 93.1 23.4 9.7
1995 10.2 20.8 78.2 32.3 10.5
2000 19.3 36.6 121.5 58.5 24.5
2003 22.9 34.6 161.3 57.2 25.8
Source: UNCTAD, 1992, 2002, 2004 
On the other hand, “FDI flows skyrocketed during and after the crisis” (Ramstetter, 2003:86; see 
also Figure 4.3), resulting in a FDI stock that more than doubled from 1996 to 2001. Due to the 
slow growth of GDP, the ratio of FDI stock to GDP increased from 10.5% in 1995 to 27.7% in 
2002. This suggests that TNCs have become much more important in the Thai economy. 
Nevertheless, as Ramstetter (2003) argues, this has not been the case. Rather, the differences are 
caused by the nature of FDI as a measure of “one source of corporate finance, equity and loans 
remitted from the parent group abroad, not a measure of real economic activity such as production 
and employment” (ibid.: 84). For example many Japanese TNCs seized the opportunity to increase 
their share through Thai joint ventures (Brimble, 2004: 8).  
4.1.4.2 Sectoral and regional distribution of FDI 
In terms of sectoral patterns, the involvement of foreign capital from 1970 to 2003 has not been 
equally distributed, but strongly focused on manufacturing (42%), trade (21%) and real estate 
(11%) (Tab. 4.7). Within manufacturing, the textile industry did not attract a large absolute amount 
of FDI, despite its importance in the early export phase of manufactured goods. Most investment 
has been assigned to the electrical machinery and appliances sector, including the hard disk drives 
industry, and the machinery and transport equipment sectors, including the automotive industry. 
Rather than sector specific pull factors, it can be assumed that the above named (generally 
favourable) conditions in Thailand have attracted FDI in these sectors, which were ‘pushed’ out of 
the high cost countries. For example, electronics and machinery were among the major outward 
flows of Japanese FDI to Asia (Ministry of Finance Japan, 2005). 
Considering the origins of FDI, Figure 4.5 clearly displays several waves of FDI inflows from 
different geographical locations. In the aftermath of the first yen revaluation most funds originated 
in Japan. The next waves, from Japan, the US and the EU, followed from 1995 onwards, 
accelerating with the crises year 1997, as foreign firms took over Thai companies facing debt and 
liquidity problems. This is reflected in the massive increase of mergers and acquisitions in Thailand 
(Brimble, 2004: 7). Japanese investors, especially, used the opportunity to increase their shares in 
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local affiliates, made possible by a relaxation of ownership regulations. This also explains the 
sudden drop in FDI in 1999 (ibid.). In recent years ASEAN countries, led by Singapore, increased 
their activities. To a certain extent, TNCs use their regional Singaporean headquarters to invest in 
Thailand (ibid.). 
Tab. 4.7: Accumulated net inflows of FDI according to sector (US$m) from 1970 to 2003  
Sector FDI net inflow % of total 
Industry 17.664 42
   Food & sugar 1.167 3 
   Textiles  872 2 
   Metal & non-metallic 2.282 5 
   Electrical machiney & appliances 4.624 11 
   Machinery & transport equipment 3.595 9 
   Chemicals 2.174 5 
   Petroleum products 416 1 
   Construction materials 153 0 
   Others 2.377 6 
Financial institutions 1.872 4
Trade 8.703 21
Construction 2.078 5
Mining & quarrying 1.135 3
Agriculture 164 0
Services 3.141 7
Investment & holding company 710 2
Real estate 4.695 11
Others 1.730 4
Total 41.892 100
Source: Bank of Thailand, 2004a; own calculation 
Figure 4.5: Accumulated net flows of foreign direct investment 1984 – 2003 – origin of investment 
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In terms of destinations for FDI, the spatial pattern of economic activity (see 4.1.3) is replicated: 
Most investments went to the extended Bangkok Metropolitan region19, with the eastern seaboard 
province of Rayong alone accounting for 31% of total approved FDI from1987 to 2000. Bangkok 
itself ranks second with 12%, followed by Chonburi (ESR) with 11% (UNCTAD, 2001: 63). Based 
on BOI data from1960 to 1991, Dixon (1999: 232) shows that 50-80% of the projects in this period 
were located in the extended BMR (Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of FDI stock in Thailand, by province  (BOI approved investment for the years 1987 – 
2000 in Mio. of Bhat) 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2001: 90, based Board of Investment unpublished data 
However, due to zoning policies implemented by the BOI (see 4.1.4.4), there has been a redirection 
of flows away from Bangkok and into the hinterland. This is mirrored by the employment pattern as 
well. Brimble (2004: 18) detects a steady shift over time from Bangkok to the surrounding 
provinces, and afterwards to the rest of the country. While in 1970 97% of the FDI induced 
employment was in Bangkok, its share was reduced to 27% from 1991 to 1998. Consequently, the 
share of employment in the rest of the country increased from 3% to 37% (ibid.). However, that the 
figure only includes BOI approved investments must also be taken into account. Hence, it only 
displays a portion of total investment, since “many foreign MNCs invest without getting BOI 
approval” (Ramstetter, 2003: 90). 
Nevertheless, it can be stated that, initially, the favourable agglomeration conditions in Bangkok 
(e.g. infrastructure, public administration, labour market etc.) drew most investment into the BMR. 
                                                 
 19 There is no single definition of the extended Bangkok region. This work considers the following provinces as part 
of the EBR: Bangkok, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Nakhon Phathom, Nonthaburi, Phathum Thani, Ayutthaya, 
Chachoengsao, Chon Buri, Rayong. 
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Subsequently, the government improved the infrastructure of some hinterland areas (e.g. outer 
Bangkok, ESR) and provided incentives for investing outside of the core region (see 4.1.4.4), which 
– together with agglomeration costs in Bangkok, such as traffic congestion and factor prices – led to 
a certain diversion of FDI.  
4.1.4.3 Effects of FDI on the Thai economy 
Since there are no official, published statistics of sales and employment for foreign TNCs, 
Ramstetter (2003: 89) estimates the contribution of TNC-affiliates to the Thai economy based on 
six different official as well as unofficial Thai and foreign sources. He reckons that TNC-affiliates 
account for about 32% of value added in manufacturing and about 16% of total employment in 
manufacturing (Ramstetter, 2003, 2004). This large gap between output and employment is partly 
due to the dichotomous nature of the Thai economy, which results in a large amount of small local 
enterprises with little value added (Ramstetter, 2004: 868). According to Brimble (2004: 18), direct 
employment from foreign investors accounts for up to 800,000, with an additional 1.6 million jobs 
created through indirect employment effects (figures for 1997). This results in a share of 7.4% of 
total employment and about 17% of employment in manufacturing (ibid.).  
In regard to exports, Brimble (2004: 16) estimates (based on the data by Ramstetter, 2003) that 
TNCs contribute about 60% of total manufacturing exports before, and roughly 70%, after the 
crisis.  
Considering wages, Matsuoka (2001, cited in Velde & Morrissey, 2002) and Ramstetter (2004) find 
evidence that salaries in TNC-affiliates are higher than in local firms. Foreign firms paid about 28% 
more for white collar, and 12% for blue collar workers in 1998 (Matsuoka, 2001).  
Because labour productivity was not found to vary significantly with ownership (controlling for 
other factors), Matsuoka argues that wage differentials between foreign and local firms “should be 
explained by labour market imperfections, with foreign multinationals dominating segmented 
labour markets for particular skills” (Velde & Morrissey, 2002: 6). Similarly, Ramstetter (2004) 
could not find evidence for higher labour productivity in TNC-affiliates generally, after controlling 
for the large number of very small local enterprises in his dataset. However, European, Japanese 
and US as well as wholly-owned TNC-affiliates tend to have a higher level of productivity. Clearer 
evidence is provided by Dollar et al. (1998). They find that foreign firms “generate about 50% more 
value added from given amounts of capital and labor than domestic firms do” (ibid.: 68). 
Furthermore, foreign firms were more homogeneous in terms of productivity than domestic 
companies, of which a substantial group is as productive as TNC-affiliates, while roughly a third 
displays far lower productivity levels (ibid.: pp. 69). Again, this reflects the typical dichotomy in 
late-industrialising and developing countries (see Ernst, 2002). In comparison, Yeung et al. (2001: 
163) report that “some 80 per cent of Singapore’s exports, 40 per cent of employment and 26 per 
cent of gross domestic capital formation are directly or indirectly accounted for by foreign TNCs”.  
These figures, therefore, underscore the greater importance of TNC-affiliates in the city-state. 
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In respect to knowledge-spillovers from TNC-affiliates in Thailand, no systematic study exists, but 
there is some ‘anecdotal evidence’: Arnold et al. (2000: 66) report of a high turnover of trained 
technicians and engineers in TNC-affiliates, which could lead to knowledge diffusion. However, it 
is unclear if the mobility of highly-skilled workers is mainly an intra-TNC phenomenon or if it 
reaches local firms (ibid.). Generally, they argue that it might be too early to find significant 
spillovers, since most TNC-affiliates just recently began to deepen their design and engineering 
activities (ibid.:67, also Brimble, 2003a: 354; see chapter 4.2.2.1, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1.2 and 6.2.2 for more 
evidence).  
Consequently, the examples mainly refer to training of personnel. Brimble (2003a: pp. 354; 2004: 
pp. 18) mentions the following training activities, which were initiated by TNC-affiliates and which 
benefit local firms (for more jointly researched evidence see chapter 6): 
• The International Disk Drive Equipment and Material Association (IDEMA), Thailand, a 
lobby group of the HDD-industry that is assembled of mainly TNC-affiliates, created, 
together with the Asian Institute of Technology, a ‘Certificate of Competence in Storage 
Technology’ and trained about 500 industry professionals in 2000. 
• The Ayutthaya Technical Training Center, a joint venture between the High-Tech Industrial 
Estate and the King Mongkut Institute of Technology North Bangkok, were given training 
equipment and new technology from a group of Japanese TNC-affiliates associated with 
Canon Ltd. Moreover, Mitutoyo Corportaion contributed precision instruments and 
measuring equipment. The centre focuses mainly on vocational training for companies 
located in the estate, but also fosters mutual knowledge flows about industry needs and 
university services beyond training. It is seen as a very successful example of university-
industry linkages in Thailand. 
• Within the BOI’s innovation programme, TNC-affiliates participate in curriculum 
development for electronics and automotive training courses at the Department of 
Vocational Education. 
• At the Thai-German Institute, a technical training institute jointly funded by the Thai and 
German government, professionals from German companies train the lecturers and provide 
most of the state-of-the-art equipment. 
Regarding technology transfer and technical assistance to local suppliers as conscious spillovers 
created by TNC-affiliates, Dahlman and Brimble (1990) could not find any such activity back in 
1990. In contrast, there is now some evidence for these types of activity. For example, TNC-
affiliates take part in vendor-meet-suppliers activities organized by the BOI Unit for Industrial 
Linkages Development (BUILD; see 4.1.4.4), where local suppliers visit plants of TNC-affiliates in 
order to learn about the production process and its requirements for suppliers. Other major TNCs 
have extensive ‘vendor development programs’ or ‘vendor clubs’ (e.g. Toyota Motors Thailand, see 
chapter 6) (UNCTD, 2001: pp.146). 
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4.1.4.4 Policies towards FDI 
The Board of Investment (BOI) founded in 1959 is the chief organisation responsible for FDI 
promotion in Thailand (Wanapha, 2002, Jomo, 1997: pp. 61). During the import substitution phase 
BOI’s primary means were tariffs, tax incentives and guarantees not to nationalise or set up 
competing state enterprises (Dixon, 1999: 87). In the 1960s its strategy was to develop Thai 
manufacturing capabilities by providing infant industry protection and access to foreign technology 
(Jomo, 1997: 61). With the shift towards export-oriented industrialisation, the BOI has also 
transformed some of its instruments. Nowadays, it generally offers privileged firms exemptions or 
reductions on import duties, exemption on corporate income taxes for up to eight years, allowance 
to deduce infrastructure investments and cost for transportation, electricity and water supply from 
the taxable corporate income and exemption of export duties for export enterprises (Poapongsakorn 
et al., 2000: 47). However, certain requirements must be met in order to receive this BOI privilege, 
such as minimum value-added, minimum registered capital, age of machinery used, and restrictions 
on foreign ownership (ibid.).  
In order to decentralise economic development (see e.g. Schlörke et al., 1992, Kraas, 1996, Dixon, 
1999 pp. 190), the BOI established a zoning policy in the mid-1980s to re-direct FDI away from 
Bangkok (Dixon, 1999: 226). Three zones have been assigned, offering different levels of 
exemption/ reduction on import duties and corporate tax.  
• Zone 1, with the lowest benefits, encompasses the core Bangkok metropolitan region: the 
provinces of Bangkok, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, Nakhon Pathom, Nonhtaburi and 
Pathum Thani,  
• Zone 2 includes provinces surrounding this core region:  Ang Thong, Ayutthaya, 
Chachoengsao, Chon Buri, Kanchanaburi, Nakhon Nayok, Phuket, Ratchaburi, Rayong, 
Samut Songkhram, Saraburi, and Suphanburi,  
• Zone 3 consists of the remaining 58 provinces (BOI, 2004).  
Since 1992 the BOI has operated the Unit for Industrial Linkages Development (BUILD). Its 
mission is to act as an intermediary between large (foreign) assemblers and (mainly local) small and 
medium sized manufacturers of parts, in order to foster linkages and technology transfer. Key 
aspects of this program are the vendors-meet-customers programme, offering TNC-factory tours for 
suppliers, the BUILD market place, where customers present opportunities and requirements for 
local sourcing, and the ASEAN supporting industry database (ASID), which tries to simplify and 
encourage local sourcing (BUILD, n.d., Brimble, 2003a: 342). 
In the aftermath of the Asian crisis the BOI relaxed many requirements and introduced new 
incentives such as the retraction of zoning requirements for export industries and capacity caps, as 
well as exemptions on import duties for export industry and exemptions on import tax for non BOI-
promoted firms as well (Wanapha, 2002: 3). Furthermore, in August 2000 restrictions on foreign 
ownership were abolished and local content and export regulations were lifted as they were not 
compatible with WTO-rules. Besides this regulatory loosening, the BOI tightened some regulations 
and reduced some incentives: BOI-approved projects are now required to get ISO 9000 certification 
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within two years after the start of operations, and the maximum tax exemption is varies with the 
total amount of investment by the TNC (Brimble, 2004: 12).  
Generally, the BOI is currently seeking to position itself away from “tax subsidies for Greenfield 
investment by export-oriented manufactures” (Amin et al., 2002), and towards more comprehensive 
objectives such as human resource development, entrepreneurship as well as the creation of 
networks and linkages in order to facilitate R&D and skills development and technological 
development and transfer (Amin et al., 2002, Wanapha, 2002). Hence, the BOI claims to have 
changed from a “tax privileges provider” to a “facilitation and investment service provider” (ibid.). 
The ‘buzzwords’ for this new strategy are: trouble shooting and the creation of an enabling 
environment, proactive marketing, investment networking, SME development, community 
enterprises development, gaining expertise on the international investment regime, and excellence 
in investment promotion administration (Kanasawat, 2002).  
Already, consequences of this new approach are being felt (Brimble, 2004: pp. 12). In 2003-2004 
the BOI: 
• abolished location requirements, 
• targeted five industries with customised incentive packages: agro-industry, automotive, 
fashion, ICT including electronics and high value-added services (including regional 
operating headquarters),  
• recognising the importance of skill development, technology transfer and innovation by 
implementing a “series of carrot rather than stick measures to promote investment” 
(Brimble, 2004: 14), such as:  
• additional tax incentives for firms with R&D- or design-expenditure of 1-2% of annual total 
sales, with S&T personnel share of 1-5% of total workforce, training expenditure of more 
than 1% of total payroll and expenditure for the development of vendors or educational 
institutions of at least 1% of annual total sales within the first three years, 
• treatment of projects in eight key fields (such as scientific laboratories, electronic design 
etc.) as priority activities that can receive maximum benefits regardless of location. These 
are allowed duty free importation of machinery and are not subject to caps on incentives, 
• treatment of science park projects as priority activities with maximum incentives. 
• realising the importance of strengthening existing and supporting the establishment of new 
Thai-owned SMEs, in order to provide a better supporting supplier structure. 
In summary, Thailand’s economic industrialisation process is closely connected to TNC activities. 
Shortly after the initial economic take-off large amounts of FDI, mainly from Japan and first tier 
NICs, sought new production opportunities in Thailand. Later investments from the USA, Europe 
and other ASEAN countries followed. However, compared to the benchmarking countries of 
Malaysia and Singapore, Thailand did not receive an exceptionally high share. To the contrary, FDI 
is distinctively less important in Thailand.  
In manufacturing most FDI went into electrical machinery/ appliances and the machinery and 
transport equipment sector. The major destinations for FDI were the Bangkok Metropolitan and 
Eastern Seaboard Region. TNCs in Thailand account for about 17% of employment, 30% of value-
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added and 70% of exports in manufacturing. There is evidence of higher labour productivity in 
TNC-affiliates, but taking into account the very heterogeneous structure of local firms this becomes 
less distinctive. Nevertheless, TNCs pay higher wages than local firms. Moreover, there is some 
‘anecdotal evidence’ supporting minor knowledge spillovers.  
In respect to FDI-related policy, the Board of Investment is the central organisation in terms of 
fostering foreign investment. In the beginning, the primary objective of the BOI was simply to bring 
in FDI in order to create a domestic industry and provide jobs. In the view of Chantramonklasri et 
al. (1998) the practices of import substitution and infant-industry protection have actually hindered 
the creation of technological capabilities, encouraging firms “to acquire only the ‘ready-made’ 
technology embodied in capital goods without utilizing the process of international technology 
transfer to augment their [the firms’] existing capabilities” (ibid.: 16) instead. Recently, the focus 
has shifted towards technical change, technological capabilities and hence the BOI starts to provide 
financial incentives to firms conducting R&D and skills development, especially in some target 
industries (BOI, 2004, Wanapha, 2002). 
4.2 State of the Thai system of innovation – a systematic view 
This section appraises the NSI in Thailand by summarising studies on the Thai NSI as such, studies 
on single actors and secondary data. So far, there have been no attempts to systematically analyse 
regional systems of innovation in Thailand. It is also questionable, if Thai regions possess the 
necessary autonomy and governance power to qualify as a RSI in the strict sense (see 2.2.2). 
Consequently, in the following the general performance of the NSI is evaluated by contemplating 
secondary data. Subsequently, a brief evaluation of the three main actors in the Thai-SI: private 
firms, knowledge-related institutes, the government, and their linkages, are presented.  
4.2.1 Current performance in a comparative perspective 
Benchmarking key indicators of the SI in Thailand with other South-East and East Asian economies 
in 1996 and 2002 shows that Thailand clearly lags behind first tier NICs like Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore, and also behind fellow second tier NIC Malaysia. There is less resource commitment to 
R&D as % of GDP (GERD). Moreover, most of these funds come from the public sector, whereas 
in most other countries the majority of money is spent by private businesses (measured in business 
expenditures as % of GDP (BERD) in % of GERD). Additionally, the human resource commitment 
in terms of R&D-personnel per capita is lower. These deficits in the input indicators consequently 
relate to weaker output (or throughput) figures, such as patents granted to residents per million 
inhabitants or the technology content of exports (see 4.1.2). 
In particular, the comparison with other 2nd tier NICs such as Malaysia casts doubt on the 
performance of Thailand. Even though the number of patents is similar according to the IMD, the 
US Patent Office registered 320 patents from Thai and 454 from Malaysian residents from 1977 to 
2003 (US Patent Office, 2003). Since Malaysia has less than half of the population of Thailand, this 
suggests a much lower output from the Thai-SI in a both competitive and important US-system. 
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Having said this, the development from 1996 to 2002 has been positive with a doubling in both 
GERD and the participation of private funds in R&D (Tab. 4.8, 4.9). 
Tab. 4.8: Key S&T indicators (2002) 
Country GERD BERD  
in %  
of GERD§ 
R&D- personnel 
per capita* 
% of R&D- 
personnel in 
business 
enterprises§ 
Patents granted 
to residents 
(1999-2001) 
per Mio. 
inhabitants§ 
Thailand 0.26 42.1 0.51 22.5 1.6
Malaysia 0.71 65.6 0.5 51.6 1.1
Singapore 2.15 61.4 5.2 52.4 26.2
Korea 2.53 73.3 4.0 62.2 616.9
Taiwan 2.30 61.1 5.1 65.4 1,097.8
Philippines 0.082 41.22 0.22 10.82 0.13
* full-timework equivalent per 1,000 people; ; §based on own calculations  
1 2001; 2latest figures for 1998; 3for 1998-2000;  Source: IMD, 2004, Asian Development Bank, 2003, 2004 
Tab. 4.9: Key S&T indicators (1996) 
Country GERD BERD  
in %  
of GERD§ 
R&D- personnel 
per capita* 
% of R&D- 
personnel in 
business 
enterprises§ 
(1995) 
Patents granted 
to residents 
(1994-1995) 
per Mio. 
inhabitants§ 
Thailand 0.13 20.1 0.2   6.3 1.3
Malaysia 0.321 47.81 0.31 37.31 1.2
Singapore 1.37 63.3 3.1 66.7 4.2
Korea 2.79 64.0 3.0 65.6 135.6
Taiwan 1.86 58.0 3.7 52.9 778.0
Philippines 0.222   2.62 0.22 10.92 0.2
* full-timework equivalent per 1,000 people; §based on own calculations, 1 1994; 21992; 
Source: Asian Development Bank, 1999, 2001, IMD, 1998, 1999 
Figure 4.7: R&D expenditure as share of GDP and according to source (1987-2002) 
0,21
0,16 0,16
0,14
0,13
0,18
0,12
0,27
0,26
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2002
0
0,05
0,1
0,15
0,2
0,25
0,3
Private Sector
Government sector
GERD
 
Source: 1987-1995 NSTDA, 1999:14; 1997 – 2002: IMD, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004 
 105
However, according to NSTDA data, the current level of GERD is only slightly higher than in the 
period shortly after the take-off phases in 1987. NSTDA (1999: pp. 11) points out that absolute 
R&D-expenditure more than doubled from 1987 to 1996 but did not keep up with the steep GDP-
growth (see Figure 4.7). This also explains the brief increase in the crisis year of 1997, when GDP 
decreased sharply. The increase of 2001 is presumably due to a new data basis, because the results 
from the first R&D/ Innovation survey became the basis for new estimates on R&D-expenditure. 
Still, in international comparisons, GERD ranks very low. 
4.2.2 Main actors and linkages in the Thai system of innovation 
According to Altenburg et al. (2003: pp. 41), the Thai NSI is seen to consist of three main 
components: local Thai-owned firms (mainly SME); large, mostly transnational corporations (dealt 
with together in the subsequent section), and knowledge-related institutions, such as schools, 
universities, government research institutes etc. Each of these levels is in turn influenced by 
government policies, which is why government is seen as an actor in its own right (Intarakumnerd 
et al., 2002). Private bridging organisations and financial intermediaries are not taken into account, 
so please refer to Intarakumnerd (2004) for an initial assessment. Each of the following sections 
briefly reflects the quality of the main actors and their linkages.  
4.2.2.1 Firms: technological capabilities and linkages 
The single most important actor group within a given NSI are private business firms, since these are 
the units where innovation activity, on a large scale, is or should take place. In order to evaluate 
firms’ skills and capabilities, the framework of technological capabilities, which has been 
introduced in chapter 2.1.2, is used as a convenient yardstick. The remainder of the chapter provides 
an overview of studies that have attempted to evaluate the TC-level of companies in Thailand. 
The Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) conducted one of the first major evaluations 
of technological capabilities in Thai firms in 1989. Teams of engineers and economists surveyed 
119 firms in the biotechnology, materials and electronics industries. These teams rated four 
distinctive technological capabilities based on 20 different indicators. The study differentiates 
between a) acquisition capability, i.e. the ability to search, assess, negotiate and procure 
technologies, set it up and start production; b) operative capability, which includes the operation, 
control and maintenance of production facilities, skill development, production planning and quality 
control; c) adaptive capabilities encompassing technology digestion, minor product and process 
modifications and finally d) innovative capability, describing the ability to create major changes in 
existing products and processes or the invention of new ones as well as in-house R&D and 
engineering. 
The primary findings suggest that operative capabilities are most common, followed by acquisition 
and adaptive capabilities. Innovative capabilities are scarce. In addition, large firms possess higher 
TCs, mostly in operative and adaptive, less in acquisitive and innovative capabilities. Foreign 
ownership (either JV or totally owned) influences operative capabilities quite positively, but has a 
negative impact on innovative and acquisitive capabilities. Firms with domestic market orientation 
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in materials and electronics possess more innovative TCs, while the opposite is observed for 
biotechnology (Vongpanitlerd, 1992). 
Making use of the TDRI survey and additional secondary data, Dahlman and Brimble (1990) 
enquire into the status of technological capabilities, the acquisition of foreign technology, the use, 
diffusion and development of technology as well as technical human capital in the early 1990s. 
They assess that,  
“while most firms in the modern sector have reasonable adequate capability to operate 
their existing technology, they are weak in searching for, acquiring and adapting foreign 
technology. They were even weaker in developing their own technology. Local R&D 
efforts were minimal in the private sector”       (Dahlman & Brimble, 1990: 41). 
 
A subsequent survey done by the TDRI in 1991 establishes the TC-level of firms in machinery and 
information equipment industries. Generally it finds strong operative capabilities in TNC-affiliates 
but weak acquisitive, adaptive and innovative capabilities. Thai firms possess especially low 
capabilities in the machine tool, mould and die industry. In contrast, some capable Thai firms are 
detected in the telecommunications equipment and computer industries, which exhibit good 
operative and acquisitive, sometimes even adaptive (reverse engineering), capabilities. However, 
almost no innovative capabilities are found. Moreover, foreign firms possess state-of-the-art 
machinery more often as well as better product and process technology than Thai firms. They also 
invest more in human resources and its development (cited in Brimble & Sripaipan, 1994: pp.22).  
In a survey of 20 firms in electronics, steel and petrochemicals, Mukdapitak (1994: pp. 212) asks 
firms to estimate which of their capabilities are most significant to their competitive advantage. She 
finds that most firms indicate ‘basic technological capabilities’ in product technology and even only 
‘production capabilities’ and ‘basic TCs’ in process technology (terminology refers to the 
framework by Bell and Pavitt (1995), cf. chapter 2.1.2). Moreover, most firms obviously do not see 
the need to improve, but report rather on passive or less intense efforts to develop TCs. 
Based on the technological capability framework proposed by Ernst et al. (1998a), Poapongsakorn 
and Tonnguthai (1998) analyse technological capability formation in Thailand’s textile and 
electronics industries by conducting interviews with 21 companies.  
They find that textile firms are able to strengthen their production and management capabilities 
step-by-step. Initially, the industry benefited from a know-how inflow of Chinese immigrants 
setting up the textile business. The second generation of entrepreneurs was trained abroad, bringing 
back knowledge about textile engineering, business management, clothing production and fashion 
design. Further progress was made by close contacts with clients and suppliers, especially Japanese 
trading companies, as well as joint ventures with foreign firms, bringing in capital and knowledge.  
Moreover, firms benefited from working as subcontractors for firms in East Asian NICs, who 
provided them with fabrics, patterns, designs and markets. After having established production and 
investment capabilities in the 1980s, the learning experiences with foreign partners resulted in the 
development of firms’ own marketing capabilities. A significant share of firms possesses its 
competitive advantage through its technical and production skills, delivery on time and product 
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quality rather than its low wages. However, linkages to the science and technology infrastructure 
are still relatively weak and while firms possess some minor change capabilities, they lack the 
design skills to cater to leading markets in Europe, Japan and North America. 
Foreign firms established the electronics industry in 1960, but it developed only minor 
technological capabilities before the 1980s, due to a lack of incentives in a highly protected 
domestic market under an import substitution regime. Poapongsakorn and Tonnguthai (1998: 187) 
find that the development of TCs has been “extremely slow” and that foreign-owned firms built few 
linkages with the host economy. However, export oriented firms have, in particular, developed (pre) 
investment capabilities, such as procurement, installation and execution of test-runs, as well as 
production capabilities like process operation and quality control, which have formerly been carried 
out by the parent firm or foreign partners. 
Particularly TNC-affiliates, joint ventures and Thai-owned OEM producers display adaptive 
capabilities for process technology. Product design and R&D-activities are far less common, but 
these firms also conduct them more often. These activities relate primarily to the modifications of 
existing processes and machinery in order to overcome weaknesses and meet new industrial 
standards. Generally, R&D-activity and linkages to the S&T-infrastructure are weak, but there are 
signs of some Thai-owned SMEs setting up R&D-units and beginning to cooperate with universities 
and public R&D institutes (Poapongsakorn & Tonguthai, 1998). 
An in-depth interview survey of 25 firms organized by the TDRI in 1998 (Chantramonklasri et al., 
1998: pp. 38-45) focuses on R&D-activities. Based on the sample, they detect a recent increase in 
R&D-activity and differentiated firms into five groups. Some conglomerates have initiate R&D 
programs with competitive pressures requiring them to reduce production costs. Primarily in the 
agro-industry, the study finds firms contracting R&D-activities out to universities and public R&D-
institutes, reflecting the well-developed knowledge base in the S&T-infrastructure in this field. 
Predominantly, these activities relate to necessary modifications of imported products and are 
caused by increased competition. The third, and largest, R&D-performing group is subcontractors 
(OEM), who are forced to implement R&D-activities by increasing demands in terms of product 
quality and costs from their customers. Therefore, this survey focused on (small) product 
modifications and process improvements. A fourth group is entrepreneurs, who acquire R&D-
knowledge while studying and/or working abroad. Back in Thailand, they start their own businesses 
concentrating mostly on design and product development, without operating production facilities. 
The final group of ‘laggards’ consists of the bulk of Thai firms in labour intensive sectors, which 
lack the financial resources, basic technological capabilities and human resources necessary to carry 
out R&D. Despite eroding competitiveness these companies do not see the need for R&D. 
In a study for the Department of Industrial Promotion, Ministry of Industry, a research consortia 
from the faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University and the Brooker Group plc. surveyed 
1,000 firms and established their capabilities in respect to technology, product development, 
information technology and marketing (MOI, 2001: chapter 5).  
Their findings indicate that the majority of firms have moderate technology capabilities, yet lack 
the ability to source computer technology and automatic systems for manufacturing. Hence, most 
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firms still use manual or mechanical material handling systems (ibid.: 5-69). However, most firms 
individually select raw material and machinery/ equipment. The firms are well aware of modern 
technology, only larger ones use medium- to high-technology, though. Most firms are reluctant to 
invest in these expensive machines. Half of them reported on product or process innovations, which 
are most often hindered by high costs and a lack of qualified personnel (ibid.: pp. 5-22). About 19% 
of all firms claim to have established an R&D-unit. The most frequent sources of technology 
include information from customers and in-house design (ibid.: pp. 5-28). However, modern 
process logistics such as just-in-time management were only implemented in about 15% of the 
surveyed firms (ibid.: 5-36). 
Tab. 4.10: Share of firms with the following capabilities (2000):  
Capability Share of 
firms 
Capability Share of 
firms 
Technological Capabilities IT-Capabilities  
Routine maintenance check 89 Use computers 77.5
Planning for improving production 81 Use internet 45.7
Tooling development 75 Use e-commerce 0.1
Plant layout improvement 75 Use electronic data exchange 0.1
Documentation of 
products/processes 
57
Product/ Process innovation 53
CAD – Computer-aided Design 18
CAM – Computer- aided 
Manufacturing 
13
CAE – Computer-aided Engineering 7
 
Product Development Capabilities Marketing Capabilities  
Improving quality control methods 81 Own marketing 88
Improving existing products and 
materials 
79 Repay loan within the due date 83
Product design 60 Adequate cash for operation 75
Localization of products developed 
abroad 
37 Define important marketing goals in 
written form 
11
R&D Department established 19 Participate in trade fairs and missions 
(National Trade Fairs) 
11
Accredited with ISO 10 Written plan for individual products/ 
product groups 
9
Accredited with QS 1 Participate in trade fairs and missions 
(International Trade Fairs) 
4
Accredited with other standard (e.g. 
GMP, HACCP, etc.) 
16 Participate in trade fairs and missions 
(International trade Missions) 
3
Source: MOI, 2001, own compilation 
For product development capabilities the study asserts that a significant share of Thai firms 
perform product and process innovations, yet do not have formal R&D-units or personnel 
exclusively assigned to this task (ibid.: 5-73). Firms with technological products (chemicals, 
transportation equipment and electrical machinery) are among those most likely to realise R&D-
units. While about 40% of all surveyed firms claim to be able to implement parts production on the 
basis of customer drawings and to produce models, only 22% see themselves capable of creating 
prototypes (ibid.: 5-47). The low rate of firms with international standards certifications casts doubt 
on their product quality (ibid.: 5-42). In respect to Information Technology (IT) capabilities, the 
study detects that Thai firms use computers, but not for advanced functions such as e-commerce or 
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data exchange. Looking at marketing capabilities the authors conclude that the capabilities are 
average. Companies pursue marketing strategies; the personnel, however, lack “the ability to 
analyze the demands and trends of the market” (ibid.: 5-73). Overall the survey concludes that 
medium and large firms have distinctively higher capabilities than small firms. Moreover, export 
oriented firms possess higher capabilities. For detailed frequencies of the examined capabilities 
please refer to Tab. 4.10. 
In a study sponsored by the World Bank and commissioned by NSTDA on the policy framework 
and institutional structure supporting industrial technology development in Thailand, Arnold et al. 
(2000) analyse the accumulation of technological capabilities in Thailand. They assert that TCs in 
most firms in Thailand are rather weak. Moreover, they emphasise  
“that the shallow technological development of Thai industry is deeply embedded in long-standing 
patterns of behaviour in firms. Market conditions and other factors may be shifting in ways that call 
for new capabilities and new kinds of technology development activities, but for the majority of 
firms this is a ‘new world’ in which they have little or no experience” (Arnold et al., 2000: 56).  
 
The authors introduce a simplified classification of firms in terms of demand for technological 
change and based on the awareness of the need for technical change, the understanding of what to 
change and the knowledge on how to change.  
• Type 1 firms have low or zero demand, since they ‘don’t know that they don’t know’ – they 
do not realise or recognise the necessity for technical change and thus have difficulty in 
comprehending and responding to changing market demands.  
• Type 2 firms ‘know that they don’t know, but don’t know what’ – they have latent but 
ineffective demand. Realising the need for change, they do not know how to improve. They 
lack the necessary skills and expertise to manage technological change, have weak external 
networks and rely on technical change provided by their suppliers or by observing other 
firms’ behaviour.  
• Type 3 firms ‘know what, but not always where and how’ – they recognise the importance 
of change, know what to change and have certain skills to do so. However, they do not 
always know where and how to acquire relevant new technology.  
• Type 4 firms are aware of the relevance of technical change. They possess the absorptive 
capacity and skills for implementing change and acquiring external knowledge and 
technology. They can utilise well developed networks and seize technological opportunities 
(ibid.: 24).  
For Arnold et al. (2000) the majority of Thai based companies belong to type 1, with a significant 
share developing towards type 2. Only a few firms can be considered type 3 (ibid.: 57). 
Consequently, the authors ascertain the following key thresholds for Thai based firms (see Figure 
4.8): Most large TNC subsidiaries, many large domestic firms and some high-tech SMEs possess 
basic operation and technician capabilities, sufficient to acquire, assimilate and operate technology. 
Currently, they are struggling to develop design and engineering capabilities for technological 
upgrading and a degree of reverse engineering. The implementation of formal R&D and further 
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upgrading is considered irrelevant for most firms at this point in time. A large number of SMEs, 
especially in labour- and resource-based industries, are improving their basic operational 
capabilities and trying to develop some capabilities for the “efficient acquisition, assimilation and 
incremental upgrading of fairly standard technology” (ibid.: 57). 
Considering the role of TNC-affiliates, Arnold et al. (2000: pp.62) conclude that the long-standing 
view of foreign firms undertaking little technology, capability and skill development in Thailand 
has been changing in recent years. Based on a number of interviews they see a profound change in 
the works –driven by decentralisation tendencies and a need for on-site engineering and 
development. Hence, TNC-affiliates are on the verge of increasing local capability development, 
yet are restricted by a lack of suitable personnel and external training opportunities within Thailand.  
There is little evidence concerning linkages among these actors in the literature. Intarakumnerd et 
al. assess that “linkages among the […] actors of the Thai NIS are generally weak and fragmented” 
(2002: 1451, see also Kwanjai, 1999: pp.55, Altenburg et al., 2003) and the industrial sector is 
understood rather as “an agglomeration of largely independent ‘islands’ of manufacturing 
companies with no strong linkages between them or to other sectors of production” 
(Chantramonklasri, 1994: 24). In order to gain more insight into these important aspects of a 
functioning SI, chapter 5 will examine linkages. 
In summary, not all studies reviewed share the same evaluation of TCs in Thailand, e.g. MOI 
(2001) seems to have an more optimistic view than most of the other (sometimes older) studies. 
However, common ground seems to suggest that most firms in Thailand have not yet developed 
advanced and innovation related technological capabilities. Innovation activities do take place, but 
are rarely performed in formal R&D-units and pertain most often to incremental modifications of 
products and/or processes. On the other hand, many firms still struggle to acquire design and 
engineering capabilities and lack the ability to introduce computer-aided design and engineering. 
Moreover, production technology in most companies falls short of state-of-the-art, while advanced 
acquisition and adaptation capabilities as well as automated production are scarce. Generally, a 
dichotomy can be observed between more sophisticated large and foreign-owned firms and less 
capable domestic – and especially small and medium sized – companies.  
Having said this, the general perception of most scholars is that “the most striking feature of Thai 
firms is their weak technological and innovative capability” (Altenburg et al., 2003: 41; see also 
Intarakumnerd et al., 2002, Intarakumnerd, 2004, Arnold et al., 2000). Intarakumnerd et al. (2002: 
1448) point out that Thai firms rely very much on off-the-shelf imported technology in the shape of 
either machinery or turn-key technology instead of fostering indigenous technological development. 
The authors argue that this is in part a product of the trading background shared by many Thai 
firms, which has led to a short-term, very commercially oriented perspective (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that Thai based firms have gradually developed TCs in due 
course of industrialisation and are currently in the stage of overcoming intermediate to advanced 
thresholds (Figure 4.8). While sector affiliation and historic developments have strongly influenced 
these developments, the core driving force seems to be the competitive pressures associated with a 
liberalised world economy.  
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Figure 4.8: Current stages of technological capabilities of firms located in Thailand 
 
 
Source: Arnold et al., 2000: 58 
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Moreover, the objectives and capabilities of TNC-affiliates seem to have undergone fundamental 
change, amidst decentralisation strategies for the headquarters and the need to have development 
and engineering capabilities on production location. The empirical part of this thesis (chapter 5 and 
6) investigates further into this latter aspect. It examines whether or not TNC-affiliates are by now 
more sophisticated actors and can consequently foster the development of technological capabilities 
within the Thai system of innovation. 
4.2.2.2 Knowledge-related organisations and human capital 
This section reflects on the performance of knowledge-related organisations. Firstly, it considers the 
essential aspect of human capital development in the education system. Secondly, it takes a brief 
look at the capabilities of universities and public research institutes to shed some light on their 
suitability for industry collaboration. 
 
Education and Human Capital 
The evaluation of the educational standard in Thailand by external observers is not very positive: 
Even though the official gross enrolment ratio20, at least for primary and secondary education, is 
favourable (Tab. 4.11) (the ratio in tertiary schooling is also similar to the benchmarking countries). 
Nevertheless, most students attain vocational colleges rather than universities. Moreover, only a few 
university faculties provide graduate degrees and curriculum standards are considered poor and 
outdated. Practical training is insufficient and not reflecting the needs of industry (EIU, 2004, Lall, 
2001: pp. 349). 
Tab. 4.11: Gross school enrolment ratio* (%) in 2001 
 Primary School Secondary School Tertiary School 
Country Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Thailand    96 100   811   851   38   35 
Malaysia    95   95   73   66   281   261 
Singapore    95   96   732   752   403   473 
Korea  102 102   91   91   61 102 
12000, 21996; 31997      Source: Asian Development Bank, 2004 
Tab. 4.12: Highest level of education attained (most recent years) 
Country No 
schooling 
Primary - 
incomplete 
Primary - 
completed 
Secondary 
- lower 
Secondary 
- Upper 
Post - 
Secondary 
Thailand 1 8.5 39.3 19.6 12.5 11.2 7.9
Malaysia 2 16,7 13,0 20,7 19,4 23,6 6,9
Singapore 3 14,3 11,2 16,5 36,9 13,7 7,6
Korea 3 8,7 0,9 17,3 15,7 36,2 21,1
1 Year 2000, age group 6+, 2 Year: 1996 age group 25+; 3Year: 1995 age group 25+ 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2002 
In respect to the highest education level, only 3% of the group aged 25-64 (1996) had completed 
secondary education versus 42% in Korea, 26% in Malaysia and even 15% in Indonesia. A 
                                                 
 20 Gross Enrolment Ratio (%) is the number of pupils enrolled in the given level of education, regardless of age, 
expressed as a % of the population which, according to national regulations, should be enrolled at this level. For 
countries with universal primary (secondary) education, the gross enrolment ratio may exceed 100 percent because 
some enrolled pupils are below or above the official school age (Asian Development Bank, 2004: 383) 
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remarkable low level caused by low enrolment rates in the 1960s and 70s, when the Thai 
government was focusing on primary education goals (Worldbank, 2000: 8). This evaluation is 
backed by UNESCO (2002) data (Tab. 4.12), although the figures are difficult to compare, since 
reference group and year vary considerably. Further support is provided by the Thai Labour Force 
Survey (Figure 4.9), which shows that more than 50% of the workforce has elementary or lower 
than elementary education level. Due to an increase of enrolment in secondary and tertiary 
education in recent years, the share of higher educated personnel in manufacturing has, however, 
increased from 1997 to 2003. 
Figure 4.9: Qualification Structure of employees in manufacturing 1997 – 2003 
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NB Figures are based on the 1st quarter report of each year. The figures do not add up to 100%, because following 
categories were excluded: ‘teacher training’, ‘short course vocational’, ‘others’ and ‘unknown’.  
Source: National Statistical Office, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, own calculations 
In addition to these statistics, evaluations show that graduates of secondary schools have low 
reading and writing skills, are much too focused on memorising and too little on problem solving. 
Although students score well in science and mathematics in comparison with pupils in advanced 
economies, they lag behind their fellow students in neighbouring countries (Middleton & 
Tzannatos, 1998). Moreover, most engineers and technicians have limited foreign language skills 
(English as well as Japanese), posing a problem for efficient work and technology transfer in TNC-
affiliates (Tambunlertchai, 2002: 42). As a consequence, roughly 40% of companies are concerned 
about the education level of job applicants, particularly in respect to communication skills 
(Worldbank, 2001: pp. 12). 
The low skill standard is also reflected in low labour productivity (ibid.). Consequently, the “skills 
required to shift to higher value-added and high-technology industries are still in short supply” 
(EIU, 2004: 20). Consequently, the shortage of skilled labour is seen as a key obstacle to economic 
growth and technological development (Middleton & Tzannatos, 1998, Tambunlertchai, 2002: 41). 
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This is especially true for S&T-manpower, which is regarded as essential for economic 
development and upgrading. Only 19% of university graduates in Thailand choose S&T degrees 
(Alpha Research, 2003: 109; see Tab. 4.13), versus 52% in Malaysia (EIU, 2004) and 49% in Korea 
in 2001/2002 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2004).  
Tab. 4.13: Graduates in higher education from public institutions, academic years 1996 - 1999 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total number of graduates 73,525 82,716 88,154 93,809
Field of study (%)     
Education 12.1 12.9 12.0 12.4
Humanities 4.0 3.4 3.3 3.4
Fine arts 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9
Law 7.0 7.8 5.8 5.7
Social science 40.9 39.8 41.2 40.9
Natural science 6.4 7.4 7.5 8.2
Engineering 10.2 10.1 10.3 10.5
Medical and health science 12.3 12.2 13.7 12.6
Agriculture 5.6 5.4 5.0 5.2
Others 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2
Level of education     
Certificate 1.4 1.8 1.9 0.6
Bachelor’s 83.0 79.7 78.9 78.5
Post graduate 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.4
Master’s 14.0 16.9 17.4 19.3
Doctorate 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Source: Alpha Research, 2003: 113 
The mis-match between supply and demand of S&T-manpower in quantitative and qualitative terms 
has frequently been pointed out by several studies (e.g. Dahlman & Brimble, 1990: chapter 6, 
Sripaipan & Brimble, 1991, Rangel, 2001, Ritchie, 2000). Even without growing demand for high-
skilled employees the Brooker Group predicted in 1997 a manpower gap for 2001 of about 10,000 
persons in engineering and 7,000 in science (both at bachelor degree).  
However, taken the enrolment rates of the last years, a steep increase in qualified graduates entering 
the labour market will have been expected in recent years (Worldbank, 2000: 8). 
Based on predictions for supply and demand of S&T-labour, Mephokee (2003: pp. 13) concludes 
that there will be an excess in S&T-labour by 2005, despite shortages at certain levels such as 
bachelor of science. Nevertheless, based on international comparisons he states that the quantity of 
human resources in S&T in Thailand is somewhat small and must be improved further (ibid.: 19).  
Tab. 4.14: Education expenditure as % of GDP (2001) 
Country Total Pre- Primary Primary Secondary  Tertiary 
Thailand  4.7 0.5 1.6 1.0 0.9
Malaysia 7.2 0.1 2.2 2.7 2.1
Singapore NA 
Korea  6.0 0.1 1.5 2.0 2.1
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2004 
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This goal is, however, hampered by low resource commitment to education (Tab. 4.14). Funding of 
secondary and tertiary education in particular (approximately 20% of total) is remarkably low when 
compared to Malaysia and Korea (around 30 – 35 %). 
 
Tab. 4.15: Gap of knowledge and skills of human resources between industry’s demand and education institutes’ 
supply 
Industries Gap Education Institutes 
Using specific and sophisticated 
technology and more 
interdisciplinary knowledge 
needed 
Lacking knowledge and 
technology information with 
real-life practical lessons 
Using obsolete technology. Too 
departmentalized knowledge 
Little participation in curriculum 
development 
Lacking mechanism in 
integrating academic curriculum 
with demands from industries 
Developing curriculum based 
on what instructors believe 
appropriate 
Emphasis on analytical skills in 
problem solving 
Lacking methodology in 
cultivating students to be self-
learners 
Emphasis on theoretical 
lessons and examinations more 
than self-learning 
Need knowledge and working 
skills such as basic statistics 
and quality management 
Those essential knowledge are 
not addressed as prerequisite 
or required courses 
Statistics and quality 
management are selective 
courses; few students choose 
to study 
Need literacy skills, such as 
English communication , 
computer programming skills for 
managing work processes 
Lacking important skills 
especially for today’s 
globalization economy, such as 
skills in international-language 
communication and computer 
management 
Some courses like English are 
compulsory courses but not 
considered by students as 
important courses. Some 
courses (e.g. computer) are not 
available 
Source: College of Management, Mahidol University (2003); cited in Intarakumnerd et al., 2003: 25 
 
A recent study by the College of Management at Mahidol University in 2003 (published in Thai; 
cited in Intarakumnerd et al., 2003: pp.23) shows that the overall knowledge flow between 
education institutes and industry is exclusively one-way. Curricula are developed by education 
institutes based on what they believe appropriate, and without consultations with business firms. 
Moreover, education institutes emphasize “know what” rather than “know how” and “know why”. 
This conflicts with a need for creativity and continuous self-learning ability, which are important 
employee characteristics demanded by employers. Consequently, there are several gaps depicted in 
Tab. 4.15. These gaps have been further illustrated through surveys conducted by TDRI (2002) and 
the College of Management at Mahidol University (2003) (original in Thai, hence cited according 
to Intarakumnerd et al., 2003), showing that the education organizations can not meet the demands 
of industry. Tab. 4.16 presents the results for the case study sectors of automobile and electronics 
industry (see chapter 6). 
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Tab. 4.16: Gap between industry’s demand and education institutes’ supply: Examples from the electronics and 
automobile industry 
Industrial Sector’s Demands Education Institutes’ Realities 
Electronic Industry 
- Due to rapid changes in this industry’s 
technology, personnel’s continuous learning 
ability through internet and information 
technology play a vital role 
- Workers lack initiative and eagerness to 
study/manage new technology, which 
impedes long-term competitiveness 
- Due to short product life cycle and faster time 
to market requirement, effective workers with 
good operating quality (such as computer 
controller in production line) to reduce 
production time are needed. 
- Insufficient engineering managers, 
electronics engineers, electrical engineers, 
mechanical engineers and industrial 
engineers with industrial experience 
- Education institutes fail to catch up with 
technological changes in industry and very 
limited in advanced IT study to major 
universities  
- Current educational environment do not 
promote students’ creativity and continuous 
self learning; institutes emphasize on 
academic knowledge and examination 
- In some education institutes, some 
necessary computer courses have not been 
introduced into curriculum 
- Most engineering students do not have 
practical experience in the industry; only 
career advising services provided by 
universities and companies. A better 
cooperative project with industry is needed to 
enhance students’ experience 
Automobile Industry 
- Insufficient engineers with strong 
technical/engineering skills necessary for 
fewer-defect production demanded by 
customers 
- Since most technologies are imported, 
lacking English and basic technical skills are 
serious problems impeding transferring and 
continuous development of technologies 
- Due to more complex technologies, 
specialized-area workers are needed such 
as those who can handle automation 
processes 
- Education institutes fail to catch up with rapid 
technological changes in the industry; more 
emphasis on traditional academic curriculum 
sometimes using obsolete technologies.  
- Some universities’ courses are required 
courses, such as English, but are not 
stressed as major/important courses.  
 
Source: TDRI, 2002, Mahidol University, 2003, cited in Intarakumnerd et al., 2003: 25 
Scientific and applied research in universities and research institutes 
Currently, there are about 24 public and 50 private universities (Intarakumnerd et al., 2002: 1451) 
as well as four major national research institutes under the roof of the National Science and 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA): The National Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (BIOTEC) established in 1983; the National Metal and Materials Technology Center 
(MTEC) and the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC), both founded 
in 1986. The latest national center, the National Nanotechnology Center (NANOTEC) was 
established in 2003 (NSTDA, 2004). Since the opening of the Thailand Science Park in 2002 in 
Klong Luang, Phatumthani province, these national research centres have concentrated at this site, 
which is located adjacent to the Asian Institute of Technology and the Rangsit Campus of 
Thammasat University.  
In order to estimate the scientific output of both research institutes and universities in Thailand and 
the benchmarking countries an online literature review of ISI’s Web of Science (Thomson, 2004), a 
major scientific publication and citation database, has been conducted. Tab. 4.17 displays the 
number of journal articles published by authors located in each country from 2000-2004. 
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Furthermore, it sets the figures in relation to the number of inhabitants in 2003 (Asian Development 
Bank, 2003) and the number of teaching staff in tertiary education 2001/2002 (UNESCO Institute 
for Statistics, 2004), which serves as an approximation for the number of researchers at universities. 
Tab. 4.17: Publications included in the ISI Web of science (2000-2004) 
Country SCI21 SSCI22 SCI per 
1,000 
residents 
SSCI per 
1,000 
residents 
SCI per 
teacher 
SSCI per 
teacher 
Thailand 9,291 473 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01
Korea 97,161 2,409 2.03 0.05 0.64 0.02
Taiwan 61,567 2,870 2.72 0.13
Singapore 23,752 1,901 5.66 0.45 NA 
Malaysia 5,559 293 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.01
Indonesia 2,493 299 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Source: Thomson, 2004, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2004, Asian Development Bank, 2004 
The analysis reveals that the scientific output in terms of science and social science publications in 
Thailand is weak compared to Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia as well. Of the considered 
countries, only researchers in Indonesia publish less. This supports Intarakumnerd et al. finding that 
universities’ “research capabilities are generally unsatisfactory” (2002: 1451). Arnold et al state that 
there is hardly any “international excellence in industry-relevant R&D in the universities” in 
Thailand (2000: 119).  
Additionally, research in public research and technology organisations (RTOs) is considered 
irrelevant to the industry. To the contrary, RTOs tend to focus on R&D and the provision of 
technical services, such as testing and calibrating, rather than helping local firms overcome the 
current thresholds of technology assimilation and adaptation, designing and engineering 
(Intarakumnerd & Virasa, 2002: pp.1450, Intarakumnerd, 2004). For this reason, RTOs have been 
criticised for being too supply- and ‘linear-model-of-innovation’-oriented, performing basic 
research for companies instead of collaborating with them (e.g. Lauridsen, 2000: 24, Schiller, 2003: 
76, Chantramonklasri, 1994). In industrialised countries it is quite common for firms to pick up 
results of basic research done by R&D-institutes and universities as an input into their own R&D 
activities. This, however, is clearly more complicated in late-industrialising countries, where firms 
lack R&D-capabilities (Arnold et al., 2000: 107). Consequently, at least some of the universities 
and research institutes should move towards more applied research and should give more attention 
to people centred technology transfer (Arnold et al., 2000: pp. 121).  
                                                 
21 Science Citation Index Expanded is a multidisciplinary index to the journal literature of the sciences. It fully indexes 
5,900 major journals across 150 scientific disciplines, including among others: agriculture, neuroscience, astronomy, 
oncology, biochemistry, biology, pharmacology, biotechnology, physics, chemistry, computer science, materials 
science, mathematics, surgery and medicine (Thomson, 2004). 
22 The Social Sciences Citation Index is also a multidisciplinary index to the journal literature of the social sciences. It 
fully indexes more than 1,725 journals across 50 social sciences disciplines, and it indexes individually selected, 
relevant items from over 3,300 of the world's leading scientific and technical journals. Among others it includes the 
following disciplines: anthropology, political science, history, public health, industrial relations, social issues, law, 
sociology, linguistics, philosophy, urban studies, psychology (Thomson, 2004). 
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Linkages between private firms, universities and research institutes are weak. This has partly to do 
with the fact that business firms doubt the capacity and effectiveness of universities and public 
research institutes to solve practical problems (Vongpanitlerd, 1992: 85). Existing university-
industry linkages are based primarily on personal connections between researchers and firms 
(Intarakumnerd et al., 2002: 1451). A survey by the Brooker Group (1995: iii) finds that links are 
“not very substantial and represent short term training or ad-hoc use of consulting or research 
services rather than long term, more extensive relationships”. According to Arnold et al. (2000: 
117), this situation has not changed extensively since the mid-1990s. 
A recent study by the College of Management at Mahidol University (2003) identifies the following 
gaps, which hinder industry-academia collaboration (cited in Intarakumnerd, 2004: 28): first, a lack 
of continuous cooperative projects or activities and motivation for collaboration; second, missing 
goals and objectives of the collaboration; third, a lack of intermediates who can understand both 
sides, coach, and foster the relationship; and finally, a lack of mutual understanding of the partner’s 
perspective. Currently, a research project organized by economic geographers at the University of 
Kiel and Hannover investigates the changing role of public research institutions for the national and 
regional innovation potential in Thailand. Within this project the science and industry side are 
surveyed, in order to assess the magnitude and type of industry-university linkages as well as 
structural obstacles for further cooperation (Schiller, 2005, Mildahn, in preparation). 
In summary, the output of the knowledge-related public sector is insufficient in terms of quality and 
quantity. Graduates lack essential skills, there are too few S&T-graduates, the education system is 
underfunded, and curricula are outdated and not oriented towards the needs of industry. 
Additionally, scientific research is not relevant to industrial needs and is of an internationally low 
level of quality. Consequently, there are large gaps between the education/ research sector and the 
business sector resulting in very limited linkages and interactions, which are instead predominantly 
of a personal, ad-hoc nature. 
4.2.2.3 Government policies and organisations 
This section briefly addresses the chief organisations responsible for science and technology 
policies in Thailand. Even though human skills development and broader industrial development 
are of major importance for late-industrialising countries, an analysis of all organisations 
responsible and their policies is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
The central planning agency in Thailand is the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB), which was established in 1959 (Kwanjai, 1999: 56). The NESDB is responsible for the 
formulation of strategic ‘National Economic and Social Development Plans’, each covering a 
period of five years. The first four plans (from 1961 to 1981) did not treat science and technology 
policies separately and hence gave little prominence to these issues (Lauridsen, 2000: 21). 
However, in the 1950s the National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT) had already been 
introduced under the Office of the Prime Minister as a cross cutting policy institution responsible 
for the development of a national science policy (Arnold et al., 2000: 112, Bell, 2003: 21). In 1979 
the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy (later Environment) (MOSTE) was set up, 
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effectively succeeding the now incorporated NRCT, as an oversight body for all government 
policies in S&T. Since many S&T responsibilities were still with the line ministries, MOSTE’s role 
was fairly general (Arnold et al., 2000: 114).  
Finally, S&T topics were explicitly addressed in the 5th (1982-1986) and 6th (1987-1991) plans. The 
latter described the key problems concerning S&T in a specific chapter: a low level of R&D-
expenditure, insufficient technological and economic benefits from technology transfer and the 
insufficient quantity and quality of S&T-manpower. Furthermore, it proposed measures, e.g. 
institutional strengthening of S&T-policy formulation, planning and implementation, an increase in 
S&T-manpower as well as in R&D-spending (aim of 0.5% of GNP), and the enhancement of 
foreign technology transfer (Lauridsen, 2000: pp. 21). Nonetheless, these objectives were rarely 
formulated into concrete policies  
In the 1980s three important organisations were established: first, three national research centres 
(BIOTEC, MTEC and NECTEC, see 4.2.2.2), secondly, the Scientific and Technology 
Development Board (STDB), an R&D-funding organisation with a focus on the private sector, and 
third, the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI), a think-tank (Arnold et al., 2000: 114).  
The 1990s saw the foundation of the National Science and Technology Development Agency 
(NSTDA) and the Thailand Research Fund (TRF). NSTDA came into being in 1991 under the roof 
of MOSTE as a ‘specialised agency’ outside of the standard government bureaucracy. NSTDA was 
assigned to run the three national research centres and, hence, to both conduct research and fund 
research in universities and private industry. Consequently, the private sector operations of STDB 
were incorporated into NSTDA. Moreover, NSTDA became responsible for human resource 
development programmes, the management of the Science Park (see 4.2.2.2) and the Software Park, 
an incubator for IT start-ups. Furthermore, NSTDA includes a policy department, assigned to 
conduct S&T-policy-analysis and generate policy recommendations (Arnold et al., 2000: 115). The 
TRF, founded in 1993, is an R&D-funding organisation focusing on universities and public 
institutes (ibid.). 
In 1997, a specific National Science and Technology Development Plan (1997-2006) was 
introduced (MOSTE, 1996), which explicitly set targets for manpower development, technology 
transfer, infrastructure and R&D-expenditure. Furthermore, a Science and Technology 
Development Action Plan specifying the general targets, was developed. The current ‘S&T Action 
Plan 2003-2013’ highlights the strengthening of both the national innovation system and industrial 
clusters (Intarakumnerd, 2004). 
In 2001, the NRCT was removed from MOSTE and again located as an independent agency 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Its task is to review ministries’ R&D-budgets at the project 
level and to manage research projects. Moreover, the government created the interim National 
Science and Technology Policy Committee (NSTC), which is supposed to advise the cabinet on the 
development of scientific and technological activities and capabilities (Bell, 2003: 22). In October 
2003, the MOST (since 2002 the ministry is solely responsible for S&T) established the National 
Innovation Agency (NIA), which strives to enhance the national innovation system by inducing 
innovation in firms largely by providing funds for R&D (NIA, 2005). 
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This brief overview of some of the main organisations already indicates that there are a large 
number of administrative bodies responsible for S&T-related policies. On the one hand, this wide 
array of organisations leads to an overlap of responsibilities and functions, hindering efficient 
policies and implementation. On the other hand, these cross-cutting policy organisations are not 
well endowed, since line ministries account for around 90% of total government R&D-spending. 
These ministries generally assign funds to their core mission and to ministry-related bodies, which 
leads to parallel and uncoordinated work (Bell, 2003: pp. 22). Hence, a single, influential cross-
cutting and coordinating actor such as the NRCT or NSTC would be advantageous (see also 
Altenburg et al., 2003: 50). However, it is still too early to judge these coordination efforts. 
The wide array of organisations responsible for S&T and policy formulation is also reflective of a 
complex and fragmented set of incentive programmes supporting innovation, skills and capabilities 
development in private firms (Turpin, 1999: pp. 20). Measures include, for example, tax incentives, 
grants, consultancy, and training programmes (Bell, 2003: pp. 25). However, rather than aiding the 
firm, this fragmentation hinders efficient support of firm’s upgrading (Turpin, 1999: 24). Moreover, 
Turpin et al. (2002: 38) state that the major problems with current incentive schemes are the 
elevated emphasis on R&D, which does not align with the needs of most firms (see 4.2.2.1), the 
supply- rather than demand-driven nature of the incentives, as well as an overlapping and general 
lack of coordination of incentives. 
In respect to S&T-policies, Bell et al. (2003: pp. 27) criticise the Thai policy system for being much 
too centrally organised. At the same time, ministries do not efficiently implement the ‘top-down’ 
policies (ibid.). Most often, policy formulation is seen as an intra-ministry, ad-hoc affair instead of 
being the result of a clearly articulated strategy. The involvement of the private sector is of a rather 
‘representative’ nature. Moreover, there is too little monitoring and evaluation of projects, while 
existing evaluations do not influence new policy formulations and implementations. Several 
ministries lack specialised knowledge about S&T and innovation, although they have these 
particular responsibilities. Furthermore, the distinction between policy formulation and 
implementation is often unclear and there is too little horizontal integration and collaboration, 
leading to redundant projects (see also Altenburg et al., 2003: pp. 38). Finally, Bell et al. (2003: 31) 
claim that government R&D-funding is too low and that most of the R&D funded by the 
government is also performed by government organisations instead of stimulating industry R&D.  
This assessment of the policy environment is shared by Intarakumnerd et al. (2002: 1450), who 
additionally state that neither industrial nor investment or trade policy have attempted to foster 
indigenous technology capability development or technological learning.  
With respect to strengthening the NSI, Altenburg et al. (2003: pp. 46) have identified four core 
dimensions of innovation policy that should be addressed: assigning responsibility within the Thai 
government for creating a coherent policy strategy and ensuring coordination, fostering inter-firm 
linkages and industry-science relations as well as the promotion of innovative entrepreneurs. 
Already, there are signs of change: foreign investment policies are more selective and support for 
supplier-customer linkages has been enhanced (see 4.1.3.4); a strong focus has been laid on the 
competitiveness issue in selected industries; public RTOs are required to increase revenues and to 
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orientate towards industrial needs; universities enjoy increased autonomy; the public is increasingly 
participating in policy planning; and a ‘private sector’s management style’ has been attempted to be 
introduced in the bureaucratic system (see Intarakumnerd, 2004, Intarakumnerd et al., 2002, 
Altenburg et al., 2003). 
In summary, the reviewed secondary data and literature leads to the conclusion that the state of the 
Thai NSI is fairly poor. Financial and human resources committed to innovation are low, as is the 
output in terms of patents. Furthermore, there are major deficits in all three actor-groups. The firm-
sector is characterised by a dichotomy of fairly capable TNC-affiliates, some larger Thai-owned 
firms and some high-tech SMEs on the one hand. On the other hand, the bulk of SMEs are 
struggling to achieve even basic operation skills. Moreover, both groups lack innovative 
capabilities, especially R&D, have limited product development and engineering capabilities as 
well as difficulty in implementing advanced processes such as automation or modern organisation 
modes like JIT. Inter-firm links seem to be limited, especially between TNC-affiliates and local 
SMEs. 
The assessment of the knowledge-related public sector reveals that the output of the education 
and research sector is insufficient in terms of quality and quantity. Graduates lack essential skills, 
there are too few S&T-graduates, the education system is underfunded, and curricula are outdated 
and not oriented towards the needs of industry. The same is true for scientific research, which is at a 
fairly low level internationally as indicated by the number of journal articles. Hence, this sector is 
neither sophisticated enough to cater to the needs of the more capable firms, nor sufficiently 
oriented towards the more basic needs of the larger group of less capable firms. Consequently, there 
are large gaps between the education/research- and the business-sector leading to marginal linkages 
and interactions between these groups. 
Finally, government policies and processes are highly centralised and, at the same time, 
characterised by a redundancy of organisations and programmes with similar objectives. This leads 
to a fragmented and inefficient support system. Having said this, evidence has been presented 
which indicates changes in this respect. 
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5 TNC-affiliates and local firms compared: technological 
capabilities, absorptive capacity, embeddedness and 
obstacles to innovation 
The first chapters have underlined the theoretical and potentially positive impacts of TNC-affiliates 
on the system of innovation in late-industrialising countries. Subsequently, the present state of the 
Thai-SI has been evaluated, based on secondary data and literature. This analysis has indicated 
fairly high capabilities within TNC-affiliates in Thailand. If this were true, TNC-affiliates could 
also have a marked positive impact on the modernisation and upgrading of local firms in Thailand 
through technology and knowledge transfer. Therefore, TNC-affiliates would be attractive partners 
for collaboration and knowledge exchange, which could foster technological learning by local firms 
either via teacher-student learning or joint research and work.  
Consequently, this chapter tries to establish the capabilities of TNCs and their collaboration 
behaviour. It is organised as follows: first, section 5.1 provides some general information on the 
analysed datasets. Second, the hypotheses deduced in chapter 2.4 will be tested, hereby in section 
5.2 all firms are analysed, while in section 5.3 the analysis concentrates on advanced firms. The 
intention is to discover whether advanced local firms can find suitable collaboration partners among 
foreign firms or not, which is of course strongly sector-dependent, as collaboration requires a 
common basis and mutual understanding. Finally, some explorative statistics are applied in order to 
pinpoint key characteristics of advanced and embedded TNC-affiliates and to determine essential 
weaknesses of the Thai-SI according to the perception of the surveyed firms. Additionally, the 
embeddedness of TNC-affiliates in knowledge networks is considered and the key characteristics of 
advanced and embedded firms are examined. 
In order to evaluate these findings, most of the results are benchmarked with firms in Singapore and 
Penang. 
5.1 General information 
It is stated in chapter 2.3.1 that TNC-affiliates (subsidiaries and branches) are commonly defined by 
an ownership of 10% or more (UNCTAD 2001). However, it has also been mentioned that other 
definitions consider a 25%-limit as necessary for foreign control. This thesis defines TNC-affiliates 
as firms with a foreign ownership of 30% or more. The reason for this is that the questionnaires in 
all four surveys do not take account of the 10% limit. The surveys in Penang and Thailand 
distinguish between ‘100% locally owned’ and ‘more than 70% locally owned’ firms. Because a 
significant capital stake is necessary to control operations, the 30%-limit is the best available and 
also considered an appropriate level. 
However, in Singapore and Europe the definition of TNC-affiliates has had to be changed, due to 
differences in the questionnaire. Here, all firms that are not 100% locally owned are considered 
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foreign23. Hence, for direct comparison these differences in the definitions need to be kept in mind 
in order to avoid misinterpretations.  
For Thailand the dataset includes 593 local and 401 foreign firms in 2000 and 866 local and 498 
foreign firms in 2002. For Singapore it contains information on 190 local and 183 foreign, for 
Penang on 116 local and 76 foreign and for Europe on 809 local and 233 foreign firms. The analysis 
in part 5.2 includes additional information on four focus industries in Thailand. These sectors are: 
food, beverage and tobacco (TSIC code 31), textiles, wearing apparels, leather and leather products 
(32), chemicals and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic products (35) and fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment (38). The choice of sectors is based on the size of the sub-
samples and the fact that these are the top four industries in terms of GDP-contribution within 
manufacturing (see. 4.1.2).  
In what follows, some basic indicators are presented, describing the composition of the sample and 
depicting key differences between TNC-affiliates and local firms.  
Age 
In Thailand, TNC-affiliates are significantly younger than local firms (Tab. 5.1). The average age 
for foreign firms is 14.2 (2000) and 13.6 years (2002), while for local firms it is 18.3 years (2000 
and 2002). The difference in the means of both years is significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney-
U-Test24). In Singapore, TNCs are on average older (16.7 years) than local firms (14 years)25, 
which is significant at the 1% level. In Penang, both local and foreign firms are of a similar average 
age (13.1 for local and 12.7 for foreign firms).  
Tab. 5.1: Distribution of surveyed firms according to age-class 
 Thailand Singapore Penang 
 2000*** 2002*** 1999** 2000 
Age Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
/ n 540 373 851 485 188 182 119 76 
<5 3.1 12.1 3.6 6.4 4.3 5.5 12.7 11.8
5-9 22.6 20.6 19.5 30.3 34.0 23.1 29.1 35.5
10-19 35.7 45.8 39.7 45.6 37.2 32.4 33.6 34.2
20-29 23.9 9.9 22.2 9.9 18.6 29.1 20.9 17.1
>=30 14.6 11.5 14.9 7.8 5.9 9.9 3.6 1.3
*** significant at the 1% level,** significant at the 5% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square) 
Number of employees 
In Thailand, the mean number of employees in TNC-affiliates is significantly (1% level) higher 
(1999: 772; 2001: 621) than in local firms (1999: 453; 2001: 384) (Tab. 5.2). In Singapore, firms 
are generally smaller, but the pattern is the same: 133 employees on average in local and 394 in 
                                                 
 23 In Singapore ownership classes were differentiated into a) wholly foreign owned, b) 30% or less locally owned, c) 
more than 30% locally owned and d) wholly locally owned. By grouping classes a to c into foreign the resulting 
mismatch is supposed to be smaller than by grouping classes a and b into foreign and c and d into local. The total 
number of firms in the disputable group c is 46 (12% of all firms). Assuming equal distribution a total of 30% of 
firms in this group might be mis-categorized. i.e. 14 companies.  
 In Europe, the questionnaire only included a dichotomic question concerning the involvement of foreign capital. 
 24 Since for most scrutinised variables a normal distribution can not necessarily be assumed in the population, the 
default test for the comparison of means is the Mann-Whitney-U-Test, which does not require normal distributed 
data. The test sorts values of both distributions and assigns ranks. Subsequently it tests if the ranks are distributed 
equally (Bortz, 1999: pp. 146). 
 25 This is also true, when category c) and d) are grouped as local firms (see footnote 23).  
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foreign companies (1% level). The same is true for Penang, with a mean of 168 employees in local 
and 524 employees in foreign firms (1% level). 
Tab. 5.2: Distribution of surveyed firms according to number of employees 
 Thailand Singapore Penang 
1999*** 2001*** 1999*** 1999*** 
Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
No. of 
employees 
/ n 575 391 862 497 160 173 105 69 
<20 2.4 0.8 2.5 1.6 37.5 12.1 16.2 4.3 
20-49 12.3 5.6 10.2 7.4 19.4 14.5 14.3 11.6 
50-99 14.1 11.5 13.3 12.3 19.4 21.4 24.8 13.0 
100-299 28.2 31.2 37.7 33.6 11.9 24.9 33.3 33.3 
300-499 14.8 16.9 14.6 15.9 5.0 8.1 3.8 8.7 
500-999 16.2 15.6 12.1 13.9 1.3 8.7 3.8 14.5 
>=1000 12.0 18.4 9.5 15.3 5.6 10.4 3.8 14.5 
*** significant at the 1% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square); Restriction: TIS1 2 cells, TIS2 one cell and PIS three cells with 
expected count <5 
Fixed Assets 
In Thailand, TNC-affiliates have significantly more fixed assets26 than local companies (Tab. 5.3). 
The median for TNC-affiliates is approximately US$ 9.0m in 1999 and US$ 4.2m in 2001, for local 
firms US$ 3.1m in 1999 and US$ 1.8m in 2001 (1% level)27. The same holds true for companies in 
Singapore and Penang.  
In Singapore, the median for local firms is in the class of ‘below S$5m’ (approximately US$ 2.9m), 
whereas for foreign firms it is in the class of ‘S$10-49.9m’ (US$ 5.8- 28.9m). In Penang, local 
firms have their median in the ‘below RM 10m’ (US$ 2.6m) class, foreign firms in the ‘RM 10-
25m’ (US$2.6- 6.6m) category. 
Tab. 5.3: Distribution of surveyed firms in Thailand according to fixed assets 
Fixed assets  2000*** 2002*** 
in Mio. Bhat 
/ n 
Local 
255 
Foreign 
173 
Local 
257 
Foreign 
159 
1-9 6.3 0.6 9.7 3.1 
10-49 24.3 9.2 27.2 16.4 
50-99 13.3 15.6 15.2 15.1 
100-199 16.9 12.7 18.7 15.1 
200-499 15.7 21.4 8.2 16.4 
500-999 7.8 13.3 9.3 11.3 
>1000 15.7 27.2 11.7 22.6 
*** significant at the 1% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square);  
classes according to National Statistical Office & Office of the Prime Minister, 2001 
Sales 
In Thailand, TNC-affiliates have significantly higher sales (Tab. 5.4): The median for TNC-
affiliates is US$ 14.6m (1999)/ 10.6m (2001), for local firms US$ 6.5m (1999)/ 3.3m (2001) (1% 
level). Again, the same pattern can be observed in Singapore and Penang. In Singapore, the median 
for local firms is in the class of ‘below S$ 5m’ (US$ 2.9m), whereas for foreign firms it is in the 
class of ‘S$ 10-49.9m’ (US$ 5.8-28.9m). In Penang, the median for local firms is US$ 2.4m and 
9.0m for foreign firms (1% level). 
                                                 
 26 Companies’ assets that are not processed or bought and sold, such as buildings and machinery. 
 27 These and the following are based on the exchange rate for June of the respective year. 
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Tab. 5.4: Distribution of surveyed firms in Thailand according to sales 
 1999*** 2001*** 
Sales in Mio. Bhat 
 /n 
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Local 
318 
Foreign 
177 
<64 31.2 12.0 31.1 15.3 
64-<250 20.9 13.7 26.1 23.2 
250-<900 31.2 39.4 23.6 27.1 
>= 900 16.7 34.9 19.2 34.5 
*** significant at the 1% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square); classes according to quartiles 2001 
Sales per employee 
In Thailand, TNC-affiliates have higher sales per employee (Tab. 5.5), i.e. they are more productive 
than local companies. The median for local firms is US$ 25,100 (1999)/ 17,600 (2001) and for 
foreign firms US$ 54,400 (1999)/ 39,700 (2001) per employee (1% level)28. The companies in 
Singapore and Penang again replicate this pattern. In Singapore, local firms display a median of 
US$ 103,500 per employee whereas foreign companies have a median of US$ 209,500 (1% level). 
In Penang, foreign firms have higher sales per employee, with a median of US$ 50,200, than local 
firms with US$ 34,500 (5% level).  
Tab. 5.5: Distribution of surveyed firms in Thailand according to sales per employee 
Sales in Bhat per 1999*** 2001*** 
employee 
/ n
Local 
555 
Foreign 
375 
Local 
317 
Foreign 
177 
<=552.150 29.0 12.5 31.9 13.0 
552.151 – 1.071.750 29.0 16.3 30.0 16.9 
1.071.751 – 2.442.350 24.1 30.4 22.4 29.4 
> 2.442.350 17.8 40.8 15.8 40.7 
*** significant at the 1% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square); classes according to (rounded) quartiles 2001 
Sector 
In Thailand, there are significant differences in the sectoral distribution of TNC-affiliates and local 
firms (Tab. 5.6). TNC-affiliates are more likely to operate in the manufacturing of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment sector (ISIC 38) whereas local firms are distinctively more 
often active in the food/ beverage and textile/wearing apparel industry. 
Tab. 5.6: Sectoral distribution of surveyed firms in Thailand 
 2000*** 2002*** 
Sector 
/ n 
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Total 
994 
Local 
866 
Foreign 
498 
Total 
1364 
Food, beverages, tobacco 17.7 9.5 14.4 15.8 7.6 12.8
Textiles, wearing apparel 16.9 9.5 13.9 19.2 10.2 15.9
Wood, wood products 5.6 1.0 3.7 6.2 1.0 4.3
Paper, paper products, printing  6.9 3.0 5.3 7.2 3.0 5.6
Chemicals & chemical 21.2 25.9 23.1 21.2 22.9 21.8
Non-metallic mineral products 4.9 1.2 3.4 4.0 1.8 3.2
Basic metal industry 1.2 3.0 1.9 3.8 5.8 4.5
Machinery and equipment  23.3 44.4 31.8 20.3 45.4 29.5
Other  2.4 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.2
*** significant at the 1% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square) 
 
                                                 
 28 The median is given, because it is less distorted than the mean by extreme, sometimes unreliable information. 
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In Singapore, firms surveyed were limited to five sectors (see chapter 3.2.1 on sampling strategy). 
Local firms often do more business in the machinery and equipment sector (ISIC 38), while TNC-
affiliates focus more on chemicals (35). In Penang, foreign firms are more often involved in the 
fabricated metals, machinery and equipment sector (38), while local firms dominate both the food 
(31) and paper (34) industries (Tab. 5.7). 
Tab. 5.7: Sectoral distribution of surveyed firms in Singapore and Penang 
 Singapore Penang 
Sector 
/ n 
Local 
188 
Foreign 
181 
Total 
369 
Local 
116 
Foreign 
76 
Total 
192 
Food, beverages, tobacco - - - 14.7 2.6 9.9
Textiles, wearing apparel - - - 0.9 2.6 1.6
Wood, wood products - - - 2.6 - 1.6
Paper, paper products, printing  - - - 9.5 1.3 6.3
Chemicals & chemical 16.0 25.4 20.6 23.3 23.7 23.4
Non-metallic mineral products 7.4 4.4 6.0 0.9 - 0.5
Basic metal industry 2.1 1.6 1.9 6.0 5.3 5.7
Machinery and equipment  75.0 69.1 72.1 38.8 60.5 47.4
Other  - - - 3.4 3.9 3.6
NB In Singapore and Penang national classification is based on ISIC Rev. 3, which had to be matched with the TSIC-
classes that are based on ISIC, Rev. 2. 
Market orientation 
In Thailand, TNC-affiliates are more oriented towards export markets than local firms (Tab. 5.8). 
Exports account for 53% (mean) of sales for TNC-affiliates (median 50%) and only 38% for local 
firms (median 20%) in 2001 (significant at 1% level). In 1999, the average was 61% for TNC-
affiliates (median: 70%) and 55% for local firms (median: 57%) (5% level). Hence, the export share 
of the firms surveyed in 2002 is markedly lower than in the 1999 dataset. This is evidently caused 
by the sample size and its composition in 2002, as the share of manufactured exports as a 
percentage of GDP in manufacturing decreased only gently from 10.9% in 1999 to 10.2 percent in 
2002 (Bank of Thailand 2004a, b). As a result, the extension of the sample size resulted in the 
inclusion of more domestic oriented firms, which had formerly been less willing to participate in 
the survey.  
In Singapore, for TNC-affiliates exports accounted for 60% (mean)/ 70% (median) of sales, while 
local firms had an export share of only 23% (mean)/ 10% (median) (1% level).  
In Penang, TNC-affiliates’ exports represent 55% (mean)/ 65% (median) of sales, whereas local 
firms display an export share of only 24% (mean)/ 8% (median) (1% level).  
Tab. 5.8: Distribution of surveyed firms according to export share  
 Thailand Singapore Penang 
Export 2000*** 2002*** 1999*** 2000*** 
share 
/ n 
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Local 
863 
Foreign 
492 
Local 
190 
Foreign 
182 
Local 
114 
Foreign 
76 
<20 53.0 34.1 44.0 25.2 54.7 22.0 63.2 34.2
20 - <40 10.0 10.9 14.9 16.3 11.6 11.5 14.0 9.2
40 - <60 5.9 9.9 7.0 11.2 4.2 10.4 5.3 9.2
60 - <80 5.4 7.7 8.5 9.6 8.4 12.1 4.4 5.2
80 - 100 25.8 37.1 25.5 37.7 11.0 43.9 13.1 42.0
*** significant at the 1% level (Pearson’s Chi-Square); Restriction: PIS: one cell with expected count <5 
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Summary 
TNC-affiliates in Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia are typified by the following characteristics: 
• they are larger in terms of the number of employees, fixed assets and sales, 
• they are more competitive, displayed by a higher productivity (sales per employees) and a 
higher export share (assuming that global markets are more competitive than domestic 
markets) 
• they concentrate mostly in medium to high tech sectors, such as chemicals (35) and 
machinery and equipment (38) (exception Singapore), whereas local firms dominate in more 
basic industries such as food (31) and – at least in Thailand – textiles (32). 
Concerning the age, there is no straightforward evidence: foreign firms are younger in Thailand, 
older in Singapore and of similar age as local firms in Penang.  
These characteristics have an impact on the innovation potential of the firms. As, for example, the 
European Union’s Community Innovation Surveys has shown, larger firms have a higher propensity 
to innovate than medium-sized firms (Eurostat, 2004: pp. 36), since they typically have more 
resources that can be devoted to R&D and innovation. Moreover, the sectors in which TNCs are 
active in the case study regions, such as chemicals; machinery and equipment, are those which 
account generally for the majority of R&D and innovation activities (e.g. Dosi et al., 1990: pp. 90, 
Pavitt, 1984). Consequently, it can be generally assumed that TNCs are more innovative, something 
that is also reflected in their higher productivity levels (partly caused by process innovations) and 
their export successes. However, this does not necessarily mean that TNCs carry out these activities 
within host countries such as Thailand. Chapter 2.3.2 states that TNCs tend to conduct R&D at their 
headquarters and transfer the knowledge and technology to their production sites worldwide.  
Concerning age, in general younger firms can be assumed to be at an earlier stage of the product life 
cycle and hence in a phase where either product- or process- innovation are essential (see 2.1.4). 
However, the age of TNC-subsidiaries must be appraised differently, because they do not begin 
with a new product. Here, a higher age may sooner allow for more innovation activities, owing to 
better embeddedness in the host SI, learning curve effects, and the development of more autonomy 
vis-à-vis or the assignment of innovation responsibilities by the parent company (see 2.3.4). 
In order to avoid misinterpretations, these basic characteristics and their influence on innovation 
must be kept in mind while analysing the dataset according to the stated hypotheses. 
5.2 Technological capabilities and absorptive capacity of TNC-affiliates 
vis-à-vis local firms  
The first hypothesis: “TNC-affiliates are actors with higher capabilities than local firms, and 
consequently, they are suitable contributors to the upgrading of the host countries’ SI”, covers all 
surveyed firms. Most parts of the questionnaire are only applicable to companies that carry out 
either innovation or R&D, because they relate to these activities and to external collaboration in 
R&D and innovation. Hence, the data on the bulk of non-innovating firms, which make up about 
75-80% of the surveyed companies, is limited to some general information. Nevertheless, these 
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questions allow one to evaluate the technological capabilities and absorptive capacity of the 
respective firms. Consequently, in the following two sections two sub-hypothesises will be tested:  
• H1a: TNC-affiliates possess higher TCs than local firms (see 5.2.1) 
• H1b: TNC-affiliates have better absorptive capacity than local firms (see 5.2.2) 
5.2.1 Technological capabilities  
Chapter 1.1.4 introduced Hobday’s technological trajectory framework, in which firms follow the 
learning route from OEM to OBM. This learning route can also be seen as a fairly broad TC-
typology. One can expect TNC-affiliates with access to the knowledge of their parent companies to 
be more advanced than local firms in regard to this typology. Tab. 5.9 depicts the average 
percentage of sales according to these TC-groups of foreign and local companies.  
Tab. 5.9: Average (mean) % of firms’ sales in each TC-group: Thailand 
 2000 2002 
All 
 
/ n 
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Total 
994 
Local 
864 
Foreign 
496 
Total 
1360 
MA   7. 9*** 38.8*** 20.4   9.9*** 24.2*** 15.1 
OEM 30.8 26.8 29.2 38.5 36.6 37.8 
ODM 16.9*** 12.3*** 15.0 16.2** 13.4** 15.2 
OBM 31.2*** 13.5*** 24.0 34.0*** 25.4*** 30.9 
Food/ Beverage/ Tobacco 
 
/ n 
Local 
105 
Foreign 
38 
Total 
143 
Local 
137 
Foreign 
38 
Total 
175 
MA   7.1*** 36.2*** 14.9 10.7*** 27.6*** 14.4 
OEM 15.1   9.5 13.6 27.5 22.4 26.4 
ODM 11.0 11.9 11.3 10.7 11.2 10.8 
OBM 48.6* 34.3* 44.8 50.3 38.2 47.7 
Textiles/ Wearing apparel/ Leather 
 
/ n 
Local 
100 
Foreign 
38 
Total 
138 
Local 
166 
Foreign 
51 
Total 
217 
MA   3.9*** 26.2*** 10.0   5.0*** 15.9***   7.6 
OEM 46.6 44.2 45.9 54.1 62.9 56.2 
ODM 21.3 17.2 20.2 23.4**   9.0** 20.1 
OBM 17.6*   4.5* 14.0 17.5 13.7 16.6 
Chemicals 
 
/ n 
Local 
126 
Foreign 
104 
Total 
230 
Local 
184 
Foreign 
114 
Total 
298 
MA   9.3*** 37.5*** 22.1 12.1* 19.2* 14.8 
OEM 30.9** 20.8** 26.4 35.4 33.5 34.7 
ODM 14.9 12.3 13.7 14.8 14.3 14.6 
OBM 33.7** 18.5** 26.8 34.3 33.1 33.8 
Machinery/ Equipment 
 
/ n 
Local 
138 
Foreign 
178 
Total 
316 
Local 
176 
Foreign 
224 
Total 
400 
MA 11.0*** 48.1*** 31.9 14.5*** 31.1*** 23.8 
OEM 31.1 26.7 28.6 35.3 33.7 34.4 
ODM 16.3*** 10.0*** 12.8 12.7 12.7 12.7 
OBM 31.1***   7.2*** 17.6 36.7*** 21.3*** 28.1 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
NB the figures do not always add up to 100%, because the questionnaire included a further category called “others”, 
which was filled in by some companies, but has not been considered for this analysis. 
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Deviating from Hobday’s original classification, the surveys in Thailand, Penang and Singapore 
included ‘manufacturing arm’ (MA) as an additional group. MAs are companies that manufacture 
products according to design specifications provided by the parent company or an associate 
company within the corporate group. MAs are therefore similar to OEMs, with the distinction of not 
selling to an external buyer.  
Obviously, the data does not support the above stated assumption (Tab. 5.9). Not surprisingly, 
TNC-affiliates are embedded into the corporate production network and therefore sell a certain 
share to parent or associate companies, i.e. MA. However, it strikes one that fewer TNC-affiliates in 
Thailand have competences and objectives (assigned by their headquarters) to participate in design 
or branding activities. On the other hand, a higher share of local firms performs these functions. Not 
only does this display to some extent their TCs, but also the need to perform these functions, since 
there is simply ‘nobody else’ (i.e. no other firm within the corporate network) that can fulfil these 
objectives. Because, for example, the task of creating a brand in the food industry is very different 
from creating a brand in the automotive industry, the following tables show the sector-specific 
distribution of sales in each TC-group. 
Tab. 5.10: Average (mean) % of firms’ sales in each TC-group: Singapore and Penang 
 Singapore Penang 
 
/ n 
Local 
184 
Foreign 
178 
Total 
362 
Local 
113 
Foreign 
76 
Total 
189 
MA   8.8*** 38.0*** 23.2   8.6*** 31.1*** 17.6 
OEM 35.7*** 25.5*** 30.7 37.4 31.6 35.1 
ODM 17.9* 11.3* 14.6 24.1* 18.2* 21.8 
OBM 15.2 12.8 14.0 21.4 11.6 17.5 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
OBM is most common among food and chemicals firms, as well as for local companies in the 
machinery sector. Textile firms rely primarily on OEM-sales. While MA sales are important for all 
foreign firms, they are especially high in the machinery sector.  
The result of a larger number of local firms selling in more advanced ODM and OBM categories 
supports the Wong’s (1999a; see chapter 2.1.4) criticism of Hobday’s (1995b) framework. 
Obviously, advanced technological capabilities do not necessarily result in design or brand 
activities, but can also lead to an upgrading within other categories e.g. the OEM category. Further 
support for this criticism can be found in the benchmark regions, Penang and Singapore (Tab. 5.10). 
Here, the overall number of ODM and OBM-sales is smaller than in Thailand despite a more 
advanced technological level according to the secondary data (see chapter 4). Of course, there is a 
bias in the data, because TNC-affiliates will most likely sell to other enterprises in the transnational 
production network, leaving headquarters to organise marketing and product development. 
Additionally, local firms have difficulty qualifying for the MA-status; qua definition they are rarely 
integrated into a corporate network and, therefore, cannot sell to a parent or associate company 
within the corporate network. However, not only do the presented categories determine the buyer, 
but they also specify functions such as design and marketing, which headquarters could assign to 
their affiliates. And indeed, the figures show that about one quarter of TNC-affiliates possess these 
responsibilities.  
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Another indicator for technological capabilities is the ISO-certification established by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). All South-East Asian surveys asked firms if 
they are certified according to the 1994 edition of ISO 9001, 9002 or 14001. ISO 9002 certifies 
quality management in production and assembly. ISO 9001 additionally verifies design, 
development and customer service. Consequently, it is a more advanced measure (see DIN, 1994b, 
a). ISO 14401 certifies an environment management system (ISO, 2004). 
According to this indicator, TNC-affiliates are evidently more sophisticated than local firms in all 
three regions (Tab. 5.11 and 5.12). Generally, the less demanding ISO 9002 is more widespread. In 
Thailand, the share of ISO 9001 certified firms has increased sharply from 2000 to 2002, with 
foreign firms leading the way. This indicates that TNC-affiliates increasingly perform design and 
development activities, which they would like to have certified. Because TNC-affiliates are mainly 
export-oriented, these figures also hint towards a need to become certified for marketing reasons or 
customer requirements on the world market. This is especially true for the environment protection 
related ISO 14001. 
Tab. 5.11: Share of ISO-certified firms in Thailand  
 2000 2002 
ISO 
/ n 
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Sig.+ Local 
863-864 
Foreign 
496-498 
Sig.+ 
9001 4.9 5.5 0.676 16.1 27.8 0.000 
9002 31.4 55.9 0.000 23.3 35.7 0.000 
14001 4.4 15.2 0.000 5.3 18.1 0.000 
+  Significance according to Pearson’s Chi-Square (2-sided) based on 2x2 tables  
Tab. 5.12: Share of ISO-certified firm in Singapore and Penang (1999) 
 Singapore Penang 
ISO 
/ n 
Local 
190 
Foreign 
183 
Sig.+ Local 
116 
Foreign 
76 
Sig.+ 
9001 11.6 23.0 0.004 6.9 11.8 0.238 
9002 34.7 58.5 0.000 31.9 61.8 0.000 
14001 4.2 15.3 0.000 2.6 11.8 0.010§ 
+ Significance according to Pearson’s Chi-Square (2-sided) based on 2x2 tables; §one cell expected count <5 
A third indicator that is available for all companies in Thailand refers to different technological 
activities. Tab. 5.13 depicts the share of local and foreign firms carrying out the following 
activities: a) basic production capabilities such as quality control, testing and acquisition of 
external technology; b) intermediate capabilities such as the adaptation of external technology and 
reverse engineering and c) intermediate to advanced capabilities like basic and detailed design 
(cf. chapter 2.1.2).  
It should be kept in mind, that the appraisal of the activities is generalised as each activity subsumes 
a fairly wide array of different activities. For example the acquisition of external technology can 
include the basic procurement of machinery as well as the advanced acquisition of patents or 
licenses. Moreover, these activities differ in respect to industry and product, e.g. basic design in the 
creation of a new read/write head for a hard disk drive is certainly very different from designing a 
new base plate in the same industry. Moreover, both activities are difficult to compare with firms 
designing new trunk lining parts for pickup trucks in the automotive industry. 
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Both the general and sector specific data in Tab. 5.13 lead to the following conclusion:  
Generally, the most common technological activities are the more basic ones: quality control and 
testing followed by acquisition and adaptation of external technology. Basic and detailed design are 
only carried out by one third to half of all companies, while even less perform reverse engineering. 
Hence, the obvious conclusion: the more advanced an activity the fewer firms perform it. Although 
reverse engineering is generally seen only as an intermediate capability (chapter 2.1.2), it requires a 
significant amount of absorptive capacity in order to ‘make sense’ of competitors’ products, which 
explains the low frequency. 
Tab. 5.13: Share of firms that conducted the following technological activities within three years prior to the 
survey 
Technological activity 2000 2002 
(Sector) 
/ n
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Local 
866 
Foreign 
498 
Quality control  91.4* 94.5* 85.6** 90.2** 
Food/ beverage 89.5 97.4 89.1 92.1 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 90.0 89.5 80.1 78.4 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 92.1 94.2 85.3* 92.1* 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 95.7 94.9 89.2* 93.8* 
Testing  87.7* 91.5* 77.8*** 85.1*** 
Food/ beverage 83.8**+ 97.4**+ 82.5 92.1 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 87.0 89.5 70.5 64.7 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 92.1 92.3 83.2 86.8 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 92.0 90.4 83.0** 90.7** 
Acquisition of external technology  55.0*** 66.6*** 54.5*** 70.1*** 
Food/ beverage 57.1 63.2 56.9 65.8 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 64.0 57.9 57.2 68.6 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 54.0 64.4 50.0*** 65.8*** 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 54.3*** 73.0*** 57.4*** 74.3*** 
Adaptation of external technology  67.3 69.1 54.5*** 68.2*** 
Food/ beverage 66.7 76.3 61.3*** 86.8*** 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 70.0 63.2 50.6 60.8 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 63.5 68.3 54.3*** 70.2*** 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 71.0 71.3 58.5** 69.5** 
Reverse engineering  38.3*** 29.2*** 24.4 22.5 
Food/ beverage 30.5 34.2 29.9 21.1 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 27.0 18.4 13.3   7.8 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 41.3** 28.8** 20.7 25.4 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 50.7*** 30.9*** 35.2* 26.5* 
Basic design 56.3*** 38.2*** 39.1 36.7 
Food/ beverage 38.1 47.4 32.8*** 60.5*** 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 57.0 44.7 31.9 25.5 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 56.3*** 36.5*** 31.5 40.4 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 65.2*** 32.6*** 53.4*** 32.7*** 
Detailed design 49.7*** 39.2*** 32.6 30.8 
Food/ beverage 35.2** 55.3** 29.2*** 55.3*** 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 44.0 44.7 25.5 23.5 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 49.2 38.5 27.2 31.0 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 66.7*** 34.3*** 44.3*** 28.8*** 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided)), + one 
cell expected count < 5 
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Comparing TNC-affiliates and local firms, foreign companies are significantly more active when it 
comes to the acquisition (2000/2002) and adaptation (2002) of external technology as well as 
testing and quality control (2000/2002). Therefore, these fields offer scope for local firms to learn 
from TNCs. However, generally less TNC-affiliates work in more sophisticated domains such as 
reverse engineering, basic and detailed design. This supports the theoretical argument that most 
TNCs still conduct product development related activities at their home base or in preferable 
foreign locations in the industrialised world, but not in late-industrialising countries like Thailand 
(see 2.3.2). TNC-affiliates in the food industry may be the exception, as they are very committed to 
design activities. 
More sector and technology specific assertions are:  
• Acquisition of external technology: more foreign firms acquire external technology than 
local firms (statistically significant for chemicals (2002) and machinery (2000/2002)). This 
could be expected because TNC-affiliates have easier access to external technology via their 
headquarters, better financial resources and higher requirements and turnover of technology 
due to global competition.  
• Adaptation of external technology: a significantly similar picture in 2002, with no marked 
differences in 2000. TNCs frequently have to adapt their processes and technology to local 
conditions (see chapter 2.3.2). This is true for local firms as well, but since they acquire 
external technology less often, they adapt these technologies less often, too. 
• Reverse engineering: more local firms carry out reverse engineering (significant for all 
firms, for chemicals and machinery in 2000, at the 10% level for machinery in 2002). Since 
reverse engineering is an important step for R&D, product and process development, most 
TNCs will perform this activity at their R&D-department abroad. Since local firms must 
conduct it in Thailand, they should exhibit higher frequencies. The less significant results 
for 2002 hint towards upgrading amongst TNC-affiliates. 
• Basic and detailed design: generally, foreign firms perform design functions less often 
(significant in the machinery sector). Again, these functions are traditionally performed by 
TNCs at their home base (2.3.2). Contrary evidence is found in the food industry, where 
significantly more foreign firms have design capabilities.  
• Testing and quality control: very important for all firms, but significantly more important 
for foreign firms. This can be explained by their export orientation: global markets tend to 
be more demanding than local markets.  
The final set of indicators analyses innovation activities, distinguishing between input indicators 
(R&D and other innovation activities), throughput indicators (patents) and output indicators (new 
products, new processes, share of new products/processes at turnover) (for discussion of indicators 
see chapter 3.1). 
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Tab. 5.14 Input-, Throughput- and Output indicators for innovation activities in Thailand 
2000 2002 Share of companies that conducted/ 
introduced… 
n 
Local 
593 
Foreign 
401 
Local 
866 
Foreign 
498 
 
R&D  16.2 14.0 10.6 11.4 
Food/ beverage 21.0 31.6 20.4* 34.2* 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products   7.0   2.6   1.8   2.0 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 14.3 20.2 13.0 16.7 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 20.3** 11.2** 11.9   8.0 
 
Other innovation activity  23.8 20.2 14.3 17.5 
Food/ beverage 27.6 36.8 22.6 28.9 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 14.0 13.2 10.8   7.8 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 22.2 21.2 12.5 17.5 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 27.5* 19.7* 17.6 21.2 
 
Either R&D or other innovation activity  26.5 24.2 20.8 22.3 
Food/ beverage 31.4 44.7 34.3 36.8 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 16.0 13.2 12.7   9.8 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 24.6 28.8 19.6 27.2 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 30.4* 21.9* 23.9 23.0 
 
Patents#    3.0   3.2   3.6**   1.4** 
Food/ beverage 1.0 2.6 3.6 - 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 1.0 - 1.8 2.0 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 1.6 2.9 4.9 2.6 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 5.8 4.5 4.5*§ 1.3*§ 
 
Product innovation in last 3 yrs.  15.9* 12.0*   6.6   8.0 
Food/ beverage 16.2 26.3 10.9 15.8 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 10.0 10.5   3.6   2.0 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 15.9 14.4   4.9   7.9 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 18.8** 10.1**   9.1   9.3 
 
Process innovation in last 3 yrs.  13.5 12.5   7.0   7.4 
Food/ beverage   9.5 18.4   9.5 13.2 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 11.0 13.2   5.4   2.0 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 12.7 12.5   7.1 10.5 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 19.6* 11.8*   7.4   7.1 
 
Either product or process innovation  19.6 16.2 11.0 12.0 
Food/ beverage 18.1* 31.6* 16.1 23.7 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products 12.0 13.2   7.8   3.9 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products 19.8 17.3 10.3 12.3 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 25.4** 14.6** 12.5 13.7 
 
Innovative $    8.1   7.0   6.2   7.8 
Food/ beverage   3.8   7.9   8.8   2.6 
Textile/ wearing apparel, leather products   7.0   7.9   4.2   2.0 
Chemicals/ chemical and plastic products   6.3   6.7   3.8**   9.6** 
Metal products/ machinery/ equipment 10.9   8.4   8.0   9.7 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level  (all Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided) 
§ Fisher’s Exact Test, which has been used where sample size is small and one or two cells have an expected count <5). 
# A patenting firm is a firm that has applied for at least one patent or has been granted at least one patent during 
1997/1999 for the 2000 dataset or 2000/2001 for the 2002 dataset. 
$ i.e. more than 25% of sales with new products or more than 25% of production volume with new processes 
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The analysis of these indicators (Tab. 5.14) results in the following findings: First of all, most of the 
differences between local and foreign firms are not statistically significant. The share of firms 
performing any of the looked-for activities is smaller in 2002 than in 2000 (with the only exception 
being the share of local patenting firms). However, the two datasets are not panel data; hence, these 
changes might simply be due to differences in the sample size and composition.  
Second, the general pattern observed in 2000 is one of more local firms performing either R&D or 
other innovation activities. Local firms do not only score well in this input but also in the output 
figures: the shares of firms bringing about either product or process innovations, as well as the share 
of innovative firms, are higher than for foreign firms. Only in the throughput indicator (patents), 
local firms present lower figures. However, the total number of patents and patenting firms is very 
low, with less than 20 patenting companies with a total of 20 to 60 granted patents. In 2002, most of 
these tendencies (all for the total figures) have reversed. This leads to the conclusion that TNC-
affiliates have apparently successfully ‘caught up’ with or even overtaken local firms when it comes 
to innovation. This could be a result of greater learning experiences in TNC-affiliates, but more 
importantly it signifies changes in TNCs’ strategy: They foster the decentralisation of R&D- and 
development-activities which can also result in the upgrading of volume production facilities in 
Thailand. 
Third, from a sectoral point of view, the food industry is a very innovative sector, with one in three 
firms performing innovation related functions. TNC-affiliates clearly tend to be engaged more often 
in innovative activities. This reverberates the requirement that the industry adapt products 
continuously to the (ever changing) local taste. Moreover, the industry is partially dependent on 
local resources or climate, making local innovation activities necessary. Companies in the textile 
industry rarely perform R&D, but innovate, for example, by designing new clothes. Nevertheless, 
it is the least innovating sector among the four focus industries. Differences between local and 
foreign firms are mixed and mostly miniscule. In the chemical industry foreign companies are 
generally more innovating than local firms, despite mixed results and marginal differences for 
product and process innovations. However, TNC-affiliates were significantly more often innovative 
than local companies in 2002. The reverse is true for the machinery sector, in which less foreign 
firms carry out R&D and (for 2000) other innovation activities. This is significant for both product 
(5% level) and process (10% level) innovation in 2000.  
 
Tab. 5.15 provides figures for the equivalent indicators in the benchmarking regions. While the 
results for Thailand do not show a clear difference between local and foreign firms, the pattern in 
Singapore and Penang is strikingly different. In both of these regions, foreign firms are more likely 
to be innovating or innovative. This is for the most part true for Europe as well, however, less 
foreign firms conduct R&D in Europe (in relation to local firms; the absolute share is much higher 
than in South East Asia). While a smaller numbers of local R&D-firms in Singapore and Penang 
reflect a lack of capabilities, the lower share of foreign firms in Europe displays the fact that they 
predominantly have major R&D-centres in their home countries. As expected (see chapter 2.3.2), a 
larger proportion of firms in Europe carry out innovations. 
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Tab. 5.15: Input-, Throughput- and Output indicators for innovation activities in Singapore, Penang and Europe 
Singapore Penang Europe Share of all companies that 
conduct/ introduced/ are… 
 
/ n 
Local 
 
190 
Foreign 
 
183 
Local 
 
116 
Foreign 
 
76 
Local 
 
739-809 
Foreign 
 
204-233 
R&D  17.9*** 37.2*** 22.4 32.9 71.9* 65.9* 
Patents#    2.6*** 13.1***   4.3   7.9 21.8*** 36.3***
Product innovation  17.9*** 43.2*** 28.4** 44.0** 63.9*** 76.5***
Process innovation. 20.0*** 39.3*** 31.9** 49.3** 58.8** 66.8** 
Prod. or proc. Innovation 27.4*** 51.4*** 37.1* 50.7* 74.4** 81.1** 
Innovative $  11.6*** 27.3*** 16.4* 27.6* 21.1+ 21.6+ 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (all Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided)  
# A patenting firm is a firm that has applied for at least one patent or has been granted at least one patent in the three 
years prior to the survey; in Europe only firms that filed a patent are included. 
$ I.e. more than 25% of sales with new products or more than 25% of production volume with new processes. 
+ NB in Europe no information about the share of new processes were obtained, therefore only firms that retrieve more 
than 25% of sales with new products are considered innovative. 
In summary, based upon the presented indicators, TNC-affiliates in Thailand cannot generally be 
considered more technological capable than local companies. They are more often certified 
according to ISO-standards and they are more likely to carry out basic to intermediate technological 
activities such as testing, quality control, acquisition and adaptation of external technology. 
However, their sales in the advanced ODM and OBM categories are lower. Furthermore, they are 
involved in basic and detailed design, as well as in reverse engineering to a lesser degree. Finally, 
available innovation indicators do not reveal significantly more sophisticated TNC-affiliates 
(despite slightly higher shares in 2002). This is particularly striking when contrasted with the 
benchmarking regions of Penang and Singapore, where foreign firms are more likely to engage in 
innovating activity. Obviously, TNCs use their operations in Thailand for assembly and some 
home-base exploiting activities (see 2.3.2), whereas firms in Penang and especially Singapore have 
been assigned at least some higher-order activities. In the case of Singapore, this is due to the fact 
that many TNCs use Singapore as their regional headquarters, assigning R&D and design functions 
to these (e.g. Yeung, 2001, Yeung et al., 2001, Giroud, 2003, McKendrick et al., 2000, Kiese, 
2004). Likewise, a more conducive environment in terms of S&T-infrastructure and human capital 
supports this development (see 4.2.1). 
Hence, in Thailand there is no evidence of higher performance from TNC-affiliates per se, from 
which local firms could benefit. However, there are some indications for recent upgrading amongst 
foreign firms. This trend suggests that TNCs may change their strategy and assign higher order 
innovation and technological activities to their volume-production sites in Thailand. This implies, 
then, the development and transfer of capabilities to these affiliates.  
The figures for Europe show that local firms should be expected to perform R&D and innovation 
activities more often than foreign firms, since the latters’ headquarters are undertaking R&D 
activities for them. Thai domestic companies do not enjoy this luxury. If they do not perform these 
functions in Thailand, they will not perform them at all.  
From a sectoral point of view, TNCs in the food and chemicals industries are more likely to assign 
R&D-functions to their affiliates in Thailand. This is primarily due to the need for adaptation to 
local/regional tastes, national legislative requirements, and for a desired proximity of R&D to 
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volume production and/or local conditions. Moreover, innovation – at least in the food industry – is 
perceived as less sophisticated than in machinery and equipment industries. In contrast, affiliates in 
the machinery sector rely more on the traditional mechanism of importing new products and 
processes from their R&D-facilities abroad. Since this industry is exceptionally export-oriented and 
must appeal to highly competitive global markets, TNCs perform R&D and product innovation 
close to leading markets and in collaboration with main customers. For these reasons, the 
opportunity for R&D in Thailand is more restricted.  
These data, however, only display frequencies. Information concerning the type of innovation 
activity performed is not included, i.e. the quantitative pattern does not necessarily also reflect the 
qualitative pattern. Consequently, section 5.3 will explore the characteristics of advanced foreign 
and local firms. But firstly, the next section will analyse data pertaining to the absorptive capacity 
of all companies. 
5.2.2 Absorptive capacity  
Chapter 2.1.3.2 introduced the notion of absorptive capacity and its significance for the 
development of technological capabilities, successful technology transfer and collaboration. 
Additionally, the chapter presented some indicators, which can be used to measure ACAP. 
Nevertheless, all innovation surveys in South East Asia asked non-innovating companies only a few 
questions, which can be related to ACAP. Therefore, this section investigates local and foreign 
firms’ ACAP by analysing the qualification level of the workforce and training expenditure. The 
data on the qualification structure for 2000 and 2002 (Tab. 5.16) show that TNC-affiliates employ 
more highly educated personnel than local firms. This is principally significant at the 1% level. This 
pattern can also be observed at a sectoral level, even though the results are only significant for the 
chemical industry in 2000 and 2002.  
Consequently, TNC-affiliates possess more absorptive capacity or at least better resources to 
develop ACAP. TNC-affiliates may even, through their higher wages, contribute to the lack of 
suitable professionals at local firms (see 4.1.4.3). The resulting lower level of ACAP in local firms 
diminishes the opportunity for technology transfer. However, all firms have increased their share of 
highly-skilled workers from 2000 to 2002. This represents a shift towards a more knowledge–
intensive economy in Thailand. 
 
The same pattern of better human capital-endowed TNC-affiliates can be observed in data for 
Singapore and Penang (Tab. 5.17). The total share of university graduates is higher in Singapore 
than in Penang, which corresponds to secondary data on the development level of the respective SI 
in both Singapore and Malaysia (chapter 4.2). However, Thailand’s companies present even higher 
shares of university graduates, which – according to the secondary data – cannot be related to the 
sophistication of the companies. It must sooner reflect the relatively lower standards of university 
education in Thailand (see 4.2.2.2). 
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Tab. 5.16: Employment structure in Thailand (2002 and 2000): Average share of personnel according to highest 
qualification29 
2002 
/ n
Local  
731-733 
Foreign 
388-390 
Total 
1119-1123 
University graduates 16.2*** 20.6*** 17.7 
 Scientists   0.6*   0.9*   0.7 
 Engineers   1.7***   3.1***   2.2 
 Others 13.0*** 14.9*** 13.7 
Vocational school graduates 21.5*** 27.6*** 23.6 
 Technical 10.6*** 13.5*** 11.6 
 non-technical   9.7* 11.1* 10.2 
Secondary school  38.3 37.5 38.0 
Primary school 24.1*** 14.3*** 20.7 
2000 
/ n
Local  
409 
Foreign 
289 
Total 
698 
University graduates 10.9*** 13.9*** 12.1 
 scientists   0.8   0.8   0.8 
 engineers   1.5**   2.1**   1.7 
 others   6.8   6.9   6.8 
Vocational school graduates 16.8*** 21.8*** 18.9 
 technical   6.9   8.4   7.5 
 non-technical   8.2   7.6   8.0 
Secondary school  34.9*** 44.5*** 38.8 
Primary school 37.5*** 19.9*** 30.2 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
Tab. 5.17: Employment structure in Singapore and Penang (1999): Average share of personnel according to 
highest qualification 
Singapore 
/ n
Local  
184 
Foreign 
178 
Total 
362 
University graduates   7.0*** 12.0***   9.4 
Diploma holders 11.6*** 13.6*** 12.6 
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) 40.6*** 31.1*** 35.9 
Unskilled 40.4 43.3 41.8 
Penang 
/ n
Local  
113 
Foreign 
71 
Total 
184 
University graduates   4.4**   6.6**   5.2 
Diploma holders   4.9***   8.4***   6.3 
Certificate holders   8.1   7.8   8.0 
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  55.2 64.2 58.7 
Primary school 27.7*** 13.7*** 22.3 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
 
Tab. 5.18 displays the training expenditure of local and foreign firms. On average, foreign firms 
spent more money than local firms on training in 2000 and 2001 (significant at the 10% level), 
while in 1997 and 1999 local firms report slightly higher figures. The share of firms spending more 
than 4% of sales is less than one tenth in the 2nd survey. Hence, companies seem reluctant to 
enhance the intensity of their efforts to build ACAP. 
                                                 
29 The dataset was subject to extensive plausibility checks and cases which were implausible or did not add up to 100 in 
the main categories were excluded. The checks on the subcategories (e.g. technical, non-technical) were less stringent 
and cases were kept in the dataset even if the figures did not add up to the superior level, because otherwise too many 
cases would have been excluded. Hence, the reliability of the subcategories is not as good as for the main categories. 
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Tab. 5.18: Training expenditure as % of sales in Thailand 
1997 1999 2000 2001 
Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign  
/ n  186 119 216 152 271 174 277 183 
> 2%# 32.3 24.4 32.9 25.0 20.7 29.9 21.3 30.1 
> 4%# 22.1 18.5 23.6 19.1   5.9   9.8   7.6 11.5 
mean§ 0.9 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.8*** 1.2*** 0.9*** 1.3*** 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
# the figures are distorted, because missing values and no expenditure were both coded as nil were in the first survey. 
Consequently they are excluded, resulting into an overestimation of the share.  
§ in order to correct for this (#) bias the calculation of the mean includes all nils. Moreover, firms with training 
expenditure of more than 50% of sales are excluded due to lack of plausibility. The median is nil. 
Tab. 5.19 presents the figures for the benchmarking regions. However, the data are not directly 
comparable, as training expenditure in Singapore and Penang was related to payroll rather than 
sales. In both Penang and Singapore (at least according to the median), foreign firms invest more in 
human capital development than local firms. 
Tab. 5.19: Training expenditure as % of payroll in Singapore and Penang 
Singapore Penang  
Local Foreign Local Foreign 
/ n 126 156 87 61 
> 2% 57.1 61.0 49.3 62.2 
> 4% 32.5 20.6 33.2 37.6 
median 1.0*** 2.0*** 1.0* 2.0* 
mean 3.1*** 2.3*** 3.8* 5.0* 
NB For comparison with the Thailand data, companies with no training expenditures or missing values have been 
neglected 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
In comparison, a study by Eurostat establishes that firms spend between 0.5 to 3.0% of total labour 
costs for additional training (Nestler & Kalilis, 2002). Relating total training expenditure to annual 
sales, a “skills study” by Forrester Research reports that the 255 surveyed European companies 
spend on average 0.05% of sales for training (Meyer, 2004). As a special case, start-ups in Canada 
were surveyed, reporting an average of 2.7% of sales for employee training (Kang, 2000). A survey 
of 100 affiliates of TNCs in South Africa did, however, record a share of 5% of firms with training 
expenditure exceeding 15% of sales (Gelb & Black, 2004: 209). Hence, the figures for Thailand 
(0.9-1.3% of sales) are clearly higher than for the average European firm, while the figures for 
foreign firms in Thailand lag behind those of TNC-affiliates in South Africa (ibid.). In general, 
training expenditure can have two objectives: first, to compensate for the weaknesses of graduates 
of the education system, and secondly, to train specific skills required for the high-skill production 
process. Compared to other late-industrialising countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore and South 
Africa, Thai firms either do not have the resources to foster human capital sufficiently or do not see 
the need for doing so.  
In summary, TNC-affiliates are clearly better endowed with human capital than local firms. This is 
probably the result of highly-skilled workers seeking positions with TNC-affiliates, where working 
conditions and wages are frequently more favourable (e.g. Ramstetter, 2004). On the other hand, 
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TNC-affiliates require higher levels of skill for more complex, state-of-the-art production 
technology (4.2.2.1) and the required ability to communicate in English (or Japanese). Many firms 
in Thailand consider “a college degree […] as a proxy for English skills” (Worldbank, 2001: 17). 
Reflecting upon the intensity with which ACAP is consciously developed, considering training 
expenditure as a valid representation of this, the findings are mixed. In Thailand (2002), Penang and 
to a certain degree in Singapore, foreign firms spend more money on training than local firms and 
hence contribute more resources to the improvement of the ACAP. Similar to indicators of 
technological and innovation activities, this pattern changed from the first to the second survey in 
Thailand. Whereas local firms exhibit higher expenditure on training in 1997/99 they lack behind 
TNC-affiliates in 2000/01. Presumably, this is caused by a recent upsurge in the collective efforts of 
foreign firms in a drive to upgrade their operations in Thailand.  
However, approximately half of all foreign and local firms in Thailand still spent less than 0.5% of 
sales on training. Despite the acknowledged need for human capital for the creation of technological 
capabilities and competitiveness, local firms seem to disregard this path of advancement. 
Nevertheless, the share of highly qualified employees increased between surveys in 2000 and 2002. 
Consequently, firms in Thailand ‘learn by hiring’ sooner than ‘by (further) training’. One reason 
why firms are reluctant to spend more money on training may actually be the lack of qualified 
human capital and subsequent personnel mobility. Firms might be reluctant to invest in human 
capital, a scarce commodity on the market and easily poached by a competitor. 
5.3 Technological capabilities and absorptive capacity of advanced 
TNC-affiliates vis-à-vis advanced local firms 
The previous section shows – based on data for the entire sample – that foreign firms are generally 
not superior in terms of technological capabilities, but that they possess different capabilities than 
local firms and have a significantly higher absorptive capacity in respect to human capital.  
This chapter focuses exclusively on advanced firms, in order to establish the kinds of differences 
that can be observed within this group. Furthermore, it examines whether or not advanced local 
firms can find suitable collaboration and technology transfer partners for sophisticated 
technological capability building and innovation among foreign firms. Thereby, the term advanced 
firm needs clarification. Chapter 4.2.2.1 shows that even large local firms, TNC-affiliates and high-
tech SMEs in Thailand, struggle to overcome the design and engineering stage (main current 
threshold) and that only a minority have achieved research and technology-development skills 
(minor current threshold) (see also own data analysis in 5.2). 
In order to identify a group of exceptionally capable firms, the following filters have been applied: 
First, firms that have either introduced a new product onto the market or have adopted a new 
process into production in the three years prior to the survey (in accordance with the Oslo-manual 
(OECD, 1997a: 42) henceforth called innovating) are considered advanced. Second, firms that 
conduct R&D are included. Even though this definition mixes input- and output indicators (see 3.1), 
it is an appropriate indicator for identifying technologically more capable and, hence, advanced 
firms in the Thai context. 
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However, this definition can lead to two problems: First, it hinders a straightforward comparison 
with the benchmarking regions. In Singapore and Penang innovating firms were exclusively asked 
to answer the question regarding R&D. Hence, when considering concerns for perfect matching 
among the regions alongside those for taking the particularities of Thailand into account as the 
focus country, this study gravitates towards the latter argument. Secondly, the application of this 
definition is occasionally impossible. The R&D/Innovation surveys treat R&D and ‘innovation 
activities other than R&D’ separately. Some questions refer only to firms reporting R&D, while 
others refer to firms claiming to conduct innovation activities without necessarily being innovating 
firms, i.e. having achieved an output (inspired by Ellis & Polcuch, 2005 henceforth called 
potentially innovating companies). Thus, not all analysis applies specifically to ‘advanced’ firms, 
but must be limited at times to the sub-groups of R&D-performing, innovating or potentially 
innovating firms (Figure 5.1 visualises the different groups). Moreover, the size of the advanced 
firm sample is fairly small (see Tab. 5.20 and 5.21). For this reason a sector specific analysis in 
Thailand is not pursued.  
Figure 5.1: Visualising key terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
own graphic 
Tab. 5.20: Sample size of R&D-, innovating, potentially innovating and advanced firms in Thailand 
 2000 2002 
 Local Foreign Local Foreign 
Total 593 401 866 498
- potentially innovating 141 81 124 87
- R&D-performing 96 56 92 57
- innovating firms 116 65 95 60
- R&D and innovating firms 65 35 34 28
- advanced (either R&D- or innovating firms) 147 86 153 89
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Tab. 5.21: Sample size of R&D-, innovating and advanced firms in Singapore and Penang 
 Singapore Penang 
 Local Foreign Local Foreign 
Total 190 183 116 76
- R&D performing 34 68 26 25
- advanced (= innovating firms) 52 94 43 38
Consequently, this chapter tests the following hypothesis: 
H2: Even within the group of advanced firms, TNC have higher capabilities than local firms 
• H2a: Advanced TNC-affiliates possess higher TCs than advanced local firms  
(see 5.3.1) 
• H2b: Advanced TNC-affiliates possess a higher absorptive capacity than advanced local 
firms (see 5.3.2) 
5.3.1 Technological capabilities and innovation activities of advanced firms  
As was conducted for all companies in the previous chapter, the TCs of advanced companies will be 
measured at the outset with the following set of indicators: MA to ODM framework, ISO-
certification and technological activities (5.3.1.1). Secondly, additional innovation variables only 
available for advanced firms will be analysed in order to examine the more sophisticated levels of 
TCs, namely the R&D and innovation processes (5.3.1.2). 
5.3.1.1 Basic technological capabilities of advanced firms 
Similar to the pattern established for the MA to ODM framework for the entire sample (chapter 
5.2.1.1) advanced local firms have higher sales in ODM and OBM categories than advanced foreign 
firms. In comparison to the total sample, advanced firms have unmistakably higher sales in OBM 
and fewer sales in OEM (see Tab. 5.9 and 5.22): figures for OBM are between 9 and 11%-points 
higher (only exception local firms in 2000); OEM figures have decreased by about 7 to 11%-points.  
This contrast is even stronger if one compares advanced and not-advanced (henceforth called basic) 
companies: Advanced firms have a high sale-share in OBM whereas basic firms have higher shares 
in OEM and MA. This is true for local and foreign firms alike (the only exceptions include local 
firms in 2000, where advanced and basic firms have the same amount of shares in OBM). 
Tab. 5.22: Average (mean) % of advanced firms’ sales in each TC-group: Thailand 
2000 2002  
 
/ n 
Local 
147 
Foreign 
86 
Total 
233 
Local 
152 
Foreign 
87 
Total 
239 
MA 11.2*** 32.6*** 19.1   6.1*** 20.0*** 11.2 
OEM 20.4 19.7 20.2 27.7 25.5 26.9 
ODM 18.2 12.2 16.0 17.9 15.3 17.0 
OBM 31.3* 22.5* 28.1 45.8* 36.1* 42.3 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
NB the figures do not always add up to 100%, because the questionnaire included a further category called “others”, 
which was filled in by some companies, but has not been considered for this analysis. 
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Firms in Singapore and Penang exhibit a trend similar to that in Thailand, although it is less salient 
(Tab. 5.10 and 5.23). The picture gets clearer when the scope for comparison is limited to advanced 
and basic firms. However, in this case ODM sales are not distributed equally, as in Thailand, but are 
higher for basic foreign firms in Penang and basic local firms in Singapore.  
Tab. 5.23: Average (mean) % of advanced firms’ sales in each TC-group: Singapore and Penang 
Singapore Penang  
 
/ n 
Local 
51 
Foreign 
92 
Total 
143 
Local 
42 
Foreign 
38 
Total 
80 
MA   9.8*** 43.2*** 31.3   9.7*** 32.9*** 20.7 
OEM 34.5** 22.8** 27.0 32.5 35.3 33.8 
ODM 21.4** 10.3** 14.3 25.2** 10.5** 18.2 
OBM 23.2** 14.9** 17.9 26.6 21.3 24.1 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
Advanced firms are more often certified to any ISO certification than firms in the total sample 
(Tab.5.24 and 5.25). Even within the group of advanced firms, TNC-affiliates seek ISO 
certifications significantly more often, which is again caused by both customer requirements and 
marketing reasons necessitated by the global market (see 5.2.1). This is evident for all three regions, 
even though in 1999 firms in Singapore were much more often certified with the more demanding 
ISO 9001 than firms in Thailand (2000) or Penang (1999). This reflects the higher design 
responsibilities in Singapore.  
Tab. 5.24: Share of ISO-certified advanced firms in Thailand  
 2000 2002 
ISO 
/ n 
Local 
147 
Foreign 
86 
Sig.+ Local 
152-153 
Foreign 
88-89 
Sig.+ 
9001 9.5 14.0 0.300 17.1 42.0 0.000
9002 40.8 55.8 0.027 40.5 43.8 0.616
14001 8.8 26.7 0.000 11.2 29.2 0.000
+ Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided) based on 2x2 tables  
Tab. 5.25: Share of ISO-certified advanced firms in Singapore and Penang (1999) 
 Singapore Penang 
ISO 
/ n 
Local 
52 
Foreign 
94 
Sig.+ Local 
43 
Foreign 
38 
Sig.+ 
9001 21.2 40.4 0.018 9.3 15.8 0.376§
9002 44.2 62.8 0.031 41.9 78.9 0.001
14000 13.5 23.4 0.149 7.0 15.8 0.208§
+ Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided) based on 2x2 tables; §at least one cell expected count <5 
In terms of technological activities, advanced firms – compared to all firms – are more often 
technologically active – this is true for all considered activities (cf. Tab. 5.13 and 5.26).  
Furthermore, basic and detailed design, which are higher order activities, are as or even slightly 
more often carried out by advanced TNC-affiliates in comparison with advanced local firms. This is 
a reversal of the pattern observed for all firms. In acquiring and adapting external technology, 
foreign firms still prevail. Consequently, in the group of advanced firms there is clear indication of 
a similar or even higher share of capable foreign firms. Hence, even if these firms cannot be 
considered ‘teachers’, because they are not more sophisticated overall, they are at least on par with 
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the local firms, and, consequently, suitable cooperation partners, even in terms of more advanced 
technological activities.  
Tab. 5.26: Share of advanced firms that conducted the following technological activities within three years prior 
to the survey 
 2000 2002 
 Local Foreign Local Foreign 
       / n 147 86 153 89 
Quality control  88.4* 95.3* 95.4 94.4 
Testing  85.0** 94.2** 90.8* 96.6* 
Acquisition of external technology  63.9 69.8 69.9** 84.3** 
Adaptation of external technology  76.9 83.7 75.8 84.1 
Reverse engineering  54.4 52.3 48.4 48.3 
Basic design  66.7 60.5 63.4 65.2 
Detailed design  59.9 62.8 60.1 64.0 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided)) 
5.3.1.2 R&D and innovation capabilities of advanced firms 
In the following, the technological activities related to innovation performed by innovating firms 
are presented in Tab. 5.27. This question was not addressed to R&D firms and can hence only be 
analysed from the sub-sample (see Tab. 5.20). 
Most of these innovating companies acquire external equipment and carry out training; obviously 
these are the most important innovation activities. Interestingly, there is a significant difference 
between local and foreign firms in the acquisition of external technology in the form of patents and 
licenses. Clearly, local firms lack the capital, knowledge or absorptive capacity to utilise this kind 
of external knowledge. One other reason that may explain why more TNC-affiliates use this kind of 
activity could be the transfer of patents and licences within the corporate network. This arms length 
transfer requires less capability on behalf of the receiver, because it is based on strong intra-
corporate assistance and trust-based knowledge exchange. This is different from market-moderated 
exchanges relied upon by local firms, subsequently demanding higher absorptive capacities and 
capabilities.  
Tab. 5.27: Share of innovating firms in Thailand carrying out the following activities linked to product and 
process innovation 
 1999 2000 2001 
/ n
Local 
116 
Foreign
65 
Local 
94 
Foreign 
60 
Local 
94 
Foreign
60 
Acquisition of machinery, equipment and 
software 84.5 83.1 74.5 83.3 77.7 85.0 
Acquisition of external technology e.g. 
patents and licences  25.9*** 44.6*** 16.0*** 36.7*** 19.1*** 38.3***
Industrial design and engineering, market 
research, marketing expenses  57.8 58.5 29.8 33.3 38.3 36.7 
Training  73.3 80.0 64.9 65.0 74.7 75.0 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided)) 
Moreover, foreign firms are more often involved in the procurement of external machinery. Since 
the capital goods industry in late-industrialising countries is typically weak (see chapter 2.1.1), 
companies must acquire these goods from abroad. Consequently, this provides a very clear 
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indication that TNC-affiliates in Thailand contribute to the SI by bringing in codified, disembodied 
as well as embodied technology via international technology transfer (see 2.1.3.3).  
Comparing the results with those of innovating firms in Singapore and Penang (Tab. 5.28), it can be 
seen, that a) the ranking of activities is the same in all three regions, b) the share of firms 
performing each activity is also roughly at the same level and c) the relation between the share of 
local and foreign firms performing each activity is also the same (the only exception being 
industrial design in Thailand (1999) and acquisition of machinery in Penang). Hence, innovating 
firms in Singapore, Penang and Thailand do not really differ in respect to these – admittedly fairly 
general – indicators. Moreover, the share of foreign firms in Thailand performing these activities is 
just as high as in Penang and Singapore. The only exceptions are ‘industrial design and engineering, 
market research and marketing’, which are more frequently carried out by TNC-affiliates in the 
latter two regions (according to Thailand 2000/2001 figures). This leads to the conclusion that the 
depiction of ‘lazy TNC-affiliates’ is inaccurate for advanced firms in Thailand.  
Tab. 5.28: Share of innovating firms in Singapore and Penang carrying out the following activities linked to 
product & process innovation 
 Singapore Penang 
 
/ n
Local 
51 
Foreign 
94 
Local 
42-43 
Foreign 
36-37 
Acquisition of machinery, equipment & software  78.4 81.9 81.4* 64.9* 
Acquisition of external technology  
e.g. patents and licences  23.5 31.9 19.0 27.0 
Industrial design and engineering,  
market research, marketing expenses  45.1 41.5 48.8 43.2 
Training  62.7 69.1 58.1 63.9 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level (Pearson Chi-Square (2-sided)) 
 
Input indicator: Innovation and R&D expenditure 
Since the previous section only reported the frequencies of companies performing innovation 
related activities (see Tab. 5.14), it is necessary to explore these activities further. Analyzing the 
resources allocated to these activities will suffice for this. The three surveys done in South East 
Asia included questions pertaining to innovation expenditures (including the activities named in 
the previous section, see also chapter 3.1) and R&D expenditure. Both are given as intensity 
values, i.e. in percentage of sales. While in Singapore and Penang this information is classified, in 
Thailand exact figures are available, offering the opportunity to calculate location parameters. By 
calculating these parameters, firms claiming to have an R&D- intensity of more than 25% and firms 
claiming to have an innovation-intensity of more than 60% have been excluded from the calculation 
due to implausibility. This assertion is based on the fact that, in the 13 largest OECD countries, the 
industries with the highest R&D-intensity, exhibit an average of 11% (pharmaceuticals) and 10% 
(aerospace) (Legler, 2003: 48). Still, the standard deviation is very large; hence the median, which 
can act as a less distorted parameter, has been calculated additionally. Tab. 5.29 displays the 
parameter for the innovation intensity of all innovating firms. Overall, innovating local firms spend 
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more money on ‘innovation activities other than R&D’ than innovating foreign firms. This pattern 
is consistent from 1997 to 2001, but statistically significant only for 1999. 
 
Tab. 5.29: Innovation expenditure in % of sales for innovating firms in Thailand 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 
 
/ n 
Local 
78 
Foreign 
51 
Local 
114 
Foreign 
59 
Local 
23 
Foreign 
22 
Local 
27 
Foreign 
22 
Mean 1.06 0.49 2.72** 0.75** 1.64 1.42 2.97 2.08 
Median 0.03 0.02 0.47 0.09 0.25 0.10 0.26 0.10 
s 2.80 1.23 6.85 1.70 3.32 1.42 7.88 6.03 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
Reliable information on R&D-intensity is only available for about one third of the 149 R&D-firms 
in Thailand in 2000/2001. The response rate was higher in the first survey, where between 50% 
(1997) and over 80% (1999) of the 154 R&D-firms reported on their R&D-expenditure. According 
to this indicator, TNC-affiliates committed slightly more resources in 2000 and 2001, whereas in 
1997 and 1999 local firms spent more money on R&D (Tab. 5.30). 
Tab. 5.30: Mean and Median of R&D-expenditure in % of sales of R&D-firms in Thailand 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 
 
/ n 
Local 
50 
Foreign 
29 
Local 
83 
Foreign 
47 
Local 
28 
Foreign 
19 
Local 
34 
Foreign 
21 
Mean 1.20 0.40 1.56** 0.72** 1.46 1.92 1.38 1.88 
Median 0.30 0.12 0.44 0.19 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.70 
S 2.14 0.53 3.10 1.72 3.92 3.45 3.75 3.53 
***significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Mann-Whitney-U-Test) 
The tendency for foreign firms to spend more money on R&D (at least in the more recent years), 
and local firms to spend more money on other innovation activities, supports Arcona and Suez’s 
(1999, 2002) observation that in late-industrialising countries innovation is less often taking place 
in formal R&D-departments, but within the production process (see chapter 2.2.1.2). This may be 
more common among local firms than among foreign ones, as the latter presumably transfer their 
organisational structure to the host country, including a formal R&D-department (if they perform 
innovation activities). However, this conclusion is not supported by the frequencies found in the 
share of potentially innovating and R&D-firms (see Tab. 5.20). Nevertheless, resource allocation is 
a stronger indicator, because it displays what is actually considered important to a firm. 
Tab. 5.31: Expenditure for innovation and R&D activities in % of sales by advanced firms in Thailand  
  1997 1999 2000 2001 
 Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
/ n 126 80 100 76 146 83 144 84 
< 2% 86.9 94.1 68.5 89.4 95.4 93.3 94.1 94.4
2-4.9% 6.9 4.7 14.4 4.7 2.0 1.1 3.3 0.0
5-9.9% 3.5 1.2 8.9 3.5 0.0 3.4 0.0 2.3
10-19.9% 2.1 0.0 5.5 2.4 2.6 1.1 1.3 2.3
20-39.9% 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.7 1.1
>= 40% 0.7 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
>= 5% 6.2 1.2 17.1 5.9 2.6 5.6 2.6 5.6
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Comparing expenditure on innovation related activities of advanced firms in Thailand with 
those in Singapore and Penang is difficult, because it is necessary to add up the separately surveyed 
expenditures on R&D and ‘innovation activities other than R&D’ in Thailand. In order to sum up 
these values, missing values had to be recoded as 0-values, which may have led to an 
underestimation of total expenditure. Still, even when taking this underestimation into account, it 
becomes clear that advanced firms in Singapore and Penang spent more money on innovation (Tab. 
5.31 and 5.32). Thereby, local firms spent more in Singapore, Penang and Thailand in both 1997 
and 1999, while foreign firms spent more in Thailand in both 2000 and 2001. 
Tab. 5.32: Expenditure for innovation and R&D activities in % of sales by advanced firms in Penang and 
Singapore (1999) 
  Singapore Penang 
  Local Foreign Local Foreign 
/ n 49 93 42 36 
< 2% 24.5 34.4 31.0 27.8 
2-4.9% 34.7 30.1 31.0 22.2 
5-9.9% 16.3 15.1 23.8 25.0 
10-19.9% 10.2 15.1 4.8 11.1 
20-39.9% 10.2 3.2 2.4 11.1 
>= 40% 4.1 2.2 7.1 2.8 
>= 5% 40.8 35.5 38.1 50.0 
Tab. 5.33: R&D-expenditure in % of sales classes of R&D-firms in Thailand, Singapore and Penang 
TIS 1 TIS 2 SNIS PIS 
Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
/n 52 29 35 21 31 66 26 28 
< 1% 67.3 89.7 77.1 71.4 32.3 30.3 26.9 25.0
1 – 2.9% 19.2 10.3 11.4 9.5 29.0 37.9 15.4 35.7
3 – 4.9% 1.9 0.0 2.9 4.8 19.4 21.2 30.8 17.9
5 – 9.9% 5.8 0.0 0.0 9.5 9.7 7.6 3.8 7.1
10 – 19.9% 1.9 0.0 2.9 4.8 6.5 0.0 15.4 7.1
>= 20% 3.8 0.0 5.7 0.0 3.2 3.0 7.7 7.1
Chi-Sq-Sig 0.301§ 0.428§ 0.427§ 0.522$ 
>   3% 13.4 0.0 11.5 19.1 38.8 31.8 57.7 39.2
> 10% 5.7 0.0 8.6 4.8 9.7 3.0 23.1 14.2
§ one or more cells with expected count <5; class sizes according to Singapore and Penang questionnaire 
Limiting focus to R&D-firms, Tab. 5.33 displays R&D-expenditure in Thailand, Singapore and 
Penang. Compared to firms in the latter two regions, firms in Thailand spent far less on R&D. This 
is in line with observations of general innovation expenditure (Tab. 5.31 and 5.32). While in 1997 
local firms clearly (but not significantly) committed more resources to R&D than TNC-affiliates, by 
2001 TNC-affiliates have clearly increased their efforts. Their share in the medium-technology 
category (with R&D-expenditure of 3% to 10% of sales30) is higher than for local firms. But this 
figure of 19% is still relatively low placed beside 30-60% of the firms in Singapore and Penang. In 
                                                 
 30 The figures approximately resemble medium technology (höherwertige Technologie) with an R&D intensity of 
3.5 to 8.5%, and high technology (Spitzentechnologie) with an R&D intensity of more than 8.5% as categorized by 
the BMBF (2000). 
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Europe 47% of foreign and 37% of local firms qualify for medium-technology. There is also an 
observable increase in high-technology firms. The 2nd Thailand dataset includes as many high-tech 
firms (> 10%) as Singapore. In both regions, a larger number of local firms are high-tech. In 
Europe, 9% of foreign and 10% of local firms are high-tech, which casts some doubts about the 
reliability of the very high figures in Penang. 
In conclusion, a small elite group of foreign and local firms exists in Thailand that invests large 
amounts of money in R&D. However, the majority of firms spend less than 1% of sales on R&D 
(Tab. 5.33). Though, even in this group, a noticeable shift can be detected, with foreign firms spend 
slightly more capital on R&D in 2001 than in 1997.  
 
In terms of the R&D-personnel intensity (R&D-personnel as percentage of the total workforce) 
R&D-firms in Thailand show a gentle increase from 4.6% (median: 2.2%) in 1999 to 4.9% (2.7%) 
in 2001. While in 1999 local firms employed a higher share of R&D-personnel 4.9% (2.3%) than 
foreign firms: 4.0% (2.1%) the difference in the mean has balanced in 2001. However, the 
difference in the median is persistent: local firms have an intensity of 4.9% (3.0%) and foreign 
firms of 4.8% (2.0%).  
These average figures are similar to those in Penang (4.6% in 1999), where local firms also possess 
a higher intensity (5.7%) than foreign firms (3.7%). Considering the median, the difference is only 
marginal: local firms: 2.5%, foreign firms 2.6%.  
In Singapore (1999) the data is consistent and clearly higher than in Penang and Thailand: The 
average for all firms is 7.3% (median: 5.5%). Local firms have a higher intensity with 10.2% 
(6.7%) than foreign firms with 5.9% (4.8%). However, even these figures are surpassed by firms in 
the European regions, which exhibited a mean of 9.5% (median: 5.7%) in 1996 without showing 
differences between local and foreign. 
 
Considering the allocation of R&D-expenditure, it is evident that most Thailand-based firms 
invest in product-oriented R&D: Persistently, local firms spend about two-thirds of their resources 
on product-oriented R&D. In contrast, foreign firms have increased their share from 58% to 68% 
between 1999 and 2001. This shift is quite remarkable, because it indicates that TNC-affiliates 
have, in the past, focused more on process-oriented R&D, which is implemented for smooth 
operation and upgrading of volume-production. However, more recently TNC-affiliates have been 
assigned additional responsibilities for product development that was previously performed at the 
home base of the firm. These R&D-activities are not focused on research at the technological 
frontier, but at developing the necessary absorptive capacity to transfer and develop products 
initially created at the main R&D-facility abroad further (see chapter 6 for complementary 
evidence). Consequently, this is a first sign of upgrading R&D-facilities (see 2.3.2) and taking a 
necessary first step towards accumulating more capabilities in the future. 
 
Moreover, local firms and – even more conspicuously – TNC-affiliates have shifted investment in 
R&D away from experimental development and towards applied and basic research from 1999 to 
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2001. Having said this, in 2001 half of the remaining resources are dedicated to experimental 
development, but 31% (locals) to 36% (foreigners) are designated for applied research. This 
indicator supports the impression that TNC-affiliates are more recently committing to the upgrading 
of their operations in Thailand by transferring more fundamental and product oriented research (for 
further evidence see chapter 6).  
 
Throughput indicator: Patents 
In Thailand, the overall number of patents applied for and granted either abroad or in Thailand in 
the three years prior to each survey was very low. Out of a total including more than 1,000 firms, a 
maximum of 18 local and 13 foreign firms applied for a patent. The total number of patents 
obtained was 78 in 2000 and 79 in 2002. Nevertheless, there is a striking contrast between TNC-
affiliates and local firms. In 2002 TNC-affiliates applied for only 0.02 patents and 0.01 patents were 
granted per firm. In contrast, local companies applied on average for 0.11 patents and obtained 0.08. 
Consequently, in 2002 TNC-affiliates hardly sought patent protection, while local firms used this 
protection mechanism a bit more often (in Thailand as well as abroad). This can have two causes: 
either foreign firms have nothing to protect, i.e. hardly any patentable inventions are created by 
TNC-affiliates in Thailand, or TNCs do not see the need or benefits of patent protection in 
Thailand, either because the market is too small, the protection too weak or the process of gaining 
the patent takes too long.  
Contrarily, in 2000, both TNC-affiliates and local firms applied on average for 0.16 patents per 
firm. While local firms obtained 0.04, foreign firms were granted 0.13 patents per firm. Hence, the 
pattern has changed: TNC-affiliates, who sought more patents in 2000 than local firms, applied for 
and obtained fewer patents in 2002. This is contrary to the above findings that more TNC-affiliates 
are becoming active in terms of R&D and innovation. Considering the time lag between R&D/ 
innovation activities and the filing of a patent, the data suggests that TNCs in Thailand may 
increase their patent activity in the near future. 
In comparison, TNC-affiliates in Singapore applied for 1.02 patents and were granted 0.44 patents 
per firm. In contrast, local companies applied for 0.07 patents on average and obtained 0.02. In 
Penang, foreign firms applied for 0.53 patents and were granted 0.24 patents per firm, while local 
firms applied for 0.56 patents and obtained 0.34. However, the actual number of patenting firms is 
pretty low in the benchmarking regions as well. A maximum of 15 firms in Singapore and 5 firms 
in Penang applied for patents. In both cases single firms account for a large share of the total 
number of patents.  
To set the figures in relation to industrialised regions: The ERIS project established an average of 
9.3 patents per foreign firm and 1.4 per local firm. Consequently, firms in South East Asia lagged 
behind markedly. When comparing these mean figures, it must be kept in mind that they were 
corrected for neither firm size nor industry, which both have a severe impact on patent propensity 
(e.g. Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999, Arundel & Kabla, 1998). Hence, if TNC-affiliates display 
higher patent rates this could be due to their larger size. 
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Output indicator: Innovative firms 
Since the purpose of the innovation process is the introduction of new products into the market or 
new processes into the production process, Tab. 5.14 has already presented some information on the 
output. Moreover, the definition of the term ‘advanced firm’ already includes firms that are 
successful, because there are innovating firms. 
In order to retain more information from the data, it is useful to compute the share of innovative 
firms, i.e. firms that earn more than 25% of sales with new products or produce more than 25% of 
production volume with new processes (Kiese, 2004: 140). While Tab. 5.14 presented the share of 
innovative firms from all firms, Tab. 5.34 displays the relation to advanced firms only. For this, the 
definition of innovative firms in Thailand has been extended to include firms that earn more than 
25% of annual sales from R&D related products or processes. This is justified by the fact that, 
otherwise, only the sales from product and process innovations other than R&D would have been 
counted. Since there is no such distinction in Singapore and Penang the data for Thailand had to be 
summarised.  
Tab. 5.34: Share of innovative companies in % of all advanced companies (n) 
Region Local firm Foreign Firm 
Thailand (2002)  49.7* 60.7* 
Thailand (2000) 38.1 37.2 
Singapore 42.3 53.2 
Penang 44.2 55.3 
Europe § 37.0§ 32.5§ 
§ in Europe only the share of product innovations of annual sales was considered 
* significant at the 10% level according to Pearson Chi-Sq. 
It can be seen from this data (Tab. 5.34) that more foreign than local firms are innovative in 
Singapore and Penang. Thus, TNC-affiliates rely more on new products and processes. This is 
explained by their stronger export focus: High demands on the world market in terms of product 
quality and costs as well as short product-life-cycles, require state-of-the-art production technology 
and frequently new or markedly improved products. Actually, this reflects one ownership-specific 
advantage (see chapter 2.3.2), which constitutes the existence of TNCs.  
In the data from the first Thai survey of 2000 no such differences between foreign and local owners 
can be detected. However, in 2002 foreign firms are clearly more often innovative than their local 
counterparts, leading to the conclusion that TNC-affiliates in Thailand have in recent years followed 
a path of development similar to that taken earlier on in Penang and Singapore. Referring to the 
technological trajectories (see 2.1.4), this mirrors a shift from producing ‘mature products’ with 
‘established technology’ towards manufacturing ‘new products’ with ‘state-of-the-art-technology’. 
Of course, this process could not take place over such a short time frame as two years. Yet, despite 
differences in the data composition, this change could hint towards an upgrading of TNC-operations 
in Thailand. 
Moreover, local firms in Thailand tend to spend more money on innovation (Tab. 5.29) and only 
slightly less money on R&D (Tab. 5.30) than their foreign counterparts in 2000 and 2001. Hence, 
their input is approximately as high as that of TNC-affiliates, but their output is significantly 
weaker (10%-level). This originates partly from less effective organisation of the innovation 
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process in local firms and from the transfer of new products and processes from TNC-headquarters 
to their affiliates in Thailand, who subsequently achieve an essential share of their turnover/ 
production with these products/ processes. 
 
Objectives for R&D and innovation 
The previous section ascertains that advanced TNC-affiliates in Thailand conduct R&D- and other 
innovation activities as often as, or even more often than, local firms. Moreover, foreign firms are 
more innovative (2001). On the other hand, firms in Thailand lag behind their counterparts in 
Singapore and Penang, because these regions are more favourable locations for development and 
R&D-activities for TNCs. Consequently, the question arises, why do TNC-affiliates perform R&D- 
and other innovation activities in Thailand at all? 
According to the Oslo Manual (OECD, 1997a), potentially innovating and R&D-firms were asked 
about the objectives for these activities. Subsequently, firms could indicate their importance on a 
five-point Likert-scale. The share of firms assessing an objective as either important or very 
important was calculated and the objectives ranked accordingly.  
The motives of TNC-affiliates are similar to those of local firms: the six most important reasons are 
related to a) product and market diversification (‘extend product range’, ‘open new markets’) b) 
market position (‘increase market share’, ‘improve product quality’), c) ‘production cost 
reduction’ and d) innovation/ upgrading (‘learn about new technology’). Tab. 5.35 shows the 
ranking of objectives for R&D in 2000 and 2002 in exemplary fashion. 
The most remarkable change over time relates to ‘learning about new technologies’ as an objective 
for R&D and innovation. Rising from a rank of 6 to 4 (R&D), and 5 to 2 (innovation) for local 
firms respectively, it has become even more important for foreign firms: jumping from a rank of 13 
to 2 (R&D) respectively, and 7 to 2 (innovation). This is a very clear indication that Thai firms in 
general, and TNC-affiliates in particular, are becoming much more aware in terms of the need for 
technological upgrading. Moreover, it reflects commitment from foreign firms to conduct 
technological learning on-site, rather than simply relying on the import of ready-to-use 
technologies. This corresponds to the recognition that even the acquisition and adaptation of 
external technology requires local learning and resource commitment. As a consequence, TNC-
affiliates should be expected to build up the learning and research capacities necessary for 
collaboration on technological issues with local partners. 
Additionally, minor changes can be detected in the increase of R&D-objectives related to market 
and product diversification and position, whereas pure cost reduction has become relatively less 
important. This hints towards a shift away from pure price competition towards other competitive 
factors, such as quality, product diversification etc. Another interesting minor detail is that foreign 
firms assess the improvement of production flexibility as an important objective for innovation. 
This indicates that the shift away from standardised towards more flexible production technology in 
times of shortened product-life-cycles is taking place in late-industrialising countries like Thailand 
as well (for further evidence see interview in the HDD-industry, chapter 6.2). 
 
 151
Tab. 5.35: Share of R&D firms that assessed the following as important or very important objectives for R&D in 
Thailand 
 2000 2002 
 
/n 
Local 
75-85 
Foreign 
43-49 
Local 
79-87 
Foreign 
51-55 
 % rank rank % % rank rank % 
Improved product quality 91.7**§ 1 3 81.6**§ 97.7 1 1 92.7 
Reduce production cost 79.8 2 1 85.7 81.4 5 6 72.2 
Extend product range 79.5 3 2 71.1 84.5 2 3 90.9 
Open up new markets 77.7**§ 4 5 59.1**§ 83.1 3 4 79.6 
Increase market share 77.7**§ 5 4 71.7**§ 77.1 6 5 74.1 
Learn about new technology 76.2* 6 13 57.1* 81.6 4 2 92.7 
Reduce energy consumption 57.5 7 11 56.5 69.9 7 13 57.4 
Reduce environment effects 56.3 8 9 51.1 62.2 8 11 58.8 
Replace products being phased 
out 53.3 9 6 65.1 62.0 9 9 61.5 
Improve cycle time 50.0 10 8 50.0 58.3 11 8 62.3 
Improve work conditions 50.0* 11 12 41.3* 50.0 13 12 58.8 
Improve production flexibility 48.2 12 10 44.7 52.3 12 10 59.3 
Fulfill regulations & standards 48.1 13 7 50.0 60.7**§ 10 7 62.3**§
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Pearson’s Chi-Sq,)  
Chi-Square test based on 3x2 crosstab (ownership x importance of objective (not/ not very important, neutral, 
important/ very important) 
§expected count for at least one cell <5 
Innovating firms in Singapore and Penang recognize the same objectives as important ones. 
However, ‘opening up new markets’ is assessed as important by far more firms in these two regions 
than in Thailand (in Singapore it ranks first for local and foreign firms, in Penang first for local and 
third for foreign firms). Unfortunately, ‘learning about new technology’ was not an answer category 
in these regions. Furthermore, ‘replacing products being phased out’ is, at least for local 
Singaporean and foreign firms in Penang, a vital objective, underlining a stronger product 
development competency in these regions. 
From the perspective of technological and innovative capabilities, the most interesting finding is 
that ‘learning about new technology’ has experienced a rapid rise in its importance for R&D and 
innovation from 2000 to 2002, for local and foreign firms alike.  
This reflects the notion that firms become aware of the need for, and commit themselves to, the 
development of technological capabilities and absorptive capacity. Moreover, this indicates a 
certain strategic shift away from pure short- to medium-term profit-seeking motives, such as 
extending the product range, opening up new markets or increasing the market share, and towards a 
more long-term strategic objective that is related to future capabilities and options concerning 
technical change.  
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In summary: 
• Advanced firms sell a higher share in the ODM and OBM category and less in OEM, but 
there is no evidence for a higher frequency of foreign firms in these categories. 
• Advanced firms seek ISO-certification more frequently, and it is much more common for 
foreign than local firms. 
• Advanced firms pursue all technological activities to a higher degree. Strikingly, advanced 
TNC-affiliates perform high-order activities, such as basic and detailed design, more often 
than local firms. This is the reversal of the trend observed for the whole sample. It indicates 
a dichotomy within the group of foreign firms: Advanced firms are very sophisticated, 
performing many high order functions, whereas a large group of basic TNC-affiliates is 
constricted to basic operation and some intermediate technological capabilities, such as 
quality control, testing, acquisition and adaptation of external technology. 
• A significant higher share of innovating foreign firms transfers new technology to Thailand 
as part of its innovation activities. This mirrors the significance of innovating TNC-affiliates 
for the NSI in terms of access to internationally available technology, either embodied in 
machinery or disembodied as in blueprints and licenses.  
• Generally, firms in Thailand commit very limited financial resources to R&D and 
innovation compared to those in Singapore and Penang. However, the R&D-personnel 
intensity is comparable to Penang. 
• While in recent years foreign firms spend more on R&D, local firms allocate more funds to 
other innovation activities. Although the data cannot be used as a time series it can be 
cautiously claimed that there may be an increase in spending from foreign firms on R&D 
and innovation alike.  
• Most firms – either local or foreign – spend the bulk of their money on product development 
and experimental development. However, comparing the two surveys, there is some 
indication that there has been a recent shift towards more applied and basic research. 
• The extent of patent activities is very limited in all three regions, displaying a fundamental 
lack of basic research capabilities by both local and foreign firms that could be translated 
into patentable products or processes.  
• While there are only minor differences in 1999, in 2001 TNC-affiliates are clearly more 
often innovative. This is valid for all R&D- and innovation-related products and processes. 
Hence, TNC-affiliates in Thailand seem to upgrade in terms of inputs as well as outputs. 
Since foreign firms are incorporated into international production networks, they receive 
more assistance and have more resources available to facilitate this process. 
• The most important objectives for R&D and innovation are product and market 
diversification, market position, cost reduction and learning about new technology. 
Remarkably, the latter one –a relatively long-term strategic aim – has experienced a rise in 
appraisal, especially from foreign firms. 
In conclusion, within the group of advanced firms, TNC-affiliates are seen to dominate over local 
firms in terms of technological and innovative capabilities more visibly than within the group of all 
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firms. This makes them, above all, suitable technology transfer and collaboration partners. In 
particular, they foster the SI by bringing in new technology, either embodied or disembodied.  
5.3.2 Absorptive capacity of advanced firms 
In chapter 5.2.2, absorptive capacity has been examined by analysing the qualification structure of 
local and foreign firms. It has been found that foreign firms in all three regions employ staff with 
higher qualifications. The following section takes this analysis one step further by testing H2a: 
“Advanced TNC-affiliates possess higher absorptive capacity than advanced local firms”. For this, 
the employment structure31 is compared in respect to three dimensions a) local vs. foreign firms, b) 
advanced vs. basic firms. Moreover, c) the different surveys are compared in regard to location and 
time. The subsequent part offers additional scrutiny of the sub-sample of R&D-firms, in order to 
investigate whether or not firms that have organised innovation activities in a formalised R&D-unit, 
representing a more strategic approach towards innovation, exhibit enhanced human resources. For 
the sake of lucidity, the subcategories for the Thailand dataset (scientists, engineers and other 
university graduates, as well as technical and non-technical vocational school graduates) are 
excluded from the illustration. 
 
Advanced vs. basic firms 
For Thailand, the figures in Tab. 5.36 and 5.37 give evidence that the qualification structure in 
foreign firms is higher than in local firms. This is not only true for the total sample (see 5.2.2) but 
also for advanced and basic firms.  
The differences between foreign and local firms are most significant at the 1% level in the groups of 
‘all firms’ and ‘basic firms’. In the group of advanced firms, no significant difference can be found 
for 1999. Nonetheless, in 2001 foreign firms employed significantly more vocational and less 
primary school graduates (5% level).  
Still, within the group of ‘advanced firms’ TNC-affiliates tend to have a slightly better educated 
workforce, especially when looking at the median rather than the mean. 
Comparing only advanced and basic local firms, the figures show that advanced firms employ more 
university and vocational school graduates (the latter only in 1999). These differences are partly 
statistically significant. On the contrary, the differences in the employment structure of basic and 
advanced foreign firms are minor and mostly statistically insignificant. Hence, it can be concluded 
that foreign firms employ more high-skilled personnel regardless of their own technological and 
innovative activities. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 31 Note that the original dataset has been subject to extensive plausibility checks prior to the analysis, which resulted 
into considerable data reduction, because implausible elements and such whose structure does not add up to 100 
were excluded. 
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Tab. 5.36: Thailand: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (2001): advanced vs. basic 
Local firms 
/n 
All  
733 
Advanced 
126 
Basic 
607 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 16.2 10.4 19.1 12.5 15.6 10.0
Vocational school graduates 21.5 16.7 20.9 17.1 21.6 16.7
Secondary school  38.3 38.5 35.9 34.9 38.8 40.0
Primary school 24.1 21.3 24.2 20.0 24.0 21.7
Foreign firms 
/n 
All  
390 
Advanced 
68 
Basic 
322 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 20.6 15.0 20.5 15.1 20.6 14.3
Vocational school graduates 27.6 23.9 26.2 21.0 27.9 24.9
Secondary school  37.5 36.3 37.9 36.4 37.5 36.3
Primary school 14.3  0.0 15.4 0.5 14.1 0.0
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
Advanced vs. 
Basic firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) 2001 
All Advanced Basic Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 - .01 .10 - 
Vocational school graduates .01 .05 .01 - - 
Secondary school  - - - - - 
Primary school .01 .05 .01 - - 
 
Tab. 5.37: Thailand: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (1999) advanced vs. basic  
Local firms 
/n 
All  
409 
Advanced 
94 
Basic 
315 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 10.9   6.7 11.9 6.7 10.6 6.7
Vocational school graduates 16.8 12.2 20.5 14.7 15.7 11.7
Secondary school  34.9 30.2 35.8 29.0 34.6 30.8
Primary school 37.5 36.8 31.8 24.6 39.1 40.0
Foreign firms 
/n 
All  
289 
Advanced 
59 
Basic 
230 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 13.9 10.0 14.5 11.5 13.8 10.0
Vocational school graduates 21.8 15.6 18.6 16.1 22.6 15.5
Secondary school  44.5 45.7 41.9 44.8 45.1 46.7
Primary school 19.9 5.1 25.0 15.5 18.5 2.7
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
Advanced vs. 
Basic firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) 1999 
All Advanced Basic Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 .05 .01 - - 
Vocational school graduates .01 - .01 .01 - 
Secondary school  .01 - .01 - - 
Primary school .01 - .01 .10 .05 
The structure observed in Thailand is also visible in Singapore and Penang (see Tab. 5.38 and 5.39): 
Here, foreign firms also hire staff with higher qualifications. In contrast to Thailand, foreign and 
local advanced firms alike employ a significantly higher share of university graduates than their 
basic competitors. In Singapore this is also true for diploma holders. In conclusion, in these better-
established systems of innovation, foreign firms are more differentiated in terms of human capital. 
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On the one hand, this underlines the limited functions that advanced TNC-affiliates in Thailand 
perform, which do not require ‘extra-capable manpower’. On the other hand, it indicates a lack of 
capable human capital, which prevents even advanced foreign firms from employing more high-
skilled employees (cf. 4.2.2.2). 
Tab. 5.38: Singapore: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (1999): advanced vs. basic  
Local firms All Advanced Basic 
/ n 184 50 134 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 7.0 3.1 10.4 7.1 5.7 2.0
Diploma holders 11.6 9.5 13.2 11.3 11.0 8.0
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) 40.6 36.5 29.1 20.0 44.8 41.0
Unskilled 40.4 39.5 47.3 50.0 37.8 30.0
Foreign firms All Advanced Basic 
/ n 178 92 86 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 12.0 9.3 15.3 13.0 8.4 6.0
Diploma holders 13.6 12.0 14.8 13.3 12.3 10.0
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) 31.1 22.7 27.6 20.4 34.9 25.0
Unskilled 43.3 41.7 42.3 40.5 44.4 50.0
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
Advanced vs. 
Basic firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) Singapore 
All Advanced Basic Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 .01 .01 .01 .01
Diploma holders .01 .10 .05 .10 .05
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) .01 - .05 .01 -
Unskilled - - .10 .10 -
Tab. 5.39: Penang: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (1999) advanced vs. basic firms 
Local firms 
/n
All firms  
113 
Advanced 
41 
Basic 
72 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 4.4 3.0 6.1 5.0 3.4 1.0
Diploma holders 4.9 3.0 5.1 3.9 4.9 2.7
Certificate holders 8.1 5.0 8.6 6.0 7.8 4.5
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  55.2 60.0 54.9 60.0 55.4 57.5
Primary school 27.7 20.0 25.6 15.0 29.0 20.0
Foreign firms 
/n
All firms  
71 
Advanced 
35 
Basic 
36 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 6.6 5.0 7.9 7.0 5.2 3.0
Diploma holders 8.4 6.0 8.2 7.0 8.7 5.0
Certificate holders 7.8 5.0 8.9 7.0 6.8 4.5
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  64.2 70.0 68.5 70.0 60.0 69.0
Primary school 13.7 5.0 8.2 4.0 19.1 10.0
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
Advanced vs. 
Basic firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) Penang 
All Advanced Basic Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 - - .01 .01 
Diploma holders .01 .01 .10 - - 
Certificate holders - - - .10 - 
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  .05 .05 - - - 
Primary school .01 .05 .05 - - 
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In total, the share of university graduates in Thailand is as high as or even higher than in Singapore 
and Penang. At first sight this might suggest higher ACAP in Thailand. However, taking into 
account the weak qualification of human capital and the deficiencies of the education system in 
Thailand (see 4.2.2.2), it sooner indicates the necessity to recruit university graduates for even more 
common, standardised tasks. 
 
R&D- vs. non-R&D-firms 
When comparing only R&D- and non-R&D-performing firms, the findings for advanced and basic 
firms can be transferred (Tab. 5.40 and 5.41). Still, the conclusion drawn is both clearer and 
stronger: In the sample of all and of non-R&D-firms, there is a significant difference in the 
qualification level of employees between local and foreign firms. TNC-affiliates possess better-
educated human capital. At the same time, R&D-firms present a similar employment structure, 
regardless of their ownership. Consequently, while foreign firms always employ better-qualified 
staff, the group consisting of local firms is sharply divided: R&D-firms with highly educated human 
capital and non-R&D-firms with less qualified employees. 
Tab. 5.40: Thailand: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (2001) R&D vs. non-R&D  
Local firms 
/n 
All  
733 
R&D 
75 
Non-R&D  
658 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 16.2 10.4 23.2 16.5 15.4 10.0 
Vocational school graduates 21.5 16.7 23.5 20.0 21.2 16.5 
Secondary school  38.3 38.5 34.1 30.0 38.7 40.0 
Primary school 24.1 21.3 19.2  5.0 24.6 22.3 
Foreign firms 
/n 
All 
390 
R&D 
41 
Non-R&D  
349 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 20.6 15.0 21.1 17.3 20.5 14.3 
Vocational school graduates 27.6 23.9 26.1 21.4 27.8 24.0 
Secondary school  37.5 36.3 35.6 33.7 37.8 36.7 
Primary school 14.3  0.0 17.2 8.8 14.0  0.0 
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
R&D vs. Non-R&D 
firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) 2001 
All R&D Non-R&D Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 - .01 .01 - 
Vocational school graduates .01 - .01 .10 - 
Secondary school  - - - .10 - 
Primary school .01 - .01 .05 - 
Despite a similar pattern in Singapore and Penang (Tab. 5.42 and 5.43), there is a noteworthy 
dissimilarity in the structure of university graduates: While foreign firms again exhibit a higher 
general qualification level, it is, more or less, an inhomogeneous group. Rather, differences in the 
share of university graduates are so large, that they are significant at the 1% (Singapore) or 5%-
level (Penang). Consequently, foreign firms employ more qualified personnel than local companies, 
but R&D-firms require even more of them. This indicates a higher specialisation, commitment and 
capability – summarised: a higher ACAP – of R&D-conducting TNC-affiliates in Singapore and 
Penang in comparison to Thailand.  
 157
This is a manifestation of the superior quality of the systems of innovation in Singapore and (partly) 
in Penang, which supply a higher quality and quantity of human resources (see 4.2). Moreover, the 
figures display a higher demand for skilled labour from R&D-performing TNC-affiliates in these 
regions, suggesting that they carry out more sophisticated functions in terms of R&D, design and 
engineering. Again, this might be related to the existence of regional headquarters of TNCs in 
Singapore. 
Tab. 5.41: Thailand: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (1999) R&D vs. non-R&D  
Local firms 
/n
All  
409 
R&D  
60 
Non-R&D  
349 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 10.9   6.7 14.3 8.5 10.3 6.5
Vocational school graduates 16.8 12.2 21.8 16.2 16.0 11.7
Secondary school  34.9 30.2 35.5 32.3 34.7 30.0
Primary school 37.5 36.8 28.4 21.4 39.0 40.0
Foreign firms 
/n
All  
289 
R&D 
38 
Non-R&D 
285 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 13.9 10.0 16.5 14.3 13.5 10.0
Vocational school graduates 21.8 15.6 20.1 18.7 22.0 15.2
Secondary school  44.5 45.7 42.1 45.3 44.8 46.2
Primary school 19.9 5.1 21.3 11.6 19.7 4.6
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
R&D vs. non-R&D 
firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) 1999 
All R&D Non-R&D Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 - .01 .05 - 
Vocational school graduates .01 - .01 .01 - 
Secondary school  .01 - .01 - - 
Primary school .01 - .01 .05 - 
Tab. 5.42: Singapore: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (1999): R&D vs. non-R&D  
Local firms 
/n
All  
184 
R&D  
33 
Non-R&D  
151 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 7.0 3.1 12.2 10.0 5.8 2.0
Diploma holders 11.6 9.5 13.7 12.0 11.1 9.0
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) 40.6 36.5 24.7 20.0 44.0 40.0
Unskilled 40.4 39.5 49.3 50.0 38.4 33.0
Foreign firms 
/n 
All 
178 
R&D 
66 
Non-R&D 
112 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 12.0 9.3 16.0 14.0 9.5 6.3
Diploma holders 13.6 12.0 14.3 13.0 13.2 11.0
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) 31.1 22.7 25.2 17.5 34.6 25.0
Unskilled 43.3 41.7 44.5 41.2 42.6 45.1
 
Local vs. Foreign 
firms 
R&D vs. Non-R&D 
firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) 2001 
All R&D Non-R&D Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 .10 .01 .01 .01 
Diploma holders .01 - .01 - - 
Skilled (NTC-2 & above) .01 - .05 .01 .05 
Unskilled - - - .10 - 
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Tab. 5.43: Penang: Qualification structure of local and foreign firms (1999) R&D vs. non-R&D  
Local firms 
/n 
All  
113 
R&D  
26 
Non-R&D  
87 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 4.4 3.0 6.7 5.1 3.7 2.0
Diploma holders 4.9 3.0 4.5 3.2 5.1 3.0
Certificate holders 8.1 5.0 9.0 6.3 7.8 5.0
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  55.2 60.0 57.9 60.0 54.4 58.0
Primary school 27.7 20.0 21.8 7.3 29.5 20.0
Foreign firms 
/n 
All  
71 
R&D  
23 
Non-R&D  
48 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
University graduates 6.6 5.0 8.3 6.3 5.7 4.2
Diploma holders 8.4 6.0 7.2 6.4 9.0 5.0
Certificate holders 7.8 5.0 9.8 7.7 6.9 4.8
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  64.2 70.0 68.3 70.0 62.2 70.0
Primary school 13.7 5.0 9.0 6.0 16.0 5.0
 
Local vs. Foreign 
Firms 
R&D vs. Non-R&D 
firms 
Significance- level (Mann-
Whitney-U-Test) 1999 
All R&D Non-R&D Local Foreign 
University graduates .01 - .05 .01 .05 
Diploma holders .01 .05 .05 - - 
Certificate holders - - - - .10 
Secondary school (incl. A-levels)  .05 - .10 - - 
Primary school .01 - .01 .10 - 
 
Training expenditure 
In terms of intensity of effort put into the development of enhanced ACAP, training, R&D and 
innovation expenditure in % of sales are the only available indicators (for the latter two see 5.3.2.1). 
Advanced firms clearly spend more money than all other firms for further training, with foreign 
firms investing more money in their employees than local firms in recent years: about 2.1% in 
contrast to about 1.1% (in 2000 and 2001; both significant at the 5% level). Contrary to those in 
Thailand, foreign firms in Singapore (2.6%) and Penang (4.8) spend less than their local 
counterparts (3.0% and 5.1%).  
In summary, TNC-affiliates display higher absorptive capacity in terms of skilled labour and 
commitment of resources on training, and – in recent years – on R&D (for the latter see 5.3.1.2). 
However, spending on other innovation activities and R&D-personnel intensity (see 5.3.1.2) is 
lower. Based on the results of statistical significant tests, it can be concluded that foreign firms in 
Thailand have a similar qualification structure, regardless of their R&D-activity. Furthermore, local 
R&D-firms are remarkably similar to foreign firms. On the other hand, local non-R&D-firms are 
very different. The results for advanced vis-à-vis basic firms are similar but less distinctive. Despite 
a higher qualification structure, TNC-affiliates display a predominantly lower R&D-personnel 
intensity.  
In contrast, local and foreign firms in Singapore and Penang exhibit stronger differences between 
and among each other depending on their R&D or innovation activity.  
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R&D-firms in Thailand have a similar R&D-personnel intensity to firms in Penang, thus not 
lagging behind in this respect. Meanwhile, the R&D-personnel intensity in Singapore (in 1999) is 
clearly higher. This reflects the quality of its respective system of innovation, which is capable of 
supplying a sufficient amount of high-skilled labour. Moreover, the figures for TNC-affiliates in 
Singapore support the assumption that they have been assigned more demanding functions, which 
are connected to the regional headquarters function and the regional division of labour (e.g. Yeung 
et al., 2001, Giroud, 2003).  
5.4 Embeddedness of TNC-affiliates in innovation and knowledge 
networks 
The previous sections state that, in terms of recent years, advanced foreign firms are even more 
technologically capable than advanced local firm. Furthermore, both groups have a similar 
absorptive capacity. In conclusion, the pre-conditions for collaboration, collective learning and joint 
capability building in this group are favourable. In what follows, the embeddedness of TNC-
affiliates in the host economy as well as in external networks and the access to external technology 
sources are considered vis-à-vis local firms. The purpose of this investigation is to test H3: “R&D 
performing and potentially innovating TNC-affiliates are suitable technology transfer partners for 
local firms, since they are strongly embedded in the host economy and have access to foreign/ 
external technology”. The latter aspect has already gathered support, because it has been proven that 
advanced TNC-affiliates acquire external technology, either embodied or disembodied, significantly 
more often (see Tab. 5.26 and 5.27). This section seeks further evidence for TNCs’ embeddedness 
in international knowledge networks. Moreover, TNCs must be embedded in domestic networks, in 
order to diffuse technology and knowledge within the Thai NSI. Accordingly, this section examines 
domestic networks as well. Since there is no single appropriate indicator available, the analysis is 
based on the following variables: intense collaborations on R&D, product and process innovation, 
external procurement of R&D-services, own R&D abroad, and external sources of information. 
 
Collaboration 
Discussions about the theoretical notion of innovation as a chain linked process (2.1.3.1), the 
importance of cooperation networks within the concept of systems of innovation (2.2.1.1), and the 
argument of embeddedness of TNC-affiliates in the host economy (2.3.3), all point towards the 
need to explore collaboration patterns for collective learning. 
The R&D/Innovation surveys in Thailand asked R&D- and potentially innovating firms about the 
intensity of their collaborations with external partners in terms of R&D, product and process 
innovation. Tab. 5.44 displays the share of advanced firms that claimed to have had intense or very 
intense cooperation in either of these activities within the three years prior to the survey32 (For the 
                                                 
 32 NB In Thailand, missing values and the answer ‘cooperation is not relevant’ were coded as nil. For the presented 
analysis all nils were recoded as ‘no/ not intense cooperation’, since it can be assumed that collaborating firms 
would have indicated the intensity of its collaboration effects. Nevertheless, this procedure may result into an 
underestimation of collaboration frequencies. However, the alternative of leaving all nils as missing values would 
have resulted into an overestimation of the share of intensely cooperating firms. In order to minimise the distortion 
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disaggregated figures please see Appendix A9). Clearly, customers are the most important 
cooperation partners, followed by other partners along the value-chain, including suppliers and 
parent/ associate companies.  
Horizontal partners such as R&D-institutes/ universities, technical and business service providers as 
well as government agencies are only of medium importance, whereas other firms and competitors 
(at least in 2001) are sought by only a small minority of firms as partners. The data show distinctive 
preferences by local and foreign firms: A higher share of TNC-affiliates is collaborating intensely 
with customers (2001), parents/associates, foreign owned suppliers and competitors. In contrast, 
more advanced local firms cooperate with R&D institutes and universities.   
Tab. 5.44: Share of advanced firms that collaborate intensely with the following partners on R&D, product or 
process innovation (Thailand) 
  1999   2001  
 
/ n 
Local 
147 
Foreign 
86 
Total 
233 
Local 
153 
Foreign 
89 
Total 
242 
Customers, buyers  52.4 54.7 53.2 62.7 69.7 65.3 
Locally-owned suppliers  38.1 27.9 34.3 44.4 48.3 45.9 
Foreign-owned suppliers  32.0 41.9 35.6 36.6 44.9 39.7 
Parent/ associate companies  15.6*** 60.5*** 32.2 30.1*** 64.0*** 42.6 
R&D-institutes/ universities  20.4**   9.3** 16.3 22.9 14.6 19.8 
Business Services Providers  10.9   7.0   9.4 13.7 13.5 13.6 
Technical services providers  15.6 15.1 15.5 17.0 18.0 17.4 
Other government agencies  NA 11.8 15.7 13.2 
Competitors  10.2 17.4 12.9   8.5 12.4   9.9 
Other firms  10.2   4.7   8.2   7.8   6.7   7.4 
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Pearson’s Chi-Sq, based on 2x2 crosstabs 
(ownership x intensity (very/ no)). 
The ranking of the most important cooperation partners is similar in Penang and Singapore (Tab. 
5.45): customers, parents and suppliers. Additionally, technical service providers are more 
important than in Thailand, as are local research institutes and universities in Singapore. As for 
most partners in Thailand, a higher share of TNC-affiliates tends to report intense cooperation with 
external partners. In both regions TNC-affiliates use (local) R&D-institutes and universities more 
often than local firms. This is the reversal of the figures for Thailand. It indicates the higher quality 
of these institutes in Singapore and Penang. Moreover it shows that TNC-affiliates perform 
different functions that make it useful to collaborate with basic and applied research organisations. 
Comparing the figures for South East Asia with Europe, it can be seen that the general ranking of 
important cooperation partners is similar: customers (partners with 30.6% of the local and for 
37.6% of the foreign firms), suppliers (17.8%/ 23.1%), services (17.3%/ 21.5%), R&D institutes/ 
universities (8.3%/ 14.9%) and finally other firms (6.5%/ 8.7%). Consequently, service providers 
are more important for European firms. Similar to South-East Asia, TNC-affiliates display a higher 
propensity for intense cooperation with any external partner. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
in comparison to the benchmarking regions, missing values in Penang and Singapore have also been coded as ‘no/ 
not intense cooperation’.  
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Tab. 5.45: Share of advanced firms that collaborate intensely with the following partners on product or process 
innovation (Singapore and Penang) 
 Singapore Penang 
 
/ n 
Local 
52 
Foreign 
94 
Total 
146 
Local 
43 
Foreign 
38 
Total 
81 
Customers, buyers  69.2 64.9 66.4 62.8** 86.8** 74.1 
Suppliers  44.2 46.8 45.9 NA 
- Foreign-owned  37.2 50.0 43.2 
- Locally owned  NA 32.6 36.8 34.6 
Parent/ associate companies  28.8*** 73.4*** 57.5 23.3*** 65.8*** 43.2 
R&D-institutes/ universities   NA   4.7**§ 18.4**§ 11.1 
- in Singapore 21.2 27.7 25.3 
- overseas    7.7   8.5   8.2 NA 
Business Services Providers  15.4 11.7 13.0 16.3 26.3 21.0 
Technical services providers  26.9 27.7 27.4 34.9 39.5 37.0 
Competitors    7.7   6.4   6.8 11.6 15.8 13.6 
Other firms  17.3   9.6 12.3   4.7   7.9   6.2 
*** significant at 1% level ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Pearson’s Chi-Sq, based on 2x2 crosstabs 
(ownership x intensity (very/ no)). § expected frequency in more than one cell <5  
Even though the questionnaire in Thailand did not explicitly request the location of the cooperation 
partner, the following assumptions can be made: partners that are supposed to be located outside the 
Thai system of innovation include a) customers, at least for TNC-affiliates (see chapter 5.1 for 
export orientation of foreign firms); b) parent and associate companies overseas (by definition), and 
c) foreign-owned suppliers –although there is a certain amount of/ rise in follow-source suppliers 
(cf. e.g. Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2004), it can be assumed that a significant share of foreign-owned 
suppliers is still located outside of Thailand33. 
The Partners most likely to be located within the Thai-SI are locally owned suppliers and 
government agencies. Additionally, service firms and research institutions/ universities are 
presumably for the most part Thailand based. The rationale behind this assertion for services is that 
globalisation in this industry is a rising but still new phenomenon, and despite modern ICT-
technology services frequently require spatial proximity, “since many services are […] deeply 
embedded in the social, cultural and political fabric of host societies” (UNCTAD, 2004: 96). At the 
same time local universities are the ‘natural first choice’ for firms, which seek collaboration with 
universities, unless there are scientific reasons not to do so. The assumption that such cooperation is 
likely regionally and/ or nationally oriented is supported by empirical data for Singapore and 
Europe (Kiese, 2004: 159, Revilla Diez, 2002a: pp. 241).  
For competitors, the assumption would also tend towards the regional scale, since trust, which is 
easier established between firms working in the same environment and in spatial proximity to each 
other, is an important facilitator for this sensitive type of collaboration.  
Based on these assumptions, advanced TNC-affiliates can be considered as important interfaces 
between the international and national system of innovation. Many foreign firms (and more than 
local firms) are embedded into international knowledge networks through intense collaboration with 
partners abroad, such as customers, parents/ associates and foreign-owned suppliers. At the same 
                                                 
 33 This assumption is supported by the data for Penang, where the majority of collaboration with foreign-owned 
suppliers takes place outside of Malaysia, in either Asia or the rest of the world. 
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time, a reasonable share is embedded in domestic knowledge networks, especially with locally 
owned suppliers and government agencies. Actually, the share of TNC-affiliates that collaborates 
intensely with locally owned suppliers has increased remarkably from 1999 to 2001 (see Tab. 5.44). 
Moreover, there are as many foreign as local firms reporting intense collaborations with service 
providers. Research institutes and universities alone are significantly less often sought as 
cooperation partners by foreign firms.  
Consequently, it seems logical to suggest that as many TNC-affiliates as local firms are embedded 
in domestic networks. This gives domestic actors reasonable opportunities to benefit from the 
knowledge acquired from TNC-affiliates. 
Enquiring into the main reasons for participating in these collaborations, the firms’ answers reveal 
that diffusion and acquisition of new knowledge are the driving forces. In all three regions local and 
foreign firms listed ‘know how transfer’, ‘entering new technology fields’ and ‘establishing long 
term strategic partnerships’ as well as ‘faster time to market’ as important reasons. Thus, local and 
foreign firms alike collaborate in order to be part of information and knowledge networks. It can be 
concluded that both R&D and potentially innovating foreign firms are active technology transfer 
partners. However, there is no information regarding their role within the technology transfer 
process, i.e. if they act mutually as recipients and senders. 
 
Acquisition of R&D-services 
Another form of acquiring knowledge involves the outsourcing and acquisition of R&D-services. 
This variable entails information about both knowledge networks and the location of the R&D-
services provider (Tab. 5.46).  
Tab. 5.46: Thailand: Share of R&D-performing firms that acquired R&D services  
 1999 2001 
 
/ n 
Local 
96 
Foreign 
56 
Local 
91 
Foreign 
57 
Acquisition of R&D-services  30.2 35.7 22.0 15.8 
• Other firms in Thailand 12.5 12.5 14.0   5.3 
• Public institutes in Thailand 11.5 10.7 17.2*   7.0* 
• Universities in Thailand 16.7 12.5 17.2*   7.0* 
• Abroad (any provider) 11.5 17.9   8.6 12.3 
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level (Fisher’s Exact Chi-Square-Test ) 
In 1999, there were only small differences, with local firms using domestic research facilities 
slightly more often; whereas foreign firms tend to procure R&D-services from other countries (no 
information on the type of foreign R&D-service providers is included in the questionnaire). These 
small differences have grown larger in 2001 and, as a result, some of the differences have become 
statically significant. Consequently, foreign firms contribute to international technology transfer by 
acquiring foreign knowledge. This enhances the domestically available knowledge-pool. However, 
TNC-affiliates rely less on the domestic research infrastructure, presumably because of the 
aforementioned deficiencies in this infrastructure (4.2.2.3). Additionally, the organisational 
structure of TNCs includes research departments close to headquarters or in advanced countries, 
which can moderate R&D-service acquisition. This is a loss for the Thai NSI, because these 
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domestic R&D-acquisitions have two major benefits. First, they create demand, which would foster 
advances in output from Thai organisations in terms of quantity and quality. Second, the acquisition 
of R&D-services is connected to knowledge flows from the customer to the R&D-service provider, 
which helps the latter to gain knowledge about industry demands and state-of-the art technology. 
 
The data on the benchmarking regions does not include detailed information on outsourcing. In 
general, 32% of local and 24% of foreign firms in Singapore and 42% of local and 24% of foreign 
firms in Penang acquire R&D-services. Hence, local firms generally tend to acquire external R&D-
services more often. This is presumably caused by their smaller size (see 5.1), which frequently 
results in fewer resources committed to permanent in-house R&D.  
Considering that the two Thailand survey datasets are not directly comparable, it is nevertheless 
striking that foreign firms procure R&D-services from external domestic sources less often in 2001 
than in 1999. It is unlikely that domestic R&D-service capabilities have decreased. It is more likely 
that the demands by TNC-affiliates for R&D have increased, and domestic R&D-services are 
unable to meet these demands. As a consequence, these functions may preferably be performed in-
house. This is more or less consistent with the observed increase in R&D-capabilities in foreign 
firms. 
All surveyed firms were asked if they conduct R&D abroad. Naturally many foreign firms have 
R&D-facilities overseas (29.8% in 2002 and 32.2% in 2000). Only a small minority of local firms 
(3.6% in 2002 and 2.7% in 2000) operate R&D-units in other countries. Favourite locations for 
R&D functions are the triad-regions: Japan, the USA and the EU, because they offer access to the 
lead-markets, strong competitors and world-class universities (Tab. 5.47).  
Tab. 5.47: Location of R&D-facilities abroad (1999) 
Country Local Firm Foreign Firm 
/ n 15 129 
Japan 73.3 57.4 
USA 33.3 14.0 
EU (total) 26.7 22.5 
China 20.0 6.2 
Taiwan 13.3 4.7 
Australia 13.3 3.9 
Germany  13.3 3.9 
India 6.7 1.6 
Singapore 0.0 3.9 
Korea 0.0 5.4 
Malaysia 0.0 3.9 
NB Distribution of international R&D activities is not available for 2001 because of failures in the data labels.  
Source of information 
Potentially innovating and R&D-firms were asked to estimate the importance of different sources of 
information for R&D and innovation activities in the three years prior to the surveys. For this 
analysis, the share of firms assessing a source as either important or very important has been 
calculated and ranks have been assigned (Tab. 5.48). This variable provides an outlook on a firm’s 
capability to utilise different sources of knowledge. Additionally it includes – to a certain extent – 
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information on the location of the source. Consequently, the question indicates local and foreign 
firms’ capability for knowledge acquisition. 
Tab. 5.48: Thailand: Important and very important sources of information for R&D and innovation activities in 
the three years prior to the survey 
 2000 2002 
  
/ n 
Local   
69-107 
% R R 
Foreign
49-67 
% 
Local 
108-147 
% R R 
Foreign
63-88 
% 
Clients 74.8 1 2 75.8 71.4 2 3 77.9 
Sources within the 
enterprise 61.9 2 3 73.1 80.1 1 1 83.0 
Foreign-owned suppliers 59.1 3 5 53.9 47.1 9 8 49.4 
Locally-owned suppliers 54.0* 4 9 40.0* 55.9 5 6 51.8 
Specialist literature 49.0 5 6 40.6 55.2 6 5 59.3 
Fairs and exhibitions 48.5 6 10 33.3 53.2 8 9 39.2 
Internet 47.9 7 6 40.6 69.0* 3 2 81.8* 
Competitors 47.4 8 4 56.3 37.21 10 10 34.6 
Parent/ associate 
company 46.4*** 9 1 83.6*** 60.0* 4 4 75.6* 
Professional 
conferences & meetings 44.9 10 8 40.3 53.9 7 7 50.0 
Technical service 
providers 33.7 11 11 32.7 32.3 11 13 26.5 
Universities or other 
higher education inst. 30.4 12 14 21.8 30.0 13 12 28.6 
Govt. or private non-
profit research institutes 28.4 13 15 20.4 26.9* 14 15 20.3* 
Business Service 
Providers 25.9 14 12 26.0 16.8 15 14 23.4 
Patent disclosures 21.1 15 13 24.5 30.7* 12 11 33.3* 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at the 10% level according to Pearson’s Chi-
Square Test (based on a 2x3 table with ownership x importance); R= Rank 
Generally, the most important sources are those which are either directly linked to the enterprise 
itself, sources within the firms or parent/ associates, or to the value-chain, such as customers and 
suppliers. Furthermore, ‘soft sources’ such as specialist literature, the internet and fairs are central 
suppliers of new ideas. At the same time ‘horizontal partners’ like service firms (either technical or 
business), competitors and public research institutes and universities as well as demanding sources 
such as patents are rarely perceived as important. 
Local firms identify customers and internal sources as by far the most important sources of 
information, but also consider locally owned suppliers significantly more important than foreign 
firms (in 2000). Foreign firms consider clients and internal sources as very important as well, but 
appreciate the knowledge received from their parent and associate firms even more. This is 
significant at the 1%/10% level for 2000/2002.  
In 2002, the internal sources are more important than in 2000. This is also valid for the Internet, 
which is named especially often by TNC-affiliates. At the same time parent/ associate firms became 
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less important to foreign firms. While foreign-owned suppliers are less decisive in 2002, foreign 
firms especially have underlined the usefulness of local suppliers. This is in line with the observed 
increase in collaboration intensity (see Tab. 5.44).  
Moreover, local firms noticeably indicate collaboration with public research institutes more 
frequently, while foreign firms more often make use of patent disclosures (both are significant at 
10% level for 2002). The latter is clearly related to a higher absorptive capacity necessary to utilise 
this source. The fact that local firms rely more on local research institutes reflects their stronger 
embeddedness in the local S&T-infrastructure. 
These findings have the following implications for the considered hypothesis: 
• Foreign firms make better use of information from abroad than local firms. They recognize 
new ideas from the following sources as important more often: parent/ associate firm within 
the corporate network, sources within the enterprise (which also might be foreign sources 
for TNC-affiliates), Internet and patent information. Moreover, their customers are more 
often globally dispersed, since TNC-affiliates primarily cater to the global market. In 
conclusion, foreign firms bring in important information from e.g. lead users in the most 
demanding markets. In conclusion, foreign firms transfer knowledge from abroad to 
Thailand more often, either through knowledge exchange with the named partners or 
through via absorptive-capacity intense patent-research. 
• Furthermore, foreign-owned suppliers are fairly important sources of information for local 
firms (esp. in 2000). Since at least some of these suppliers are supposed to be located in 
Thailand, it can be asserted that TNC-affiliates in Thailand foster the upgrading of local 
firms quite significantly. However, in 2002 the importance of foreign suppliers has declined 
markedly. In 2002 local firms also evaluated the Internet, which provides access to global 
information, as very important. Notwithstanding, they rely more on local institutions such as 
public research institutes and universities than foreign firms. 
The pattern in Thailand is similar to the one in Penang (no information for Singapore is available). 
Firms in both regions rank the same sources as most important, indicating no differences in 
information-acquisition capability.  
 
In summary, TNC-affiliates make better use of foreign sources of information for R&D and 
innovation, and source R&D-services more often from units abroad. Moreover, about 30% of the 
foreign firms perform R&D elsewhere – hence advanced TNC-affiliates transfer technology and 
knowledge from abroad to Thailand. Local firms on the other hand rely much more strongly on 
domestic sources of information. This pattern is also supported by the figures for intense R&D and 
innovation collaborations: Foreign firms frequently seek cooperation with partners that are 
(possibly) located outside of the Thai NSI and can consequently facilitate technology transfer. The 
share of firms that is embedded in the Thai NSI is mostly as high as the share of local firms –the 
only exception being the cooperation with research institutes and universities. TNC-affiliates hardly 
collaborate with the domestic S&T infrastructure. Both foreign and local firms state that the 
diffusion of knowledge is an important reason for collaboration. 
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5.5 Exploring key characteristics of advanced and embedded TNC-
affiliates in Thailand 
The previous sections conclude, in short, that advanced TNC-affiliates can be beneficial to the Thai 
NSI, because they are by definition more capable than basic local and foreign firms, and are equally 
or even more competent than locally-owned advanced firms. Moreover, they transfer technology 
from abroad, by acquiring embodied and disembodied technology, by procuring R&D-services 
from abroad or performing their own R&D in other countries, whose results are then (partly) 
transferred to Thailand. Additionally, these advanced foreign firms seem to be more embedded 
within international knowledge networks, and are for the most part as embedded as local firms in 
domestic networks.  
Consequently, this chapter relates to:  
Q1: What are key characteristics of advanced TNC-affiliates in Thailand? (see 5.5.2) and 
Q2: What are main determinants of embedded TNC-affiliates? (see 5.5.3) 
 
Hence, the research objective for this chapter is to determine independent variables that explain if a 
given TNC-affiliate is either advanced or embedded. Besides for scientific interest, answers to these 
questions would be very relevant to the design of custom-tailored policies targeting those TNC-
affiliates, which promise positive impacts on the Thai NSI. 
In the remainder of this chapter the CHAID analysis, which will be implemented for this 
investigation, will be introduced. Second, both the 2000 and 2002 datasets are analysed in order to 
find characteristics of advanced TNC-affiliates (5.5.2), of generally embedded and foreign firms 
embedded in the Thai NSI (5.5.3). 
5.5.1 Excursus: Explorative data analysis using CHAID analysis 
For the implementation of the CHAID analysis the software package AnswerTree 3.1 from SPSS is 
utilised. It offers decision trees algorithm as a tool for explorative statistics. These explorative 
statistics are part of data mining procedures that try to discover formerly unrecognised patterns 
within complex datasets. Other methods in the field of data mining are e.g. factor, cluster, 
discriminant and regression analysis. Since much information in the R&D/ Innovation survey is 
either nominal or ordinal, methods that require metric variables as either dependent/ group variables 
or independent/ characteristic variables are not appropriate. Furthermore, the decision tree analysis 
does not require a large set of dummy variables that can easily result in a high degree of complexity 
in e.g. regression analysis. Hence, the exhaustive CHAID (Chi-squared Automatic Interaction 
Detection) algorithm, which creates non-binary decision trees, is implemented. 
The original CHAID algorithm developed by Kass (1980), creates segments based on Chi-square 
tests. Hereby, the dependent variable (group variable or criteria) as well as the independent 
variables (predictor variable) can be of nominal, ordinal or metric scale. Metric variables, however, 
are categorised automatically. The procedure basically operates in two steps (cf. Baltes-Götz, 2004: 
28; Bühl & Zöfel, 2002: ch. 1.4; SPSS, 2001: pp. 220):  
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a) Merging: For each predictor variable, the categories will be analysed if they display significant 
differences in respect to the dependent variable. To accomplish this, different statistical procedures 
(F-Test for metric, either Pearson’s Chi-Square Test or Likelihood-quotient- Test for nominal and 
Likelihood-quotient- Test for ordinal variables) generate the significance probability (p-value) for 
each category pair of every predictor variable. The category-pair with the highest p-value will be 
merged. For ordinal and metric predictors only neighbouring categories can be merged. All 
categories that display significant differences, i.e. whose p-value is smaller than the αmerge, generally 
5%, will be retained. The result is a new set of categories for each predictor. 
b) Splitting: For every predictor variable the association with the dependent variable will be tested 
(for procedures according to scale level see a). If a predictor variable includes categories that have 
been merged in step a), the resulting p-value will be adjusted based on the Bonferroni method. This 
is necessary, because the merging of categories results in an artificial reduction of the p-value in 
step b) (see Baltes-Götz, 2004: pp. 29). If the p-value is smaller than αsplit, i.e. the difference is 
statistically significant at e.g. the 5%-level, the predictor variable will cause a node, which creates 
new branches. The first node will be created by the predictor variable with the lowest p-value. This 
process continues as long as either no more significant predictor variables can be found or a ‘stop-
criteria’ is reached. Stop-criteria can be a) the specified maximum number of branches/ nodes is 
reached, b) the size of the node falls short of the minimum size for split-able nodes, or c) further 
splitting would result into nodes with less than the required minimum specified size of final nodes. 
If no further splitting is possible, the respective nodes are referred to as final nodes. 
Based on this basic CHAID algorithm, Biggs et al. (1991) developed the exhaustive CHAID 
algorithm. Exhaustive CHAID can be considered superior (Bühl & Zöfel, 2002, ch. 1.8; Baltes-
Götz, 2004: pp. 29) for two reasons: first, the algorithm is more thorough and precise, because it 
merges categories for each predictor variable until only two categories remain (SPSS, 2001: 225) 
and second, it corrects some of the inconsistencies of the Bonferroni-adjustment in the traditional 
CHAID (for details see Baltes-Götz, 2004: 33). Hence, despite extended processing time, the 
exhaustive CHAID is used in this research34.  
The user influences the automatic routine of (extensive) CHAID by determining the following 
parameters: αmerge, αsplit, maximum number of branches/ nodes, minimum size of major nodes 
(which are split-able) and minimum size of final nodes. Alternatively, the procedure can be run 
semi-automatically, i.e. the user chooses appropriate predictor variables for each node from a list of 
significant predictor variables. The second alternative allows for the selection of qualitatively 
equivalent predictors that might better fit theoretical assumptions/ arguments. 
In order to control the quality of the analysis, both a misclassification matrix and an estimation of 
risk are produced. Furthermore, for large datasets, cross-validation is possible, by using only a 
small sample (training data) of the database to develop the decision tree and subsequently validating 
the model with the remaining ‘test data’. 
                                                 
 34 Alternative algorithms available in AnswerTree 3.1. are C&RT (Classification& Regression Trees, developed by 
Breiman et al. (1984)) and QUEST (Quick and Unbiased, Efficient Statistical Tree by Loh and Shih (1997)). Both 
create binary decision trees and were therefore discarded.  
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Advantages of the method are seen in the transparency of the analysis, the fact that it does not 
require assumptions concerning the functional relation between independent and dependent 
variables and its ability to reveal hidden interactions between independent variables. On the other 
hand, there are some disadvantages, such as the creation of complex and difficult to interpret 
segments every now and then and the need for rather large samples, because the tree structure 
results in a steep decrease in the absolute size of elements in the end nodes. Moreover, analysis 
leads to a loss of information on metric variables, because these must be categorized. Finally, there 
can be problems with highly correlating variables: occasionally significant split variables might be 
neglected for the tree building process, because another highly correlating and significant split 
variable was chosen. Subsequently, this can ‘erase’ the other variable from the process, even though 
it would explain the splitting very well (Munzer, 2000: pp. 211). 
5.5.2 Key characteristics of advanced TNC-affiliates 
In this first step of the analysis, key determinates of advanced foreign firms are to be identified. For 
this, one dependent variable (called INVATING) has been created, which is coded 1 for all 
advanced firms and 0 for basic firms. Moreover, a set of 28 independent variables is compiled, 
which are available for basic and advanced firms alike (Tab. 5.49). Basically, this is the general 
information gathered in part A of the questionnaire. The parameters for the analysis are determined 
as follows: αmerge and αsplit is 5%, the maximum number of branches/ nodes is 10, the minimum size 
of major nodes is 60 and the minimum size of final nodes=30. 
 
Figure 5.2 and Tab. 5.50 display the results of the analysis of the 2002 data. Foreign firms that carry 
out detailed design, acquire external technology, and have more than 700 employees have the 
highest hit rate, i.e. the highest share of advanced firms within this final node: About 75% of the 
firms in this group are advanced. The index in Tab. 5.50 indicates that this group is four times more 
likely to carry out R&D or achieve product or process innovations than the average foreign firm.  
The overall pattern of Tab. 5.50 suggests that the variables ‘performing detailed design’ and 
‘acquiring external technology’ have the most significant, positive impact on a foreign firm’s 
chance to be advanced. In line with theoretical considerations, firm size (measured in number of 
employees) also has a positive impact, as larger firms generally commit more resources to 
innovation activities and are more likely to have a formal R&D-department. According to the 
misclassification matrix and the risk estimates, the likelihood for a misclassification is 14.9% (with 
a standard error of 0.016). Hence, the model is – taking into account the limited number of variables 
used – quite accurate. 
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Tab. 5.49: Dependent and independent variables included in the exhaustive CHAID analysis 
Variable Name 
2000 2002 
Scale Description 
Dependent variable 
INVATING INVATING Nominal R&D performing or product innovation introducing or 
process innovation applying (yes/no) 
Independent variables 
BKK BKK Nominal Firm located in the BKK-region35? (yes/no) 
SEC SEC Nominal Sector affiliation (2 digit) 
OWNER OWNER Ordinal Ownership (100%, 50-99%, 30-409% foreign owned) 
EMPLOY99 EMPLOY01 Metric Number of employees at the end of  1999/2001 
TRAIN99 TRAIN01 Metric Share of training expenditure as % of sales in 1999/2001 
ASSET99 ASSET01 Metric Total fixed assets as of 12/1999 / 12/2001 in million Bhat 
DOMES99 DOMES01 Metric Percentage of domestic sales in 1999/2001 
EXPORT99 EXPORT01 Metric Percentage of export sales in 1999/ 2001 
P2Q10A P2Q10A Metric % of sales to parent/ associate company overseas 
P2Q10B P2Q10B Metric % of OEM sales 
P2Q10C P2Q10C Metric % of ODM sales 
P2Q10D P2Q10D Metric % of OBM sales 
ISO9001 ISO9001 Nominal Certificated according to ISO 9001 (yes/no) 
ISO9002 ISO9002 Nominal Certificated according to ISO 9002 (yes/no) 
ISO14000 ISO14000 Nominal Certificated according to ISO 14000 (yes/no) 
P3Q13A TECHAC1 Nominal Tech. activity: Acquisition of external technology (yes/no) 
P3Q13B TECHAC2 Nominal Tech. activity: Adaptation of external technology (yes/no) 
P3Q13C TECHAC3 Nominal Tech. activity: Reverse Engineering (yes/no) 
P3Q13D TECHAC4 Nominal Tech. activity: Basic design (yes/no) 
P3Q13E TECHAC5 Nominal Tech. activity: Detailed design (yes/no) 
P3Q13F TECHAC6 Nominal Tech. activity: Testing (yes/no) 
P3Q13G TECHAC7 Nominal Tech. activity: Quality control (yes/ no) 
AGE AGE Metric Age of firm 
EMPLOYAP EMPLOYAP Metric % of university graduates of total employment 
EMPLOYBP EMPLOYBP Metric % of vocational school graduates of total employment 
EMPLOYCP EMPLOYCP Metric % of secondary school graduates of total employment  
EMPLOYDP EMPLOYDP Metric % of primary school graduates of total employment  
SALEMP99 SALEMP01 Metric Sales per employee in 1999/2001 (Bhat) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 35 Consisting of the following provinces: Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Nakhon Pathom, Samut Sakhon, 
Samut Prakan, Ayutthaya, Chachoengsao, Chon Buri and Rayong. 
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Figure 5.2: Decision Tree for advanced foreign firms in Thailand (2002) 
 
with: Korr.W.-Wert = p-value; Chi-Quadrat = Chi-Square; D.F. = degrees of freedom; Knoten = node; Gesamt = Total; <fehlt> = missing 
 
Tab. 5.50: Gains summary table for advanced foreign firms in Thailand - 2002 (sorted by hit rate) 
Node 
 
Detailed 
design 
Acquisition 
of external 
technology 
Reverse 
engineering
Employment 
(2001) 
Hit rate (%) Index (%) 
8 yes yes  > 700 74.2 415.2
7 yes yes  <= 700 34.1 190.9
5 no  yes  19.1 106.6
4 yes no   13.5   76.6
6 no  no    7.9   44.3
 
In order to support these findings, the 2000 data has been analysed (Figure 5.3). The automatic 
procedure results in different splitting variables. However, with the semi-automatic procedure most 
of the 2002-predictors can be manually selected, because they display equivalent p-values to the 
automatically chosen predictors. Consequently, a similar tree can be created (Figure 5.3), which 
actually displays a lower risk estimate (18.5%) than the automatic procedure (18.7%). 
The highest hit rate is shown for firms that carry out detailed design and adapt external technology 
(Tab. 5.51). Furthermore, larger firms are more likely to be advanced. Compared to the 2001 data, 
the adaptation rather than the acquisition variable exerts a strong influence on the splitting.  
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Figure 5.3: Decision Tree for advanced foreign firms in Thailand (2000) 
 
 
with: Korr.W.-Wert = p-value; Chi-Quadrat = Chi-Square; D.F. = degrees of freedom; Knoten = node; Gesamt = Total; <fehlt> = missing 
 
Tab. 5.51: Gains summary table for advanced foreign firms in Thailand- 2000 (sorted by hit rate) 
Node Detailed 
design 
Adaptation 
of external 
technology 
Reverse 
engineering
Employment 
(1999) 
Hit rate (%) Index (%) 
28 yes yes  > 400 61.5 286.9
27 yes yes  <= 400 27.4 127.7
30 no  yes  25.0 116.6
29 no  no  10.5 49.0
20 no  no  6.3 29.1
 
In conclusion, the acquisition and adaptation of external technology as well as detailed design 
activities are the most important factors for advanced foreign firms. Also, size matters: firms with 
more employees have a higher likelihood of conducting R&D or being innovating firms. 
Consequently, these findings support the notion that technical change in late-industrialising 
countries is strongly related to the acquisition and adaptation of external technology available in 
advanced countries (see 2.1.2). Moreover, it underlines the proposition that firms need to cumulate 
certain basic and intermediate capabilities, before they become successful innovating firms. 
Namely, they must have access to technology (acquisition) and understand how it works as well as 
how to – incrementally – change it (adaptation). The latter capability can also be achieved by 
INVATING
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designing specific details of products after key features have already been determined (which may 
have been completed by the customer or component supplier).  
Hence, from a political point of view, it is first and foremost important to foster foreign firms’ 
access to external sources of technology and to improve their capability to acquire either embodied 
(e.g. machinery) or disembodied (e.g. blueprints) technology. Many foreign firms are expected to 
have easy access to these technologies via their corporate networks. Consequently, rather than 
enhance TNC-affiliates’ capabilities directly, this instead becomes a question of influencing the 
strategies of TNCs. Providing a favourable business environment or system of innovation can be a 
means to achieve this. In addition, it is essential to foster foreign firms’ design capabilities, which 
are a prerequisite for R&D, product and process innovations.  
5.5.3 Key characteristics of embedded TNC-affiliates 
Embeddedness in this section does not relate to flows of goods or services, but to cooperation in the 
fields of R&D and innovation. Firms that are strongly embedded in international and domestic 
cooperation and knowledge networks are of major significance for the potential diffusion of 
internationally available knowledge and technology within the Thai NSI. In order to use explorative 
statistics to determine key characteristics of these embedded foreign firms a ‘collaboration 
intensity index’ (CII) has been computed.  
The analysis is restricted to foreign R&D and potentially innovating firms, because only these firms 
were asked about the intensity of collaborations with external partners on R&D, product and 
process innovation. The surveyed firms specified the intensity of their cooperation with each partner 
on any of these three activities (see chapter 5.4). This intensity was measured on a five point Likert-
Scale. For the analysis the first two categories of ‘not at all’ and ‘hardly intensely’ have been 
recoded as 1, the median answer of ‘quite intensely’ as 2 and ‘intensely’ and ‘very intensely’ as 3. 
Missing values are coded as 0. Next, the variable CII has been created by summing up the values 
for the ten possible collaboration partners (nine in 2000, because ‘other government agencies’ was 
not offered as a partner category) and the three possible activities. Hence, a firm could score a 
maximum of 90 points (81 in 2000).  
This first step of the index displays the general embeddedness of foreign firms in any type of 
network. In the 2002 dataset, the actual minimum is nil, the maximum 67 and the average 19.8 
points (median: 17). For 2000 the minimum is again nil, maximum is 71 and the average 25.2 
(median: 27) points. For the application of the answer tree, the intensity variable was classified into 
two groups: weakly embedded firms (with a below average 2002-CII of <=19) and strongly 
embedded firms (CII of >= 20). The 2002 dataset includes 62 weakly and 49 strongly embedded 
foreign firms, while for 2000 44 weakly and 53 strongly embedded foreign firms were identified. In 
addition to the variables named in Tab. 5.49, several other variables on R&D and innovation 
activities are included into the analysis (see Appendix A8). The minimum size of main nodes has 
been reduced to 20 and for final nodes to 10, because of the limited sample size. 
The second step concentrates on collaboration with collaboration partners, which are presumably 
located within Thailand. Hence, it tries to capture key variables influencing the embeddedness of 
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TNC-affiliates within the Thai-NSI. In this case, the possible maximum score is 45, while the 
actual maximum is 30. Again, the intensity variable was classified into two groups: weakly 
embedded firms (with a below average 2002-CII of <=9) and strongly embedded firms (CII of >9). 
The 2002 data entail 40 strongly embedded and 71 weakly embedded foreign firms, while the 2000 
dataset records 49 weakly and 48 strongly embedded TNC-affiliates. 
 
Embeddedness of TNC-affiliates in R&D and innovation networks 
In 2002, one of the most influential variables in the distinction between strongly (category 2) and 
weakly embedded (1) foreign firms (see Figure 5.4 and Tab. 5.52) is the share of R&D-expenditure 
spent on basic research (labelled P8Q6C). Firms that spend less than 10% on basic research and, 
consequently, more on applied research and experimental development have a higher likelihood of 
being strongly embedded. This is especially true for those firms that are at the same time innovative 
(INOVATIV), i.e. which achieve at least 25% of sales with new products or produce at least 25% of 
their production with new processes. A high share of those foreign firms that either did not perform 
R&D or did not report the distribution of their R&D-spending, is strongly embedded when it 
performs ‘industrial design and engineering linked to innovation’. Despite being the ‘best possible’ 
model, the risk estimate of 24% (standard error: 0.04) is fairly high with one in four cases predicted 
wrongly. 
Figure 5.4: Decision Tree for strongly embedded foreign firms in Thailand (2002): all partners 
 
 
with: Korr.W.-Wert = p-value; Chi-Quadrat = Chi-Square; D.F. = degrees of freedom; Knoten = node; Gesamt = Total; <fehlt> = missing 
 
These findings indicate that, of all R&D- and potentially innovating foreign firms, those that focus 
on applied research and experimental development collaborate most intensely. Apparently, these 
activities provide more opportunities for collaboration than basic research. Particularly, innovative 
firms that achieve a high percentage of sales with new products or which realise a high percentage 
of production with new processes are considered intense ‘networkers’. This suggests a mutual 
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causality: innovative firms collaborate intensely and are therefore innovative. Additionally, design 
and engineering, when linked to innovation, has a positive impact on collaboration. The tree for 
2000 is less conclusive, but shows that firms that evaluate know-how transfer as an important 
reason for collaboration have a higher propensity to collaborate closely. Moreover, the commitment 
to innovation and R&D, indicated by carrying out training for innovation, financing R&D-activities 
with own funds, and spending money on non-R&D innovation activities, are positively related to 
collaboration intensity.  
Tab. 5.52: Gains summary table for strongly embedded R&D and potentially innovating foreign firms in 
Thailand - 2002 (sorted by hit rate) 
Node % share of R&D 
exp. on basic 
research 
Innovative Industrial design and 
engineering linked to 
innovation in 2000 
Hit 
rate 
(%) 
Index 
(%) 
14 <=10% yes  100.0 226.5
13 <=10% no  70.0 158.6
15 missing  yes 60.0 135.9
11 >10   37.5 84.9
16 missing  no 20.8 47.0
 
Embeddedness of TNC-affiliates in R&D and innovation networks within Thailand 
Before presenting the respective analysis, a ‘word of caution’ is necessary: the questionnaire in 
Thailand did not request that firms specify the location of their collaboration partners. Therefore, 
this analysis is based on assumptions concerning the prevailing location of collaboration partners 
(see 5.4). The following partners tend to be based within the Thai NSI: locally owned suppliers, 
government agencies, technical and business service providers, as well as research institutes and 
universities. Due to the speculative character of this analysis, the results should be regarded with 
caution. 
The CHAID analysis from the 2002 data (see Figure 5.5 and Tab. 5.53) shows that firms which 
assign more than 40% of their R&D-expenditure to process-related R&D and those that are 
innovating firms have the highest inclination to be strongly embedded in the Thai NSI. The risk 
estimate for this model is 18% (standard error 0.04). This result is not surprising. Obviously, TNC-
affiliates that have been assigned development and innovation functions by their headquarters both 
see the need and show the commitment to collaborate with local partners. It seems that intense 
cooperation with local partners is more common in process innovation, which is reasonable: As will 
be shown in the in-depth interviews (chapter 6), there is more scope for TNC-affiliates to build up 
process R&D rather than product R&D and development capabilities. Many foreign firms reported 
that product development takes place predominantly at their home base, whereas (incremental) 
process related R&D is more closely connected to the site of volume-production. However, this 
picture is not supported by the quantitative data on R&D-spending, which indicates the 
predominance of TNC-affiliates in terms of product-related R&D (see Tab. 5.37). Nevertheless, the 
disaggregated collaboration frequencies for local and foreign firms (see Appendix A9) also support 
these findings, since, especially in the field of process innovation, a high share of foreign firms 
reported intense collaboration with local partners. For the 2000 data (Figure 5.6 and Tab. 5.54) 
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there is additional evidence for a positive impact from product and process innovations. Here, the 
successful market introduction of a new product is the most influential splitting variable, followed 
by process and R&D-related products or process innovations. However, because one in four cases is 
mismatched, this tree is not very reliable (25.7%; standard error: 0.04). 
Figure 5.5: Decision Tree for strongly embedded foreign firms in Thailand (2002): domestic partners 
 
with: Korr.W.-Wert = p-value; Chi-Quadrat = Chi-Square; D.F. = degrees of freedom; Knoten = node; Gesamt = Total; <fehlt> = missing 
 
Tab. 5.53: Gains summary table for strongly embedded R&D and potentially innovating foreign firms in 
Thailand - 2002 (sorted by hit rate) 
Node %of process-
oriented R&D 
(P8Q7B) 
Process 
innovation?  
(PROCIN) 
Product 
innovation? 
(PRODIN)  
Hit 
rate 
(%) 
Index 
(%) 
23 >40   86.7 240.5
27 <= 40, missing Yes yes 80.0 222.0
26 <= 40, missing No yes 27.8 77.1
25 <= 40, missing No no 15.9 44.0
 
In summary, foreign firms in Thailand are generally strongly embedded in R&D and innovation-
related networks, particularly when they perform more applied research or experimental 
development, and when they are innovative. It can be assumed that the variables are interrelated: 
successful innovating firms see the need for intense collaborations and the benefits that arise from 
these. 
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The same conclusion holds for the local embeddedness of TNC-affiliates: Foreign firms that are 
innovating and that spend a substantial part of their resources on process-related R&D collaborate 
intensely with external partners located in Thailand. Ultimately, innovating firms tend to be more 
embedded – globally as well as locally. 
Figure 5.6: Decision Tree for strongly embedded foreign firms in Thailand (2000): domestic partners 
  
with: Korr.W.-Wert = p-value; Chi-Quadrat = Chi-Square; D.F. = degrees of freedom; Knoten = node; Gesamt = Total; <fehlt> = missing 
Tab. 5.54: Gains summary table for strongly embedded R&D and potentially innovating foreign firms in 
Thailand - 2000 (sorted by hit rate) 
Node Product 
innovation? 
(PRODOUT) 
Process 
innovation? 
(PROCOUT) 
Products or processes 
innovation as a result of 
R&D? (RDOUTPUT) 
Hit 
rate 
(%) 
Index 
(%) 
5 yes  yes 83.3 168.4
3 no yes  58.8 118.9
6 yes  no 44.4 89.8
4 no no  15.6 31.6
 
5.6 Internal and external obstacles and conditions for innovation  
The analysis of factors that hamper innovation and the quality of business environment conditions 
as perceived by the surveyed firms can bring about insights into the technological capabilities and 
absorptive capacity of firms as well as their assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the system 
of innovation. Hence, this section relates to Q3: “What are major bottlenecks within the Thai 
system of innovation as perceived by local and foreign firms?” In the following section, the limiting 
factors for R&D as well as those for other innovation activities and the evaluation of specific 
environment conditions are presented. 
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Factors limiting R&D and innovation 
First, the most important limiting factors for R&D as perceived by firms in Thailand (Figure 5.7) 
are a lack of government R&D-incentives, lack of R&D-personnel in-house and insufficient 
(external) supply of R&D-personnel. Consequently, the lack of capable human capital is a key 
concern for both local and foreign firms (see also 4.2.2.2). However, significantly fewer TNC-
affiliates have evaluated the lack of R&D-personnel as either important or very important. 
Obviously, foreign firms suffer from a lack of human capital, but experience fewer problems in 
finding adequate staff compared to local firms. This is due presumably to the higher wages paid by 
foreign firms (see 4.1.4). Furthermore, a higher share of local firms assesses almost all factors as 
more severe than foreign firms. This is especially true for the availability of financial resources, the 
lack of an R&D-strategy and information on R&D-opportunities (2000), as well as for the 
availability of suitable support services (2002). Evidently, TNC-affiliates have better access to 
funds and information and can, consequently, make up for some of the external weaknesses. 
Strikingly, TNC-affiliates suffered from the fact that the management did not see the need for R&D, 
which ranked as the most significant problem in 2000. In 2002, this hardly remains an issue – this 
perception is in line with the observed increase in R&D-activities in foreign firms (see chapter 5.1 
and 5.2). Generally, fewer firms perceived of these problems as either important or very important 
in 2002.  
Second, important obstacles for innovation activities other than R&D (Figure 5.8) are the perceived 
costs and risks, a lack of qualified personnel and government support as well as inadequate support 
services. Again, local firms have evaluated most factors more negatively foreign firms. In contrast 
to R&D, the lack of human capital and the role it plays in limiting innovation is perceived similarly.  
Figure 5.7: Percentage of firms that named the following as important or very important factors limiting R&D 
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Figure 5.8: Percentage of firms that named the following as important or very important factors limiting 
innovation activities other than R&D 
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Figure 5.9: % of firms in Singapore and Penang, encountering problems in innovation projects, that named the 
following as important or very important limiting factors for innovation   
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Despite significant differences in limiting factors, rankings between foreign and local firms in 
Thailand are fairly similar. Comparing the concerns of advanced and basic firms, only a few 
conspicuous differences can be detected. Regarding the rank, advanced firms see the lack of 
information on markets and technologies as more, and financing as less, problematic. 
In terms of technological capabilities this suggests that about 70% (2000) and 45% (2002) of the 
surveyed local firms cannot conduct R&D as they would like to, because they lack the personnel, 
infrastructure, financial means and a clear strategy. However, a very positive trend is also revealed, 
as many firms have overcome these problems from 2000 to 2002. In respect to external factors, 
neither government support for R&D nor support services seem to be sufficient to make up for in-
house weaknesses.  
Moreover, local firms clearly lack the capability to access information on technology and markets 
necessary for innovation on a larger scale. Additionally, they more often experience difficulty in 
financing these activities. Both aspects are easier for TNC-affiliates to tackle, due to the availability 
of funds and thanks to technology and market scanning mechanisms within the corporate network. 
In conclusion, TNC-affiliates clearly seem to possess higher capabilities than local firms and/or 
have a different perception of factors limiting their R&D-activities. Therefore, TNC-affiliates could 
support technological learning and innovation in local firms by facilitating access to information on 
technology and markets, by educating personnel that may spill over to local firms, and by assisting 
local firms in finding capital for R&D and innovation. From a political perspective, these issues 
must be addressed.  Alongside this, the human capital base must be improved via a reformation of 
Thailand’s education system. 
However, the matters that concern firms in Thailand also pose as obstacles for innovation in Penang 
and Singapore (Figure 5.9). Here, only advanced firms that had encountered serious problems in an 
innovation project were asked about limiting factors for innovation. Therefore, the sample size is 
very small (19 local and 27 foreign firms in Singapore and 15 local and 9 foreign firms in Penang). 
Nevertheless, similar factors show prominence: perceived risk and costs, lack of qualified personnel 
and of information on technology and finances. Like in Thailand foreign firms report of less 
problems in finding qualified personnel and funds for innovation. 
 
Perception of the business environment 
According to the surveyed firms, the most pressing problem in Thailand is the ‘availability of 
government incentives for innovation’. Since the surveys were commissioned by NSTDA, which is 
a government agency under the roof of the Ministry of Science, it can be assumed that this 
assessment reflects a certain ‘strategic behaviour’ on behalf of the surveyed firms. This, however, 
does not mean to suggest that this is not a valid problem among firms in Thailand, though it may be 
overstated, since firms can expect that the government will react to the results, perhaps offering up 
more incentives (Figure 5.10 presents figures for 2002).  
The remaining top four problems in 2000 were, respectively, the availability of human capital in 
S&T, the acceptance of failure, the regulatory environment and the availability of funds for 
innovation. In 2002, the most pressing problems relate specifically to innovation collaboration 
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opportunities: Firms find fault with the availability of local universities and R&D-institutes for 
technical support and R&D-collaboration. Furthermore, the unavailability of technical support 
services and difficulty concerning the requirements of the stock exchange are mentioned. However, 
it has to be kept in mind, that the total share of firms evaluating conditions as poor or very poor has 
dropped remarkably from around 40-60% in 2000 to 14-36% in 2002 – hence, this is a sign that 
conditions are improving. 
While in general patterns of evaluation were fairly similar between local and foreign firms, there 
were some striking differences: 
• In 2000: the availability of S&T-personnel, technological sophistication of local suppliers, 
local universities as cooperation partners and the openness of government and regulatory 
authorities are more often named by foreign firms, whereas listing requirements of the stock 
exchange, the regulatory environment and the openness of suppliers for innovation have 
been more frequently criticised by local firms.  
• In 2002: the availability of business personnel and local universities for potential 
collaboration were named by foreign firms as severe problems, while local firms assessed 
the regulatory environment, ICT services and access to funding as poor. 
In conclusion, firms would like to begin to increase collaborations with local universities and 
research institutes. Apparently, however, the S&T-infrastructure is seen as major weakness. This 
might be due to a lack of quality or quantity, a technological mis-match between companies’ needs 
and universities competences and/or a lack of incentives within research institutes and universities 
to foster university-industry linkages (see Schiller and Mildahn, forthcoming).  
Furthermore, these aspects were more frequently criticised by foreign firms, which can compare the 
situation in Thailand with other systems of innovation. Skilled human capital is, once again, 
identified as a problem despite a more positive evaluation in 2002.  
The perceived problems in Penang and Singapore are similar: Availability of manpower, missing 
tolerance for failure and the availability of technical support services are a major concern in 
Singapore. Firms in Penang criticise the government for offering too few innovation incentives, and 
are unsatisfied with local universities and R&D institutes as collaboration partners and service 
providers. Also, the technological sophistication of local suppliers raises concern, primarily for 
foreign firms.  
In summary, main bottlenecks for further R&D and innovation in the Thai NSI are the lack of 
suitable personnel, lack of government support and incentives. Moreover, essential problems with 
finding suitable ‘horizontal’ collaboration partners, namely technical support services, local 
universities and R&D institutes have been expressed. Having said this, there is a remarkable 
improvement in the assessment of these environmental conditions from 1999 to 2001 from both 
local and foreign firms.  
The most important internal factors – and consequently aspects of firm capabilities – are the 
reluctance to take the risks and costs associated with innovation and a lack of R&D-strategy within 
the firm. A missing absorptive capacity at the firm level is of medium importance, indicated by the 
lack of skilled personnel and of information on either R&D-opportunities or technology.  
Figure 5.10: Perception of the business environment in Thailand - 2002 (% of all firms) 
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6 Case studies: the impact of TNC-affiliates in selected 
industries on the Thai system of innovation 
The analysis of quantitative data in chapter 5 provides the insight that TNC-affiliates in Thailand do 
not generally have higher technological capabilities, but that in recent years tangible upgrading 
seems to have taken place. Nevertheless, TNC-affiliates possess more ‘basic operation capabilities’ 
and intermediate ‘technological capabilities’, such as quality control, testing, acquisition and 
adaptation of external technology. Moreover, TNC-affiliates are better endowed than local firms in 
terms of absorptive capacity. As a consequence, TNC-affiliates can be suitable partners for local 
firms in learning basic operation and intermediate technological capabilities. Furthermore, the 
analysis emphasises that advanced TNC-affiliates are particularly beneficial for strengthening the 
Thai NSI. Advanced foreign firms acquire technology and knowledge more frequently abroad, 
either via embodied or disembodied technology transfer, acquisition of R&D-services, own R&D-
activities abroad, customer-related information, etc. Additionally, advanced foreign firms display a 
stronger degree of embeddedness in international as well as domestic knowledge networks than 
advanced local firms. In conclusion, particularly advanced TNC-affiliates can potentially foster 
technological upgrading of the Thai NSI and technological learning in domestic firms, by 
transferring new technology and knowledge to Thailand and diffusing it within the Thai NSI.  
This diffusion is partly reflected by the fact that clients are important sources of information and 
powerful collaboration partners for local firms. At least some of the clients are TNC-affiliates 
located in Thailand that source locally. However, it is difficult to establish the type of technology 
and knowledge that is really transferred and which mechanisms are used on the basis of quantitative 
data. Consequently, this chapter will use qualitative data to enquire further into the mechanisms of 
technology and knowledge transfer between TNC-affiliates and other actors in the Thai NSI. 
Moreover, it tries to pinpoint technological capabilities and problems of the NSI as perceived by the 
interviewed firms.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Chapter 6.1 considers the automotive industry 
in Thailand. It gives an overview of the industry and presents the key findings of the interviews. 
Chapter 6.2 looks at the hard disk drive industry in Thailand, displaying key characteristics and the 
main findings on technological capabilities and embeddedness. 
6.1 Automotive industry 
6.1.1 Overview of the automotive industry in Thailand 
The automotive industry is Thailand’s third largest industry, employing about 200,000 people and 
having an annual production capacity of more than 1 million cars and trucks (see Tab. 6.1) (Office 
of Industrial Economics, 2002). The country hosts 15 car assemblers, of which six are majority-
owned by Thai-capital. Nevertheless, these firms are also dependent on the TNC they operate for 
(Brooker Group, 2002b). Additionally, there are six motorcycle assemblers, of which one is Thai-
owned (Tiasiri, 2003). Total output of the industry was about 740,000 cars and trucks and 1,9 
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million motorcycles in 2003 (Bank of Thailand, 2004b). In 2002, the share of motor vehicles on 
manufacturing GDP was 7.4% (National Economic and Social Development Board, 2002). Vehicle, 
parts and accessories accounted for about 6% of total manufacturing exports in 2003 (ca. US$4 
billion), of which passenger cars and parts represent about 40% (Bank of Thailand, 2004a). 
 
Tab. 6.1: Car assemblers operating in Thailand 
Assembler Brand Since Capacity 
2001 
Thonburi Automotive Assembly Plant Co Ltd* Mercedes Benz 1961 15,000
Siam Motors and Nissan Co Ltd* Nissan, Suzuki 1962 31,200
Isuzu Motors Co (Thailand) Ltd  Isuzu 1963 160,000
Toyota Motor Thailand Co Ltd  Toyota 1964 240,000
MMC Sittipol Co Ltd Mitsubishi 1966 187,000
Hino Motors (Thailand) Ltd  Hino, Toyota 1966 21,600
Bangchan General Assembly Co Ltd* Jeep 1968 21,000
YMC Assembly Ltd* Audi, Peugeot, VW 1972 12,000
Thai Rung Union Car Plc* Isuzu, Nissan 1973 13,000
Thai-Swedish Assembly Co Ltd  Volvo, Land Rover 1976 10,000
Siam Nissan Automobile Co Ltd* Nissan 1977 80,200
Honda Automobile (Thailand) Co Ltd  Honda 1984 70,000
AutoAlliance (Thailand) Co Ltd Ford, Mazda 1998 135,000
General Motors Assembly Center Chevrolet 2000 130,000
BMW Manufacturing (Thailand) Co Ltd BMW 2000 10,000
Total   1,136,000
* Thai majority ownership          Brooker Group, 2002b 
 
Especially in the production of pickup trucks, Thailand has established itself as the world’s second 
largest producer behind the USA. Toyota, Isuzu, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Mazda and Ford use the 
country as their global production base. Output in pickup trucks was 470,000 in 2003 and most 
assemblers (plan to) invest in the extension of their capacities: Ford US$500m, Nissan US$ 440m, 
Toyota US$ 750m, Mitsubishi US$ 525m (The Economist, 2004a). Toyota and Isuzu will set up 
R&D-centres (Bangkok Post, 2003) and Mercedes Benz has established a regional R&D-office 
(Praiwan, 2004a). Pickups and commercial vehicles account for about 66% of total vehicle exports 
(Jaiimsin, 2004).  
 
Generally, large, transnational car assemblers such as Toyota or General Motors (GM) head the 
assembly system in the automotive industry. These firms are termed OEMs, Original Equipment 
Manufacturer, in the automotive industry – actually, this term has a very different meaning from the 
OEMs described in chapter 2.1.4 and 5. Consequently, in what follows this term will not be used for 
car assemblers but rather for subcontractors as defined in chapter 2.1.4. Each assembler is heading 
its own production system, consisting of 1st tier or systems suppliers that procure e.g. transmissions, 
components (2nd tier), parts (3rd tier) and raw material (4th tier). Frequently the assembler only deals 
with the first tier suppliers and expects them to coordinate the lower tiers. Some suppliers sell parts 
and components also to the aftermarket, providing e.g. spare parts. 
 
 184 
Figure 6.1: Sectoral innovation and production system: Thai automotive industry 
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Source: Tiasiri, 2003 
Figure 6.1 depicts the sectoral innovation and production system. The value-chain is encircled by 
supporting industries and services, public institutes, industry associations and is subject to 
government policies. 
Reasons for the success of the automotive industry in Thailand are seen in an attractive industrial, 
tax and duty policy (especially for pickup trucks), BOI privileges, good infrastructure, a sufficiently 
large domestic market with profitable prospects on the AFTA (Asian Free Trade Area) market and 
the growth of the local components industry (The Economist, 2004a, Torok, 2003; on policy see 
also Terdudomtham, 2004).  
The latter was essentially fostered by industrial policy that enforced local-content requirements 
from 1972 until its abolishment in 2000 (Office of Industrial Economics, 2002: 10). Intarakumnerd 
et al. (2002: 1450) assert that this has been virtually the only selective policy in Thailand and has 
proved to be successful. Local content continued to rise even after the abolishment of the official 
requirement to ca. 80% for pickup trucks, 55% for passenger cars and almost 100% for motorcycles 
in 2002 (Office of Industrial Economics, 2002: 15).  
This was only possible because many suppliers are located in Thailand. Additionally, Thailand 
hosts about 700 1st tier suppliers of which 290 are TNC-affiliates, 60 are Joint Ventures (with Thai 
majority) and about 350 are wholly Thai-owned suppliers. Furthermore, the country contains about 
1,100 2nd tier suppliers, which are mainly Thai-owned (Tiasiri, 2003 and Interview Tiasiri). Nearly 
the entire industry is clustered in the Bangkok/ Eastern Seaboard region (see Figure 6.2). While the 
first wave of investment targeted Bangkok, expansions and new investments in the 1990s were 
located for the most part in the Eastern Seaboard region (Lecler, 2002). The same spatial pattern can 
be observed for suppliers, of which 232 are sited in Bangkok, 158 in Samutprakarn, 39 in Phatum 
Thani, 55 in Chonburi and 41 in Rayong (Tiasiri, 2003).  
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of automotive manufacturers in Thailand 
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About 80% of the production capacity belongs to Japanese firms. Consequently, most of the follow-
source suppliers (see chapter 2.3.4) are also Japanese. However, due to investment by GM, Ford 
and Chrysler in the mid 1990s, many non-Japanese first tier suppliers, such as TRW Automotive, 
Delphi Automotive Systems or Visteon, have recently set up production facilities in Thailand 
(Office of Industrial Economics, 2002: 15, Brooker Group, 2002c: 2-6). A study on the part 
procurement systems of Japanese and American assemblers in Thailand found that these systems 
are fairly similar, but that American firms lean towards more price-oriented market transactions, 
whereas Japanese firms are rather dedicated to long-term relationships (Charoenporn, 2001). 
Despite its success, the quality of the industry is disputed: Government sources emphasize that the 
quality of the automotive parts in Thailand was rated best among ASEAN countries by the Japan 
Automobile Manufacturers Association (cited in Office of Industrial Economics, 2002: 15). 
However, scholars such as Abbott (2003: 145) state that “one of the biggest problems facing the 
Thai automotive industry is that after decades of protection it is simply uncompetitive in the global 
market”. A recent study by Porter (2003) assesses the productivity and level of automation in 
Thailand’s automotive industry as very low, with low labour costs compensating for this weakness. 
Only pickup trucks, as well as tires and rubber-related products, display a comparative advantage. 
He points out that “the potential for growth will be limited until Thailand significantly improves its 
sophistication and technology” (ibid.: 32).  
Similarly, in 1996 a TDRI study determined that Thailand had only a revealed comparative 
advantage in parts for trailers and trucks, but not in automotive, auto-parts, van, truck and special 
purpose vehicles (cited in Abbott, 2003). Moreover, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
found in 1998 that the “actual local content, i.e. real value added of vehicles assembled in Thailand, 
is much lower than the official 54-70%, closer to 20%” (cited in Doner et al., 2004: 41). 
In particular, Thai-owned firms show low levels of sophistication. Doner et al. (2004) underscore 
the fact that only 30% of auto-part exports originated from Thai-owned firms in 1999. Moreover, a 
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1995-study by UNICO International, a Japanese consultant firm, determined that the level of 
production technology in Thai-owned firms corresponded to a rating of “C+” and, hence, below the 
international OEM-requirement of “B” (cited in ibid. and Abbott, 2003: 145).  
Moreover, Laosirihongthong et al. (2003) identified divergences between local and foreign-owned 
companies in the implementation of new manufacturing technologies. Due to limited resources, 
Thai-owned companies more often opt for ‘stand alone technologies’ such as CAD/ CAM and 
CNC. 
A report by the Brooker Group (2002a: pp. 2-14) asserts that local auto-parts makers have low 
technological capabilities and are largely dependent on technology provided by JV-partners or 
licensers, but also that they cannot absorb the transferred technology due to a lack of skilled labour. 
However, Japanese firms with financial support of the Japanese government have primarily 
invested in human resource development, resulting in an improvement in the availability of skilled 
labour in recent years (Poapongsakorn, 2004: 182). 
Techakanont (2002, 2003) reports on the subject of related evidence: TNC-affiliates are actively 
transferring technology via information sharing and advising to local suppliers. Thereby, the 
content of the inter-firm technology transfer had gradually enhanced from simple ‘operational 
technology’ to a higher level of ‘process engineering technology’. According to his research, there 
has been another shift towards ‘product engineering capabilities’ since the year 2000. However, 
only a number of local suppliers with long-term relationships to assemblers, willingness to 
participate in product developments in Japan and own efforts in human resource development, are 
given the opportunity for higher-level technology transfers. 
Despite the above named shortcomings of domestic suppliers, Ito (2004) was not able to find 
pervasive productivity differentials between foreign and local plants in the Thai automobile 
industry. Porter’s (2003: 32) assessment suggests that this is due to lower productivity by TNC’s 
operations in Thailand and not an indication of a successful catch-up by local firms.  
Since the abolishment of local content requirements in 2000, domestic suppliers face stronger 
competition, with new opportunity for assemblers to source globally. Hence, the current challenge 
for Thai-owned firms is to develop R&D, design and product development capabilities in order to 
safeguard their current position within the supply chain (Techakanont, 2003: 39, Abbott, 2003: 145, 
Brooker Group, 2002a: 2-15). However, due to high costs and the ‘traditional’ procedure of 
customers providing product drawings, samples and specification, firms display a certain reluctance 
to develop these capabilities (Brooker Group, 2002a: 2-15, Terdudomtham, 2004: pp. 46).  
6.1.2 TNCs in Thailand’s automotive industry: capabilities, linkages, 
spillovers 
First, this chapter gives an overview of the interviewed firms and their central business activities 
(6.1.2.1). Second, it explores their embeddedness in the value-chain and external collaborations 
with a focus on domestic linkages. Third, it presents the findings in regard to technological 
capabilities and the organisation of R&D and innovation processes. Furthermore, the firms’ 
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perception of the current business environment in terms of collaboration partners and availability of 
human capital is reported.  
6.1.2.1 The interviewees in the automotive industry and their embeddedness – 
value-chain and cooperation 
The results presented in this chapter are based on ten firm interviews conducted by the author with 
five TNC affiliates and five local firms. 
Of the foreign firms TNC1, TNC2 and TNC3 are assemblers and (partly) producers of key 
components for their own vehicles and sometimes other assemblers. TNC 4 and TNC5 are first 
tier suppliers of which one supplies some of the surveyed assemblers. Of the Thai-owned firms 
LC1, LC2 and LC3 are suppliers at different positions in the value chain. One is a pure parts 
supplier, while the other two supply OEM parts to several assemblers. Moreover, LC4 and LC5 are 
included, both operating in the aftermarket, designing and producing accessories and add-ons. 
The first section of each interview examines the basic production process, as well as the location of 
the main customers and suppliers. Tab. 6.2 presents this information and gives additional data on 
external collaborations. It can be seen that the majority of surveyed firms produce essentially for the 
domestic consumer or intermediate market. However, most firms also state that they are either 
currently trying to increase their export share or commence exporting to ASEAN countries.  
For procurement, most firms follow a localisation strategy, i.e. they try to source as many inputs as 
possible locally. The rationale behind this strategy is to decrease currency exchange rate risks, 
import/export taxes and transport costs, to ease supply chain management and to exert control over 
key suppliers e.g. by plant visits. However, certain high-precision parts must be imported, even 
though the firms would like to supply them locally, either because there are no suitable suppliers in 
Thailand or because local suppliers lack the necessary skills.  
 
Tab. 6.2: Embeddedness of the surveyed automotive firms: Value-chain and external collaboration  
Firm Supplier Customer/ Market External linkages  
(beyond pure market based) 
TNC1 Target: 100% local content; 
currently 30% of components 
manufactured in-house.  
85-95% of components from local 
suppliers. 80% of domestic 
suppliers are JV between Thai 
and Japanese firms, 20% wholly 
Thai-owned. 
Currently 90% of production 
sold in domestic market, but 
strong increase in export 
expected, due to new 
production strategy. 
Supplier: TNC1 Supplier club: advice & 
training on system, QC, Kaizen, cost 
reduction, good practice. In the future: R&D 
cooperation.  
Universities/ R&D institutes: Cooperation 
on curricula, staff lectures at institutes, joint 
research projects with e.g. graduates. 
TNC2  Local content 40%. 60% CKD 
from home base. 20% of parts 
procured locally, 20% in-house 
assembly. Most local suppliers are 
foreign-owned/ JV follow source 
supplier. 
70% for domestic market, 
30% export to neighbouring 
countries. 
Supplier: Giving technical assistance to 
meet specifications and requirements (QC, 
ISO). 
Universities/ R&D institutes: internship/ 
practical projects, cooperation on traffic 
safety 
Competitors Allow competitors to use its 
CMM machine (testing/QC). 
   … cont. next page 
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TNC3 Local content about 45%, 
remaining parts are imported. 
60% of local suppliers are Thai-
Japanese JV, 10% Tai-European 
JV and 30% wholly Thai-owned. 
75% to 100% domestic 
market, some export to 
Australia/ NZ 
 
Customer: Cooperation restricted to cost 
cutting plans etc. 
Supplier: TNC3 supplier club, frequent 
cooperation on minor product 
improvement. When TNC3 Thailand gets 
new requirements from the HQ its R&D 
engineers work together with local 
suppliers to meet the requirements. 
TNC4  Local content different for every 
model. On average 40%. 60% 
CKD from home base. 90% of 
local suppliers are Thai-Japanese 
JV, 10% wholly Thai-owned.  
Ca. 30% follow source supplier. 
95% domestic, 5% export. Supplier: Some cooperation on local parts 
development. Some informal visits by 
engineer teams. 
Universities/ R&D institutes: sometimes 
broken parts are sent to MTEC for testing/ 
analysing. 
Competitors Some cooperation on 
production issues; Hence informal visits by 
engineer teams. 
Automotive Industry Club: important as 
information source about new regulations 
TNC5 Target for 2004: 80% local 
content; currently 75% locally 
procured. 75% of local suppliers 
are JV mainly (90%) between 
Japanese and Thai firms, 25% 
wholly Thai-owned.  
 
30% exported; 70% 
domestic market 
 
Customer: Cooperation with main 
customer, but restricted to Audit/ Quality 
control. Training of employees. 
Supplier: Encouraged by customer, TNC5 
provides training on JIT, waste reduction, 
cost cutting, quality control to its suppliers. 
Universities/ R&D institutes: Some 
calibration is done at Chualalongkorn. 
LC1 90% local suppliers of which 40% 
JV (mostly Japanese-Thai), 60% 
wholly Thai-owned. More 
sophisticated parts supplied by 
JV. 
90% for domestic market Customer: Cooperation/ Information on 
cost reduction, QC, ISO and joint product 
development. 
Supplier: Cooperation on parts 
development. 
Universities/ R&D institutes: 
Collaboration with university for a new 
management system; receiving some 
information on new material from MTEC/ 
NECTEC. 
LC2 Ca. 80-90% locally sourced. 
components mainly procured by 
associate firms in the group, raw 
material outsourced. 
10-20% imported completely 
knocked-down cars.  
More than 90% for domestic 
market  
Customer: Cooperation/ Information on 
cost reduction, QC, ISO and joint product 
development; training of employees. 
Supplier: Cooperation on parts 
development. 
Competitors: Some informal information 
exchange with LC1  
LC3 40% locally sourced; 60% 
imported  
74% domestic, 26% export 
markets. Of domestic 
market about 90% of 
customers TNCs 
Customers: cooperation on product 
development, training of employees 
Supplier: Intense cooperation with material 
supplier 
Universities/ R&D institutes. R&D 
collaboration with KMUTT; Professor as 
private consultant, e.g. for new plant layout. 
LC4 About 75% local suppliers  70% exports Customer: Long-term relationship to 
foreign customer, cooperation on product 
improvements. 
Supplier: Firm sometimes receives training 
by specialised Singapore based suppliers. 
LC5 Maximum 20% local content 100% of sales domestic, 
80% either licensed or trade 
products, 20% own 
developments 
European JV partners/ license sellers: 
Important source of knowledge, 
cooperation on implementation. 
Universities/ R&D institutes: Some 
cooperation with NSTDA; KMUTT 
professor as private consultant.  
Source: Author’s interviews 
In summary, the embeddedness of foreign and local firms in the Thai NSI in terms of product flows 
is fairly strong, whereas additional linkages (collaboration in respect to product/ process 
development and improvement, human resource training etc.) are very limited in number and 
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intensity. Often, the strongest linkages are with customers and/ or customer HQs in Japan (for more 
details see subsequent sections; and Tab. 6.2). 
6.1.2.2 Technological capabilities in the automotive-industry 
In order to investigate firms’ technological capabilities (see 2.1.2), the TC-framework developed by 
Afzulpurkar (see chapter 3.2.2 and Tab. 3.9) is utilised. The interviewees were asked to indicate in 
which ‘box’ they would place their firm. Several interviewees found it difficult to indicate only one 
box, but stated that their firm had, for example, basic but also some intermediate capabilities. Tab. 
6.3 takes this into account by including additional ‘in-between’ levels. 
 
Tab. 6.3: Self assessment of technological capabilities by firms in the automotive industry 
Manufacturing  Investment 
Process 
Engineering
Product 
Engineering
Industrial 
Engineering
Innovation Linkages 
Basic   
LC 1 
LC 4 
TNC 2 
TNC 3 
TNC 5
LC 3 
LC 4 
 
LC 1 
LC 4 
TNC 4 
TNC 5 
LC 1, LC 2 
LC 3,  
LC 4 
TNC 3 
TNC 5
 LC 4 TNC 5 LC 4 
LC 3 
TNC 4 
LC 1 
TNC 2 
TNC 4 
LC 3 
TNC 2 
TNC 4 
 
Intermediate 
LC 1 
LC 3 
LC 5 
TNC 1 
TNC 3 
LC 1 
LC 5 
LC 2 
TNC 1 LC 5 
LC 2 
LC 5 
TNC 1 
TNC 3 
LC 5 
TNC 1 
TNC 2 
 LC2 TNC2 
LC 3 
TNC 2 
TNC 3 
 LC 2   
Advanced TNC4 
LC 2 
TNC 1 
TNC 4 
TNC 5 
LC 5 
TNC 1 
TNC 3 
TNC 5 
  
                            Source: author’s interviews 
Even though this self-evaluation might show a bias towards an over-optimistic profile, it can be 
seen from Tab. 6.3 that the surveyed firms remained quite critical, displaying a fairly consistent 
pattern: Process engineering capabilities are the most advanced for the majority of firms. Industrial 
engineering is strong in three of the TNC-affiliates (TNC1, TNC3 and TNC5), because they 
strongly replicate their parents’ industrial organisation. Two others TNCs (TNC2 and TNC4) 
exhibit visibly lower capabilities in this respect, relating to their simpler production objective. The 
same is true for locally owned suppliers, which possess more or less intermediate skills. Investment 
capabilities are generally intermediate, whereas product engineering, innovation and linkage 
capabilities are lowest. 
 
 
 190 
Process technology 
For most TNC-affiliates the parent firm has chosen the initial process technology and for the most 
part all technology is imported. Furthermore, parent firms’ engineers had initially set up the 
production line. However, in subsequent upgrading phases the level of input from Thai engineers 
has markedly increased and these perform some minor/ incremental improvements. But, for major 
overhauls, the headquarters still make the decisions regarding technology and provide engineers for 
joint installation. Production, furthermore, is more labour-intensive and less automated than in the 
home country.  
For the Thai-owned component suppliers, the procurement of process technology is done entirely 
by the firms’ engineers. Sometimes, customers give advice regarding – especially advanced – 
technology. The bulk of machinery is imported from either Taiwan or Japan. Local engineers set up 
the production lines, adapt it to local conditions, maintain it and perform incremental improvements 
themselves. 
The part suppliers and firms in the aftermarket are not directly comparable, because they are 
located outside from the inner production networks of the assemblers. For example, the parts 
supplier is currently using outdated, second hand equipment, but will upgrade to modern machinery 
when moving to the new plant site. Nevertheless, this firm is fairly active in implementing ISO, 
TQM as well as preventive maintenance. Moreover, it frequently executes incremental process and 
organisational innovations of a fairly basic scale (e.g. pre-forming of the material to reduce waste, 
construction of a stamp that is more suitable than the imported machine etc.). The firms in the 
aftermarket generally perform assembly, which is to a certain extent labour oriented rather than 
technology intensive. 
 
Product development 
TNC-affiliates report that R&D and product development is performed in Japan. Operations in 
Thailand have small R&D-units in order to implement and/or adopt new product specifications and 
blueprints provided by the parent company. Additionally, they improve or adapt new products and 
processes incrementally. For example, engineers from TNC5 have adapted the Japanese air-
conditioning to the tropical climate. The customer and/or the headquarters must approve of this kind 
of change. 
Accordingly, R&D-cooperation is normally conducted in Japan. The common procedure is that, for 
example, the headquarters send a ‘request for design development’ to their respective affiliate in 
Thailand, which then passes it on to its Thailand-based supplier. This supplier would then send it on 
to its R&D department in Japan, where the actual innovation cooperation between the two firms 
takes place. Less than 10% of Thai-owned suppliers are included in this process, since – according 
to TNC1 – they lack the necessary R&D-capabilities.  
Having said this, there are also some local developments: either an assembler develops new product 
ideas or requirements and sends these to local suppliers or – less frequently – local suppliers come 
up with an improved product (e.g. advanced leather tanning for seats).  
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On the other hand, there are also TNC-affiliates whose main objective is to assemble the imported, 
‘completely knocked down’ (CKD) cars. These firms were set up to avoid the high import taxes and 
tariffs and related regulations. In order to fulfil the (former) local content requirement, they 
assemble some components (e.g. engines) locally and procure other parts (e.g. seats and windows) 
from domestic suppliers. 
For the Thai-owned suppliers, the majority of products (70-90%) are pure OEM-products that are 
produced according to customers’ specifications. However, two firms have underlined a recent shift 
towards more self-developed products and towards R&D.  
For example, LC1 has conducted R&D informally since 2002 and established an R&D-department 
consisting of 12 engineers in 2003. It carries out R&D on motorcycle- and car-parts and has 
recently developed a golf car by itself. The R&D-unit for motorcycles is the larger and more 
established of the two. It was set up by LC1-engineers who received training from a motorcycle 
company in Japan. Currently, LC1 works together with its main customer on product developments. 
At the initial stage the customer sends Japanese engineers to LC1, who develop ideas and plans for 
the improvement of existing parts jointly with LC1-engineers. Once the basic concept is 
established, LC1-engineers go on alone to implement the concept. Since the customer is currently 
extending its R&D-activity in Thailand, it is requiring LC1 to enhance its R&D-effort, too. In the 
car segment, the R&D-team is both smaller and newer. R&D in this industry is more difficult, 
because parts are technologically more sophisticated and competition is stronger. At the moment, 
LC1 is, for example, developing a new footboard (new form and material) for pickup trucks. The 
Japanese customer provided the initial idea. At the conceptual stage LC1-engineers worked together 
with Japanese engineers from the customer in Thailand and Japan as well as with engineers from its 
suppliers. Once the prototype was developed and approved by the customer’s Japanese HQ, it was 
transferred to the customer’s Thai affiliate, which then developed the pilot line for mass production. 
According to the interviewees such activity does not help to develop new parts for other customers, 
but the general learning experience is seen as very beneficial to further upgrading. One prominent 
result is the development of a golf car. Only the wheels and the engine are procured from other 
firms. For this new product LC1 cooperates intensely with its suppliers and, in terms of design-
software, with Chulalongkorn University. 
Similarly, LC2 is currently setting up an R&D-department, in which 50 engineers will eventually 
work. The firm sees the need to have development capabilities in order to qualify for global 
sourcing and to compete with overseas (Japanese) suppliers of its main customers. Due to the 
implementation of the IVM project by Toyota (see 6.1.2.3), LC2 feels the need to commit itself to 
R&D. The product development process e.g. for a fender liner begins with the customer sending 
either the drawing or the body of a car. Thereafter, LC2-engineers begin developing the fender, 
thereby frequently collaborating with engineers from the customers’ factory in Thailand. 
Essentially, the plant in Thailand acts as an interface with the TNC-headquarter. There is no direct 
interaction with the Japanese headquarters, even the approval of the prototype is received via the 
TNC-affiliate. LC2 emphasises that at the development stage the cooperation with suppliers is as 
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intensive as with the customer. The joint work is done alternately in the facilities of LC2, the 
customer or the suppliers. 
LC3, LC4 and LC5 produce mainly according to customer specifications. However, all firms state 
the need for their own product development, due to either eroding comparative advantage or the 
loss of important customers, which have in many cases moved to China. This forces the companies 
to upgrade their skills and to enter the OBM-market with their own product developments (e.g. 
LC3) (see notion of crisis construction for intensity of effort chapter 2.1.3.4). Means to achieve this 
goal include the recruitment of retired foreign R&D-engineers, licensing, joint ventures with 
European firms and intensified cooperation with customers. Moreover, information of international 
exhibitions is also considered important (for example the president of LC5 took photos of products 
in Germany and the UK, which the engineering department then reproduced using simpler 
technology and at a lower cost). Additionally, firms utilise external knowledge, e.g. from designers 
or universities in order to develop – in a first step rather technologically simple – OBM-products.  
 
The importance of proximity in joint development 
Most interviewees stated that proximity in joint development and improvement of parts is 
beneficial, because it makes face-to-face contact both easier and cheaper. This increases the 
frequency of interaction. However, since R&D and product development is not (yet) of high 
relevance for Thai based firms, proximity is seen as more important for logistics (JIT) and ‘urgent 
cooperation’, i.e. emergency troubleshooting requiring joint engineering teams. As one manager 
stated “We do not go to our customers for product developments daily, but we supply them three to 
four times a day”. Moreover, some managers assert that they experienced no problems in product 
developments with remote cooperation partners for example in Japan, since travelling is considered 
an appropriate substitute for proximity. 
 
S&T-infrastructure and human resources 
Most firms had only minor collaborations with the S&T-infrastructure, such as universities or 
NSTDA’s R&D-institutes. Moreover, some explicitly expressed that they are unsatisfied with 
science-industry cooperation opportunities, because the science sector is not efficient enough 
(LC3), the staff lacks practical experience (LC5) and the right equipment (TNC5).  
In respect to the availability and quality of human resources as an important pre-requisite for 
technological capabilities, the firm interviews support the findings from the quantitative data 
(chapter 5.5) that skilled labour is in short supply. Several firms experience problems with finding 
suitable engineers, high turnover rates and head-hunter activities. Their perception of the quality of 
available personnel is mixed. While some firms do not consider them problems, others complain 
about the lack of foreign language proficiency (English and Japanese) and engineering skills. The 
capability to “think outside the box” is especially missed: interviewees criticise that most engineers 
tend to think in a hierarchical and functionally separated manner and stick to one solution instead of 
questioning it further. Furthermore, one firm underlined the mismatch between university curricula 
and industry requirements. Consequently, all firms provide further in-house training (on the job) – 
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from two months to three years. Additionally, firms send their engineers to parents’ or customers’ 
facilities abroad, primarily to Japan, to receive further training (for up to three years). Moreover, 
some firms make use of external training courses provided, for example, by the Thailand 
Automotive Institute, the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS), a Japanese non-
profit organisation to promote technical cooperation, the Thai-German Institute, an independent 
training centre for industrial technologies, or the Thailand Productivity Institute under the Ministry 
of Industry. 
6.1.2.3 Excursus: the case of Toyota Motor Thailand36 
Toyota is both the major pioneer and ‘anchor’ of the automotive industry in Thailand, and is 
currently shifting significant R&D and development capabilities to Thailand. This chapter will 
briefly summarise these recent developments, bringing to the forefront the ways in which TNC-
affiliates can contribute to a major upgrading of segments of the Thai NSI. 
Toyota Motors Thailand (TMT) opened its first plant in Thailand in 1964. A second plant was 
added at the original location in Samut Prakarn in 1975. In 1994, TMT opened the Gateway City 
Plant in Chachoengsao. TMT operates in the car and the pickup truck markets. It is the country’s 
largest vehicle assembler and has dominated the Thai vehicle market for the last three decades 
(Brooker Group, 2002b). Localisation of supplies is essential for TMT, in order to avoid currency 
exchange uncertainties and enhance control over suppliers. Moreover, TMT depends on a reliable 
supply chain (JIT) and wants to foster cooperation to stimulate technical change. Since most Thai 
suppliers are not sophisticated enough to become 1st tier suppliers, car assemblers such as TMT ask 
home-base suppliers to follow them to the host region. Additionally, TMT is forced to import parts 
that it cannot procure locally because local suppliers lack the necessary high precision skills 
(interview with Thailand Automotive Institute).  
A recent example is Toyota’s Innovation and International Multipurpose vehicle (IVM) project, 
which started in mid-2004 and will see Toyota make Thailand its global export production base for 
one-ton pickup trucks, multi-purpose vehicles, diesel engines and parts (Toyoda, 2003). This 
relocation of the pickup production from Japan to Thailand induces at least 56 companies to move 
to Thailand (Thailand Automotive Institute interview). The IVM project will create 10,000 new 
jobs at TMT alone. The export value is supposed to rise to approximately US$ 1.2 billion per year 
(Toyoda, 2003). 
TMT has established the Toyota cooperation club for first tier suppliers, where it gives assistance to 
the Toyota production system, quality assurance, kaizen37 and cost reduction. Furthermore, it 
encourages ‘best practice’ suppliers to teach fellow suppliers and encourages first tier suppliers to 
set up similar supplier clubs. About 80% of the suppliers are follow-source suppliers (mostly 
organised as Joint Ventures), 20% are wholly Thai-owned. Altogether, there are ca. 130 1st tier 
suppliers of parts and components and 50 material suppliers. The Thai-owned suppliers clearly both 
                                                 
 36 In addition to the cited sources this part is based on information gathered in several firm interviews by the author. 
 37 A system or philosophy of continuous improvement, similar to incremental innovations see (Imai & Nitsch, 2001)  
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need and get more assistance, since most of the follow-source suppliers are accustomed to the 
Toyota production scheme.  
As with other assemblers, TMT expects its suppliers to constantly reduce costs. Moreover, suppliers 
have a strong sense of competition with e.g. Japanese based suppliers but also see the opportunity to 
qualify as ‘global suppliers’, delivering parts for other production sites. These mechanisms drive 
locally based suppliers to increase their efforts in respect to product and process optimising and in 
setting up R&D-units. The latter is especially true for TMT’s plan to set up a Toyota Technical 
Centre Asia Pacific in Thailand and Australia. The centre is part of the IVM project and will be 
Toyota’s third R&D-centre outside of Japan (other locations are Arizona, USA and Brussels, 
Belgium (Toyoda, 2003)). The new facility is intended to develop the new Soluna Vios passenger 
car and Hilux Pickup truck. The scope of work for the centre in Thailand includes R&D in product 
design, testing and evaluation, material evaluation and painting, engine-R&D, market surveys and 
evaluation and the distribution of technology-related information within the region (Santivimolnat, 
2003). TMT will therefore recruit 500 engineers of which 200 are Japanese and 300 mostly Thai. 
Since innovation and R&D are interactive processes (see chapter 2.1.3), TMT pushes its Thai-based 
key suppliers to set up their own R&D-facilities, in order to create the capabilities necessary to 
collaborate with TMT on product development. Traditionally, this collaboration has been taken 
place between Toyota and its suppliers in Japan. This development represents the present climax of 
a process that has been ongoing for years: While the first Thai-specific Soluna passenger car was 
completely developed in Japan, input from Thai engineers towards the development of its later 
generations has increased permanently. Hence, by gradually shifting more development tasks to 
Thailand, TMT has developed the technological capabilities considered necessary to establish large 
scale R&D-operations.  
In conclusion, Thailand is currently experiencing a wave of R&D-activity in its automotive 
industry. For Thai-owned suppliers this is both an opportunity and a threat: They have the 
opportunity to become integrated into Toyota’s R&D-system, yet if they fail to develop the required 
capabilities soon, they may also be forced out of business and replaced by other follow-source 
suppliers (Thailand Automotive Institute interview). 
6.1.2.4 Mechanism by which TNCs in the automotive industry contribute to the 
system of innovation 
In summary, the findings of the interviews in Thailand’s automotive industry lead to the following 
conclusions about the mechanisms through which TNC-affiliates positively influence the TCs of 
local firms and the Thai-SI as such:  
 
a) TNCs are very demanding and lead to crises among supplier firms. This can trigger an 
increase in the intensity of effort on behalf of upgrading and learning. 
TNCs provide either product specifications or simply the requirement forms, which shift 
responsibility to the suppliers’ engineers to develop the detailed product. Moreover, they demand 
continuous cost reductions (e.g. 3% per year), which push supplier firms’ engineers to look for new 
materials, new suppliers and new processes. Additionally, TNCs are exceptionally demanding in 
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terms of quality and environmental standards (ISO 900x, ISO 14000) as well as production and 
supply chain organisation (JIT, kaizen, TQM). 
 
b) TNCs help their suppliers to develop technological capabilities, if it is in their self-interest. 
Firms in Thailand receive advice from their TNC-parents or -customers with the production 
technology. Sometimes parents or customers support local firms in the procurement and assembly 
of the production technology. Moreover, they counsel local suppliers about the procurement of 
inputs. In addition most large TNC-affiliates operate supplier clubs in Thailand, which organise 
training and/ or information exchange for – at least first tier – suppliers. Within the clubs, capable 
follow-source suppliers are frequently asked to train or assist locally owned suppliers. This 
mechanism also works on an international scale: TNCs establish the contact between local firms 
and suppliers in Europe, Japan or North America, in order to initiate technical assistance and ‘good 
practice’ training. Moreover, TNCs frequently provide direct technical assistance, for example, by 
sending their own engineers from plants in Thailand or abroad to the locally owned suppliers, who 
train the personnel or collaborate on product or process improvements. TNCs also invite Thai 
engineers to their home plants for training courses. Additionally, TNCs enable ‘learning by 
visiting’, e.g. plant visits allow Thai engineers to get a feeling for state-of-the-art production 
processes. 
 
c) TNCs provide local firms an opportunity to access markets. 
TNC-affiliates in Thailand are mostly dedicated to localisation strategies and, therefore, seek local 
suppliers. Although they frequently bring in follow-source suppliers, there is – at least in principle – 
scope for local firms to become part of the global TNC-production network. Hence, TNC-affiliates 
in Thailand act as an interface between the corporate production and R&D-networks and Thai 
suppliers. Consequently, if suppliers prove themselves, they can be given the opportunity to become 
a global source for the TNC-operations. Some may use existing customers as references, or win 
new customers thanks to increased performance (see a).  
 
d) TNCs enrich the SI by bringing new actors with them. 
Firstly, TNC-affiliates are actors in their own right. Additionally, they bring in follow-source 
suppliers. Although these can potentially drive local firms out of business, they are more likely to 
fill a segment in the economy that did not exist before. The involvement of these new actors within 
the SI is strongly dependent on the commitment of the TNC, the autonomy of the TNC-affiliate and 
– fairly often – the number of years that the affiliates has been operating in Thailand. 
 
e) TNCs improve the S&T-infrastructure and the human capital basis. 
TNCs cooperate with universities, sponsor institutes, design industry-relevant curricula, provide 
teachers for lectures and give opportunity for internships, student projects, and joint research for 
master students and – in principle – for applied research. Moreover, some have advanced in-house 
human-resource-development programs and most send engineers abroad. As indicated by TNC1’s 
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claim to have a high turnover of engineers, these skills seem to spill over to other companies. 
However, it remains unclear whether or not local firms benefit from these spillovers, if personnel 
mobility is essentially restricted to TNC-affiliates. 
6.2 Hard disk drive industry 
6.2.1 Overview of the hard disk drive industry in Thailand 
Thailand is the world’s second largest hard disk drive producer behind Singapore in terms of 
output, and third largest in terms of value, with an overall market share of about 17% (KRC, 2003) 
to 24% (Runckel, 2004) in 2003. Currently, four of the top five HDD-assemblers have major 
operations in Thailand, namely market leader Seagate, Western Digital, Hitachi Global Storage 
Technologies (result of the 2003 merger of IBM’s and Hitachi’s disk drive operations) and Fujitsu 
(Runckel, 2004). A fifth assembler is Union Technology, a Thai-owned affiliate of the Saha group, 
which operates for Hitachi. According to Runckel (2004), the industry includes 50-60 
manufacturers of parts, employing more than 90,000 workers.  
A recent study by Afzulpurkar and Brimble (2004), in which the author participated, surveyed and 
mapped about 25 firms within the HDD-cluster (see Tab. 6.4, Figure 6.3). Almost all firms in the 
HDD-cluster are either wholly foreign-owned or joint ventures (see also Runckel, 2004, McKinsey, 
2002). Most of the firms are located in the provinces surrounding Bangkok (Brooker Group, 
2002a), although BOI zoning policies have led some large HDD-assemblers to locate in zone 3 (see 
chapter 4.1.4.4). For example Hitachi owns a plant in Prachinburi and one of Seagate’s two 
factories is located in Korat (Nakhon Ratchasima), each about two hours by car from Bangkok. 
In 2004, the industry experienced large investments of over US$ 600m (Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 
2004: 11), after Seagate relocated its assembly plant from Singapore to Thailand (Wiriyapong, 
2004b) and Hitachi, Fujitsu and Western Digital expanded their production markedly (e.g. 
Wiriyapong, 2004a, Bunyamanee, 2004, Runckel, 2004). As a result the market share was supposed 
to have increase to over 31% in 2004 (KRC, 2003).  
According to the BOI (2002) the export of HDDs and HDD-parts accounted for US$ 4.5 billion in 
2001. A market survey by Runckel (2004) and a study by Afzulpurkar and Brimble (2004) estimate 
exports worth US$ 5 billion in 2003. Hence, the HDD-industry accounts for ca. 63% of total 
computer and peripheral exports (McKinsey, 2002). According to these figures HDD-related 
exports would represent about 7.5% of manufacturing exports (based on figures by Bank of 
Thailand, 2004a). Kasikorn Research Center (2003) guesstimated that one half of the HDD-
components is exported, while the other half is supplied to domestic HDD-plants.  
In terms of GDP, the aggregated ‘office, accounting and computing machinery’ sector produces 
about 5.3% of manufacturing GDP in 2002 (National Economic and Social Development Board, 
2002). As the HDD-industry dominates this sector, a share of 2.5 – 3% would be a reasonable ‘best 
guess’. Based on a local content estimation of 31%, Afzulpurkar and Brimble (2004) calculate a 
local-value added of about US$ 1.6 billion, which would approximate 3.3% of manufacturing GDP 
and 1.16% of total GDP. Other sources assume a higher local value-added, e.g. Runckel (2004) and 
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KRC (2003) mention a margin of 37-46%, which would equal 1.3 – 1.6% of GDP in 2002 (KRC, 
2003). 
Tab. 6.4:Firms in the Thailand’s HDD-industry 
Company No. of 
employees 
Total Investment 
(Mio. Bhat) 
Export Values in 2003
(Mio. Bhat) 
HGA/ HSA/ HDD Assembly 
Fujitsu 2,863 719 24,504
Hitachi GST 7,081 31,200 72,569
Seagate Technology 13,000 2,605 57,829
Western Digital 10,630 2,800 29,151
Union Technology 5,010 NA NA
HGA Components 
K.R. Precision 1,550 200 280
Magnecomp 573 NA 974
Head Stack Components 
Belton 3,400 1,200 3,000
LTEC (Fujikura) 3,552 4,059 1,383
Mektec 2,316 1,033 2,461
San-Ei 13,500 35 NA
Totoku 181 110 5
Spindle Motors 
JVC Components 4,728 NA 7,000
Minibea (20% HDD related) 6,000 33 NA
TDK NA NA NA
Nidec Electronics 10,773 19,107 19,000
PCB/ FSA 
Innovex 1,800 NA 1,300
Agere 1,050 NA NA
Cal-Comp Electronics 1,400 202 NA
HDD Mechanical Parts 
Fuji Shinsei 228 20 4
NHK Spring (20% HDD related) 240 40 1,200
NOK Precision Component 538 149 707
Texchem-Pack 132 46 14
Altum Precision 215 NA 153
Z. Kuroda 710 250 300
Clean Room Supplies/ Services 
Adampak 72 35 64
Prima Clean 85 30 NA
Riverstone Resources 110 50 80
Union Microclean 105 NA NA
Other 
3M 520 NA NA
Gem City Engineering 20 10 NA
TOTAL 92,382 83,273 221,977
Source: Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004: 30 
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Figure 6.3: Visualisation of the Thai HDD-cluster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brimble, 2003b 
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Value-chain 
HDDs are the most complex components of a computer. The basic manufacturing process consists 
of four subassembly (1-4) steps and one final assembly (5) step (see Figure 6.4): 
1. Assembling read/write heads: First wafers are made, which are subsequently fabricated into 
sliders. Sliders are very small read/write elements that are attached to a suspension, a small 
arm holding the head above the disk. This process is called head-gimbal assembly (HGA). 
Several of these arms are stacked together, combined with actuators and circuitry in a 
process called head-stack assembly (HSA). 
2. Producing media/ disks: Disks are made out of aluminium or glass and store the data. 
Normally a HDD contains several disks. 
3. Assembling motors: The motor spins the media. They include a shaft, a rotator, ball bearings 
and lubricants. 
4. Producing the electronics: These include mainly semiconductors, printed circuit boards 
(PCBs) and flexible circuits, which connect the PCB to the other components of the HDD. 
These components coordinate the operation of the motor, heads and actuators. 
5. Head-Disk Assembly (HDA): All components, which are typically assembled in separate 
plants, are finally brought together in head-disk assembly. The HDA is then placed in a base 
plate. The final step is the servo writing, an electromechanical technique to control the 
positioning of the head, and testing of the HDD (based on McKendrick et al., 2000: pp.22). 
 
Figure 6.3: Hard disk drive industry value-chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PCB: Printed Circuit Board            Source: McKendrick et al., 2000: 21 
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According to (Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004) the main competence of HDD-firms in Thailand is the 
subassembly of components, especially heads as well as the final assembly. 
 
History 
Thailand’s development towards a major HDD-producer began when Seagate relocated its HSA 
from Singapore to Thailand in 1983 and grew “in tandem with the development of the regional 
production network” (McKendrick et al., 2000: 186), which had its centre in Singapore. From 1988 
onwards, Seagate pulled other TNC-affiliates into Thailand. In the first phase essential locational 
advantages included a large pool of labour close to Singapore, low factor costs (especially wages), 
favourable tax and tariff policies, Thailand’s political and macroeconomic stability and a non-
interventionist government approach (McKendrick et al., 2000: pp. 186). While these conditions 
remained important, Thailand developed additional agglomeration benefits, such as access to 
trained manpower, a cluster of internal and external suppliers and industry-related facilities. As the 
president of K.R. Precision stated: “Thailand’s key advantage is its ‘technical infrastructure’, the 
cadre of engineers and technicians that has gradually built up” (cited in McKendrick et al., 2000: 
198). Many of these technicians were trained at Seagate. However, McKendrick et al. (ibid.) point 
out that the quality of the human capital base should not be exaggerated, since many high-skill 
activities have not been performed in Thailand.  
Another advantage was the speed with which firms could start their production, due to available 
personnel and, sometimes, even plant facilities. This is also true for ramp-up and –down, which is 
essential in the HDD-industry, due to extremely short product-life-cycles and product specific 
production technology. The HDD production process in Thailand has gradually extended over the 
years, including now several production steps: In the beginning, for instance, Seagate’s products 
were brought to Singapore for debugging. At the end of the 1990s, all the pilot and preproduction 
work for HGAs was performed by Seagate Thailand.  
However, information spillovers are low: “Here we don’t share anything, not even epoxy” (Read-
Rite38 executive cited in McKendrick et al., 2000: 198). Several attempts to create advanced 
industry-specific facilities, such as an industry training program, a centre for testing and failure 
analysis, a tool and die institute or a centre for magnetic testing have failed (ibid.). A new initiative 
is currently underway to establish these kind of projects within the cluster (see Afzulpurkar & 
Brimble, 2004). 
Generally, the hard disk drive industry is characterised by strong price competition, constantly 
increasing quality demands and short product-life-cycles, which make short lead-times a necessity. 
These developments go hand in hand with a rapid change in process technology and increasing 
pressures for automation, in order to meet the high precision standards. This development leads to a 
decreasing demand in labour but an increasing demand for technical service providers, a strong 
supplier base and highly skilled technicians and engineers (Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004, HDD 
Industry Thailand, 2002, KRC, 2003).  
                                                 
 38 Read-Rite went insolvent in 2003 and Western Digital bought the Thailand operations of Read-Rite. 
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Another development, which challenges Thailand as a production site for HDD, is the recent move 
of many large PC-assemblers to China. Almost all interviewees reported experiencing ‘strong 
forces’ to re-locate to China in order to have operations close to their main customers. 
 
The impact of this challenge is multiplied by the weaknesses of Thailand’s HDD-cluster:  
• A key concern is that the HDD-industry in Thailand is focused too much on assembly. 
Important, high value-adding steps such as R&D, design and the fabrication of disk media 
and wafer are not performed (Panichapat & Kanasawat, 1999: 18, Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 
2004:7, McKinsey, 2002: 175). 
• Thailand lacks high-technology laboratories for testing. Consequently, most testing of final 
HDDs is performed in either Japan, the US or Singapore. Additionally, the infrastructure 
poses a certain obstacle, for example unreliable power supply can sometimes cause 
problems during testing (a process which takes up to 46 hrs.). (Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 
2004: 7, McKendrick et al., 2000: 196, Panichapat & Kanasawat, 1999:18).  
• Furthermore, there is a persistent lack of highly skilled engineers (ibid.). 
• The fairly low local content originates from the lack of local suppliers, low quality of 
domestic components and a rather complicated process of selling between domestic plants 
(Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004: 6). The latter is the direct result of BOI tax incentives, 
which require suppliers to export their products in order to receive raw material import tariff 
exemptions. “If the manufactured components are not exported, as declared by the BOI, the 
suppliers must submit papers declaring the value of indirect exports that may be considered 
as domestic sales for payment of the raw material import duties” (ibid.: 6). Hence, suppliers 
frequently export parts and components to Malaysia or Singapore, before assemblers re-
import these as raw materials (ibid.; see also Sukhpisarn, 2002). 
• There is little involvement of domestic, Thai-owned firms in the industry. Also, there are 
few linkages within the industry and between the HDD-industry and other electronics 
industries (KRC, 2003, Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004, Panichapat & Kanasawat, 1999: 18). 
• Customs procedures take too long for smooth JIT production methods, controls too often 
cause damage to the products, and BOI incentives do not match the characteristics of the 
industry (e.g. the constant modernisation of existing production lines is not sufficiently 
covered by the BOI policy of privileging new projects) (McKendrick et al., 2000: 196, HDD 
Industry Thailand, 2002: 5; Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004: 14).  
Recently, there have been some policy activities, focusing particularly on the HDD-industry. 
Firstly, the BOI has declared HDD a ‘priority industry’ in spring 2004 with some additional 
benefits especially for firms committed to R&D, training, and subcontractor development (see 
chapter 4.1.4.4). Secondly, NSTDA is currently trying to create a HDD-cluster through the 
provision of a cluster development manager and supporting specific cluster strengthening projects 
(Afzulpurkar & Brimble, 2004: pp.11).  
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6.2.2 TNCs in Thailand’s HDD-industry: capabilities, linkages, spillovers 
In accordance to chapter 6.2.1 this section begins by introducing the interviewed firms and their 
core business activities. Secondly, it displays the firms’ embeddedness in the value-chain and 
external collaborations. Thirdly, it reflects upon the self-assessment of technological capabilities 
and reports on the organisation of the R&D and innovation process as well as the perception of the 
business environment.  
6.2.2.1 The interviewees in the HDD-industry and their embeddedness – value-chain 
and cooperation 
Together with Dr. Peter Brimble of Asia Policy Research, and Dr. Nitin Afzulpurkar, Professor at 
the Industrial Systems Engineering Program, School of Advanced Technologies, Asian Institute of 
Technology, the author conducted interviews with eleven firms in the HDD-industry, which 
encompass five HDD/HGA/HSA assemblers, of which all but one are TNC affiliates (HDD1, 
HDD2, HDD3, HDD4, HDD5) and five key suppliers (SP1, SP2, SP3, SP4, SP5), of which all but 
one are again TNC affiliates.  
In the first part of the interviews the basic production process, as well as the location of the main 
customers and suppliers, were established. Tab. 6.5 presents this information and gives additional 
data on external linkages. The HDD-assemblers supply mostly the main PC- and laptop-assemblers 
abroad, but differ in the degree of local sourcing. While HDD1, HDD3 and, to a certain extent, 
HDD4 have a fairly high rate of local sourcing, HDD2 and HDD5 rely heavily on global sourcing 
and imports. The first and second tier suppliers on the other hand import almost all critical inputs. 
They sell to a varying degree to domestic customers. 
Tab. 6.5: Embeddedness of the surveyed HDD-firms: Value-chain and external collaboration  
Firm Supplier Customer/ Market External linkages  
(beyond pure market based) 
HDD1 Over 90% of suppliers are located in 
Thailand. According to newspaper 
sources local content is 70%. 
Export to either the main 
PC assemblers or end 
user market. 
Suppliers: Frequent collaborations on 
product development with Thai-based 
suppliers 
Universities: Three ambitious 
programs: a) automation engineers 
program with 5 universities; b) 
coursework for master’s courses in 
three universities, c) providing 
laboratory facilities in 2 universities 
(see text) 
HDD2 Generally global sourcing. All suppliers 
are Japanese-owned, with plants in 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, China, 
Thailand etc.  
Of key components only spindle motors 
are supplied locally. Qualified local 
suppliers would be welcomed as backup 
for global sourcing. 
Export to large PC 
assemblers. 
Customers: Visits from customers for 
quality auditing. 
Suppliers: long term relationships, but 
most suppliers are from overseas. 
HDD3 70% of suppliers are located in Thailand 
(in terms of value 50%): Spindle motors, 
and FSA/ PCB are sourced locally. All 
local suppliers foreign-owned/ JV; 
mostly Japanese. 
Contract manufacturer for 
another assembler 
Suppliers: some interaction with 
suppliers, e.g. supplier meetings, 
audits, source inspection – but 
generally external linkages are 
dominated by customer. 
HDD4 Some local supplies, e.g. spindle motors 
and FSA/PCB; no figures given 
Export to large PC 
assemblers  
Suppliers: Collaboration on product 
development. 
Universities: Professors as local 
lecturers for internal training 
… cont. next page 
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HDD5  80% of inputs are imported, mainly from 
Japan. 20% locally sourced: cover, base 
plate, spindle motors, actuator and 
magnet plates. HGA come from Japan. 
Locally owned companies only account 
for 2-4% of supplies – these are non-
critical parts such as packaging. HDD5 
would like to have more local suppliers, 
but cannot convince Japanese suppliers 
to locate in Thailand. 
100% of production is 
exported, mainly to China. 
Suppliers: Some minor collaboration 
with Thai based suppliers. 
SP1 All critical components are supplied 
from firms in the USA and Japan. 
30% of sales domestic, 
70% export (i.e. China) 
Customers/ suppliers: very strong 
collaboration on product development; 
same intensity with Thai and foreign 
based firms 
Universities: Research linkages with 
MTEC and Chualalongkorn, but also to 
DSI (Singapore) and universities in 
USA, Japan and China  
SP2 Main supplies are low beams and 
fixtures from Japan and China; 
additionally mountplates from the USA.  
Local suppliers only for non-critical 
parts, such as packaging. 
50% domestic; 50% 
export (China). 
Customers: Some information 
exchange in Thailand at the initial stage 
of a new/improved product; during 
volume production only quality audits/ 
troubleshooting. 
Public services: Uses service of 
Department for Vocational Training for 
in-house training. 
SP3 Main inputs are castings, which are 
supplied from Malaysia; almost no local 
supplies. 
100% domestic. Customers: quality audits, feedback 
on product 
Universities: Sometimes using 
university laboratory for testing. 
SP4 Only very few part supplies; firm 
strategy: ‘make yourself’; hence mostly 
raw material  
More than 90% export Customers: quality audits, feedback 
on products, information exchange 
Universities: Allows universities to use 
on of its high-end machines in the R&D 
department, because it is the only one 
of its kind in Thailand. 
SP5 Key input is only produced in Japan and 
the USA and hence supplied from there. 
Other material from US, Japan, Taiwan;  
Only some metal parts can be supplied 
locally; ca. 10 suppliers in Thailand 
producing according to SP4’s 
specifications. 
70-80% domestic; export 
to Malaysia, Singapore 
and China. 
Customers: Frequent interaction, 
mostly about quality control, audits and 
customer requirements. 
SP6 Try to procure locally, but experience 
difficulty, e.g. because of premiums 
demanded by monopoly-like domestic 
suppliers. Importing is often cheaper. 
About 40% HDD related, 
total export 20%;  
Customers: Core business is 
identifying bottlenecks and custom-
tailored automation process equipment, 
which requires intense collaboration 
with customers.  
Source: Author’s interviews 
Consequently, the Thai HDD-cluster gives the impression of having a fairly good presence of first 
tier suppliers, allowing at least some assemblers to create a partial production network in Thailand. 
This is not true for the 1st and 2nd tier suppliers, which often require high-technology inputs that are 
not available locally. Moreover, most firms would favour a stronger supplier-base in Thailand. 
Several firms, suppliers as well as assemblers, expressed the intention to source more locally, but 
could not find suitable domestic suppliers. This is either because the technology necessary to 
produce the input is not accessible in Thailand, for example, flexible Polyimide (reported by SP5) 
or die casting and e-coating (SP3), the precision and/or quality is not sufficient, e.g. for etching 
(SP2), or the suppliers are not price competitive and have lead times that are too long (SP3, SP5).  
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In order to overcome such structural problems, several firms tried to attract their foreign suppliers to 
Thailand (SP2, SP1, HDD5), but did not succeed. In consequence, firms either keep on importing or 
begin to integrate their production steps (e.g. SP1, HDD1). 
Concerning external linkages, most companies are linked to the value-chain in Thailand and share 
related information (e.g. on QC). However, only very few firms work together with suppliers or 
customers on product-, process- or human-resource- development in Thailand (for more see 
6.2.2.3). Accordingly, innovation-related vertical links are weak.  
Still, innovation-related horizontal linkages to universities, R&D-institutions, service providers or 
competitors are even scarcer. Hence, most surveyed firms can be regarded as ‘islands’ within the 
Thai NSI. Their linkages are restricted to partners abroad.  
Only a few firms can be considered locally embedded. These are either headquartered in Thailand 
or display a ‘commitment’ to the location based on firm strategy and a long history in Thailand. 
6.2.2.2 Technological capabilities in the HDD-industry 
As for the automotive-industry, the interviewees in the HDD-industry were asked to evaluate their 
firm’s technological capabilities according to the framework presented in chapter 3.2.2. 
2nd tier suppliers, such as SP3, and contract manufacturers, such as HDD3, have the lowest 
capabilities, whereas most of the assemblers and SP1 score fairly high. In general, investment, 
industrial and especially process engineering capabilities are high, while product and especially 
innovation and linkage capabilities are in most cases more basic. As a matter of fact, some 
interviewees state that their firms are “not even basic” (SP4) in terms of linkage capabilities, 
whereas HDD1 and SP1 exhibit high linkage capabilities, which is in line with their degree of 
embeddedness. 
 
Process technology 
The process engineering capabilities of the HDD-assemblers are high but not uniform. Two types 
of firms can be distinguished: 
First, firms whose process-layout the headquarters or customer develops. The process technology is 
imported. The volume-production line is set up in cooperation between Thai and foreign engineers, 
either working for the parent firms or the equipment supplier (HDD2, HDD3, HDD5). While some 
of these firms even have pilot-lines in Thailand (HDD5), others run pilot-lines at the headquarters, 
but carry out extensive tests on the production line in Thailand before approving volume-production 
(HDD2). Even contract manufacturers have maintenance and troubleshooting capabilities and report 
successful process improvements, such as scrap reduction and workflow optimisation (HDD3). 
Furthermore, all of these firms report rising capabilities within their engineering teams, e.g. HDD2 
engineers have developed robots for a production line entirely in-house. 
Second, firms with more advanced capabilities perform most of the process development in 
Thailand (HDD1, HDD4): “Our engineers in Thailand start with concepts on paper about new 
equipment which will be used in 2-3 years time” (HDD1). In doing this they closely cooperate with 
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equipment suppliers in other Asian countries (e.g. Japan, Singapore, Malaysia), because there are no 
suitable suppliers available within Thailand.  
The suppliers, whose capabilities are similar to those of less capable assemblers, share these 
characteristics. They also import all of the process technology, mainly from Japan and the USA. 
Frequently, the parent firm in the USA or Japan develops the process, the pilot-line is implemented 
in Japan or China, and then the turnkey production technology is transferred to Thailand (SP2, 
SP5). Joint Thai-foreign engineering teams are responsible for setting-up the volume-production 
line. Once the process is established, local engineers may perform some minor, incremental process 
improvements from time to time (SP3, SP5). Only the one supplier headquartered in Thailand does 
advanced process development in Thailand. 
Tab. 6.6: Self assessment of technological capabilities of firms in the HDD-industry 
Manufacturing  Investment 
Process 
Engineering
Product 
Engineering
Industrial 
Engineering
Innovation Linkages 
Basic SP3 HDD3 SP3 
SP2 
SP3 
SP4 
HDD3 
 
SP2, SP3 
SP4, SP5 
HDD3 
[SP3, SP4]* 
SP2, SP5, 
HDD2, HDD3, 
HDD5 
      HDD4 
Intermediate 
SP2 
SP5 
HDD5 
HDD3 
SP5 
HDD1 
HDD2 
HDD4 
SP2, SP3 
SP4 
SP5 
HDD3 
HDD1 
HDD4 
HDD5 
 
      HDD1 
Advanced 
SP1 
SP4 
HDD1 
HDD2 
HDD4 
SP1, SP2, 
SP4, SP5 
HDD1,HDD2
HDD4 
HDD5 
SP1 
HDD5 
SP1 
HDD1 
HDD2 
HDD4 
HDD5 
SP1 
HDD2 SP1 
* less than basic; NB due to its particularity, SP5 was not asked to evaluate its TCs;  Source: author’s interviews 
However, there are some indications that a certain degree of upgrading in assembler and supplier 
firms has taken place. For example, SP2 reports that it plans to move process development 
functions to Thailand, as it expects a higher efficiency through the concentration of process 
development teams, pilot- and volume-production lines in the same location. Moreover, it states 
that customers expect this kind of commitment close to their operations. HDD3 reports that new 
products are now launched on its own pilot-line rather than in Japan. In addition, HDD2 expresses 
the intention to gradually move more process and equipment development facilities from Japan to 
Thailand. 
 
Product development  
As in process development, two groups of assemblers can be distinguished: Firstly, firms that 
receive detailed product specifications, blueprints and/ or ‘ready to manufacture’ products from 
 206 
their headquarters or either customers in Japan or the USA. Accordingly, collaboration on product 
development takes place between parents, customers and suppliers at the home base of the TNC 
(HDD2, HDD3).  
The second group has higher responsibilities for product development. For example, HDD1 has its 
R&D-departments for product development in the USA, Singapore and Northern Ireland. However, 
as soon as a working prototype has been developed and the new HDD has entered the “pure 
conceptual proven stadium” (HDD1) it is transferred to Thailand where all further development 
takes place. Consequently, HDD1 reports on its interacting frequently and intensely with its 
suppliers in Thailand regarding product development. 
The development process at HDD5 seems to be even more advanced: Basic research and initial 
product design is conducted in Japan in intense cooperation with suppliers. As soon as this initial 
phase is concluded the design is transferred to Thailand, where the engineering team develops the 
prototype. However, HDD5 reports that the entire development process in Thailand is performed in-
house, without any external cooperation partners. Similarly, HDD4 performs product development 
in Thailand, but declined to give further details. 
The suppliers demonstrate a product development process similar to that of the first named 
assembler group. Their parent firms perform product development either at their headquarters or in 
R&D-departments in the USA, Japan and/ or Singapore (SP2, SP3, SP4, SP5), where they closely 
cooperate with the R&D-departments of customers and suppliers. Consequently, only the volume 
production is taking place in Thailand. 
However, there are various minor R&D-activities situated in Thailand: For example SP4 runs an 
R&D-facility, even though its main objective is analysing and testing. Nevertheless, it was recently 
involved in the development of a new fluid dynamic bearing, collaborating with its parent firm and 
the customer. In this process the Thai-unit developed a cheaper and qualitatively better product by 
itself, which is now used for production. Moreover, the department is improving this product further 
at the moment.  
SP1’s products are developed in the US and Thailand. The purpose of the department in the USA is 
intense collaboration with customers during the initial stage of development. Soon after, R&D-staff 
transfer the knowledge from the US to the R&D-department in Thailand, where further research and 
development is executed. During this process R&D-personnel is sometimes collaborating with the 
customers’ regional headquarters in Singapore. 
 
The importance of proximity in joint development 
Many interviewees stated that proximity is important for supply-chain-management (HDD1, 
HDD5, SP1), but absolutely essential for joint product development, because of very short lead-
times in the industry: “Time to knowledge is greatly enhanced by being co-located” (HDD1, 
similarly SP1). Consequently, some firms experience problems with collaborations, because 
customers and suppliers are located abroad. For example, SP1 reports in relation to the need to be 
close to its customers, which have established facilities in China, and the unwillingness of its 
Japanese suppliers to move to Thailand. These suppliers would sooner follow to China. Hence, in 
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order to achieve proximity to customers and suppliers SP1 would need to re-locate to China. 
Currently, firms create proximity either by having R&D-laboratories close to their most important 
collaboration partners – at least for the initial stage of the development process, or through the 
frequent travelling of R&D-personnel. 
Other interviewees confirm that proximity would ease supply-chain-management, but that global 
sourcing is normally no obstacle for JIT (HDD2). 
 
S&T-infrastructure and human resources 
Most firms had almost no collaborations with the S&T-infrastructure in Thailand. Some low-scale 
examples include the use of university laboratories for testing (SP3) or the provision of own 
equipment for universities’ research (SP4).  
Of the interviewed firms, only SP1 and HDD1 display signs of more intense linkages. However, 
SP1 is very unsatisfied with the domestic education and science system, stating that it lags 10 years 
behind most other Asian systems and needs major reforms. 
On the other hand, HDD1 is at the moment actively trying to foster the indigenous knowledge base 
by pursuing the following three programs with universities: 
• Automation engineers program: Together with five universities HDD1 developed the 
program, providing the curriculum, basic course structure and material. Moreover, HDD1 
gives instructions to the universities on how to train the automation engineers. The program 
is very much oriented towards the requirements of HDD1’s applications. 
• Coursework: HDD1 has developed three fully accredited courses among the masters 
courses for microelectronic/ industrial engineering called “recording and technology” and 
“competitive manufacturing and leadership” at the Asian Institute of Technology, the King 
Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi and the Khon Kaen University. 
Furthermore, HDD1 staff teaches these courses.  
• Donation of laboratories: HDD1 has provided Khon Kaen University with an HDD-
laboratory, including a clean room, and Suranaree Univeristy of Technology in Korat 
(Nakhon Ratchasima) with a mechanical engineering laboratory. 
 
In respect to the availability and quality of human resources the firm interviews offer contradictory 
evidences: Most firms complain about the quality and number of (S&T) university graduates 
(HDD2, HDD5, SP1, SP3, SP5, SP6) and some report high turnover and poaching within the HDD-
cluster. According to SP6 the main problem with Thai engineers is that they lack problem solving 
and interdisciplinary capabilities (‘thinking outside the box’), which are not fostered by the 
education system. On the other hand, there are also firms that are satisfied with the available pool of 
skilled labour and did not report any problems (HDD1, SP2, SP4). 
There are several mechanisms that firms can utilise in order to cope with shortages of skilled 
labour: 
• Overseas training: Many firms send their engineers to Japan or other foreign locations for 
further training (HDD2, HDD4, HDD5, SP1, SP5)  
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• Internal training: Several firms provide extensive in-house training to cater to the industry/ 
firm specific requirements (HDD2, HDD4, SP2, SP5). This service is at times provided by 
incoming university professors (HDD4).  
• Hiring of foreign engineers: Because Thailand lacks professionals in certain fields, firms 
hire expatriates. For example, engineers with precision tooling skills appear to be in short 
supply, leading two firms to hire Indian engineers (SP1, SP2). 
However, these investments in human-resource development are frequently sunk costs for the 
individual firm, because engineers leave the company soon after the training (e.g. they are 
‘poached’ by other firms) (HDD5, SP1). Some firms also experience problems in attracting and 
keeping high skilled engineers, because of their plant’s location in the BOI zone 3, which lacks the 
‘soft location-advantages’ sought by high-skilled professionals (HDD2). 
An exceptional case is HDD1: The interviewee emphasised that the high technology, automated 
process technology requires highly educated staff. Nevertheless, HDD1 does not experience 
problems in finding and sustaining its engineer base. It attributes this to its long history in Thailand, 
which resulted in many “home-grown talents” and a stable workforce. Actually, HDD1 perceives 
the technical expertise of the human capital as the “single most important competitive advantage of 
Thailand”, which would be difficult to replicate in new locations like China.  
6.2.2.3 Mechanism by which TNCs in the HDD- industry contribute to the system of 
innovation 
The HDD-industry in Thailand incorporates only a few locally owned companies. Of the 
interviewed firms only two can be considered local: HDD3 and SP1. Consequently, this section 
does not reflect the impact of TNC-affiliates on local firms, but on other foreign firms and the SI as 
such. 
 
a) TNCs are very demanding and hence lead to crises among supplier firms. This can trigger 
an increase in the intensity of effort on behalf of upgrading and learning. 
Virtually all firms in the HDD-industry experience permanent demand for cost cutting and quality 
improvements. In many cases, customers formulate specific requirements, which have to be met by 
suppliers and which cause considerable upgrading and learning efforts from the suppliers. 
 
b) TNCs enrich the SI by bringing with them or inducing the creation of new actors. 
Several firms were asked by their customers to set up production facilities in Thailand (SP3, SP5). 
Additionally, SP6 created a subsidiary in Thailand, because proximity to its suppliers was required 
by one of its main customers. Nowadays, SP6 is one of very few companies in Thailand that operate 
in custom-tailored process-technology development.  
Moreover, the establishment of SP1 was induced by a TNC, because it needed a second supplier to 
avoid dependence on its main supplier. This start-up has in the meantime developed into a global 
player within the HDD-industry.  
Hence, all these firms fill a vacancy within the NSI, providing competences that were not available 
before. They therefore enhance the structure of the economy and the NSI. However, the presence 
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does not automatically improve the system of innovation, besides providing employment and taxes. 
Many foreign firms – at least in the HDD-industry – have limited domestic linkages, which are 
mostly restricted to the value-chain. Furthermore, the production networks are characterized by high 
entry barriers for local firms (at least for critical components) and can hence be seen as an example 
for a ‘parallel economy’, which must become further embedded in order to reap higher benefits for 
the NSI. 
 
c) TNCs improve the S&T-infrastructure and the human capital basis. 
Almost all interviewed TNC-affiliates provide either in-house or external training. Very often they 
sent engineers overseas for further training courses, either to Japan or the United States. This 
improves significantly upon the knowledge- and skill-base of the human capital in Thailand. As a 
matter of fact, the pool of skilled personnel is one important reason named by HDD-firms to locate 
in Thailand. Nevertheless, the existing pool and further supply of S&T graduates from university is 
considered too small and of too poor quality for current challenges and further expansion by most 
interviewees. This is supported by reports on the poaching of highly educated engineers within the 
industry. As a consequence, firms like HDD1 are actively involved in fostering the education of 
students in universities by providing state-of-the-art equipment, industry relevant curricula, 
experienced professionals as teachers and specific teaching material. These activities clearly 
advance the entire industry, since HDD1 does not absorb all of the trained engineers. 
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7 Summary, conclusions, and policy implications 
Technical change in late-industrialising countries is sooner a process of acquiring and adapting 
technology and knowledge available in advanced economies than one of undertaking research and 
development at the technological frontier. It is a process that essentially consists of building 
technological capabilities through technological learning. The purpose of this thesis has been to 
enquire into the role of affiliates of transnational corporations in late-industrialising countries, in 
order to evaluate if and how they might foster these processes in the host economy and in domestic 
firms. This thesis presents the case of manufacturing firms in Thailand and benchmarks it with 
results from Singapore, Penang (Malaysia) and to some extent Europe. 
The objectives of this thesis are: 
a) to determine the contribution of TNC-affiliates to the SI and the technological learning of 
firms in late-industrialising countries theoretically, 
b) to ascertain the current state of the Thai-SI, 
c) to assess the technological capabilities and knowledge-network embeddedness of TNC-
affiliates in comparison to local Thai-firms, and firms in Penang and Singapore, in order to 
evaluate their suitability as collaboration partners and technology senders within the Thai-
SI, 
d) to investigate the primary characteristics of advanced and embedded TNC-affiliates, 
e) to elaborate upon the key mechanisms by which TNC-affiliates improve the Thai-SI and 
foster technological learning within domestic firms, 
f) to identify weaknesses of the SI as perceived by firms and offer policy recommendations for 
strengthening the SI and the impact of TNC-affiliates. 
 
These objectives are met with the following findings: 
Theoretical contribution of TNC-affiliates  
Chapter 2 makes it clear that the central challenge faced by (latecomer) firms in late-industrialising 
countries is catching up with their competitors in industrialised countries. The main objective 
hereby is to develop technological capabilities in order to upgrade the technological performance, to 
develop innovation capabilities and reap a higher share of the value-chain. The development of 
technological capabilities requires technological learning, which is a time consuming and costly 
exercise. Important inputs for technological learning include learning opportunities (learning by 
interacting), the development of absorptive capacity (especially via personnel training) and the 
utilisation of advanced technology from abroad via channels of technology transfer.  
These efforts have to be set in the context of national, regional and sectoral systems of innovation, 
which strongly influence firm behaviour and opportunities. This SI-approach describes learning and 
co-operation opportunities through its evaluation of the stocks of the system, the quantity and 
quality of suitable partners, and its assessment of the flows within the system through the 
consideration of their linkages. Furthermore, it takes determinants of firm behaviour into account by 
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looking at incentives and support for learning and innovation in regard to policies, market 
conditions, available funds, prevailing attitudes and norms etc.  
TNC-affiliates have an impact on these systems, because they are additional elements creating 
additional flows. This influence is important, because TNC-affiliates (can) display characteristics 
that domestic firms lack: TNCs possess by definition particular owner specific-advantages in terms 
of product and process technology, market access, resources, knowledge, etc. In addition, TNCs 
operate international production networks that tend to be dispersed over several countries and, 
consequently, have access to diverse external sources of knowledge on markets and technologies. 
Hence, TNC-affiliates in Thailand pose as an opportunity for domestic firms to tap into these 
knowledge networks, either directly or indirectly. In result, TNC-affiliates may potentially offer an 
advanced learning opportunity to local firms. However, the learning potential provided by TNC-
affiliates varies markedly. It is determined by the type of technology applied, the kind of functions 
performed, the position of the TNC-affiliate within its corporate network, its autonomy and 
openness towards cooperation with local firms, etc. These determinates are decisive in regard to two 
aspects: First, they can influence whether or not local firms get an opportunity to interact and 
therefore learn directly from a TNC-affiliate, and second, whether or not functions, technologies, 
absorptive capacity and knowledge of local and foreign firms match to a degree that suggests 
(mutual) learning. 
Since systems of innovation in late-industrialising countries are typically characterised by a weak 
knowledge base, a dichotomised economic structure and fragmented linkages, these learning 
opportunities and additional linkages provided by TNCs can greatly contribute to the upgrading of 
local firms and the SI as such. 
 
Consequently, this thesis enquires into the functions and technological activities performed by 
foreign and local firms that aim to establish learning and collaboration potential. Furthermore, it 
analyses collaboration patterns, in order to determine whether or not TNC-affiliates in Thailand take 
part in intense R&D and innovation collaborations.  
Besides improving the quality of local companies and linkages to these, TNC-affiliates can have 
further positive impacts on the system of innovation as such: They can bring in additional actors 
(e.g. follow-source suppliers) that enrich the system or increase the human capital base by 
providing training or contributing to the education system.  
However, TNC-affiliates can also be indifferent to or even have negative impacts on the SI. They 
may exclude themselves from local cooperation networks, either creating an ‘autonomous’ 
economic structure by simply replicating home-base production networks, or concentrating on their 
external linkages to partners abroad. Furthermore, they may restrict the interaction between their 
local suppliers or associated companies with third parties. Additionally, TNCs can absorb scarce 
local resources (e.g. human capital, capital) and thereby diminish the development potential of local 
firms.  
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The current state of the Thai-SI 
The review of secondary data and literature in chapter 4 leads to the conclusion that the current state 
of the Thai-SI is fairly poor. Financial and human resources committed to innovation are low, as is 
the output in terms of patents. Furthermore, there are major deficits among all three major actor-
groups. 
The firm-sector is characterised by a dichotomy: on the one hand fairly capable TNC-affiliates, 
some larger Thai-owned firms and some high-tech SMEs, and on the other, the bulk of SMEs 
struggling to attain even basic operation skills. Both groups lack innovative and R&D-capabilities, 
have limited product development and engineering capabilities as well as difficulties implementing 
advanced processes, such as automation or modern organisation modes like Just-in-time. Inter-firm 
links are limited, especially between TNC-affiliates and local SMEs. 
The assessment of the knowledge-related public sector reveals that the output of the education and 
research sector is insufficient in terms of quality and quantity. Graduates lack essential skills, there 
are too few S&T-graduates, the education system is under-funded, and curricula are outdated and 
not oriented towards the needs of the industry. The same is true for scientific research, which is – in 
international comparison – at a fairly low level, as indicated by the number of journal articles. 
Hence, this sector is neither sophisticated enough to cater to the needs of the more capable firms, 
nor sufficiently oriented towards the more basic needs of the large group of less-capable SMEs. 
Consequently, there are large gaps between the education and research sector and the business 
sector leading to marginal linkages and interactions between these groups. 
Finally, government policies and processes are deeply centralised, but at the same time 
characterised by a redundancy of organisations and programmes with similar objectives. This leads 
to a fragmented and inefficient support system. 
 
Technological capabilities and embeddedness  
In order to meet this objective, sections 5.2 – 5.4 test three hypotheses (for an overview of all tested 
indicators and the results see Tab. 7.1):  
 
H1: TNC-affiliates are actors with higher capabilities than local firms. Consequently, they are 
suitable contributors to the upgrading of the host countries’ SI. 
In terms of technological capabilities the data analysis leads to the conclusion that TNC-affiliates 
in Thailand cannot generally be considered more technologically capable than local firms. They are 
more often certificated according to ISO-standards and they are more likely to carry out basic to 
intermediate technological activities such as testing, quality control, acquisition and adaptation of 
external technology. Nevertheless, TNC-affiliates do not perform R&D- and innovation-related 
activities more frequently than local firms (despite a slight increase in 2002). This is especially 
striking in contrast to the benchmarking regions of Penang and Singapore, where foreign firms 
carry out innovation activities much more often than local firms. This indicates a regional division 
of labour, with TNC-operations in Thailand restricted to assembly and manufacturing, whereas the 
facilities in Singapore and Penang more often having the responsibility for higher-order functions.  
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Tab. 7.1: Summary of the analysed indicators: Do they support the stated hypothesis (Y) or not (N)? 
Indicator TIS 
2000 
TIS 
2002 
PIS SNIS ERIS 
H1a: TNC-affiliates possess higher TCs than local firms. 
MA to OBM framework N N N N  
ISO certification      
- 9001 Y Y*** Y Y***  
- 9002 Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***  
- 14001 Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***  
Technological activities      
- Quality Control Y* Y**    
- Testing Y* Y***    
- Acquisition of ext. technology Y*** Y***    
- Adaptation of ext. technology Y Y***    
- Reverse Engineering N*** N    
- Basic Design N*** N    
- Detailed Design N*** N    
Innovation      
- R&D  N Y Y Y*** N* 
- other innovation activities N Y    
- R&D or other innovating activities N Y    
- patents Y N** Y Y*** Y*** 
- product innovations N* Y Y** Y*** Y*** 
- process innovations N Y Y** Y*** Y** 
- innovating N Y Y* Y*** Y** 
- innovative  N Y Y* Y*** [Y] 
H1b: TNC-affiliates have a better absorptive capacity than local firms. 
Qualification structure of workforce Y*** Y*** Y*** Y***  
Training expenditure N Y*** Y* Y***  
H2a: Advanced TNC-affiliates posses higher TCs than advanced local firms. 
MA to OBM framework N N N N**  
ISO certification      
- 9001 Y Y*** Y Y**  
- 9002 Y** Y Y*** Y**  
- 14001 Y*** Y*** Y Y  
Technological activities      
- Quality Control Y* N    
- Testing Y** Y*    
- Acquisition of ext. technology Y Y**    
- Adaptation of ext. technology Y Y    
- Reverse Engineering N ~    
- Basic Design N Y    
- Detailed Design Y Y    
Innovation activities      
Acquisition of machinery, equipment & software N Y N* Y  
Acquisition of external technology e.g. patents and 
licences 
Y*** Y*** Y Y  
Industrial design and engineering, market research, 
marketing expenses 
Y Y/N N N  
Training Y ~ Y Y  
Input-/ Throughput- /Output-indicators      
Innovation expenditure N** N    
R&D expenditure N** N/Y N N  
Innovation and R&D expenditure N N Y N  
Patents Y N N Y  
Innovative firms N Y* Y Y [N] 
continuous on the next page 
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Indicator TIS 
2000 
TIS 
2002 
PIS SNIS ERIS 
H2b: Advanced TNC-affiliates have a higher absorptive capacity than advanced local firms. 
Qualification structure of workforce Y Y Y Y  
R&D-personnel intensity N N N N  
Training expenditure Y Y N N  
H3: R&D performing and potentially innovating TNC-affiliates are suitable technology transfer 
partners for local firms, since they are strongly embedded into the host economy and have access to 
foreign/ external technology. 
Collaboration      
- customer Y Y Y** N Y 
- locally-owned suppliers N Y Y** 
- foreign-owned suppliers Y Y Y Y*** Y 
- parent/associate Y*** Y*** Y** Y  
- R&D institute/university N** N Y Y Y 
- business services N ~ Y N 
- technical services N Y Y*** Y Y 
- government agency  Y    
- competitors Y Y Y N 
- other firm N N Y N Y 
Acquisition of R&D services Y N N N  
- other firm in Thailand ~ N    
- public institute N N*    
- universities N N*    
- abroad Y Y    
Performing own R&D abroad Y Y    
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
Y yes, N no, Y/N one year yes, another no (some questions cover two years in one survey), ~ ambivalent, [..] not 
entirely comparable 
NB sometimes for aggregated indicators, e.g. MA to OBM, the presented significance is representing the tendency, not 
the exact result over all variables. 
Hence, in Thailand there is no evidence for a higher performance by TNC-affiliates per se, from 
which local firms could benefit. However, there are indications that TNCs are beginning to change 
their strategy and beginning to upgrade their operations in Thailand. 
In terms of human capital as a pre-requisite for absorptive capacity, TNC-affiliates are clearly 
more endowed than local firms: Their personnel possess a significantly higher qualification level. 
Moreover, foreign firms invest more money in training than local firms and hence are more devoted 
to the improvement of their absorptive capacity. Similar to other indicators, the expenditure on 
training by TNC-affiliates has increased in the 2nd survey, but is still low in international 
comparison.  
Nevertheless, the share of highly qualified employees in Thailand has increased between 2000 and 
2002, in part due to the higher enrolment rates in tertiary education in recent years.  
 
H2: Even within the group of advanced firms, TNCs have higher capabilities than local firms. 
Within the group of advanced firms, TNC-affiliates are clearly superior to local firms in terms of 
technological and innovative capabilities. Consequently, they are suitable candidates for 
technology transfer and collaboration.  
Generally, advanced firms pursue technological activities at a higher frequency and variety than 
basic firms. Thereby, advanced TNC-affiliates perform high-order technological activities, such as 
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basic and detailed design, more frequently than their local counterparts. Moreover, they contribute 
much more to the international transfer of embodied and disembodied technology to Thailand than 
local firms. This underlines the importance of advanced TNC-affiliates as technology and 
knowledge suppliers to the Thai-SI.  
However, compared to Singapore and Penang, firms in Thailand commit only very limited 
resources to R&D and innovation. In recent years, TNC-affiliates spent more on R&D, whereas 
local firms allocate more funds to other innovation activities. Furthermore, there is some indication 
for an increased R&D- and innovation- spending by TNC-affiliates. Most local and foreign firms 
assign the majority of funds to product development and experimental development. There are 
indications for a shift towards more applied and basic research. Still, the levels of investment 
remain much too low or too recent to result in new patentable products or processes. The number of 
patents in Thailand is minuscule. This is valid for Penang and Singapore, as well – their figures are 
only slightly higher. This underlines that TNCs still carry out basic research and R&D, which 
results in patents in their home-countries or in favourable locations in advanced economies, but not 
in late-industrialising countries in South-East Asia. 
Nevertheless, TNCs have increased their input and, consequently, a higher share of advanced TNC-
affiliates in Thailand has become innovative. The share of innovative foreign firms in 2002 is 
noticeably higher than in 1999 and clearly above the figures for local firms.  
The most important objectives for R&D and innovation within local and foreign firms include 
product and market diversification, market position, cost reduction and – at least in Thailand – 
learning about new technologies. The latter aspect is remarkable, because it has been assessed by 
the firms as being much more important in 2002 than in 1999. This indicates a clear commitment to 
technological capability building and learning.  
Additionally, advanced TNC-affiliates display a higher absorptive capacity than advanced local 
firms in respect to skilled labour and resources allocated to training and R&D. In addition, foreign 
firms exhibit a similar qualification structure, independent of their being basic or advanced.  
Interestingly, local and foreign R&D-firms display similar qualification structures. Foreign non-
R&D-firms are as well endowed with human capital as R&D-firms, whereas local non-R&D-firms 
exhibit fewer high-skilled employees. In conclusion, even non-R&D and basic foreign firms 
possess the potential to become R&D- or advanced firms – at least in terms of a qualified 
workforce. Hence, upgrading to R&D and innovation activities should be fairly easy for these firms. 
In contrast, basic and non-R&D- local firms do not display the human skill base that seems to be 
necessary for carrying out innovation and R&D. Consequently, they first need to enhance the 
qualification structure of their workforce in order to develop R&D and innovation capabilities. 
Despite a similar qualification structure, local firms tend to display a higher R&D-personnel 
intensity than foreign firms. This may result from the larger size of TNC-affiliates in terms of 
employees and a similar sized R&D-department.  
In contrast, the qualification structures in firms in Singapore and Penang are more differentiated 
between foreign/local, advanced/basic, R&D-/ non-R&D firms. This suggests that foreign advanced 
and R&D-firms in Thailand could employ more skilled personnel if the supply were improved. 
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Additionally, it supports the finding that TNCs in Thailand perform less sophisticated functions 
than their counterparts in Singapore and Penang.  
While the R&D-personnel intensity in Thailand is as high as in Penang, it lacks behind firms in 
Singapore. This displays Singapore’s advanced position within the regional division of labour, 
above all its function as a location for regional headquarters, which perform R&D, design and 
engineering.  
 
H3: R&D performing and potentially innovating TNC-affiliates are suitable technology 
transfer partners for local firms, since they are strongly embedded in the host economy and 
have access to foreign/ external technology. 
TNC-affiliates make better use of foreign sources of information for R&D and innovation, and 
source R&D-services more often from abroad. Moreover, about 30% of the foreign firms perform 
R&D elsewhere. In addition, TNC-affiliates have intense R&D and innovation collaborations with 
partners outside of the Thai-NSI. Consequently, R&D-performing and potentially innovating TNC-
affiliates acquire and learn about technology and knowledge abroad and transfer it to Thailand.  
This is essential for local firms, because they rely much more on domestic sources of information. 
Since foreign firms are as often embedded into the Thai-NSI as local firms, TNC-affiliates are 
suitable interfaces for the diffusion of internationally available technology and knowledge in the 
Thai-NSI. Only exception is that TNC-affiliates cooperate far less often than local firms with 
research institutes and universities. This emphasises on the one hand, the low quality of research 
organisations, on the other hand, their irrelevancy to the functions performed by TNC-affiliates in 
Thailand. Nonetheless, the observed increase in R&D and innovation activities performed by TNC-
affiliates will increase the demand for these respective collaborations. 
Furthermore, it has to be underlined that foreign and local firms in Thailand (in 2002) often 
cooperate just as intensely as their counterparts in Singapore and Penang (in 1999). Technical 
service providers alone less often become partners, suggesting a lack of sophistication among the 
actors in this segment of the Thai economy. 
 
In order to inquire into key characteristics of technologically advanced and embedded firms in 
Thailand, chapter 5.5 applies a CHAID-analysis. In order to perform this, the most significant 
independent variables capable of explaining dependent variables, such as ‘being advanced’ and 
‘being embedded’, are established. For the latter a collaboration intensity index is calculated.  
The analysis leads one to suspect that the acquisition and adaptation of external technology as well 
as detailed design activities are the most important factors for advanced foreign firms. Moreover, 
size matters: firms with more employees are more likely to be advanced. Consequently, these 
results support the notion that technical change in late-industrialising countries is strongly related to 
the acquisition and adaptation of external technology available in advanced countries. It also 
underlines the proposition that firms need to cumulate certain basic and intermediate capabilities, 
before becoming successful innovators. Namely, they must gain access to technology (acquisition) 
and, subsequently, understand how it works and how to – incrementally – change it (adaptation). 
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The latter capability can also be achieved by designing specific details of products after key features 
have already been determined.  
Strongly embedded TNC-affiliates are characterised by the fact that they perform applied research 
or experimental development rather than basic research. Moreover, innovative firms, i.e. firms that 
achieve a high share of sales with new products or a high share of production with new processes, 
tend to be more strongly embedded. It can be assumed that innovativeness and embeddedness are 
interrelated: innovative firms see the need for intense collaborations and through these become even 
more innovative. 
The same conclusion holds for the local embeddedness of TNC-affiliates: Foreign firms that spend 
a substantial part of their resources on process related R&D and are successful product or process 
innovators collaborate strongly with partners, which are assumed to be predominantly Thailand 
based. Consequently, innovating firms tend to be more embedded – generally as well as locally.  
 
Technological capabilities and key mechanism by which TNC-affiliates improve the SI in the 
case study industries 
Chapter 6 presents the results from the in-depth interviews in the automotive and HDD-industries. 
The aim of the interviews was to further investigate mechanisms by which TNC-affiliates foster 
technological learning in local firms and enhance the SI as such.  
The interviews found that, in both sectors, the TNC-production networks present high entry barriers 
for local firms. This is primarily due to the fact that TNCs tend to replicate their home-base 
production networks in the host country. Hence, there are relatively few domestic firms within the 
core group (assembler, 1st tier supplier) of these production networks. Nevertheless, the case studies 
show that local firms have the opportunity to become part of the value-chain. These opportunities 
are higher in the automotive than in the HDD-industry, simply because there are more parts and 
especially more basic, low technology parts in a car, offering windows of opportunities to local 
firms.  
Not surprisingly, the technological capabilities of TNC-affiliates are for the most part higher than 
those of local firms. In both the automotive and HDD- industries, TNC-affiliates have high 
technological capabilities in investment, process engineering and to some extent industrial 
engineering. Capabilities in product engineering, innovation and linkages are generally much 
weaker. These findings are supported by the inquiry into the product and process innovation 
process. TNCs still overwhelmingly perform R&D and product design at their home bases and/or in 
preferable locations in other advanced markets, close to the R&D-departments of their key 
customers and/or suppliers. Nevertheless, they tend to shift responsibilities for process 
developments and innovations stepwise to production locations in Thailand. The interactive 
character of the innovation process can explain this. Upgrading is more efficient if development, the 
pilot line and the volume production line are close together. Moreover, this reflects the growing 
skills of the affiliates and their engineers. 
Additionally, some product development takes place in Thailand. These are mostly small 
adaptations to local conditions, but increasingly also major development steps are assigned to TNC-
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affiliates. For example, HDD-prototypes or even conceptual drawings are transferred to Thailand 
for final development and, additionally, new pickup truck models are on the brink of being 
developed within the country. These developments will lead to the advancement of many core 
partners in the respective production networks, because innovation requires collaboration between 
suppliers and customers. Moreover, spatial proximity was considered to be very important for 
innovation-related activities by many interviewed firms. For example TNC1’s R&D-centre relies on 
its first tier suppliers to develop complementary R&D-capabilities in Thailand. However, it is 
difficult to evaluate the scale of upgrading that will take place in supplier firms at this point in time.  
Embeddedness in respect to the value-chain and external linkages is higher in the automotive 
industry than in the HDD-industry. This is partly due to the fact that HDD-parts are smaller, fewer 
and more sophisticated. Hence, they are either easier to import or have to be procured from abroad 
anyway. However, in both industries there are good examples of seemingly ‘committed’ TNC-
affiliates with a long local history that actively seek linkages to horizontal partners such as R&D-
institutes and universities. 
In conclusion, TNC-affiliates foster the capabilities of actors in the Thai-NSI by enhancing their 
own capabilities and, consequently, either forcing or convincing related (first tier) suppliers to 
follow suit. Additionally, the interviews identified the following mechanisms by which TNC-
affiliates improve the SI of the host economy. TNC-affiliates: 
• Create crises among locally based local and foreign suppliers, by permanently increasing 
requirements in terms of price, quality, and improvements. This triggers intensified 
upgrading effort by suppliers, making them more competitive and attractive for other 
customers as well. 
• Give assistance to suppliers to meet these requirements, for example by providing training, 
establishing contact with more capable suppliers, operating supplier clubs etc. 
• Provide opportunities to enter production networks. The entry barriers in TNC organised 
production networks are fairly high, at least for key components and parts. However, these 
production networks are ‘there’ and aim for a localisation strategy – consequently this 
provides opportunities for local firms to become part of them. This creates both a market 
and learning possibilities for local firms. Once integrated into the production network local 
firms can prove themselves and may be asked to source TNC-affiliates in other countries as 
well. 
• Attract new actors (firms) to Thailand and the Thai NSI. These frequently fill gaps in the 
economic structure, making the fragmented system more mature. Subsequently, local firms 
can also benefit, for instance, from a technical service provider brought in by a TNC, 
allowing for technological upgrading and collaboration opportunities. 
• Improve the human capital base by providing in-house training and training at TNC-
facilities abroad. Furthermore, TNCs improve the standards of universities by providing 
equipment, curricula, lecturers and information on industry-relevant content. Moreover, 
TNC-affiliates can act as practical training grounds for graduate students (internships/ 
student projects). 
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• Create demand for highly skilled graduates. The demand should create extra-supply. The 
education system could be expected to offer additional S&E courses, students should be 
attracted to these courses by promising career opportunities with TNCs. However, as long as 
the demand is not satisfied by the supply of the education system, TNC-affiliates can cause 
a shortage of skilled personnel in domestic firms, reducing their potential to develop 
technological capabilities. Poaching is another downside within the industry, which reduces 
the incentives for investment in further training and can pose an obstacle for steady 
upgrading. 
 
Weaknesses of the SI as perceived by the surveyed firms 
In order to detect important weaknesses within the Thai-SI, chapter 5.6 analyses firms’ assessment 
of factors impeding R&D and other innovation activities as well as their perception of the business 
environment.  
These indicators point out the following main obstacles for further R&D and innovation: Lack of 
suitable personnel, lack of government support/ incentives and problems with the availability of 
suitable ‘horizontal’ collaboration partners, namely technical support services, local universities and 
R&D-institutes. While the lack of human capital is one of the most pressing problems for both 
TNC-affiliates and local firms, the absolute share of local firms suffering from insufficient skilled 
personnel supply is much higher. Contemplating these bottlenecks and the qualification structures 
of foreign and local firms (see above), it can be concluded that TNC-affiliates are indeed worsening 
the situation of local firms by attracting the bulk of scarce skilled personnel.  
The most important internal factors hindering R&D and innovation – and consequently aspects of 
firms’ capabilities – are the reluctance to take the risks and costs associated with these endeavours 
and a lack of R&D-strategy at the firm level. Missing absorptive capacity at the firm level is also 
perceived as a problem, indicated by a lack of in-house R&D-personnel. Since the lack of 
information on R&D-opportunities and technology, as well as lack of R&D-infrastructure, can also 
be seen as indicators for missing absorptive capacity, this poses a noteworthy problem, considered 
important by more than 40% of foreign and 45% of local firms in 2002.  
Having said this, the assessments of the conditions for R&D and innovation have improved 
markedly from 1999 to 2001. Additionally, the factors that concern firms in Thailand tend to be 
serious problems for firms in Singapore and Penang as well. 
 
Policy recommendations 
Based on these findings, the following policy suggestions can be derived in order to strengthen the 
SI as such, to foster technological learning in local firms and technological upgrading in TNC-
affiliates, as well as to further embed TNC-affiliates in the Thai-SI. Hereby, it is essential to point 
out that upgrading is a circular process: improving the business environment and system of 
innovation will lead to upgrading within both TNC-affiliates and local firms, which in turn will 
further strengthen the SI, triggering even more activities, etc. 
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1.  Strengthen the human capital basis (especially in S&T) 
The lack of human capital is a major obstacle to R&D and innovation in foreign and local firms. 
TNC-affiliates, who presently tend to employ a better-educated workforce, seem to absorb 
skilled human capital that is urgently needed for upgrading in local firms. Hence, the education 
system needs to be improved, and in tertiary education especially. More money needs to be 
allocated, curricula need to be modernised and adapted to industry needs, incentive schemes 
need to be developed that attract students to S&T-courses, collaborations between industry and 
universities have to be developed in order to inform universities of state-of-the-art 
developments in industry and to provide students and researchers with opportunities for 
practical-oriented joint projects. Furthermore, initiatives for reverse ‘brain drain’ of highly 
skilled expatriate Thais should be developed. Additionally, the government should provide 
assistance and financial support for the recruitment of foreign R&D-experts to act as a 
foundation for building up R&D-departments in Thai-based firms and training of employees. 
 
2. Increase the quality, industry-relevance, and openness of R&D-institutes and universities  
Advanced foreign and local firms miss partners in the S&T-infrastructure for collaboration and 
technical support. This is especially true in the current upgrading phase. Moreover, when 
moving from the catching-up to the keeping-up strategy (2.1.1), TNC-affiliates and local firms 
start to look for suitable cooperation partners in the public S&T-sector – this opportunity to 
embed TNC-affiliates stronger into the Thai NSI should be seized. Therefore, it is necessary to 
offer high quality, reliable and relevant research and to create incentives for public S&T-staff to 
seek industry collaborations. Financial incentive programs can support these activities. 
Moreover, public S&T-institutes should also take the needs of basic local firms into account and 
try to custom-tailor low-scale training and joint-research programs. 
 
3. Go for production network flagships: The results of the interviews underline the power aspect 
in production networks. This could be utilised as a lever for location and upgrading policies. 
Policy could target flagships explicitly (such as HDD1, TNC1) and ‘convince’ them with 
custom-tailored incentives to locate in/ upgrade their operations in Thailand. Once convinced, 
these flagships will exercise power over their suppliers, pulling them to Thailand or pushing 
them to set up their own R&D-facilities. At this stage, supporting policies for suppliers’ 
upgrading/ relocation should be implemented. An improved system of innovation with a large 
pool of skilled labour is, of course, a strong incentive for such moves. 
 
4. Identify missing links in the economic structure of specific industries  
The survey data showed that a lack of technical support services pose a problem for many firms. 
Moreover, many interviewees in both focus industries stated that there are several parts they 
would like to source locally, but must import because no local suppliers are available. If these 
market chances are not seized by local firms due to information asymmetries, public actors 
could act as intermediaries. For example public agencies could try to identify these gaps (e.g. 
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high precision tool and die in the HDD-industry) and encourage local firms or start-ups to enter 
these niches. Additional support such as seed capital, co-financing/ loan-schemes for training 
and acquisition of equipment could be provided. This would create new actors and linkages 
within the NSI and would further bind and embed TNC-affiliates.  
 
5. Alternatively, support firms in bringing their suppliers to Thailand. If it is not possible to 
fill essential vacancies in the value-chains of the vital industries with local firms, it makes sense 
to support firms in their effort to attract their suppliers to Thailand. Some firms reported trying 
to convince suppliers to relocate to Thailand and having failed. Government incentive programs 
could enable these activities.  
 
6. Link incentive schemes for TNCs to specific requirements in terms of technological content, 
R&D-activities, training expenses, assistance of/ collaboration with suppliers and universities 
on assistance, education, etc. The recent introduction of R&D-requirements for higher BOI 
privileges should be extended further, complementing BOI-zoning policies. However, this is 
only possible if the basics for such activities are sufficient (see 1. and 2.). 
 
7. Support explicitly technological capability building in local firms. Many local firms stated 
their intentions to begin R&D and product development capabilities or to increase existing 
capabilities. However, the analysis of the absorptive capacity shows that many local firms lack 
the necessary human capital base to create R&D and product development capabilities. Hence, 
government policies need to support upgrading activities by providing more qualified graduates 
(see 1.) and further training programs (e.g. Thai-German Institute), by fostering internships for 
Thai professional in advanced firms in leading markets, by facilitating the recruitment of 
experienced R&D-personnel from advanced countries, by providing tax incentives or loan 
schemes for the costly creation of these capabilities. Subsidies for these activities can be 
justified, because these capabilities are a pre-requisite for the qualification as first-tier suppliers 
in TNC-production networks, which would bring with them higher shares of local value-added 
activity.  
 
8. Support product and process development capabilities in foreign firms as well. The 
analysis points out that many foreign firms have the necessary pre-requisites for R&D and 
innovation in terms of human capital. Moreover, it shows that foreign firms, which are 
committed to product and process innovations, are more strongly embedded in the Thai-SI. 
Hence, must be implemented that trigger these TNC-affiliates to utilise their potential and 
become real innovating firms. Fostering these capabilities would result in stronger 
embeddedness among foreign firms, which in turn would lead to more diffusion of technology 
and knowledge to local firms – facilitating further embeddedness of TNCs and upgrading in 
local firms. Consequently, this would justify policies that target TNC-strategies and support 
capability building in TNC-affiliates as well. 
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9. Support the acquisition and adaptation of external technologies, as well as design, 
activities of foreign firms, because these have been identified as key characteristics of 
advanced TNC-affiliates, which are appropriate collaboration partners for interactive learning 
with and upgrading within local firms. Moreover, this could enhance the basis for domestic 
technology diffusion. Hence, the regulatory (intellectual property rights, customs, etc.) and 
S&T-environment should be mainstreamed further in order to ease acquisition of external 
technology. Financial and tax incentives should be assigned for design activities.  
 
10. Intensify programs, such as BUILT, that attempt to foster linkages between domestic 
suppliers and (foreign) customers, e.g. in the form of industry cluster policies. Follow a pro-
active policy strategy that tries to create networks: Listen to industry needs, learn about 
competences of domestic (foreign and local) firms and bring together firms that might benefit 
from working with each other. 
 
Limitation and need for further research 
The study asserts that TNC-affiliates contribute to international technology transfer by acquiring 
external embodied and disembodied technology. Since advanced TNC-affiliates are as embedded in 
domestic R&D and innovation networks as local firms, they are – potentially – suitable interfaces 
for the transfer and diffusion of internationally available knowledge and technology in the Thai-SI. 
Data from the R&D/Innovation surveys as well as findings from the interviews support the 
assumption that essential knowledge is exchanged along these networks. However, it is not clear 
how much and what type of external knowledge and technology is really being transferred along 
these networks, and whether intentionally or unintentionally. Hence, future research should explore 
the specific types of knowledge and technology that are a) acquired by TNC-affiliates, b) 
transferred to domestic partners, and c) actually missing in local firms, in order to evaluate the 
benefits of TNC-affiliates in the SI more profoundly. Essentially, this is a matter of knowledge and 
technology-matching between TNC-affiliates and domestic firms. As a means to answer this 
question, either questionnaires with more detailed answer categories or firm interviews that are 
accompanied by professional engineers would deliver valuable results. 
The same is true for the classification of technological activities. This thesis assumes, for example, 
that two firms carrying out ‘detailed design’ have sufficient common ground for collaboration; and 
that a local firm without ‘adaptation of external technology’ capabilities can learn from a TNC that 
is performing this kind of activity. However, this is not inevitably the case, since these categories 
are often fairly broad and can encompass different activities. Consequently, future research needs to 
apply more detailed, perhaps even industry specific, categories.  
Having said this, the R&D/ Innovation survey questionnaire is a well-adopted empirical tool for the 
particularities in late-industrialising countries, because it contemplates innovation activities that 
have not resulted in new products or processes. In the future, researchers should consider how this 
part of the questionnaire could be improved in order to retrieve even more information on these 
essential activities. In addition, data reliability would increase if innovation surveys in late-
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industrialising countries applied trained interviewers (e.g. graduate students) to assist firms in 
filling out the standardised questionnaires, rather than implementing a postal survey. Many of the 
questions can lead to uncertainties among respondents who are not entirely familiar with innovation 
and R&D, although their firm may carry out minor improvements. Certainly, this depends on the 
ability to receive available funds for such a survey. 
In addition, the R&D/ Innovation surveys consider collaboration patterns of advanced firms only. 
These firms possess high capabilities by definition. In contrast, basic firms, which make up the 
majority in Thailand, do not carry out R&D or other innovation activities and, yet, need to build up 
more fundamental capabilities. Access to advanced knowledge and technology that resides with 
TNC-affiliates is a sound learning opportunity for them. Hence, it is necessary to analyse general 
collaboration patterns of basic firms, in order to ascertain – based on a broad sample – whether or 
not TNC-affiliates (can) foster their upgrading.  
 
Furthermore, the results from the case study interviews presented in this thesis identified and/or 
confirmed important mechanisms by which TNCs foster technological upgrading and technological 
capability building in local firms. Two aspects are noteworthy in this respect. First, can the 
measurement of TCs be optimised? Currently, it is based either on self-assessment or requires the 
costly assignment of experts to evaluate capabilities in surveyed firms. Therefore, a topic for future 
research could be the design of a ‘check-list’ that ascertains easy to answer detailed, factual 
information on all major activities, such as “are you implementing TQM”, “do you use Kanban”, 
etc. Based on this list a TC-index could be calculated that gives a detailed, accurate and objective 
picture of firm level TCs. 
Second, the mechanisms by which TNCs foster the advancement of local firms and SI upgrading 
are mostly ‘anecdotal evidences’. More quantitative research would be vital to any evaluation of 
how relevant these mechanisms really are for late-industrialising economies and latecomer firms.  
Moreover, detailed case studies could move beyond existing research by enquiring deeper into the 
means through which local firms have developed technological capabilities. It would be worthwhile 
trying to measure the contribution of different learning sources for the development of 
technological capabilities, such as TNC-affiliates, local research-institutes, external experts, etc. It 
should also be kept in mind that the contribution may be TC-specific: e.g. industrial engineering 
may benefit from sources other than product engineering. This may even be level-specific, e.g. 
intermediate product engineering capabilities might require collaboration and learning partners 
other than advanced product engineering capabilities. These kinds of results could form a basis for 
thorough and efficient custom-tailored policies. The presented research can only be a first step in 
these respects.  
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 A1: Lall’s Illustrative Matrix of Technological Capabilities 
FUNCTIONAL 
 
INVESTMENT PRODUCTION 
DEGREE OF 
COMPLEXITY 
Preinvestment Project Execution 
 
Process 
Engineering 
Product 
Engineering 
Industrial 
Engineering 
Linkages within 
Economy 
 
BASIC 
 
SIMPLE, ROUTINE 
(Experience based) 
 
Prefeasibility and 
feasibility studies, site 
selection, 
scheduling of 
investment  
Civil construction, 
ancillary services, 
equipment erection, 
commissioning. 
Debugging, 
balancing, quality 
control preventive 
maintenance, 
assimilation of 
process technology  
Assimilation of 
product design, minor 
adaptation to market 
needs 
Work flow, 
scheduling, time-
motion studies. 
Inventory control. 
Local procurement of 
goods and services, 
information exchange 
with suppliers  
 
INTERMEDIATE 
 
ADAPTIVE, 
DUPLICATIVE 
(Search based) 
 
 
Search for technology 
sources. Negotiation 
of contracts. 
Bargaining suitable 
terms, Info. Systems. 
Equipment 
procurement, detailed 
engineering, training 
and recruitment of 
skilled personnel. 
Equipment stretching, 
process adaptation 
and cost saving, 
licensing new 
technology. 
Product quality 
improvement, 
licensing and 
assimilating new 
imported product 
technology. 
Monitoring 
productivity, improved 
co-ordination 
Technology transfer 
from local suppliers, 
co-ordinating design , 
S&T links 
 
ADVANCED  
 
INNOVATIVE 
RISKY 
(Research based) 
 
 
 Basic process design. 
Equipment design 
and supply. 
In-house process 
innovation, basic 
research. 
In-house product 
innovation, basic 
research. 
 Turnkey [supply] 
capability, co-
operative R&D, 
licensing own 
technology to others. 
Source: Lall, 1992: 166 
 A2 : Technological Capability Framework by UNIDO 
Investment Production Technology Marketing Nature of 
capacity 
building 
strategy and 
effort  
Pre- 
investment 
Project 
execution 
Process 
engineering 
Product 
engineering 
Industrial 
engineering 
and HRD 
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
Basic 
Simple, routine: 
based mainly on 
internal effort 
and experience 
Pre-feasibility 
and feasibility 
studies, site 
selection, 
scheduling, 
arranging 
finance 
Routine 
engineering of 
civil works, 
ancillary 
services, 
erection and 
commissioning 
Debugging plant; 
routine process 
coordination; 
quality 
management; 
routine 
maintenance; 
process quality 
certification 
Assimilation of 
basic product 
design; product 
quality 
management and 
certification; 
minor adaptations 
to meet market 
needs 
Workflow 
scheduling; 
time/motion 
studies; innovative 
management and 
optimization; skill 
upgrading and 
training 
Local procurement 
systems and 
procedures, drawing 
in available 
knowledge from 
institutions 
Foreign 
sourcing; 
information 
from suppliers; 
industry 
networking; 
accessing 
public 
information 
Market 
research; 
distribution and 
servicing 
systems; some 
advertising 
Export market 
analysis; links 
with buyers and 
other export 
channels. 
Design/ 
packaging 
capability 
Intermediate 
Adaptive, 
duplicative: based 
on search, 
experimentation 
and inter-firm and 
other cooperation 
Search for 
sources of 
technology, 
equipment. 
Contract 
negotiation 
Equipment 
procurement, 
detailed 
engineering staff 
recruitment and 
training 
Capacity 
stretching; 
adapt/improve 
technology; use 
new , techniques 
(JIT, TQM, etc.); 
routinized process 
engineering; 
preventive 
maintenance 
Product quality/ 
design 
improvement; 
licensing new 
technology; 
reverse 
engineering; 
continuous 
monitoring of 
global 
technologies 
Continuous and 
systematic 
productivity 
analysis and 
benchmarking; skill 
audit and 
formalized training; 
supply 
chain/logistics 
management; 
advanced inventory 
control 
Technology transfer 
to and from local 
suppliers/buyers; 
coordination in design 
and manufacture; 
links with technology 
and other institutions. 
Capacity to take 
collective action 
Vertical 
technology 
transfer; 
systematic 
coordination of 
international 
knowledge 
sources; links 
with technology 
institutions 
overseas 
Dedicated 
marketing  
department. 
Systematic 
monitoring, 
feedback 
analysis. 
Branding and 
differentiation 
Systematic 
market building 
and analysis of 
foreign markets. 
Alliances and 
networks abroad. 
Brand 
introduction. OEM 
arrangements 
Advanced 
Innovative, risky: 
based on 
purposive effort, 
R&D and 
advanced forms of 
collaboration 
Own project 
outline and 
design 
capability. 
World class 
project 
management 
capabilities 
Basic process 
engineering, 
equipment design 
and start up. 
Turnkey capability 
design methods. 
Continuous 
process 
improvement; 
process innovation; 
basic research; use 
of new process 
Organizational 
capacity for 
generating, 
codifying, 
socializing 
knowledge 
Mastery of product  
design methods; 
new product 
innovation; basic 
research. Strategic 
alliances. 
Organizational  
capacity for 
innovation and risk 
taking 
World-class 
industrial 
engineering and 
supply chain 
capabilities, 
training systems, 
inventory 
management 
Continuous links with 
R&D institutions and 
universities. Licensing 
own technology to 
others. Deep 
innovative links with 
other firms. 
Specialization in 
context of networks 
and clusters 
Cooperative 
R&D; strategic 
alliances; 
advanced 
leveraging 
strategies for 
new 
technologies. 
Foreign 
acquisitions, 
direct investment
Advanced brand 
creation; 
coordination 
with retailers/ 
buyers; 
advanced 
distribution 
systems abroad
Brand deepening. 
ODM and OBM 
arrangements. 
Own marketing 
and design 
channels and 
affiliates 
Source: UNIDO, 2002: pp. 96 
  
 A3: Questionnaire of the first and second Thailand R&D/ Innovation Survey  
 
 
 
                  THAILAND R&D/INNOVATION SURVEY – 2000 
 
                              Technical Information Access Center 
and National Science and Technology Development Agency 
 
in association with 
Federation of Thai Industries and Board of Investment 
 
 Implemented by The Brooker Group plc 
 
 
The first decade of the 21st century will be characterized by major changes in the way in which we do 
business. And there is no doubt that R&D and other innovation activities will be the critical 
determinant of Thailand’s future competitiveness. World-renowned business professor, Michael 
Porter of Harvard University, characterizes the next competitiveness challenge as being one of 
developing innovative capacity. He states convincingly that: “Innovation drives the rate of long-run 
productivity growth and hence future competitiveness.” 
 
At the macro level, little is known about the technological innovation capabilities of Thai enterprises. This 
makes it very hard for Thai policy makers to formulate appropriate measures and programs to raise the levels 
of innovation in the Thai economy, and for private firms to access the information they require to improve 
productivity. 
 
Through the Thailand R&D/Innovation Survey – 2000, the National Science and Technology Development 
Agency will compile an information base on R&D and innovation in Thailand’s manufacturing sector. The 
survey results will be used to intensify NSTDA’s efforts to stimulate creativity and innovation in Thailand – 
and in the business sector in particular. 
 
Please note that this will greatly benefit all Thai-based companies – including yours – through improved 
policies and measures to support competitiveness, R&D and other innovation activities. In addition, all firms 
that complete the survey will receive NSTDA’s path-breaking publication on Thailand’s Science and 
Technology Vision 2020 free of charge as well as copies of the final reports on the Thailand 
R&D/Innovation Survey – 2000. 
 
It must be emphasized that all information outside the public domain that is obtained from this questionnaire 
will be treated in complete confidentiality by the National Science and Technology Development Agency. 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire before 12nd of February to: The Brooker Group PLC, 
Harindhorn Building, 16th Floor, 54 North Sathorn Road, Silom, Bangrak, Bangkok 10500, Thailand, Tel: 
(662) 229-3111 or [(662) 267 9222 after February 28th]; Fax: (662) 229-3127. If you have any queries, 
especially on the R&D and innovation definitions in the questionnaire, please do not hesitate to contact our 
helpful research team, Oranee Sritongin or Mope Giwa at the number above. 
 
Information on Company and Respondent 
Name of company that is being reported upon  
Name of Respondent(s) and their position(s)  
Direct telephone line  
E-mail address  
Fax number  
 
h ttp ://w w w .tiac .o r .th
T IA C  
  
A. General Information 
 
1. Please name your company’s three main 
product(s) or product group(s) in Thailand and 
indicate their approximate % contribution to your 
production sales in 1999: 
 
1.  % 
2.  % 
3.  % 
 
2. Year of establishment: ______________ 
 
3. Please indicate your company’s ownership 
status:  
 
a) Wholly locally owned company [     ] 
b) More than 70% locally owned [     ] 
c) More than 50% to 70% locally owned [     ] 
d) 50% or less locally owned company 
(Nationality of largest owner:) 
________________________ 
[     ] 
e) Wholly foreign-owned company  
(Nationality of largest owner: ) 
________________________ 
[     ] 
 
4. Total employment (headcount) at end of: 
 
1997 persons 1999 persons
 
5. Please indicate your company’s employment 
structure as of December 1999 (numbers of 
employees): 
 
University graduates, of which  
1. scientists ____ 
2. engineers ____ 
a) 
3. others ____ 
Vocational school graduates, of which ____ 
i) technical ____ 
b) 
ii) non-technical ____ 
c) Secondary school  ____ 
d) Primary school ____ 
Total Employees ____ 
 
6. Expenditure on training as percent of sales in: 
 
1997 % 1999 %
 
7. Total fixed assets of your company as of 
December 1999:  
[Fixed assets includes land, buildings and civil works, 
leasehold improvements, equipment and machinery 
(including installation costs)] 
 
1999 Baht Million 
 
8. Please indicate the total sales of your company 
for the following years: 
 
1997 Baht Million 
1999 Baht Million 
 
9. What percentage of your total sales were from: 
 
 1997 1999
Domestic Market % %
Export Market  % %
Total  100  %  100  %
 
10. Please indicate the approximate % of your firm’s sales 
according to the following categories: 
 
a) Products manufactured by your 
company according to design 
specifications provided by parent 
company or associate in the 
corporate group (“manufacturing 
arm of parent company”) 
 
___% 
b) Products manufactured by your 
company according to design 
specifications provided by external 
buyers (“original equipment 
manufacturing” or OEM) 
 
___% 
c) Products developed and designed by 
your company according to 
performance requirements of buyers 
(“original design manufacturing” 
or ODM) 
 
___% 
d) Products developed and designed by 
your company and sold under your 
own brand (“original brand 
manufacturing”/OBM) 
 
___% 
e) Others (please describe): 
________________________ 
 
___% 
 Total 100% 
 
11. How important are the following characteristics for  
the sales success of your products? 
 (0 – not relevant, 1 – not important, 5 – very important) 
 
a) Price 0 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Quality 0 1 2 3 4 5 
c) On time fulfillment 0 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Customer service 0 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Flexibility upon 
customer request 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Novelty of products 0 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Large production 
capacity 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Short delivery time 0 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Environmental 
acceptability 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Design and appearance 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12. Has your company qualified for any of the following 
certifications or quality standards?  
 
a) ISO9001 [     ] 
b) ISO9002 [     ] 
c) 
ISO14000 
[     ] 
d) Others ( please specify) 
 
 
 
[     ] 
 
[     ] 
 
  
13. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, please 
indicate whether or not your company carried out 
any of the following technological activities in 
Thailand: 
 
  Yes No 
a) Acquisition of external technology   
b) Adaptation of external technology   
c) Reverse engineering (studying 
competitors’ products by breaking 
down product components) 
  
d) Basic design (designing key features 
of products) 
  
e) Detailed design (designing specific 
features of products after key 
features have been determined)  
  
f) Testing   
g) Quality control   
h) Others (please specify) 
 
 
  
 
14. Have any of your former employees started up 
companies in Thailand in the past 3 years? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] 
 
If yes, please name the companies and their main 
product: 
Name of company: 
Main product: 
Name of company: 
Main product: 
Don’t know: 
 
B. Research & Development Activities 
For this section please note the following definitions: 
Research and experimental development (R&D) 
in industry is defined as creative work which is 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to create new 
or improved products, processes, services or other 
applications. R&D is distinguishable from other activities 
by the presence of a substantial element of novelty and 
by the resolution of problems and uncertainties using 
scientific or technological methods. 
 
The three classes of R&D: 
Basic Research: It is experimental or theoretical work 
undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the  
underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts 
without any particular application or use in view. 
 e.g publications in scientific and engineering magazines 
Applied Research: It is also original investigation 
undertaken  
in order to acquire new knowledge. It is however directed 
at determining possible uses for basic research findings or 
finding new ways of achieving some specific 
predetermined objectives.  
Experimental Development: It is systematic work, 
drawing on existing knowledge gained from research and 
practical experience that is directed at producing new 
materials, products, devices, installing new processes, 
systems and services or at improving substantially those 
already produced or installed. 
Source: derived from the Frascati Manual (OECD) 
 
Examples of the three classes of R&D 
 
 
In the Biotechnology industry 
Basic 
Research 
Mapping of the 
Human 
Genome i.e. 
the blueprint of 
a human being 
Applied Research  
 
Discovery of genes for 
breast cancer and 
diabetes using the 
human genome 
Experimental 
Development  
Trial stage and 
development of 
drugs for breast 
cancer and 
diabetes 
 
In the Food and Beverage Industry 
Basic  
Research 
Study into the 
properties and 
structures of 
Thai herbs and 
plants 
Applied Research  
 
Research on 
discovered herbs and 
plants as health 
remedies 
Experimental 
Development 
Production of 
health drinks for 
combating 
minor ailments 
and to increase 
vitality 
 
In the Telecommunications Industry 
Basic  
Research 
 
Study 
electromagnetic 
wave 
propagation at 
different 
frequencies 
Applied Research 
 
 
Study wireless 
technology 
emphasizing on 
cellular  
technology 
Experimental 
Development 
 
Develop a 
mobile phone 
prototype 
 
What is R&D? What is NOT R&D? 
• Development of prototypes • Scientific and technical 
information services 
• Construction of pilot plants • Routine testing and 
standardization 
• Trial production (if it implies 
full-scale testing and 
subsequent further design 
and engineering 
• Patent and licence work 
not related to any R&D 
project 
• Industrial design and drawing 
directly linked to R&D 
• General purpose data 
collection, including 
market research 
• Technical activities carried out 
on new products & processes 
after they have been turned 
over to the production unit 
• Feasibility and policy-
related studies 
• Industrial engineering and 
tooling up directly linked with 
the development of new 
products or improved 
products or processes 
• Education, training, and 
after-sales services 
 
Please call our helpful research team on (662) 229-3111 or 
[(662) 267-9222 after February 28th] if the activities carried out  
in your firm is not included above or you have any queries on  
the definitions and examples given. 
  
1. Did your company carry out R&D activities in 
Thailand in 1999? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] if No, please go to question 
12 
 
2. If Yes, please describe these R&D activities: 
 
 
3. Please estimate your R&D expenditure for the 
following years: 
 
1997 Baht 
1999 Baht 
 
4. Please indicate which of the following R&D 
activities was carried out in 1999: 
 
  Yes No 
a) R&D ( in-house)   
b) Acquisition of R&D services  
( contracted out to other units): 
i) other firms in Thailand 
ii) public institutes 
iii) universities 
iv) abroad 
  
c) Other R&D-related activities 
(please specify: 
___________________) 
  
 
5. Please indicate the % distribution of your R&D 
expenditure on the following categories in 1999: 
 
a) R&D personnel cost ____% 
b) Capital expenditure (land, plant, vehicles, 
machinery & equipment) 
____% 
c) Other operating costs (all consumables, 
repairs and maintenance, others) 
____% 
Total 100 % 
 
6. Please indicate the % distribution of your R&D 
expenditure on the following categories of R&D in 
1999 : 
 
a) Basic Research ____% 
b) Applied Research ____% 
c) Experimental Development ____% 
Total 100 % 
 
7. Please indicate the % distribution of your R&D 
expenditure on the following activities in 1999: 
 
a) Product-oriented R&D ____% 
b) Process-oriented R&D ____% 
Total 100 % 
 
8. In 2001 and 2003, R&D expenditure is expected to: 
 
  2001 2003 
a) increase [     ] [     ] 
b) remain unchanged [     ] [     ] 
c) decrease [     ] [     ] 
 
9. Please provide the number of R&D personnel as of 
December 1999 and the average % of their time spent 
on R&D? 
 
 R&D Personnel No. of 
Staff 
Average 
% of 
time on 
R&D 
a) PhD researchers 
(Scientists and engineers 
with a PhD qualification) 
 
____ 
 
 
_____% 
b) Non-PhD researchers 
(Scientists and engineers 
with other degree level 
qualifications) 
 
____ 
 
_____% 
 
c) Technicians 
(Technically qualified 
personnel) 
____ _____% 
d) Managerial, administrative 
& clerical staff 
 
____ 
 
_____% 
e) Other R&D staff 
(machinists and 
electricians, etc) 
 
____ 
 
_____% 
g) Total R&D Personnel  
____ 
 
_____% 
 
10. In 2001 and 2003, R&D personnel is expected to: 
 
  2001 2003 
a) increase [     ] [     ] 
b) remain unchanged [     ] [     ] 
c) decrease [     ] [     ] 
 
11. What were the sources of funding for R&D activities in 
1999?   
(Tick where applicable) 
 
a) Own funds [     ] 
b) External funds 
1. other companies, locally based 
2. other companies, foreign based 
3. government  
4. other funds (please specify)  
 
 
[     ] 
[     ] 
[     ] 
[     ] 
 
[     ]  
 
12. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, please  
indicate the number of patents applied for and obtained 
by your company: 
 
  Thailand Other 
Countries 
Total 
a) Number applied ______ ________ ____ 
b) Number 
granted 
______ ________ ____ 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
13. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, did 
your company introduce or adopt any products or 
processes 
as a result of carrying out R&D activities? 
 
 Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] if No, go to question 15 
 
14. If Yes, please indicate the approximate % of the 
total 
annual sales from R&D related products & 
processes:  
 
a) Less than 10% [     ] 
b) 10% - 24% [     ] 
c) 25% - 49% [     ] 
d) 50% - 74% [     ] 
e) 75% and above [     ] 
 
15. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, please 
indicate the degree of importance of the following 
as objectives for undertaking R&D activities: 
(0 – not relevant, 1 – not important, 5 – very 
important) 
 
a) Replace products being phased out 0 1 2 3 4 5
b) Improved product quality 0 1 2 3 4 5
c) Extend product range 0 1 2 3 4 5
d) Open up new markets  0 1 2 3 4 5
e) Increase market share 0 1 2 3 4 5
f) Fulfill regulations & standards 0 1 2 3 4 5
g) Improve cycle time 0 1 2 3 4 5
h) Improve production flexibility 0 1 2 3 4 5
i) Reduce production cost/improve 
yield 
0 1 2 3 4 5
j) Reduce energy consumption 0 1 2 3 4 5
k) Reduce environment effects 0 1 2 3 4 5
l) Improve work conditions for 
employees   
0 1 2 3 4 5
m) Learn about new technology 0 1 2 3 4 5
n) Others (Please elaborate:  
_____________________) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
 
16. Did your company carry out R&D elsewhere in 
1999? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] 
 
If Yes, please state the countries(s): 
 
 
 
 
 
17. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, please  
indicate the importance of the following as 
factors limiting R&D within your firm:  
 (0 – not relevant, 1 – not important, 5 – very important) 
 
Internal factors 
a) Lack of R&D strategy at the firm 
level 
0 1 2 3 4 5
b) Lack of infrastructure for R&D in 
the firm (space, equipment, etc) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
c) In-house lack of R&D personnel 0 1 2 3 4 5
d) Limited financial resources 0 1 2 3 4 5
e) Lack of information on R&D 
opportunities 
0 1 2 3 4 5
f) Management sees no need for 
R&D 
0 1 2 3 4 5
g) Others ( please specify: 
___________________) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
External factors 
h) Insufficient supply of R&D 
personnel 
0 1 2 3 4 5
i) Lack of government R&D 
incentives 
0 1 2 3 4 5
j) Lack of competition in the domestic 
market 
0 1 2 3 4 5
k) Inadequate support services 0 1 2 3 4 5
l) Others ( please specify: 
___________________) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
 
C. Innovation Activities other than R&D 
 
For this section please note the following definitions: 
 
Product innovation: 
Either the development of a new product whose technological 
characteristics or intended uses differ significantly from those of 
previously produced products, e.g. the development of a gel fuel 
from agricultural refuse to be used for cooking in poor agricultural 
countries; or the portable electronic dictionary that translates the 
English language into Thai (‘Talking Dic’) 
 
Or an existing product whose performance has been 
significantly enhanced or upgraded, e.g. the environmentally -
friendly motorcycle developed in Thailand, or the boosting of 
radio reception capacity to suit residents in remote areas. 
 
Process innovation: 
Adoption of technologically new or significantly improved 
production methods through the introduction of new process 
equipment or re-engineering of operational processes, e.g. the 
introduction of a robot in the spray painting unit in a car factory in 
order to increase efficiency of the production process, or the use 
of CAD/CAM to help assemble bicycle components to lower 
process times. 
Source: derived from the Oslo Manual (OECD) 
 
Please call our helpful research team on (662) 229-3111 or  
[(662) 267-9222 after February 28th] if the activities carried out 
in your firm is not included above or you have any queries on the 
definitions and examples given. 
  
1. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, did 
your company carry out innovation activities 
other than  
R&D in Thailand? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] if No, go to question 9 
 
2. If Yes, please indicate which of the following other 
innovation activities was carried out in 1999: 
 
1999 
  Yes No 
a) Acquisition of machinery, equipment 
& software linked to product & 
process innovation 
  
b) Acquisition of external technology 
linked to product & process 
innovation e.g. patents and licences  
  
c) Industrial design and engineering, 
market research & marketing 
expenses linked to product & 
process innovation 
  
d) Training directly linked to  
product & process innovation 
  
 
♦ If you answered Yes to any of the options in 
Question 2, please carry on 
♦ If you answered No to all the options in 
Question 2, please go to Question 9 
 
3. Please estimate your total expenditure on 
innovation activities other than R&D for the 
following years: 
 
1997 Baht 
1999 Baht 
 
4. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, did 
your company introduce into the market any 
product innovation developed in Thailand? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] if No, go to question 6 
 
5. If Yes, please indicate the approximate % of total 
annual sales of new/improved products: 
 
a) Less than 10% [     ] 
b) 10% - 24% [     ] 
c) 25% - 49% [     ] 
d) 50% - 74% [     ] 
e) 75% and above [     ] 
 
6. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, did 
your company adopt any process innovation 
developed in Thailand? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] if No, go to question 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. If Yes, please indicate the approximate % of your 
production volume using new/improved processes:  
 
a) Less than 10% [     ] 
b) 10% - 24% [     ] 
c) 25% - 49% [     ] 
d) 50% - 74% [     ] 
e) 75% and above [     ] 
 
 
8. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, please 
indicate the degree of importance of the following 
objectives for undertaking innovation activities other than 
R&D: 
(0 - not relevant, 1 – not important, 5 – very important) 
 
a) Replace products being phased 
out 
0 1 2 3 4 5
b) Improved product quality 0 1 2 3 4 5
c) Extend product range 0 1 2 3 4 5
d) Open up new markets  0 1 2 3 4 5
e) Increase market share 0 1 2 3 4 5
f) Fulfill regulations & standards 0 1 2 3 4 5
g) Improve cycle time 0 1 2 3 4 5
h) Improve production flexibility 0 1 2 3 4 5
i) Reduce production  
cost/improve yield 
0 1 2 3 4 5
j) Reduce energy consumption 0 1 2 3 4 5
k) Reduce environment effects 0 1 2 3 4 5
l) Improve work conditions for 
employees 
0 1 2 3 4 5
m) Learn about new technology 0 1 2 3 4 5
n) Others (Please elaborate:  
 
_____________________) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
 
9. Please indicate the importance of the following as 
factors limiting innovation within your firm:  
(0 – not relevant, 1 – not important, 5 – very important) 
 
Internal factors 
a) Perceived risks too high 0 1 2 3 4 5
b) Perceived cost too high 0 1 2 3 4 5
c) Limited financial resources 0 1 2 3 4 5
d) Internal resistance to innovate 0 1 2 3 4 5
e) Lack of information on technology 0 1 2 3 4 5
f) Lack of information on markets 0 1 2 3 4 5
g) Others ( please specify: ___________________) 0 1 2 3 4 5
External factors 
h) Lack of qualified personnel 0 1 2 3 4 5
i) Inadequate support services 0 1 2 3 4 5
j) Lack of government support 0 1 2 3 4 5
k) Lack of customer interests in innovation 0 1 2 3 4 5
l) Lack of competition in the domestic market 0 1 2 3 4 5
m) Others ( please specify: ___________________) 0 1 2 3 4 5
 
 
 
  
 
D. External Collaboration for R&D and Innovation 
 
Please complete this section ONLY if you carried out R&D or other innovation activities from 1997-1999. 
 
1. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, please indicate the degree of importance of the following sources of 
information to your R&D and other innovation activities?   
(0 – not relevant, 1 – not important, 5 – very important) 
 
a) Sources within the enterprise 0 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Parent/associate companies 0 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Clients 0 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Locally-owned suppliers 0 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Foreign-owned suppliers 0 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Universities or other higher education institutes 0 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Government or private non-profit research institutes 0 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Business Service Providers (management consultants, market researchers, etc.) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Technical service providers 0 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Competitors 0 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Patent disclosures 0 1 2 3 4 5 
l) Fairs and exhibitions 0 1 2 3 4 5 
m) Professional conferences & meetings 0 1 2 3 4 5 
n) Specialist literature (journals, monographs etc.) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
o) Internet 0 1 2 3 4 5 
p) Others (Please elaborate: _______________________) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. How intensely do you cooperate with any of the following external parties in your R &D and other innovation 
activities?              
(1 – not at all, 5 – very intensely) 
 
  R&D Product Innovation Process Innovation 
a) Customers, buyers 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Locally-owned suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Foreign-owned suppliers 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Parent/associate company overseas 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
e) R&D institutes/ universities 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Business Service Providers  (management consultants, market research, etc.)  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Technical Service Providers (engineering consultants, IT services, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Competitors 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Other firms 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
3. What reasons were central to your co-operation with other partners?  
(1 – not important, 5 – very important) 
 
a) Share / reduce risk & cost 1 2 3 4 5 
b) Entering new technology fields 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Know-how transfer 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Faster time to market 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Pooling financial resources 1 2 3 4 5 
f) Establishing long term strategic partnership 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Others (Please elaborate): _______________________________   1 2 3 4 5 
 
4. During the three-year period 1997 to 1999, did your enterprise receive venture capital ( investment provided 
at the 
preliminary business plan stage) or business angel investment (investment provided at the developmental stage  
of the business idea) for your R&D and other innovation activities? 
 
Yes  [       ];    No  [       ] 
  
E. R&D and Innovation Environment of Thailand 
 
1. How do you assess the current business environment in Thailand for R&D and other innovation activities? 
(0 –no opinion, 1 – very weak, 5 – very good)  
 
a) Availability of government incentives for innovation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Availability of suitable manpower 
i) in scientific-technical sector  0 
1 2 3 4 5 b)  
 ii) in business sector 0 1 2 3 4 5 
c) Technological sophistication of local suppliers 0 1 2 3 4 5 
d) Consultancy support services 0 1 2 3 4 5 
e) Local university for technical support and R&D collaboration 0 1 2 3 4 5 
f) R&D institutions for technical support and R&D collaboration 0 1 2 3 4 5 
g) Availability of other technical supporting services  0 1 2 3 4 5 
h) Acceptance of failure  0 1 2 3 4 5 
i) Attitude of people towards innovation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
j) Openness of customers to innovation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
k) Openness of suppliers to innovation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
l) Openness of government departments & regulatory authorities to innovation 0 
1 2 3 4 5 
m) Regulatory environment 0 1 2 3 4 5 
n) Intellectual property protection  0 1 2 3 4 5 
o) Quality of telecommunications and IT services for enabling innovation  0 1 2 3 4 5 
p) Availability of finance for innovation (e.g. venture capital) 0 1 2 3 4 5 
q) Listing requirements on SET stock exchange 0 1 2 3 4 5 
r) Others (please elaborate): _______________________________________) 0 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Does your company have knowledge of any of the following government or related support networks and 
research granting agencies? And have you used any of their services/incentives?  
 
 Government Support Networks/Research Granting Agencies Knowledge of 
or familiarity 
with? 
Has your firm 
used their 
services? 
  Yes 
 
No Yes No 
a) National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA)     
 i) Technical Information Access Center (TIAC)     
 ii) National Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (BIOTEC)     
 iii) National Metals and Materials Technology Center (MTEC)     
 iv) National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC)     
 v) Industrial and Techno-Business Development Department  
(ICS, CD, IPS, STAMP) 
    
b) National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT)     
c) Thailand Research Fund (TRF)     
d) Department of Science Services (DSS)     
e) Technological Transfer Center     
f) Board of Investment (BOI)     
g) Health Systems Research Institute (HSRI)     
h) Ministry of Industry (MOI) and related institutes     
i) Thai-Japan Technological Promotion Association (TPA)     
j) Thailand Institute of Scientific and Technological Research (TISTR)     
k) Business association or industry group (please specify name) 
1. _________________________ 
2. _________________________________ 
    
l) Others (please specify) 
1. _________________________ 
2. _________________________________ 
    
 
             
***** N.B. Question E2 was not asked in 2002 **** 
 
  
3. Please indicate which, if any, of the services and incentive programs provided by the government 
agencies/support networks indicated above your firm has used for supporting R&D and other innovation 
activities: 
 
 Government Services and Incentive Programs Yes No 
Services provided by NSTDA (MTEC, NECTEC, BIOTEC, TIAC)   
i. industrial consultancy services   
ii. technology transfer arrangements   
iii. loans and grants   
iv. support for quality systems   
v. testing and analytical services   
vi. information services   
a) 
vii. human resource development support (i.e training, scholarships, research fellowships, other)   
Services provided by the Ministry of Industry   
i. industrial consultancy services   
ii. technology transfer arrangements   
iii. loans and grants   
iv. support for quality systems   
v. testing and analytical services   
vi. information services   
b) 
vii. human resource development support (i.e training, scholarships, research fellowships, other)   
c) Tax deductions for training programs (150% under the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare)   
d) Tax deductions for R&D activities (200% under the Department of Revenue)   
e) University laboratory services (please specify which university(ies)) 
1. _________________________ 
2. _________________________________ 
  
f) Others (please specify)  
1. _________________________ 
2. _________________________________ 
  
 
4. What do you think the government can do to promote R&D and other innovation activities in Thailand? 
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your valuable input and kind cooperation. 
******** 
  
A4: List of interview partners 
 
Hard Disk Drive 
Western Digital (Thailand) Ltd.* Don Blake, Vice President 08.09.2003 
Hitachi Global Storage 
Technologies (Thailand) Limited 
Masamitsu Horike, Managing Director 12.09.2003 
Union Technology Company 
Limited 
Yongyuth Pongvanit, General Manager 18.09.2003 
Bamroong Koolawonk, General Manager Altum Precision Co. Ltd. 
Chua Khe Wie, Assistant General Manager, 
24.09.2003 
C.K. Cheung, Director, Operations/ Manufacturing 
Engineering 
Magnecomp (Thailand) Ltd. 
Thanathip Ratsameechand, Manager, 
Administration & Human Resource Department 
26.09.2003 
Seagate (Thailand) Ltd. Brent L. Bargmann, Vice President 29.09.2003 
James W. Gibson, Managing Director Gem City Engineering Co., Ltd. 
Dr. Chatree Homwongs, Director of Engineering 
Design 
30.09.2003 
Hank Pselos, Director of Asia Marketing & Sales KR Precision Public Co. Ltd. 
Jake Vigoda, Chief Financial Officer 
30.09.2003 
NMB – Minebea Thai Ltd. Tosei Takenaka, Member of the Board, Senior 
Managing Executive Officer & Regional Director 
Group Operations in Asia 
03.10.2003 
Hiroyuki Mase, President 
Koji Hiroishi, Director Logistic Department 
Fuijtsu (Thailand) Co. Ltd. 
Suchit Vachiranapalai, Manufacturing Department 
Director 
10.10.2003 
Mektec Manufacturing Corporation 
(Thailand) Co., Ltd. 
Hideki Hosoya, Director/ General Manager 16.10.2003 
Electrical and Electronics Institute Somboon Hotrakool Director, Administration 
Department 
17.9.2003 
Thai Embedded Systems 
Association 
Apinetr Unakul, Association Secretary 01.10.2003 
Silicon Craft Technology Co. Ltd.  Naiyavudhi Wongkomet Partner  19.09.2003 
 
Automotive 
S.K. Polymer Co., Ltd. Katawut Paramee, Export Sales & Marketing 
Division Manager 
09.09.2003 
Pisith Pongarchavakoson, Team Leader of Import 
& Export Team, Production Control Department 
Hino Motors Manufacturing 
(Thailand) Ltd. 
Suthee Khamvichit, Research & Development 
Team, Engineering Department 
29.09.2003 
Suparat Sirisuwannangkura, Vice President, 
Technical Division 
Kiatsin Praveenvorakul, Deputy General 
Manager, Corporate Planning Office 
Charnchai Suppayakorn, General Manager, Plant 
Administration Department (Samrong) 
Toyota Motors Thailand Co. Ltd. 
Panat Piyathummaporn, Chief Engineer, Plant 
Administration Department 
03.10.2003 
 
Denso (Thailand) Co. Ltd. Montree Musitmanee, Assistant General 
Manager, Engineering Section 
07.10.2003 
Prontip Hananekkhun, Export Department Autotrim International Transaction 
Co., Ltd. Kornnika Udornchainit, Marketing Coordinator 
08.10.2003 
Royal Motor Works Co. Ltd. Phichai Tinsuntisook, President 13.10.2003 
  
Thai-Swedish Assembly Co. Ltd. 
(Volvo) 
Jörgen Hakansson, Managing Director 16.10.2003 
Dr. Kosol Surakomol, Operations Director Summit Auto Seats Industry Co. 
Ltd. Koson Ruangwongwit, Assistant Administrative 
Manager 
20.10.2003 
Thai Automotive Industry Co. Ltd. 
(Nissan) 
Sangchai Hoonterdthai, General Manager 
Production Engineering Department 
16.10.2003 
Mr Somporn , Purchasing Manager 15.10.2003 
Yongsuk Suttisri, Assistant Section Manager, 
Project & Marketing Department 
Thai Summit Autoparts Industry 
Co., Ltd. 
Yongchai Onkvisessphiboon, Marketing Division 
Manager, Marketing Sales Department 
17.10.2003 
Thailand Automotive Institute Vallop Tiasiri, 
Executive Director  
13.10.2003 
 
Background interviews 
GTZ, Industrial Environmental 
Management Project  
Bernhard Meyhöfer, Advisor  19.08.2003 
Deutsch-Thailändische 
Handelskammer  
Dr. Paul R. Strunk, Hauptgeschäftsführer 26.08.2003 
Board of Investment, Unit for 
Industry Linkage Development  
Dr. Wisan Tanthawichian, Head of BUILD 10.09.2003 
 
Office of Industrial Economics 
Ministry of Industry 
 
Dr. Somsak Tambunlertchai, Field Project 
Director, UNIDO Integrated Programme for 
Thailand-Component 6:“Tracking Manufacturing 
Performance: Towards an Early Warning 
Mechanism Geared to the Real Economy” 
12.09.2003 
Chokedee Kaewsang 
Director, Investment Facilitation Division 
Board of Investment 
Yutthasak Kanasavat  
Senior Investment Promotion Officer, Investment 
Strategy and Policy Division 
15.09.2003 
Kota Nagai, Investment Adviser 
Business Support Center in Thailand 
Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) 
Satoshi Kubota, Deputy Representative 
Institute of Developing Economies 
10.10.2003 
The Federation of Thai Industries Phichai Tinsuntisook, Deputy Secretary General 13.10.2003 
 
Frozen Food 
S.Chaivaree Cold Storage Co., 
Ltd./ Chaivaree Marine Products 
Co., Ltd. 
Wichien Chantayasakorn Deputy Managing 
Director 
 
08.09.2003 
Sawat Khaimarn, Chief Operating Officer CFT – CO-OP Foods (Thailand) 
Ltd. Somchai Rojvirasingh, Legal & Logistics Officer 
11.09.2003 
Far East Cold Storage Co. Ltd. Dr. Seksan Kiatsupaibul, Vice President – 
Business Development 
25.09.2003 
* Interview was led by Dr. Afzulpurkar and Dr. Brimble, the interview notes are available.  
  
A5: Interview Guide for the interviews in the automotive industry 
 
A) Introduction 
- Introduction 
- Background of study 
- Confidentiality statement 
- Structure of the interview 
 
B) Company’s main activities 
- What are your company’s main activities/ products 
- Is your company a single-site operation, or part of a transnational corporation? 
- If yes, please state other locations of that network?  
 What is Bangkok’s/ Thailand’s role within in the corporate network?  
- How is the ownership structure of your company? 
- What are your main inputs (raw material, components)? 
- Who are your main suppliers? Where are they located? 
- Who you are mainly selling to? Where are your customers located?:  
- What is your market position (share) or your most important product/ product group? 
- What are your main challenges at the moment? 
 
C) Technological Capabilities 
 
PRODUCT:  What is your product like (specifications given by the customer vs. self developed  
 product)?  
  In what way do you improve or change your product?  
  Do you conduct market research/ technology scanning in order to improve   
 existing products or developing new ones? 
  What kind of activities do you pursue in order to improve or change your  
 products (technology acquisition, reverse engineering, R&D)  
 
PROCESS:  Do you conduct maintenance and troubleshooting at the  production process   
 yourself? 
  Do your pursue TQM; JIT etc.? 
  In which way do you optimise/ improve your production processes?  
  Do you pursue process-related R&D? 
 
NEW PROJECTS: How do you plan and implement new projects (new plants, expansion,   
 modernization)?  
  What do you do yourself, what do you outsource, contract out? (example) 
 
HRD:   What kind training do you offer your personnel?  
  What HRD activities do you pursue? Why do you do this?  
 
EVALUATE your capabilities with help of the TC matrix:  
  Do you see the need to improve some of your capabilities?  
 
 
 
  
D) Linkage capabilities: External Collaboration  
We would like to learn more about your cooperation partners and activities in respect to innovation 
activities and the development of technological capabilities... 
 
List of partners: 
Do you collaborate with any of these partners in 
a) product development 
b) process technology/ organisation development 
c) Training of HR 
 
If yes:  
- Please name (the most important) of your co-operation partners 
- What do you do in these collaborations?  
- Where are your co-operation partners located (country, in Thailand: city)? 
 Is it important for you that your cooperation partners are close by? 
 If yes, why is it important; if no, why is it of no importance? 
 
- Are these long standing co-operations? How long? 
- How did the relationship to the partner develop over time?  
- How did you choose your partner initially? 
 
- What kind of problems did you experience while collaborating? 
  
A6: Interview Guide for the interviews in the HDD industry 
 
1. Overview of perceptions of the competitive situation and major challenges facing the HDD industry 
2. Overview of firm-level technological capabilities (following the classification below) 
 
3. Elaborate a number of stories on firm-level efforts to “upgrade” 
a. General measures 
b. Training activities 
c. R&D and innovation activities 
d. Other “interesting” stories 
 
4. Discussion of the nature and quality of linkages within the cluster: 
a. With suppliers 
b. With service providers – S&T and non-S&T 
c. Educational institutes 
d. Government agencies 
e. Overseas agencies/institutions 
f. Clients 
 
5. Conclusion of the major constraints to HDD industry development in Thailand 
a. General 
b. Related to the players in the cluster 
 
6. Ideas or comments on major “projects” or “initiatives” that can be developed to address the 
constraints: 
a. Focus on specific projects that can be implemented relatively quickly 
Such as:  
1. Training Program for Automation Engineers and Technicians 
2. Revitalize the Certificate of Competence in Storage Technology (at AIT) 
3. Establish a Thailand Tool and Die Institute 
4. Implement the IDEMA Automation Project 
5. Establish a Disk Storage Institute 
6. Develop a New Investment Incentive Package for the HDD Industry  
 
b. Specify clearly roles of key players – especially the industry and the government 
 
 
  
A7: Letter of request for an interview in the automotive industry 
Dr. Chatri Sripaipan 
Vice President of NSTDA 
 
73/1 Rama VI Road, Rajdhevee,  
Bangkok 10400 
Dipl. Geogr. Martin Berger  
University of Kiel, Institute of Geography 
Currently: visiting researcher at NSTDA 
Mobil: 09 – 07 52 897 
Fax:  02 – 644 – 8194 
E-Mail:   martinberger@web.de 
Bangkok, 12.9.2003 
Dear Sir, 
 
Interview Survey on Innovation Networks in Thailand’s Automotive Industry 
 
For companies as well as our country as a whole, innovation is critical for future competitiveness. To 
develop new products and processes, manufacturing firms increasingly rely on collaborations with 
external partners, such as customers, suppliers, research institutions, technical and business service 
providers, or even competitors. 
Despite this recognition, very little is still known about how such networks work, and how their 
development could be fostered. 
The National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) is cooperating with Prof. Revilla 
Diez from the Chair of Economic Geography at the University of Kiel, Germany, on an interview survey 
on innovation networks within Thailand’s automotive industry. Following up on our recently completed 
R&D/Innovation Survey 2002, the aim of this survey is to illustrate and enhance some of the findings 
through selected case studies. These studies will be a basis for NSTDA’s future policy 
recommendations. 
Among the questions to be answered in this survey are: 
1. What are the major challenges your company is facing today?  
2. Do you try to improve your products or your production process? How? 
3. Do you cooperate with external partners like customers, suppliers or universities on the 
improvement of your products, your process technology or your human resources? If yes, what kind of 
activities do you pursue with your partners?  
4. Are you satisfied with the number and quality of local partners?  
5. What problems do your company encounter in co-operations? Is more collaboration desirable, and 
if so, how can government support these activities? 
We are writing to request a factory visit and an interview with you, or one of your colleagues, to 
discuss these matters. The survey will take place in early October. The interview should take about 60 
minutes and will be conducted in a semi-structured way to give you ample opportunity to express your 
views. Your response to the questions will be treated in the strictest confidence. You are assured that 
the information you provide will not be published in a form which would identify you or your business 
without your consent. 
We hope that you will agree to participate in this survey, because it is very important that we obtain an 
accurate picture for Thailand’s automotive industry. 
In anticipation of your co-operation, our interviewer, Mr Martin Berger, shall telephone you in the next 
few days to arrange a time when he can visit you. 
As a small acknowledgement for your cooperation, we will happily provide you with the key findings of 
our survey. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
  Dr. Chatri Sripaipan        Dipl. Geogr. Martin Berger 
                  Vice President of NSTDA   Research Fellow, Kiel University 
  
A8: List of independent variables included into the CHAID analysis for embedded foreign firms (exemplary for 
2002; same variables with different labels were used in 2000) 
Variable Scale Description 
BKK Nominal Firm located in the BKK-region39? (yes/no) 
SEC Nominal Sector affiliation (2 digit) 
YEAR Metric Year of establishment 
OWNER Ordinal Ownership (100%, 50-99%, 30-409% foreign owned) 
NATION Nominal Nationality of largest foreign owner 
EMPLOY Metric Number of employees at the end of  1999/2001 
TRAIN Metric Share of training expenditure as % of sales  
ASSET Metric Total fixed assets in million Bhat 
SALE Metric Total annual sales 
DOMES Metric Percentage of domestic sales 
EXPORT Metric Percentage of export sales 
P2Q10A Metric % of sales to parent/ associate company overseas 
P2Q10B Metric % of OEM sales 
P2Q10C Metric % of ODM sales 
P2Q10D Metric % of OBM sales 
TECHAC1 Nominal Tech. activity: Acquisition of external technology (yes/no) 
TECHAC2 Nominal Tech. activity: Adaptation of external technology (yes/no) 
TECHAC3 Nominal Tech. activity: Reverse Engineering (yes/no) 
TECHAC4 Nominal Tech. activity: Basic design (yes/no) 
TECHAC5 Nominal Tech. activity: Detailed design (yes/no) 
TECHAC6 Nominal Tech. activity: Testing (yes/no) 
TECHAC7 Nominal Tech. activity: Quality control (yes/ no) 
EMPSTART Nominal Did former employees found a start-up 
P8Q7A Metric % of R&D expenditure on Product-oriented R&D  
P8Q7B Metric % of R&D expenditure on Process-orient R&D  
P7Q4A Nominal Carried out R&D in-house? 
P7Q4B Nominal Acquisition of R&D services contracted out to other units 
P7Q4B1 Nominal  - in thailand 
P7Q4B2 Nominal  - from public institutes 
P7Q4B3 Nominal  - from university 
P7Q4B4 Nominal  - from abroad 
P8Q6A Metric % of R&D expenditure on experimental development 
P8Q6B Metric % of R&D expenditure on applied research 
P8Q6C Metric % of R&D expenditure on basic research 
RDSOURA Nominal Own funds for R&D activities? 
RDSOURB Nominal External funds for R&D? 
RDSOURB1 Nominal  - Funds from other companies, locally based? 
RDSOURB2 Nominal - Funds from other companies, foreign based? 
RDSOURB3 Nominal - Funds from government? 
RDSOURB4 Nominal - other funds 
RDOUTPUP Ordinal Percent of total annual sales from R&D related products/process 
RDELSE Nominal Carry out R&D elsewhere in the world? 
INNOA00 Nominal Acquisition of machinery, equip, software linked to innovation in 2000 
INNOB00 Nominal Acquisition of external technology in 2000 
INNOC00 Nominal Industrial design and engineering linked to innovation in 2000 
INNOD00 Nominal Training linked to innovation in 2000 
INNOA01 Nominal Acquisition of machinery, equip, software linked to innovation in 2001 
INNOB01 Nominal Acquisition of external technology in 2001 
                                                 
 39 Consisting of the following provinces: Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Nakhon Pathom, Samut Sakhon, Samut 
Prakan, Ayutthaya, Chachoengsao, Chon Buri and Rayong 
  
INNOC01 Nominal Industrial design and engineering linked to innovation in 2001 
INNOD01 Nominal Training linked to innovation in 2001 
PRODIN Nominal Introduce into the market any product innovation developed in Thailand? 
PRODINP Ordinal % of total annual sales of new/improved products 
PROCIN Nominal Adopt any process innovation developed in Thailand? 
PROCINP Ordinal % of production volume using of new/improved process 
COLLA1 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Sources within the enterprise 
COLLA2 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Parent/ associate companies 
COLLA3 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Clients 
COLLA4 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Locally-owned suppliers 
COLLA5 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Foreign-owned suppliers 
COLLA6 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Universities or other higher education 
institutes 
COLLA7 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Government or private non-profit 
research institutes 
COLLA8 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Business Services Providers 
COLLA9 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Technical services providers 
COLLA10 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Competitors 
COLLA11 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Patent disclosures 
COLLA12 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Fairs and exhibitions 
COLLA13 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Professional conferences & meetings 
COLLA14 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Specialist literature 
COLLA15 Ordinal Importance for R&D and innovation: Internet 
EMPLOYAP Metric % of university graduates of total employment 
EMPLOYBP Metric % of vocational school graduates of total employment 
EMPLOYCP Metric % of secondary school graduates of total employment  
EMPLOYDP Metric % of primary school graduates of total employment  
KNOWEXP0 Metric knowledge expenditure (R&D+ Innovation exp.) as % of sales 2000 
KNOWEXP1 Metric knowledge expenditure (R&D+ Innovation exp.) as % of sales 2001 
INOVATIV Nominal Innovative firms (process and product innovation)?  
PATENT Nominal Patenting firms (at least one patent applied or granted) 
SALEMP00 Metric Sales per employee 2000 
SALEMP01 Metric Sales per employee 2001 
INRDIVE Nominal Innovative firm (product, process innovation or R&D related 
product/process)) 
 
  
A9: Share of R&D and innovating firms that collaborate with the following partners in an intensive or very intensive manner 
R&D Product innovation Process innovation  
2000 2002 2000 2002 2000 2002 
Thailand Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
Partner / n 147 86 153 89 
 
147 86 153 89 
 
147 86 153 89 
Customers 26.5* 38.4* 36.6 41.6 47.6 41.9 19.6** 34.8** 19.0   26.7   25.5   24.7   
Locally-owned suppl. 20.4 17.4 31.4* 27.0* 27.9* 19.8* 11.8** 16.9** 19.0   10.5   13.1*   23.6*   
Foreign-owned suppl. 18.4* 31.4* 22.9 22.5 23.8 24.4   8.5** 15.7** 17.7   20.9   15.0**   28.1**   
Parent/assoc. comp. 10.9*** 47.7*** 19.0*** 40.4*** 12.2*** 38.4***   9.2*** 28.1***   9.5***   39.5*** 13.1***§  27.0***§   
R&D institutes/ univ. 16.3**   5.8** 18.3   9.0 10.9   5.8   5.2   2.2   8.8     4.7     4.6     5.6   
Business Services   6.8   4.7   8.5   9.0   5.4   5.8   3.9   3.4   6.1     3.5     5.2     4.5   
Technical Services   8.8   7.0   9.8 11.2 12.2*   9.3*   3.9   6.7 10.2   10.5     7.2   11.2   
Government agency NA NA   9.2 12.4 NA NA   3.3   2.2 NA NA   1.3     5.6   
Competitors   6.8 12.8   3.9   5.6   8.2 14.0   4.6   3.4   6.1   10.5     2.0*§   6.7*§   
Other firms   6.8   4.7   5.9   4.5 
 
  6.8   3.5   1.3   2.2   4.8     3.5     2.0     5.6   
 
Singapore Penang Singapore Penang  
Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign 
Partner / n 52 94 43 38 
 
52 94 43 38 
Customers 42.3** 55.3** 48.8 71.1 44.2*** 20.2*** 46.5 36.8 
Suppliers 23.1** 31.9**   26.9 26.6   
- Locally-owned    25.6 23.7   25.6 28.9 
- Foreign-owned   23.3 31.6   32.6*§ 39.5*§ 
Parent/assoc. comp. 19.2***§ 64.9***§ 16.3***§ 57.9***§ 19.2*** 45.7*** 16.3*** 55.3*** 
R&D institutes/ univ.     4.7 15.8     0.0**§ 13.2**§ 
- in Singapore 13.5 18.1   13.5 18.1   
- overseas   7.7**§   6.4**§     5.8   2.1   
Business Services   5.8   7.4 11.6 21.1 11.5*§   5.3*§ 16.3 23.7 
Technical Services 13.5 18.1 27.9 23.7 21.2 16.0 30.2 36.8 
Government agency         
Competitors   3.8   5.3   7.0 13.2   7.7***§   2.1***§ 11.6 13.2 
Other firms 
 
  7.7   5.3   2.3   7.9 11.5   5.3   2.3   5.3 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, significant at the 10% level according to Pearson’s Chi-Square Test based on 2x3 matrix (owner x intensity (not 
at all/hardly, medium, intensely/very intensely); § expected frequency in at least one cell <5. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erklärung 
 
Hiermit erkläre ich, dass die Abhandlung – abgesehen von der Beratung durch den Betreuer 
– nach Inhalt und Form meine eigene Arbeit ist.  
Sie ist weder ganz noch zum Teil einer anderen Stelle im Rahmen eines Prüfungsverfahrens 
vorgelegt oder veröffentlicht worden, noch ist sie zur Veröffentlichung eingereicht.  
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